ML20041E032

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Forwards Rept of Nondisclosure of Safeguards Info by NRC for Period Ending 811231,per Public Law 96-295 of 800630.W/o Encl
ML20041E032
Person / Time
Issue date: 02/12/1982
From: Palladino N
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To: Udall M
HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS
Shared Package
ML20041E022 List:
References
NUDOCS 8203090830
Download: ML20041E032 (17)
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{{#Wiki_filter:, t >S U CQg [g UNITED STATES 3 E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E E WASHINGTON,0.C. 205SS \\...../ 'y$"a,((u"' February 12, 1982 c The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of a report on the non-disclosure of Safeguards Information by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the period ending December 31, 1981. In accordance with Public Law 96-295, of June 30, 1980, this report has been prepared and submitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President of the Senate for referral to the appropriate committees of the Congres,s. Sincerely, hu& Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman

Enclosure:

Report cc: Rep. Manuel Lujan l l f l 8253090030 820212 i RES DE CE PDR t

v to NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION QUARTERLY REPORT ON NON-DISCLOSURE OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of specific types of Safeguards Information. This section also directs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to prescribe such regulations as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information. NRC's regulations implementing Section 147 were published in the Federal Register on October 22, 1981 (46 FR 51718) and are enclosed. The attachment to this report identifies the specific types of information, documents, and reports that are protected from unauthorized disclosure. Section 147 also requires that the NRC report on a quarterly basis the Commission's application during that period of every regulation or order prescribed or issued under this section. As required by Section 147, the following items indicate the type of Safeguards Information withheld from public disclosure under the provisions of the implementing regulations.' This first report covers the period July 1,1980 through December 31, 1981. Subsequent reports will cover the previous three-month period. I. Type of Information Withheld On five occasions information was withheld from public disclosure which identified local law enforcement response capabilities, safe havens for use during safeguards emergencies, and communications shortcomings along particular routes used to ship irradiated nuclear reactor fuel (spent fuel). On one of those occasions the withholding was challenged in court. The NRC's position was upheld by the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (Virginia Sunshine Alliance, et al. v. NRC, No. 81-1381 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 8,1981)). Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of local law enforcement capabilities (LLEA), the safe havens, and the information identifying communications. shortcomings could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public, because public disclosure would significantly increase the likelihood of thef t, diversion, or sabotage of spent fuel shipments. The LLEA response capabilities contain detailed information about the expected timing and extent of LLEA response to an incident or emergency involving a spent fuel shipment. LLEA response is an important aspect of the safeguards l measures required for spent fuel shipments to protect the public, and knowledge of LLEA capabilities could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage i i

_2-attempt. Furthermore, public release of information concerning LLEA capabilities that was obtained in confidence by NRC could reduce the effectiveness of local police with regard to crimes not associated with the shipment. The listing of safe havens could reveal to a potential saboteur an aspect of a licensee's contir.gency planning in case of emergency, as well as potential route vulnerabilities revealed by -the absence of nearby safe havens. Communications shortcomings reveal specific vulnerabilities in the route which could be of significant assistance to a saboteur in planning an attack. Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The NRC makes publicly available spent fuel routes shortly after they have been approved by the NRC. The routes are published . periodical.ly in NUREG-0750, and have also been made available to the public in response to Freedom of Information Act requests. The withholding of information about LLEA response capabilities, safe havens, and communication vulnerabilities does not deny the public basic information about spent fuel transportation, but does leave information gaps for a potential saboteur. The potential saboteur may risk detection in attempting to discover the additional information. On each occasion the documents which contain the withheld information were reviewed on a line-by-line basis to ensure that the minimum amount of information necessary to prevent possible diversion was withheld. II. Type of Information Withheld On two occasions information was withheld from public disclosure which was contained in NRC inspection reports and which identified various details of the physical security system, such as guard procedures, access controls, alarm systems, and record keeping requirements regarding alarm annunciations at licensed facilities. Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of this type of information would significantly increase the likelihood of illegal entry into the facilities and undetected access and removal of special nuclear material. Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The security requirements that a licensee is required to maintain are contained in 10 CFR Part 73 of NRC's regulations. In those two cases, all of the information in the inspection reports, except for the limited Safeguards Information, was made available to the public.

