ML20042B695
| ML20042B695 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1982 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1064, NUDOCS 8203250543 | |
| Download: ML20042B695 (43) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS I) 4 g
5 Sheraton, Motor Inn R
Brooks Avenue h
6 Rochester, New York Friday, March 19th, 1982 g
7 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor 8
Nj Safeguards was convened at 8:30 a.m.
9 i
h 10 PRESENT FOR THE ACRS:
E E
11 W.
M.
Mathis, Chairman David C.
Fischer, Member d
12 Raymond F.
Fraley, Member Chester P.
Siess, Member
(]) l 13 Harold Etherington, Member m
Ivan Catton, Consultant E
14 Dale Fitzsimmons, Consultant wh!
15 PRESENT FOR THE NRC STAFF:
5 16 Allen Wang Bill Russell i
17 Jim Lyons 5
4 18 PRESENT FOR THE RG &
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19 Robert Mecredy Arthur Morris a
20 Bruce Snow Richard Watts 21 22
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4 (2) 24;l 25 {
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IND EX
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SPEAKERS:
PAGE NUMBER:
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4 Chairman Mathis
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e 5
Robert Mecredy 4
0 6
Robert Witmer 5
9 7
Richard Watts 6
s j
8 Lee Lang 19 dd 9
Bruce Snow 21 10 Jim Lyons 23 E
h 11 Raymond Fraley 30 m
j 12 Arthur Morris 31 3
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13 George Daniels 32 h
14 Dr. Ivan Catton 34 5
2 15 Dale Fitzsimmons 39 E
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24 25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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2 CHAIRMAN MATHIS:
The meeting will now come to 3
order.
This is a continuation of the Meeting of the
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4'
'visory Committee on Reactor Safeguards subcommittee on S
I' Reactor Operations at the Rochester Gas & Electric -
0 Ginna Plant.
9*E 7
I am W.
Mathis, Subcommittee Chairman.
3 k
0 The other ACRS Members present today are H.
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9 Etherington on my'left; and Consultants Dr.
I.
Catton and o
10 D.
Fitzsimmons.
e 11 We also have with us today, Mr. Ray Fraley, who B
Y I2 is the Executive Director of ACRS.
13
(])
The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the l
14 Systematic Evaluation Program as applied to Ginna and the h
15 Steam Generator Tube failure and the Inside Emergency z
E I6 failure on January 5th.
e i
17 The meeting is being conducted in accordance with i
h I0 the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and P"
19 j
g the Government and Sunshine Act.
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20 Davis Fischer on my right is the Designated 21 Government Employee for the meeting.
The rules for partici-22
{])
pation in today's Committee Meeting have been announced as 23 l part of the Notice for this meeting previously published 24
{])
in the Federal Register on March the 1st, l'982.
25 i The transcript of the meeting is being kept.
It ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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4 is requested that each speaker first identify himself or 1
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herself and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so 2
3 that it can be readily heard.
We have received no requests for oral statements
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4 from members of the public.
However, as of this morning, c
5 A
d 6
we have received questions from a spokesman of the Rochester e
R Safe Energy Alliance which we will consider as part of our j!
7 s
j 8
deliberations.
I haven't had time to really look at the dd 9
questions in detail, but I am sure that we will attempt to 5
g 10 answer some of them in our discussions this morning.
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11 I think with that introduction, if there is a
j 12 nothing more, then we will proceed with the meeting.
I
(]) 1 13 will call on Bob Mecredy of Rochester Gas and Electric to y
14 start out.
Bob.
2 15 MR. MECREDY:
Good morning. I am Bob Mecredy, s
16 Manager of Nuclear Engineering at Rochester Gas & Electric.
3 A
p 17 This morning we would like to begin by addressing the l
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18 radiological aspects of the Steam Generator Tube rupture 5
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19 incident.
Rick Watts, our Corporate Health Physicist, 5
20 will discuss this area.
21 Lee Lang will then address the various ways that 22 we will be communicating our investigations of this inci-
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23 l dent to the rest of the Nuclear Industry and the public.
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24 This will conclude our discussion of the incident itself.
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25 l Following a break, we will discuss our Steam i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Generator operating history, the results of the recent O
2 inspections and our analysis, testing and repair programs.
3 Our legal counsel would now like to make a state-()
4 ment about this latter portion of the meeting at thi.e g
5 time.
0 6l MR. WITMER:
Mr. Chairman, I am Bob Witmer with R
7 the Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle Law Firm in Rochester, sj 8
New York, representing Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation d
m; 9
We have recently learned from the news media and ag 10 other sources that several litigations requesting extra-E j
11 ordinary potential monetary claims against our company and a
j 12 Westinghouse Corporation has been filed in the Federal
(]) c 13 District Court in Buffalo.
l 14 That pending litigation, which the company has g
15 not yet had the opportunity to evaluate, directly involves
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matters relating to causes of the Steam Generator Tube A
17 rupture and may pose potential, serious impacts on our
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M 18 rate pares and investors.
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19 The Company has a longstanding policy of not n
20 commenting in public on matters subject to litigation.
21 Nonetheless, the Company wishes to cooperate with the
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Committee and we believe the Federal Advisory Committee 22 23 Act provides, in the form of closes sessions, a mechanism 24 to do so today.
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i 25 Therefore, we recuest the Committee to close that i
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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6 j
portion of today's meeting dealing with the Steam Generator
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2 pursuant to your authority to do so under the Act.
3 CHAIRMAN MATHIS:
Okay.
Let's take that under
(])
4 advisement.
That is a little bit on down the road as far e
5 as our agenda is concerned.
3 N
4 6
I would like to take a break when we address e
h that.
Before we address it, in the meantime, however, if 7
4 I
8 there are questions that are raised that you feel are n
d a
9 applicable to your concern here, then just say so and we i
h 10 will move on.
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11 In order to keep the meeting on schedule, how-d 12 ever, we have got a tight schedule today.
Unfortunately, Ea d
13 a lot of people have to catch airplanes shortly after s
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14 noon.
