ML20042A163
| ML20042A163 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1982 |
| From: | Wolfe S Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8203230162 | |
| Download: ML20042A163 (3) | |
Text
-
e
t.s 7 y -
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULA'IORY COMMISSION
'82 NM 19 P2:05 i.
Saw MARS 0lSB2
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-382-OL U11ISIANA PGCR AND LIGTT COMPANY
)
)
~
(Waterford Steam Electric Station,
)
March 18, 1982 Unit 3)
)
p
)
RECElVED 9
k-2 MM 2 P,1982* Z
(
m rrst tr:La"W h MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
- cca wwx;;u j[s
[
MEMORANDUM (r3 l
The Board has reviewed Board Notification 82-18, dated March 2,1982, from Tbbert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing, Division of Licensing. W e second item thereof, Feed and Bleed Capability, is of great concern to this Board. We note that the NRC Staff is continuing its evaluation of this issue arti will issue a supplement to the Waterford SER. At this time, however, we cannot presume that this issue will be resolved to the Board's satisfaction.
W mst raise this issue sua sconte.
Our reasons for raisina this issue are as follows:
'Ibe possible vulnerability of the Waterford 3 steam supply system to failures in the Emergency Feedwater System was brought to our attention by the ACRS Report on Palo Verde dated, December 15, 1981. W is report pointed out that the Palo Verde plant does not include capability for rapid depressurization 1
8203230162 820318 nea PDR ADOCK 05000382 4/.3U o
PDR S,o l
)
. follwing shutdown ard hence a feed-and-bleed backup for the EPe:S was not available.
It n w appears that the Waterford 3 plant shws this design deficiency.
We note in the Staff's Supplemental Safety Evaluation for Palo Verde that the Staff has taken the position that the reliability of the EF'.G is so good (failure probability less than 5x10-6) that a backup cooling system is not required.
'Ihis is completely at variance with the reliability estimates of Bowsome and Murphy of the Division of Risk Analysis, which estimate failure probabilities at least 100 times greater than the Palo Verde SSER. 'Ihe ORNL analysis based on analysis of LER's also demonstrates that failures of EEW systems occur frequently.
(See enclosures to BN 82-18).
In light of the above discussion, we believe the issue of
" Feed and Bleed Capability" may have serious safety consequences.
ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is, this 18th day of March, 1982 ORDERED 1.
'Ihat by express mail on April 20, 1982, Applicant and Staff shall, and the Joint Intervenors may, submit written direct testimnies upon the follwing questions which will be heard during the course of the hearing which will be resumed on May 3, 1982:
l
.e
. (a)
Is there any basis for the assumption that the reliability of the Drergency Feedwater System is so high that its failure following a
- s. mall break loss-of-coolant accident is incredible?
(b) Will it be necessary to provide feed-and-bleed backup to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of failure of the EMP systems?
i 2.
Wat, since only the abstract of the ORE report /CR-2497 was enclosed with the Board Notification, copies of the draft report shall be served upon the Board and the parties as soon as is possible.
IOR 'INE A'IOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOMD bd Sheldon J.
fe, Ollirman ADMINISTRAT JUDGE r.-