+ 3-The withholding of this type of Safeguards Information does not deny the.public basic information concerning the level of protection afforded material at facilities but does leave information gaps. A line-by-line review was conducted of the documents to ensure that only the minimum amount of information was withheld. III. Type of Information Withheld On one occasion information was withheld from public disclosure which was contained in an NRC inspection report and which identified various details of the physical security system for transportation vehicles such as type of vehicle, armament of guards, and the type of communication equipment used. Unauthorized Disclosure Cou'1d Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of this type of information could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public because public disclosure would significantly increase the likelihood of theft, diversion or sabotage of special nuclear material shipments. Knowledge of the number of guards, quantity and type of armament they have available, and the vehicle's communication capability could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage attempt: Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld All of the information in the inspection report, except for the limited Safeguards Information, was made available to the public. The withholding of this type of Safeguards Information does not deny the public information concerning the provision for safeguarding special nuclear material shipments. A line-by-line review was conducted to ensure that the minimum of information was withheld. IV. Type of Information Withheld On one occasion information was withheld from public disclosure which consisted of the detailed physical security plan for an-NRC licensed university research reactor possessing formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material. Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The physical security plan ~ contained detailed description of measures used to protect the reactor and the highly enriched uranium fuel elements against theft and sabotage. These measures included equipment and procedures used to control access, intrusion detection

e. devices, communications capabilities, and procedures for response to safeguards emergencies. Disclosure of such information would significantly increase the probability of undetected access and removal of special nuclear material, undetected intrusion into the reactor core area, and bypass of forces for responding to an illegal en t ry. _ Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of,Information was Withheld The reactor physical security plan was a document included in a Freedom of Information Act request for 15 categories of information associated with a license renewal. 0f the 15 categories of information requested, the only document withheld was the detailed physical security plan. to the intent of Section 147a(3) of the Act. Release of this documen V. Type of Information Withheld On one occasion inform: tion was withheld from public disclosure which was contained in in NRC investigation report which described details of the physical security plan such as access controls and guard orders used to protect a licensed nuclear power reactor, and contingency security measures employed by the licensee subsequent to the discovery of an abnormal incident. Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact Subsequent to the conclusion of its investigation of the incident, NRC prepared a comprehensive report that set forth details of the event, estimate of potential impact, investigative data, interview summaries, and conclusions. The report also contained a description and as background data, a description of certain nor equipment and procedures. The information was withheld on the-basis that disclosure would significantly decrease the effectiveness of the vital area access control system used to insure that only authorized individuals having work related needs are permitted access to certain sensitive safety-related equipment. Assurance tnat Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld-The remainder of the report was released for public disclosure. The staff believes that withholding the security related data was justified under the provisions of Section 147, and that this information was not necessary in order for the public to assess the cause and impact of the event and the adequacy of the licensee's response to the incident. A detailed line-by-line review of the report was conducted.

4 5 VI. Type of Information Withheld i An Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board's decision and underlying record regarding the Diablo Canyon facility security plan were withheld from public disclosure. The decision and record identified various details of the physical security system, such as the size of the utility's armed response force, communications systems, alarm systems, and the utility,'s 1iaison with local law enforcement authorities. Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have' Adverse Effect The public disclosure of this type of information could increase the prob' ability of unauthorized entry into the facility. This type of information could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage attempt. 1 Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The Commission conducted an adjudicatory proceeding regarding whether the physical security at the Diablo Canyon facility was adequate. Those proceedings were conducted in camera because the hearing focused on specific details of the utility's physical security plan. Intervenors, including California's Governor Brown, and their expert witnesses were given access to the physical security plan after they executed affidavits of non-disclosure. There is a motion pending before the Commission.to release those portions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board's decision which do not contain protectable Safeguards Information. While that motion is being acted upon, the entire decision is being withheld from public disclosure. 4 m n. m.- - --

ATTACHMENT IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC TYPES OF INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE 1. Physical Protection at Fixed Sites Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to the protection of facilities that possess formula quantities of strategic.special nuclear material and power reactors. Specifically: (i) The composite physical security plan for the nuclear facility or site. -(ii) Site specific drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps that substantially represent the final design features of the physical protection system. (iii) Details of alarm system layouts showing location of intrusion detection devices, alarm assessment equipment, alarm system wiring, emergency power sources, and duress alarms. (iv) Written physical security orders and procedures for members of the security organization, duress codes, and ~ patrol schedules. (v) Details of the on-site and off-site communications systems that are used for security purposes. (vi) Lock combinations and mechanical key design. (vii) Documents and other matter that contain lists or locations of certain safety-related equipment explicitly identified in the documents as vital for purposes of physical protection, as contained in physical security plans, safeguards contingency plans, or plant specific safeguards analyses for production or utilization facilities. (viii) The composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or' site. (ix) Those portions of the facility guard qualification and training plan which disclose features of the physical security system or response p.rocedures. (x). Response plans to specific threats detailing size, disposition, response times, and armament of responding forces. O