We recognize your wish, a
2 15 However, we will have to take a caucus here a n
j 16 little later on to consider it.
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I'7 MR. WITMER:
Thank you.
E 18 CHAIRMAN MATHIS:
But that has no bearing on Fe
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19 the radiological consequences that Mr. Watts was about to 5
20 present; is that correct?
21 MR. WITMER: Yes, that is correct.
22 CHAIRMAN MATHIS:
Okay. Very good.
Let's proceed 23 with that then.
24 MR. MECREDY:
Okay.
Fine.
Mr. Watts.
I 25 MR. WATTS:
Good morning.
My name is Richard ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
7 1
Watts.
I am Corporate Health Physicist for Rochester Gas
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2
& Electric Corporation.
3 My purpose is to discuss the radiological qspects 4
of the Ginna Steam Generator Tube rupture event which
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e 5
occurred on January 25th.
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Mr. Lee Lang yesterday provided an overview of R
7 the overall functions and the staffing of the on-site
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Technical Support Center and the off-site Emergency dd 9
Operation Facility. (Slide)
Yg 10 Our emergency plan organzation includes pro-3l il visions for radiological dose assessment to be performed a
g 12 out initially at both the Technical support Center and the E
13 Emergency Operation Facility when both organizations are
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2 15 The procedure for this is to have the Technical 5
g' 16 Support Center begin by having lead responsibility for s
g 17 dose projection and survey team direction with the off-site i
M 18 Emergency Operation Facility serving as technical backup.
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19 Then once the proper flow of communications and i
M 20 adequate staffing is achieved at the Emergency Operation 21 Facility, the Emergency Operation Facility dose assessment 22 can assume part or all responsibility for off-site (q
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23 radiological assessment.
24 This arrangement allows the Plant Radiological 25 Assessment group, TSC, to focus its attention more closely ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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on in-plant concerns.
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2 In fact, this overall arrangement for radiologic-3 al assessment was used during the January 25th Ginna
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4 emergency, and it worked well.
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The Technical Support Center was activated at 9
d 6
about 9:33 and initiated radiological ausessment efforts e
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7 including dispatching of on-site and off-site monitoring
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teams.
These teams were in the field begir.ning at 10:31.
dd 9
The Emergency Operation Facility Dose Assessment iog 10 group was activated at approximately 10:30.
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11 The Emergency Operation Facility group did B
g 12 assume responsibility for directing mon'.oring teams and 5
(]) y 13 environmental sampling by early afternoon on the 25th and
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l 14 then continued to provide the plant assistance in arranging 2
15 for additional laboratory analysis, maintaining meteor-s j
16 ological monitoring and release assessment.
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17 In addition, radiological and meteorological E
M 18 information was disceminated by direct telephone lines to 5
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19 the NRC, and by a direct hot line to the State of New York, N
20 Wayne and Monroe Counties, t
21 Representatives from the NRC provided helpful 22 radiological support at both the Technical Support Center
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23 and off-site Emergency Operation Facility.
24 '
Representatives from New York State, Wayne and l
25 j Monroe Counties also assisted at the Emergency Operation l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
9 i
Facility.
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2 Environmental sample laboratory analysis was 3
performed by Rocheste'r Gas
&' Electric with assistance by
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4 the NRC mobile laboratory, the laboratory staff at the e
5 J.
A.
Fitzpatrick Plant and the State of New York.
h 6
(Slide)
R 7
I would now like to summarize some of the key A
8 8
data collected during the tube rupture event with regard to d
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off-site radiological consequences.
10 Radionuclides were released from three points in j
11 the Plant:
3 g
12 (1)
The condenser air ejector which is combined 5
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13 with the gland seal exhaust; l
14 (2)
The turbine-driven auxiliary feed pump 2
15 exhaust; E
j 16 (3)
A relief valve on the steam line from the m
6 17 "B"
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18 Two types of releases occurred:
k 19 g
(1)
Noble gases; 1
l 20 (2)
Radiciodines and particulates including 21 tritium.
22 The total release of Noble gases is currently
(])
23 ;
estimated to be approximately between thirty and forty-two 24 currie.
A majority of this amount is estimated to have
(])
25 '
been released via the air ejector and gland seal off-gas ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
10 I
with minor contributions from the turbine-driven auxiliary 2
feedwater pump and safety valve lifting.
3 Now, these estimates were derived from the
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4 response of radioactivity monitors which sample the air 5
g ejector and gland seal' exhaust line.
9 6
(Slide)
R 8
7 Now, this table presents the estimated releases 3
j 8
of radiciodine, radioactive particulates and tritium d
q 9
from the lifting of the safety valve on the "B"
Steam Eg 10 Generator' steam line.
II The release estimates are based upon the radio-sj 12 nuclide concentrations measured in the "B"
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13 immediately following the tube rupture.
m 5
I4 The ranges given reflect the possible associated 15 volume of steam and water mixture, which could have been j
16 relieved through the safety valve.
The calculated radio-M h
I7 logical doses which I will describe in detail in my con-
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18 l
=
c]uding remarks are based upon the upper bound valves P
h I9 shown here and in the previous transparency.
I n
20 (Slide) 21 At the Ginna site, meteorological data are 22
(])
continuously collected by instrumentation on two weather 23 towers.
24 Shown here is the configuration of the 250 foot
(])
25 ;
primary tower located a few hundred feet west of the main I
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
11 k
j plant buildings.
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Ambient weather data are collected at three 2
3 levels, which are displayed in the Control Room and are
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4 available by computer link to the Technical Support e
5 Center and the Emergency Operation Facility.
U 6i The tower has been equipped with redundant R
8 7
instrumentation and backup recorders.
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An additional back up tower is located approxi-do 9
mately half a mile south of the primary tower and is i
k 10 provided with wind speed and direction sensors.
5
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11 Timely an' accurate meteorological data were k
g 12 available to both the Technical Support Center and the h}
13 Emergency Operation Facility Dose Assessnent groups during h
14 the Ginna emergency.
2 15 Weather parameters measured at both towers were x
j 16 consistent, and also were consistent with visible observa-l
^
d 17 tions and survey measurements of the release plume.