. O (xi) Size, armament, and dispositon of on-site reserve forces. (xii) Size, identity, armament, and arrival times of off-site forces committed to respond to safeguards emergencies. 2. Physical Protection in Transit Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relative to the protection of shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and spent fuel. Specifically: (1) The composite transpor.tation physical security plan. (ii) Schedules and itineraries for specific shipments. (Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not withhela from public disclosure. Schedules for spent fuel shipments may be released 10 days after the last shipment of a current series.) (iii) Details of vehicle immobilization features, intrusion alarm devices, and communication systems. (iv) Arrangements with and capabilities of local police response forces, and locations of safe havens. (v) Details regarding limitations of radio-telephone communi-cations. (vi) Procedures for response to safeguards emergencies. 3. Inspections, Audits and Evaluations Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to safeguards ins'pections and reports. Specifically: (i) Portions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations,. audits, or investigations that contain details of a licensee's or applicant's physical security system or that disclose uncorrected defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities in the system. Information regarding defects, weaknesses or vulnerabilities may be released after corrections have been made. Reports of investigations may be released after the investigation has been completed, unless withheld pursuant to other authorities, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).

= Ti:!cr.1 b $ter / Vet & No. N / Thursd.y Ortchu :. m1 / P.nio r.nd Repulations pruhihit ihr unnu:horized dsdowic cf fa i!: tics and ; t cist nudtar matnials certain safeguards information 13 NRC required to be pwtreted cr. der 10 CFR licensers or other persons (45 m 6E). Part 73 shou!d be includt d in the The proposed rule was publit.hed in proposed r' le. Upen further review the u response to the provisions of a new Commission has concluded that section 147. SAFECUARDS applicability should be more dosely thTORMATiON of the Atomic Energy related to the si;;nificant cdverse effect Act, as amended. Public comment on the on the health e~nd cafety" standard proposed rule was received from forty-contained in Section 147 t,f the Atomic five groups and organizations as follows: Energy Act, as amended. Accordingly, the scope of the rule has been reduced to apply only to those facilities. nucicar materials, or transport activities for Po-- Auc=t -== which there exists significant potential a M Z *j* y for harm to the public health and safety ss.w. if the nuclear materials or facilities " s M"* - 8 involved are intentionally misused or

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ce.,, damaged.Derefore Safeguards Pm

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Information is limited to information 1 "Ihere were no comments received regarding the physical protection of: from public interest groups or All activities involving formula organizations.. quantities of strategic special nuclear Extensive revisions hav~ been raade material. both irradiated and e to the rule as a result of the comments unitradiated (most of the physical received.The mest significant revisions protection information for activitics include: Involving a formula quantity of Exduding from the scope of the rule unitradiotedstrategic special nuclear 10 CFR Parts 2,50,70, and 73 activities involving less than a formula material would be classified as National. quantity of strategic special nuclear Security Information under to CFR Part Protection of Unclassified Safeguards material (except for spent fuel 95), - Information shipments). Operating power reactors, and AcENcy: Nuclear Regulatory Deleting limit of error ofinventory Spent fuel shipments (but not routes - Commission-difference (LE1D)Infonnation from the and quant!!ies). rule. This separation is generally consistent AcTacN: Final rule. Adding guard qualification and with the overall NRC Policy of graded sumAny:ne Nuclear Regulatory ' training plans as items considered to be safeguards.ne activities that remain Commission is amending its regulations Safeguards Information (those portions under the rule (with certain minor to require NRCheensees and other that disclose facility safeguards exceptions such as non power reactors) perseas to protect undassified features). require protection by armed guards, safeguards Information against Deeming information protection wherees the activities deleted do not. unauthorized disdosure.ne rule systems used by State and local police Appropriate paragraphs of [ 73.21 have establishes requirements and sets forth force adequate to meet regulatory been modified to reflect this scope condibons to be applied by NRC requirements. change. In regard to the second point,

licensees and otherpersons for the Rephrasing [ 2.790(d)(1).