18 (Slide)
E[
19 A total of eight Rochester Gas & Electric n
20 survey teams, each consisting of two to three persons were 21 utilized during the Ginna emergency.
22 Six Ginna teams were dispatched from the on-site
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23 !
Emergency Service Center and two additional trained teams 24 were made available from the Emergency Operation Facility l {}
25 l Dose Assessment group.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
12 1
1 The Ginna teams were fully manned and commenced
()
2 their environmental survey routes shortly after 10:30 on 3
January 25th.
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4 The teams were equipped with air samplers, e
5 radiation survey meters, sample containers and communica-6 tions gear.
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R 7
There were seven coordinated survey campaigns a
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conducted by the on-site and off-site teams throughout the dd 9
day on January 25th with confirmatory measurements prin-i O
g 10 cipally of snow deposition continuing on the 26th and the i
g 11 27th of January.
3 y
12 A more detailed pressurized ion chamber survey 5
(]) y 13 and thermoluminescent dose meter collection were performed 3
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l 14 by an Emergency Operation Facility team on January the 2
15 29th and 30th.
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16 (Slide) e l'7 Now, this map shows a large portion of the Ginna i
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5 18 Plant site.
The dotted lines show three designated survey 5
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19 routes for the on-site teams, which were adjusted as n
20 appropriate during the event.
i 21 The numbers "2"
through "7"
shown on the map 22 correspond to the fixed on-site air monitors.
23,
Also, shown to the west of the Ginna Plant l
24 i building is the primary weather tower; and to the east is 25l the on-site Manor House which is always unoccupied.
I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
l 13 1
The closest downwind site boundary during the
()
2 event was about six hundred meters to the southeast.
3 The maximum direct radiation exposure rates 1
()
4 measured by the on-site survey teams are also shown on the e
5 map.
The highest which is three millirem per hour was 6
measured just outside the security fence shortly before 7
noon on the 25th and persisted only a few minutes.
y 8
Now, other readings #.ncluded
.6 millirem per d
q 9
hour measured just after 11:00 o' clock at the approximate a
h 10 location of the on-site air sampler No. 4; E
11 And, also, 1.2 millrem per hour, which was 3
g 12 measured again shortly after 11:00 o' clock at the end of 3
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13 the driveway leading to the Emergency Survey Center shown 14 here also labeled as the " Training Center".
15 Generally on-site readings were a few tenths of f
16 a millirem or less on the plant site.
W d
17 (Slide) 5 18 Now, shown here is the ten-mile region around 5
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19 the Ginna Plant.
Initial off-site survey team measurement s n
20 were made concurrently within a five-mile radius around 21 the plant, west, south and east of the plant, in order 22 to place thermoluminescent dosimeters in the field, and
{)
23 to take measurements confirming the direction of the i
i 24 release plume.
25 Subsequent surveys then focused on the sectors ALDERSON REPORTING ~ COMPANY, INC.
14 lY ng between a southern and eastern direction from the i
1
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g1ene.
off-site thermoluminescent dosimeters placed 3
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4 by the survey teams, which is shown in circles, and other e
5 Rochester Gas & Electric thermoluminescent dosimeters al-
.6 6
ready in place shown by squares; and also approximately 7
eighteen thermoluminescent dosimeters also in place
'nj 8
belonging to the NRC not shown on the map were processed d
c 9
atid showed no radiation exposure above the natural back-5 10 ground.
E 5
11 (Slide) g 12 On this map all numbered locations are intended
~c 13 to designate Rochester Gas & Electric on-site thermolumin-(])
l 14 escent dosimeters including the on-site air monitor 2
15 location shown as triangles.
y 16 Also shown are two thermoluminescent dosimeter l
W d
17 sets belonging to New York State on the western boundary 5
M 18 or western portion of the site and over by Air Monitor 5
19 Logation No.
4.
g n
20 With regard to the Rochester Gas & Electric 21 on-site thermoluminescent dosimeters data, the only indi-22 cation of a measurable thermoluminescent dosimeter
{])
23 ;
exposure, which was 15 millirem above background, was 24 found at Location No. 4 situated about three hundred
{)
25f meters downwind of the plant.
i l
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
i
15 1
Now, these thermoluminescent dosimeters were
()
2 not collected until January 29th and already had three 3
weeks prior field exposure to background.
This location
()
4 corresponds to the approximate center line of the release e
5 plume as determined by meteorological and survey measure-h 6
ments.
R 7
Measurements of direct radiation levels from 8
snow deposition at Location No. 4 indicated that deposition d
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9 on and in proximity to the thermoluminescent dosimeter 10 may have accounted for most, if not all, the dose measured s
5 11 by the thermoluminescent dosimeters between January 25th a
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I 12 and January 29th.
5
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The New York State thermoluminescent dosimeter 13 l
14 located near Location No. 4 was collected in-the early 9-
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15 evening of January 25th. Its reading was -approximately x
g 16 six millirem above background and it too'was probably w
d 17 influenced by local deposition.
E 18 (slide) 5
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19 Air sampling was performed by survey teams who n
20 took readings on air filters in the field and then sent 21 the filters back to the plant for laboratory analysis.
22 In all, about forty air samples were taken on and off-site
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23 Air sampling data are shown in this table as 24 measured by on-site Air Monitor No. 4 to which thermolumin 25 escent dosimeter No. 4 is attached; and from off-site ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
16 1
air samples which were collected and later analyzed in our
()
2 Environmental Lsboratory by gamma spectrometry.
3 For perspective, the potential thyriod dose
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4 commitments associated with the two off-site air measure-g 5
ments would amount to less than 0.2 millirem for an E
l 6
assumed exposure period of six hours.
l R
7 (Slide)
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8 Now, extensive measurements were made of deposit -
0 9
ed activity in snow.
Approximately one hundred samples ze 10 were collected on and off-site.
11 No direct radiation levels from deposited traces W
l g
12 of contamination in snow could be detected off-site as 3
(]) $
13 determined by thermoluminescent dosimeter measurements
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l 14 and surveys using a low level pressurized ion cha2 er.
,2 15 Detectable concentration ranges of measured
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j 16 radiciodine, particulates and tritium are shown in this w
d 17 table. The highest concentrations were found on the 5
18 Ginna Plant rooftop near the point of release; and also l
P h
19 within several yards of the immediate plant structures, n
20 Much of the mostly highly contaminated snow and 21 ice, in fact several thousand cubic feet, has been plowed 22
[])
up and stored in a holding container for radioactive decay 23 :
on site.
l 24
{])
(Slide) l 25
'We have been regularly monitoring both raw and i
l t
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
17 1
treated Lake Ontario water at the nearest public drinking
()
2 water intake, which is located about 1.1 miles east of 3
Ginna.
()
4 Composite samples of the raw water are continu-s 5
ously collected and removed for analysis three times per A
6 week.
No radiactivity levels above background have been R
2 7
detected.
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8 Fish samples collected subsequent to the event 0d 9
hava also shown no detectable radioactivity above back-10 ground.
3l 11 (Slide) 3 y
12 Now, here is a summary of upper bound off-site 5
(]) y 13 dose estimates from the Ginna tube rupture event.
These I
m l
14 are intended as maximum calculated doses from plume 2
15 exposure and potentia ingestion pathways and are based g
16 upon the upper ranges of radionuclide releases which I A
b' 17l l
y presented earlier.
18 We.are now in the process of refining our 5
h 19 off-site dose estimates as part of our overall evaluation n
20 of the Ginna incident and we expect the more realistic 21 dose values to be well under these upper bound values.
(])
Now, this conclusion is supported by our 22 23l en'vironmental measurements to date.
These upper bound 24 values include exposure from the plume via inhalation and
{)
25 l direct exposure to the whole body and skin, the highest i
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
18 1
of these values being eight millirem to the thyroid.
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2 Through potential ingestion pathways of drinking 3
water and fish, we have evaluated the upper bound of
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4 whole body and thyroid, whoh body dose from drinking water g
5 and whole body dose from fish.
The highest of those 9
3 6
values being eight millirem from fish ingestion.
G 8
7 For perspective in the Rochester Area, the s
j 8
natural radiation background is approximately one hundred d
q 9
to one hundred and twenty millirem per year.
These values h
10 are well within the natural background values received
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11 by all residents each year.
3 g
12 Furthermore, even at the levels at eight mill-
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5
(]) f 13 irem thyroid dose or eight milliremwhole body dose, we l
14 are well within the current EUA standards for routine g
15 operations.
m j
16 Now, these levels of dose are also orders of w
d 17 magnitude below the EPA protective action guidelines for l
5
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18 nuclear emergency situations.
A h
19 What is important is that our total radiological n
20 assessment program during the Ginna emergency worked well 21 and enabled us to know where we are with respect to these 22
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guidelines.
23 ;
Having timely and comprehensive environmental $
24 measurements insures that the correct measures were taken 25 at all times to protect the health and safety of the public ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
19 1
Thank you.
()
2 CHAIRMAN MATHIS: Does Enyone have any questions 3
for M~r. Watts?
O 4
(No response) 5 CHAIRMAN MATHIS:
I guess there are no questions g
6 Thank you.
3 7
Mr. Lang is our next speaker on the agenda.
Mr.
3l 8
Lang is next on our agenda.
d 9
MR. LANG:
My name is Lee Lang.
I am the o
10 Superintendent of Nuclear Production at Fochester Gas, &
e E
k II Electric.
I I2 (Slide) 3 13 At this time I would like to tell you some of
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14 the methods we plan on using and already have used to g
15 disseminate the information-to the Nuclear Industry and u
d 10 the general public.
w d
17 Basically, we started out by sending a chronology 5
5 18 of the events through the note pad industry system.
We 5
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19 also have made presentations to the Westinghouse owners' n
20 group.
21 We have also participated with the NRC in their^0 22 review.
The NRC also sent down an inquiry team covering
)
23 ;
the various aspects of the incident and their information 24 will be released in the near future.
25 We also had at the plant an INPO review team, I
1 f
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1 20 I
which just refinished their review and they covered O
2i various aspeces of the incident.
That repore w111 a1so h, 3
released sometime in the near future.
O 4
weseinehouse is conductine an interna 1 review of e
5 the incident.
That will also be released through their h
3 6
release mechanism also sometime in the near future.
R 7
A presentation will be made to the Edison j
8 Electric Institute thro' ugh the Nuclear Operations Committee d
d 9
late in April where it will be disseminated through the i
h 10 Nuclear Industry.
aj 11 Sometime early this Summer, a presentation will isj:
12 be made to the American Nuclear Society and its membership S
13 of the Ginna incident.
l 14 We also plan and have already conducted one 15 Public Meeting in Wayne County where members of the public j
16 were asking questions concerning the incident.
s 6
17 Also, a meeting is planned to be conducted in 5
}
18 Monroe County in the near future which will be an open E
19 g
Public Meeting.
n 20 Basically, that is the method that we have used 21 and will be using to send information to the public and to 22 the Nuclear Industry.
Are there any questions?
23 CHAIRMAN MATHIS:
Yes.
From the standpoir t of 24 feedback to these 'rarious groups, apparently you have that 25 planned reasonably well.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l 21 l
let me pose 1
However, from a timing standpoint 2
a specific and then get your reaction to that.
3 From a procedure standpoint, and I think that
()
4 Mr. Morris mentioned yesterday that these are being e
5 reviewed, but will that be again reviewed by the owners' b
3 6
Group and INPO b.efore you implement changes in your pro-9 8
7 cedure or how do you propose to handle that type of, shall 3l 8
I say, an adjustment or fine tun'ing or whatever?
d d
9 MR. SNOW:
Bruce. Snow, Superintendent of the 10 Ginna Station.
The Owners' Group meetings that Art Morris 3
h 11 has been attending, he is feeding back some of the 3
12 recommendations that we have learned and they are under
'j j ()
13 their consideration at this moment.