the Commission has de!crmined protect on of undessified Safeguards Not requiring the marking of Information for cperating power. documents more than one year old generict.Ily that infonnation concerning a licensee's or app!! cant's material reactors, spent l'.:el shipments, and stored by licensee contractors. Such control and accounting or physical activities involvmg formula quantities of documents would be marlsed if and ' security program for special nuclear strategic special nudear raatenal* when taken from storage for use, material, not otherwise covered by crFEC71vE DATc: October 211981 for A. Discussion o/ Comments Resulting specifie statutory exemptions ls [l 2.744(e) 2.790'dj[1). 73.2 (ii) and (11). in Changes to PreposedRule . commercial or financial information for. and 7.3.21 (a). (b) and [c)(1). All (1) Reducflon in the Secpc of purposes of Freedom ofInfonnation Act remaining sectie s willbe effective on Applicofion--A number of cornmenters (5 U.S.C. 552) (FO!A) requests. In crder january 20.193.:- suggested that physical protection to reduce both the licensee's and the information for facilities that possess

  • Commission's administrative burden FoA FURTHcR INFCRLtATloN CONTr.CR only special nuclear material oflow associated with licensees applying for a hk Donald J. Wsun. Physical Security strategic significance (Category ID) be withholding driermination for each itent Licensing Branch. DMslon of Safeguards. Office cf Nudear Material deleted from the rule considering the of such information submitted to the small potential hazard of such materials.

NRC under 10 CFR 2.790 b)(1).10 CFR Safety and Esfe;.ards. US. Nuclear Cominenters also suggested that this 2.790(d)(1) has been ame(nded to Regulatory Coru:Ission. Washington, type ofinformation when in the hands of such information confidential D.C. 20555. Phene 301-127-4010. the NRC be withheld from public cocunercia!Information under surn1MENTARY INFontATION: dis ~ closure as commercially valuable exempbon (4) of the FOIA.This Baciground (proprietary)information. The Commission agrees with both continues in effect present procedures for such infermation. On December 23.1953. the Nuclear points. The eriginal det ermina tio.. cf Nine cors= enters supported the .I Ergulatory Co=.luien published for scope was based cn the assumption that retention and/or expansion of comment a preptsed rtIe that would appropriate information pertinent tohl) [ 2.790(d)(1) as no appropriate method

u., Federal Rc;ister / Vol. 46. No. 204 / Thursday. October 22.1tet / Rules and Regulations 51719 for withholding material cont ol and to indicate that any drawing or 1.imit dff. site communication 6ecounting and physical security document that substantially represents information that needs to be protected information not consider.d to be the final design of the physical security to ccmmunications used for security Safeguards Information. There were no system would have to be protected.This purposes. comments to the contrary. change eliminates the need to control Show that portions of any p)Dcletion of Limit of Error of much.of the initialinformation. such as correspondence that contains intentory Difference (LEID) requests for bids. but still requires Safeguards Information would have to Information-A large number of protection of documents that are only be protected., commenters recommended the deletion slightly different from the final version. Remove from the rule and place in of 1.EID information for low enriched (6) Vito/ Area Identification and guidance documents many of the uranium fabrication facilities on the Location-Several commenters noted detailed requirements relative to - basis that this information would not be that the proposed rule might be marking. transmission, and destruction very valuable to a diverter attempting to interpreted as requiring protection of of documents that contain Safeguards steal material within the limits of a information already in public Information. - / statistical alarm threshold. documents, such as in the FSAR. Note in i 2.744(e) the applicability of The Commission agrees and LEID specifically in regard to drawings that criminal sanctions. as well as civil information has been deleted from the showlocations of safety related penalties, for violations of Board orders rule (LEID information for activities equipment.nc rule was therefore pertaining to Safeguards Information; - involving formula quantities of strategic revised to indicate that only drawings or B. Discussion of Comments Not special nuclear material would still be documents that explicitly identify items AcceptedBy the Commission of safety-related equipment as vital for (1) Protection During Ag'ency ~ classified under Part 95). purposes of phys, cal protection are Proceedings-%e adequacy of (3) Addition of Cuord Qualification i cnd Training Plans to the Rule-Ten required to be protected. (Note that the proposed 10 CFR 2.744(e) was comments were receised on this matter. conte'nt of Appendix E has now been questioned by law firm commenters the most for any item. Commenters incorporated into the tqxt of the rule ist representing licensees.Le amendment paragraph i 73.21(b).) Other than as as proposed would confirm a presiding stated that guard qualification and training plans contained, among other above, engmeenng and construction - ,7f;c,,.s authority to issue appropriate things, site specific response procedures drawings that show the locations of protective orders whenever protected and descriptions of facility safeguards. safety-related equipment are not Safeguards Inform.ation is required in an ' features. A review of several such plans considered Saferuards Information. - ad u ca or ann e amen ent received by the NRC disclosed that (7) Acceptabihty of Present Pmtection while some plans were so general that Systems-Several commenters minimum restriction needed to protect they could not be considered Safeguards suggested that specdic physical the health and safety of the Public or the Information, others coritamed specific protect 2cn requirements not be included common defense and security in the information that should be protected. in the existing rule but that licensee or context of adjudicatory hearings ne rule has been amended to include State standard procedures be accepted Pursuant to section 147a of the Atom,ic those portions of guard qualification and instead.The Commission has concluded. Energy Act of1954, as amended (the training plans that disclose site specific based on frequent NRC staff contacts. Act), and to impose the minimum features of the physical protection that State and local police forces protect impairment of procedural rights, as, Information in a way that is eq 2ivalent (4) Ctandfathering-Comments to the rule requirements. Accordingly, requiredby secCon181 of the Act.Tne system. amendment makes it clear that the pointed out that certain organizations - the rule has been revised to deem State physical protective measures and need - f (e.g. architect / engineering firms) may - and local police information protection to know standards of proposed i 73.21 I have verylarge quantities of old procedures acceptable. In regard to NRC would apply to Safeguards Info,rmation documents that qualify as Safeguards licensees that fallinto the scope of the Information but are rarely removed from nile, the Commission has concluded that in adjudicatory hearings.. First, the commenters note correctly.,. storage.They suggested that this ~ without formal requirqments there but as a shortcoming. that i 2.744(e) Information be exempted or at least would be no assurance of uniformity, given special consideration.We consistency or an adequate level of applies only to agency records and not Commission agrees with this suggestion protection across the industry. As to Safeguards Information possessed In part and has amended the rule to evidenced by the comments received, only by an applicant, bcensee, or. require marking of documents more than there is considerable divergence of contractor. A second objection was that one year old only when they are opinion as to what constitutes a the proposed i 2.774(e) gives relatively removed from storage. Storage, minimum acceptable level. weak authority to the licensing boards protection and access requirements (8) OtherMinor Changes-Based to prevent disclosure by intervenors and however, would still apply. Documents - primarily on comments received. their la wyers. The commenter a ss erted containing Safeguasds Information additional rule changes have been made that some showing of reliability should be required of such persons before located at the operating f acility would to: have to be marked regardless of age. Permit Safeguards Information to be Safeguards Information is disclosed. (5) "As Built"Dmwings--Some transported by any individual Wird, the commenters stated that the l commenters suggested that c11 revisions authorized access under the rule. Proposed regulation gives inadequate of drawings, not just the final. be Show that matter other than guidance to the licensing boards on the considered as Safeguards Information. documents may contain Safeguards kind of protectionintervenors should be Other commenters suggested that Information. required to give to Safeguards preliminary design and construction Allow use of ADP systems by Information.ne commenters suggest. drawings be specifically excluded from contractors of licensees. that the restrictions used in the Diablo the rule.Le Commission believes there Indicate that non security related Canyon case be adopted.~See Pacific, is some merit in both suggestions. orders and procedures for guards need Cos cadElectric Co. (Diablo Caeyon Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2) Accordingly, the rule has been changed not be prctected.