They will be con-l 14 sidered over the next series of maetings that the Owners' 15 Group meeting will have.
16 As far as INPO, I can't respond for INPO's g
i d
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17 plant.
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18 MR. MECREDY:
I am Bob Macredy from Rochester E
19 Gas & Electric.
Immediately following the incident, we 20 did have two representatives from Westinghouse up at the l
21 site.
We did review with them and send back with them
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22 information from the incident.
23,
We have looked at our procedures.
We are i
24
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implementing some near term changes in those procedures, 25 l and some changes have been reviewed by the appropriate ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
22 1
Westinghousa people.
They have concurred in our changes.
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2 Now, those changes have been reviewed already 3
with the Westinghouse Owners' Group, first, with the
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4 Owners' Group Subcommittee and in addition with the full e
5 Owners' Group specifically several weeks ago.
A 6l The longer term changes will be reviewed, those G
7 requiring additional analysis or additional reviews.
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8 Those reviews will be' conducted by the Westinghouse d
d 9
Owners' Group. There will be feedback to us and feedback 10 to the rest of the Westinghouse utilities.
5l 11 Now, the. reports that we will be submitting in k
j 12 the near future will contain discussions of the near term
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13 procedure changes that we will have accomplished prior to 14 starting up a rationale for those changes.
We have been E
2 15 working with our supplier.and with the other utilities, s
j 16 the Westinghouse utilities, on what we see is the changes x
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l 18 CllAIRMAN MATHIS:
These will also be discussed 5
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n 20 MR. MECREDY:
Yes.
21 CHAIRMAN MATHIS:
Okay. Fine. Does anybody else
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have any questions for Mr. Lang at this time?
22 23 !
(No response) 24 CHAIRMAN MATHIS:
Thank you, Mr. Lang.
25 j MR. LANG:
Thank you.
i 1
I Ai DERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
23 1
CHAIRMAN MATHIS:
Next I would like to call on 2
the Staff to basically give us any information that you 3
have as far as procedures are concerned.
I guess specific-
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4 ally the question has been raised about the pumps on, s
5 pumps off, that sort of situation.
6 Now, Jim, are you prepared to field that one?
~n d
7 MR. LYONS:
Good morning.
My name is Jim Lyons.
'nj 8
I am with the NRC Division Of Licensing.
I am the d
c; 9
Licensing Project Manager for the~Ginna Station.
5 0
10 Immediately after the accident at Three Mile
_E 11 Island, keeping the Reactor Coolant Pumps running during k
small break loss of coolant accident LOCA was considered y
12 a
(])
13 to be the preferred mode of operation.
mg 14 Bulletins79-05A, 79-06A and 79-063 were issued 15 immediately after the accident and instructed the operator s g
=
g of PWR's to keep the pumps running in the event of high 16 w
(
17 pressure injection actuation.
f18 Subsequently, on June 5, 1979, the staff re-P g
quested that the industry analyze certain postulated 19 n
20 accident sequences including small break loss of coolant 21 accidents to better understand the effects of RCP opera-
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22 tion.
23 In July 1979, Babcock and Wilcox informed the 24 staff that delayed trip of the Reactor Coolant Pump
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25 during a small break, LOCA can lead to predicted fuel ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
24 I
cladding temperatures in excess of current licensing 2
limits.
3 Soon after that, Combustion Engineering and 4
Westinghouse made similar determinations.
Babcock and a
5 Wilcox advised their customers to trip Reactor Coolant b
6 Pumps in the event of reactor trip and safety injection 7
actuation due to low system pressure.
The staff then 7.j 8
issued revised Bullatins confirming vendor guidance tio d
o; 9
trip Reactor Coolant Pumps early.
10 The staff studied the problem as part of post-Il TMI Task Force activities including meetings with the s
j 12 ACRS.
Recommendations for further study were included in O j 13 the TMI Action Plan, NUREG - 0660.
l 14 The relationship between steam bubble dynamics 15 and Reactor Coolant Pump operation has received considdr-j 16 able staff attention since TMI.
There have been tests v5 h
I7 in both Loft and semi-scale to study the effects of pump f18 operation on bubble dynamics.
E g
We have required holders of ECCS evaluation 19 n
20 models to predict the experimental behavior of the Loft 21 pumps on/ pumps off experiments.
O 22 As a resu1t of this action, improvements were 23 made in the models.
We now regard them as acceptable for O
24 ev tu tias 91 at re von =e to ne otor coot at "u=9 25 '
operation during small break LOCA's and other system l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
25 1
transients that shrinks the liquid volume of the primary O
2 system.
3 Pursuant to the TMI Action Plan, the staff 4
initiated a comparative failure probability study in order a
5 to evaluate the merits of automatic versus manual action A
h 6
for RCP trip during a small break LOCA.
d 7
The study was recently completed and is being 4
j 8
evaluated.
We hope to have a solutica to this particular d
c; 9
aspect of the problem later this Spring.
z h
10 We also intend to establish criteria by which i
j 11 continued operation of the pump for other depressurization k
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12 events, for example, some overcooling events and Steam 13 Generator Tube rupture woald be allowed.
This information l
14 will be incorporated into the ongoing staff review of 2
15 Emergency Operator Guidelines and Procedures.
g 16 On March 24, 1982 at Albuquerque, New Mexico A
f I7 the staff will discuss with ACRS-ECCS Subcommittee our
=
18 criterion for Reactor Coolant Pump trip and solicit their E
39 8
input.
20 Additionally, it is planned that in April 1982 21 the staff will issue a letter to licensees regarding
()
22 Reactor Coolant Pump trip criterion.
23 ;
Now, as with the Reactor Coolant Pump Trip
()
Guidelines, the TMI accident led to the development of 24 25 a high pressure core injection, HPCI, termination ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
i
26 1
criterion.
The event of this criterion or guideline is
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2 to assure adequate system inventory before terminating 3
emergency core cooling.
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4 The previously referenced IE Bulletins e
5 recommend that reactor operators not terminate high h
6 pressure core injection until a stable pressurizer level R
7 is established and the primary coolant attains 50 F.
A j
8 subcoolingt d
0; 9
The 50 F.
subcooling is not a rigorous require-z f
10 ment and it is intended to assure a.small degree of sub-E 11 cooling.
g 12 To obtain this assurance on certainties in the
(]) 5 13 temperature, instrumentation must be incorporated into the l
14 operator's emergency procedures.
Based upon the accuracy 15 of plant specific instrumentation, some operating plants j
16 have a termination criterion of less than 50 F.
subcooling.
w d
17 '
This is acceptable to the staff.
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18 Now, on the matter of consequences of a Steam P
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20 block valve that closed,that is another aspect that I 21 would like to make a brief statement on.
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The inability to close the block valve to an 22 23 atmospheric dump valve is not typically reviewed when (3
24 analyzing Steam Generator Tube rupture events, u) 25l Present review procedures, for example, Standard W
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
27 1
Review Procedures require the asJessment of the limiting
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single failure during postulated events.
2 3
The need to close a block valve automatically
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4 assumes a failure of the dump valve to seat.
As a result, e
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6 and is, therefore, not required by present review pro-R 7
cedures.
sj 8
The staff does nct presently intend to require d
d 9
multi-failures for licensing evaluations.
10 However, such events may.be addressed during 11 the review of Operator Guidelines and Procedures.
m j
12 CHAIRMAN MATHIS:
Thank you, Jim.
Any questions 5
- ( ) y 13 for Jim?
m h
14 (No response) 15 okay.
I have one.
The question of thermal j
16 shock keeps coming up, the limitations on repressurization s w
d 17 as far as the pumps on and pumps off situation, Jim, E
18 would you care to comment on that at all?
5 h
19 MR. LYONS:
I don't have any first-hand knowledge n
20 on that myself.
I know that there is a continuing review 21 of that though.
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22 CHA_'RMAN MATHIS : That is the generic item.
l 23 MR. LYONS:
Yes, that is the generic item and 1
I
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it was addressed in a meeting last week or the week before 24 25l last.
It was addressed in Bethesda.
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
28 CHAIRMAN MATHIS:
Anything else?
j 2
(No response) 3 Okay.
Thank you, Jim.
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4 We have one other question I guess for Rochester e
5 Gas & Electric.
Ray.
6 MR. FRALEY:
In the cool down and in the re-R d
7 pressurizations, and the blow downs and what have you 3j 8
that occurred during the incident, did you excede any dc 9
cool down rates or limits that'had been established by 10 Westinghouse on the pressure veseel or.other parts of the Ej 11 primary -cooling system or were you able to keep those s
y 12 things within acceptable ranges?
E
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Well, our technical specifications a
l 14 contain a limit on the cool down rate of a hundred degrees 2
15 per hour..
The cool down rate on the loop containing the 5
y 16 faulty Steam Generator did contain or its did excede that w
d 17 one hundred degrees an hour.
5 5
18 The cool down rate was well in excess of that.
=
f 19 The cool down rate on the "A"
Steam Generator, the "A"
n 20 loop was slightly in excess of a hundred degrees por 21 hour2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br />.
22 One set of data would indicate about a hundred
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23 and twelve degrees for an hour's period of running 24 approximately at 9:30 in the morning to approximately
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25l 10:30 in the morning.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l 29 1
./estinghouse has completed for us a preliminary
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2 evaluation of the potential impact on the safety ingestion 3
not
'u, the reactor vessel inlet nozzle, and the reactor
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4 vessel itself and it is shown that cool down was of no p
5 consequence in either case.
9 3
5 The analysis is continuing at this point.
%y 7
MR. FRALEY:
How about with respect to n'
j 8
repressurizations, do y'ou or Westinghouse plan to change d
d 9
any of your operating procedures as a result of that 10 consideration or haven't you gotten to that point yet.
j 11 MR. MECREDY:
We haven't gotten to that point 3
y 12 yet.
However, one plant design feature that is different 5
(]) {
13 than the more generic design is that our high pressure l
14 saf ety inj ecture pumps have a lower shutof f lead on the 2
15 order of 1,500 to 1,300 PSI.
j 16 In our design it is impossible to repressurize s
6 17 i to the levels in those plants with the charging pumps i
a b
18 used as the safety ingestion pumps so we are perhaps a 5
h 19 special case.
n 20 MR. PRALEY:
Okay.
f 21 MR. ETHERINGTON:
The one hundred degrees per 22 hour2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> is a normal startup and cool down.
In a transient,
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23,
the duration is more important than the rate.
Wh3t is l
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the maximum temperature change during this period?
24 25 !
MR. MECREDY:
Over the short term and the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l l
30 1
"B" loop, the initial temperature or the average tempera-O 2
eure at hoe fu11 gewer is on the order oc svo degrees.
3 In the "B"
loop, RTD cold leg indication dropped O
4 to.on the order of 250 to 300 degreee, end ehen increased 5
later in the transient as Reactor Coolant Pumps were e
h 3
6 restarted and so forth.
The system tended to equali::e.
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MR. ETHERINGTON:
That was of what length of j
8 time?
d ri 9
MR. MECREDY:
That was within the first hour.
10
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loop it.Jas a continuously n
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The rate of change in the Q
13 temperatures within the first hour decreased by a hundred m
l 14 degrees and continued to decrease throughout the rest of 15 the period of time.
y 16 MR. ETHERINGTON:
Thank you.
- ,5 6
17 MR. FRALEY:
With respect to the double forma-
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18 tion, I know in some recent evaluations that the staff i:
19 has asked that this be considered in the Operating g
n 20 Procedures.
Was that covered in your Operating Procedures 21 or do you intend to deal with that or how do you plan to 22 handle this bubble problem in the future?
Q 23; In other words, are you going to try to pressur-24 ize the plant so that you don't get a bubble or are you 25 going to learn to live with it?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
31 MR. MECREDY:
Perhaps Mr. Morris can answer 1
2 that.