  • 31720 rederal Register /.Vol 40. No. 204 / Thursday. October 22.19M / Rules and Regulations

' ALAldoo.12 tiRC 3 (1950). Finally, the Safeguards Informstion should be reasonable necessity for disclosure.10 commenters suggest that the possibility inserted into the agency's rules as the CTR 2.744(c) as drafted requires o cf c-iminal sanctions es well as of civil commenters request. findmg by the presidmg offictr that p;nalties, be noted for violations of For this reason also, the Commission dist!csure is necessary to a proper Board crders pertaining to Safeguards will defer to a later time the decision decision. he presidmg efficer. as usual. Information. whetherit should stipulate any further will exercise a rule of reason in applying in response to these comments the guidance or rules for how the licensing the standard.The language used Commission has made one change to boards should wdte protective orders to accomplishes the same result and is proposed 12.744(e).nat change notes protect Safeguards Information. At this generally consistent with the ~ ime the Commission believes that its terminology in i 2.744. the epplicability of criminal sanctions t . by stating. for the purpose of section 223 opinion and those of the Boards provide (2) Trustworthiness Determinations-of the Act, th'at any order issued adequate guidance. See. Pocific Cos and A number of commenters disagreed with pursuant to i 2.744(e) with respect to Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear the absence of a personnel clearance or Safeguards Information be considered Power Plant, Lnits 1 and 2) CLI 80-24 screening program as a necessary en order issued pursuant to section 11 NRC 775 (1980). ALAB 410,5 NRC condition for access l' Safeguards o 161b. of the AE Act. This is in accord 1398. (1977); ALAB 580,11 NRC 227 Information, noting that the traditional with section 147b.of the Act. (1960); ALAB 592,11 ??RC 744 (1960); requirements for access to sensitive The Commission believes the other and ALAB 000.12 NRC 3 (1980). info'rmation include both "need.to-4, comments should not be adopted. It was One commenter also took the position }:.ow" and trustworthiness not the intention of the Commission to that proposed i 2.744(e) did not provide determinations. One commenter 1 place ary restrictions on discovery by adequate protection against undesirable suggested that persons having access be 7 intervenors, or to write any special rules disclosure of physical security plans for subjected to the screening program 0 " chilling intervenors' rights, such as a nuclear power plants. In his view a which the Commission has directed be tcreening requirement not applicable to protective order and affidavit of established for power reactor personneh '3 til parties. Not only would such rules be nondisclosure would not eliminate the Another commenter suggested that discriminatory, but also would be risk of unauthorized disclosure by individuals be required to show contrary to sections 181 and 147a of the intervenors who had an ultenor motive sufficient evidence of trustworthiness Act.This Commission cannot presume of securing the plans for use in before being granted access. beforehand that intervenors and their sabotaging the plant. This commenter & Caission's position on this = g counsel are any the-less trustworthy recommended (i) inclusion of rules of matter has not changed. In the first than the staff or applicant ~and their decision based upon Diablo Canyon for place, Section 147 of the Atomic Energy presiding officers to apply in hearings, Act contains no provisions regarding counsel. .g The minimum protection required for and (ii) security clearances or a trustwoithiness determinations on Safeguards Information is stated in screening program for persons with which to base a federal personnel ,propos ed ! 7321. The requirements access to Safeguards Information in g, g g,y g g there apply to intervenors and their hearings,in order to assure Section145 for access to Restricted counsel as well as to the applicant or ' trustworthiness and reliability.Both of Data). Secondly, the Commission does licensee. Section 2.744(e) allows a Board these recommendations have been not beheve that there is any reasonable to go further, if. in its judgment after discussed above and rejected.In regulatory framework diat can be used hearing all relevant arguments, the addition, the Commission does not to establish a licensee adnunistered circumstances warrant it This propose to write rules affecting rights of screening program. cor.sidering the wide Commission needless to say,h"as intervenors in adjudicatory hearings distribution afforded some Safeguards confidence in the ability ofits Boards to based upon a suspicion of ulterior Infonnation. While the power reactcr exercise sound judgment in the exercise motives in intervening.To do so would access authorization program ment,oned i of their discretion under { 2.744(e), and be tantamount to writing rules based by one commenter might be used for therefore at this time declines to write upon speculation rather than on fact and "cleanng,* licensee employees and other l' any,special rules for the guidance of the law.The hearing process already persons granted unescorted access to Boards as to the extra measures they contains screens to separate the genuine the reactor facility.it would not be l(' [ may require for the protection of Intervenor from the spurious.The Safeguards Information in adjudicatory Intervenor must validate both his applicable to engineering firm bearings. standing under judicial rules and the employees who are never on the site With respect to the protective merit cf his contentions.lle is a known (but who in some cases have total measures used by the Boards in the and readily identifiable person who access to the physical protection system Diablo Canyon case and their potential openly participates at considerable design information). Thirdly, the Commission believes that the proper general applicability, the Commission expense. Intervenors generally make no administration of the need to-know >;i notes that those conditions are involved effort to conceal their opposition to in a review of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power, but this does not supply requirement combined with the rule's hearing by an At'omic Safety and an adequate basis to consider them as occupational restrictions will provide an 1.lcensing Appeal Board.The Appeal potential co. conspirators in plots to efrective information protection program Panel has informed the Commission that sabotage operating power reactors. and stil1 satisfy the "mmirr.um restrict,ons" provisions of section 147a it would like to make some sug;cstions In contrast to the above, a third i