3 MR. MORRIS:
Ferhaps you can ask the question
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e 5
MR. FRALEY:
Well, the question was with respect b
the void that occurred in the upper head of the 6
to R
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pressure vessel during the transient.
I presume that
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there are several choices.
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9 For example, you can keep the system pressure 10 higher and try to avoid that sort of thing or you can j
11 learn to live with that or you can instruct your operators 3
y 12 to be on the lookout for it, et cetera.
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h 14 MR. MORRIS:
Well, we are going to take a look 2
15 at the long-term cool down view of this kind of a j
16 transient and handle it with natural cir.culation.
We e
d 17 are going to basically say with all of the proper pre-5 18 cautions how we are going to handle it with the void in 5
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19 [
the upper head.
n 20 Also, you learn to live with it when you look 21 at the oth,'r things.
We are going to basically look st 22 both situc. ions, that is, how it is that you can get rid
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23 of it, if possible, and learn to live with it, if i
24 possible.
25 MR. FRALEY:
I presume that you are going to ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
32 i
leave your thermocouple in the upper head which were
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2 useful.
Have you thought any more about installing some 3
other kind of pressure level, measurement in the pressure
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4 vessel?
e 5
MR. MORRIS:
I think that we have looked at that k
6 However, I think that one of these other gentlemen can R
a 7
answer it better than I can.
Ml 8
MR. DANIELS:
My name is George Daniels.
I am dd 9
the Electrical Engineering Manager for Rochester Gas &
10 Electric.
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11 For the past two years, as a matter of fact, a
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4
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14 ent technologies associated with vessel level measurement.
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16 wave, differential pressure and heating injecture thermo-s d
17 couples.
M 18 In our opinion at the present time the most A
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20 injecture thermocouple.
There are some technological 21 tradeoffs.
It does not have some of the advantages that 22 the differential pressure has, for instance, full pressure
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23 vessel capab9ity.
24 On the other hand, it does have added benefits
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25 in terms of being able to supply direct temperature ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
33 1
measurement as well as level measurement which in certain
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situations may in fact be as valuable or more valuable 2
3 than the actual level.
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4 I do think that it needs to be kept in mind that e
5 vessel level itself is not a precise concept.
The liquid h
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gas interface in severely disrupted pressure vessels would R
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not be a nice, neat physical barometer; so, therefore, 3j 8
we have to look at the conditions that are occurring in dd 9
the core and what effect those conditions would have on 10 any type of instrumentation.
E 11 The state of the technology right now is still B
y 12 developmental.
The primary problems associated with
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16 and the shroud that encloses it.
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5 18 which is inserted within the pressure vessel, therefore, 5
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21 MR. FRALEY:
Do you have any idea when you 22 will make a decision with respect to this instrumentation?
l
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l 23 MR. DANIELS:
No, sir, I don't, firsthand.
24 MR. FRALEY:
Are you considering any other
)
25 instrumentation as a result of this incident that you i
l
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
34 1
might want to put in the plant?
2 MR. DANIELS:
Sir, do you mean directly with 3
respect to vessel level or generally?
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4 MR. FRALEY:
Generally.
5 MR. DANIELS:
Well, we have ongoing programs g
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6 with respect to a wide variety of instrumentation, most R
7 of which actually started before the incident. We are s
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using the experience, however, that we gained ir. the dc 9
incident to feed back into our designed programs.
10 We have a major program underway to develop a 3=
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y 12 system utilizing digital computers to establish a quick
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l 14 w-e have other instrumentation systems associated l
15 with radiological measurement and other supp.orting instru-
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17 present time.
h 18 MR. FRALEY:
But these are long-term programs I
5" l
g not resulting specifically from this incident?
19 n
20 MR. DANIELS:
No, sir, these are longer term.
I 2I MR. FRALEY:
Thank you.
22 DR. CATTON:
Is the SPDES concept a subset of
(])
23 the data acquisition system and display system which we 1
(])
are calling a Safety Display System?
Would there be any 24 I
I changes as a result of this incident or have your ideas 25 1
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
35 1
as to what they ought to do have they changed?
O 2
MR. DANIELS:
Well, I went through and witnessed 3
a simulation of a Steam Generator Tube rupture just to 4
evaluate the response of the SAS System. It was because g
our tube rupture was a fairly classical one that all af 5
a 3
6 the indicators were there and the indication that we had n'
7 on our Safety Assessment System were likewise very clear.
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parameters that would be used for diagnosis were-pretty z
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II DR. CATTON:
Are you referring to the design k
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13 MR. DANIELS:
Indian Point.
14 DR. CATTON:
Indian Point?
$j 15 MR. DANIELS:
Yes.
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I0 DR. CATTON: How did the simulator simulate your W
h I7 accident, was it close?
Did you make a comparison of x
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18 what you saw in your control room and what you see in the A>
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simulator?
n 0
MR. DANIELS: Well, in any simulator, the acci-21 dent simulation is specific to the particular plant.
At Indian Point, the simulator reproduces an accident 22
(])
23 '
postulated on the Indian Point No. 1 System, which is a
(])
four loop system.
There are some differences, but 24 i
25 basically the same as far as parometric response.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
f 36 DR. CATTON:
You did make that comparison then?
j
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2 MR. DANIELS:
In terms of the speed in which 3
the depressurization occurred, they were similar enough
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5 any loss of information.
R 8
6 DR. CATTON: Thank you.
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7 MR. FRALEY: Could I just backtrack just one n'
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moment.
With respect to your high pressure injection d
d 9
system being 1,400 or 1,500 PSI, is that low enough so Y
10 that you don't expect you would have any repressurization 2
11 problem throughout the vessel's life or just at this j
k j
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l 14 MR. MECREDY:
Well, we would expect that when 9
15 the analyses are finished, and specifically for Ginna g
16 Station, that it would apply throughout the life.
W d
17 l MR.FRALEY:
Okay.
Just one other thing.
I M
18 guess that we might have hit on this yesterday a little 5
l
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5 20 Do you feel that there is any point in the 21 transient when you might not have turned on your IIPCI 22 if you had better instrumentation or different operating
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23,
procedures or do you think that you operate it about
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the way that you would have in the future in terms of 24 25j operating the high pressure injection system?
I l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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MR. MECREDY:
Are you saying turned them on?
J 2
MR. FRALEY:
Yes, or off.
3 MR. MECREDY:
Or off?
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4 MR. FRALEY:
Yes.
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5 MR. MORRIS:
Well, as far as turning them on Ej 6,
or off, do you mean because of some other instrumentatien R
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8 MR. FRALEY:
As a result of the accident, do dd 9
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11 making those decisions?
m j
12 MR. MORRIS:
In turning high pressure injection 5
O s ia on or ore 2 m
14 MR. FRALEY:-
Turning high pressure injection on b
2 15 or off.
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16 MR. MORRIS:
Well, the procedures have been w
p 17 changed to date to add some additional guidance or helps 5
18 along the way.
If there is any question in anyone's mind 5
{
19 during the handling of the transient relative to high a
20 pressure injection starts and stops, so, yes, procedurally 21 we are going to address that.
All of the information was
{])
22 already there.
These are just additional notes that will 23 l help them in making the decision.
24
()
As far as instrumentation goes, however, I think 25 i that remains to be seen.
If we are talking about reactor ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
i 38 1
vessel level indications, there is not enough experience
()
2 with it now nor has it been tied to how does it look 3
during the transient.
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4 I don't know enough to be able to tell if it e
5 is going to fit into the high pressure injection criteria 6
or readmission criteria.
It may not fit into either.
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7 really don't know that right today.
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8 In fact, I don't know if anyone else does.
If d
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they do, please speak up.
g 10 MR. FRALEY:
What were the nature cf the changes 3j 11 in your operating procedures?
Did you tell them to turn 3
y 12 it off faster or later or what?
l
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It wasn't a necessarily time l4 dependent turn-on and turn-off.
It was an additional aid E
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17 '
If there was any decision-making points, it was s
18 tried to clarify them right there in the procedure so P
h 19 there would be no question in anyone's mind about whether n
20 or not they wanted to or didn't want to turn them off or 21 on.
({}
22 MR. FRALEY:
Okay.
Thank you.
23 MR. ETHERINGTON:
This is a change of procedures 24 with no additional information with oral input; is that
(}
25 right?
i l
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
39 1
MR. MORRIS: This is a change of procedure only O
2 from a note standpoint.
3 DR. CATTON:
It is as a result of having had
()
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4 g
5 MR. MORRIS:
Yes, that is correct, and all of 9
6 the questions that people have during the transient in R
7 their own minds and the ones that they verbalize.
Mj 8
MR. FITZSIMMONS:
Were the established proced-d c
9 ures followed throughout, that is, was there any incon-10 sistencies in the procedures themselves?
E j
11 MR. MORRIS:
No.
The procedural guidance was 3j 12 used and it was adequate to the situation. However, it
()
13 just doesn't answer everybody's questions. They don't know h
14 all of the background analysis.and all of those things, 15 for instance, if some different things hapnen like the j
16 power operator relief valves not closing..
There are w
h 12 some other things that have to be answered in the 18 operator's mind specific to that situation that he needs 5
19 g
to deal with right then.
n 20 MR. FITZSIMMONS:
There was mention made yester-21 day about some ambiguities in perhaps not these proced-ures, but I believe that they were referred to in these
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22 23 procedures, some of these procedures as well as perhaps
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others that are being attended to.
Are you reviewing 24 I
25 l essentially all of the emergency procedures for those i
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l 40 1
ambiguities?
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2 MR. MORRIS:
To date I haven't personally looked 3
through all of them to see if this particular one apolies
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However, this tube rupture is such a unique e
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3 6
others.
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This one deals with as far as handling the M]
8 event SI termination and in general the rest of them a
c 9
don't.
Secondary side break is the exception.
You term-i h
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11 MR. FITZSIMMONS:
That tended to be the k
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- p l
l-4 MR. FRALEY:
Do you plan to look at more than 2
15 one tube rupture?
j 16 MR. MORRIS:
We don't, but the, Westinghouse A
6 17 people do and already have. They will be coming out with 18 a set of procedures.
The next set of procedures that 5
~
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19 appears on the street, they will be multiple Steam M
20 Generator, Steam Generator addressed.
21 MR. FRALEY:
Do you know how-many?
22 MR. MORRIS:
How many tubes?
(")%
23,
MR. VOLP ENHEIT :
How many tubes?
(N 24 i MR. FRALEY:
Yes.
()
f 25 i MR. VOLPENHEIN :
Well, they will address if all i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
41 1
of them ruptured.
When you get beyond ten of them, the 2
system is essentially the same.
We have analyzed up to 3
twenty.
4 Our analysis capabilities have been limited to e
5 analyzing the multiple Tube Generator and one Steam 6l:
Generator.
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7 up to all Steam Generators.
'nj 8
CHAIRMAN MATHIS:
Well, I think that we are d
9 9
getting off into some generic questions which have come 10 up many times among the owners' groups.
I think that 11 from here on we are going to get into a discussion of a
N_
12 matters which Mr. Witmer has referred to earlier.
() d 13 In order to follow along in our responsibilities h
14 I am now going.to ask that the proceedings from here on 15 will be closed.
We will take a break.
Only those persons y
16 who are either associated with ACRS or the licensee, w
17 Rochester Gas and Electric, will be permitted in the room.
E 18 So, with that we will take a fifteen-minute P
h 19 break.
l n
20 (Whereupon, at 9:50 R.M.,
the proceedings 21 were concluded.)
l CJ 22 23 (2) 24 l 25 l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
NUCLEAR REGUMTORY COMMISSION This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the j Nuclear nenulatory commission Advisorv Committee on Reactor Safeguards in the matter of:
Date of Proceeding:
March 19th, 1992 Docket. Ilumber:
Place of Proceeding:
Rochester, New York were held.as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file-of the Commission..
RICHARD J.
KLAK Official Reporter (Typed)
M xd/
0 icial Rep r (Sienature)
.