i regarding the handling of Safeguards commenter stated that proposed of the Act I,.

Information in adjudicatory hearings but i 2.744(e) was potentially too restrictive (3) Unresfricted Use of J feels constraine3 not to do so until the of intervenors' rights in that it gave too Telecommunications-Several Diablo Canyon adjudication is finished. much authority to ihe presiding officer. commenters suggested that the The Commission believes that the The commenier suggested rnodification restrictions on the use of telephone .g suggestions cf the AppealPanel willbe of proposed i 2.7.H(e) to allow circuits for transmission of Safeguards a most usefulin deterr+.ing if restrictions disclosure of Safeguards Information to information be deleted. Various rearons .I on intervencr's rights of discoscry of a party upon a showing by the party of were given for this change.One e i I i'

Tedercl Keldster / Vol. 46 Nc. 204 / Tnursday October 22. WS1 / Rules and 1:epb,tions 51721 ccmmenter stated that the rule would Safe;uards Information stored in ADP safeguards incident. Tne Commission pu rent the 1;cor.*ce from cal!!ng for 53 stems is more severe than with ducs not apec. Dxuments located he !p in a safernids ernergency.This is telephone usage. ADp systems located within cir.rm t.!aliu.s and guard houses r.ot so since the regulations make an at cn;ineering firms may have in need n6t be in lo&d secunty exception fer extraordinary or memory large amounts of information on containus since they cre under direct cmcrgency circumstances. Another the design of a physical security systern. control of security personnel. Similarly. commenter contended that the resources Without restrictions, access to such guard orders and rocedures may be P needed to intercept unsecured information potentially could be gained posted ct access cen rol points prodded cor=munications exceeded the technical by anyone, authorized or net, who is that the rest is ccr.ti.uously rnanned cqabilities of the design basis threat. familiar with the operation and has and the information is located so as to The Commission disagrees with this access to a terminal Remote ter=inals prevent observation by visitora. position and believes that relatively could provide an especially easy and (6) Addition of Other Types of little skillis needed to tap phone lines or unobtrusive means for obtaining Informction-Several commenters eavesdrop on radio conversations. A selected Safeguards Information. Access disagreed with the deletion of generic third commenter noted that the to unprotected data lines between - safeguards studies and reports (such as - telephone is normally used to transmit facilities could also be used to the Sandia Laboratories

  • Handbooks on shipping information and it would be compromise a physical security system.

Berrier Technology cnd Entry Control burdensome to use another method. In (5) Physico1 Protection Systems) from the scepe of the rule and this regard. the only shipments covered Requirements-Several commenters noted that no justification was given for by the final rule are spent fuel and stated that the storage requirements the o~ mission. On this matter the' formula quantities of strategic special were too restrictive. Suggested Commission notes that the original - nuclear materisl. (Category L) alternatives (to locked security storage legislative proposal prepared by the' Notifications regarding spent fuel containers) included storage in desks, NRC, and interim versions' of the shipments are required to be by mail file cabinets. locked roorns, legislation, contained explicit language (See 10 CFR 73.72) except that reporting undesignated or non-GSA approved regarding the protection of " studies, schedule changes are permitted to be storage repositories, or anywhere in a reports, and analy~ es which s made byphone in the form of time controlled access or protected area. The concern the safeguarding of nuclear deviations from the original schedule. Cornmission does not agree with the materials or facilities."8 This provision Ir. formation regarding Category I sug;ested alternatives.The basic was deleted from the final version of shipments is classified National Security objective of the security containeris to section 147. In view of this deliberate Information under Part 95 and use of make more difficult undiscovered action by the Congress, the Commission unsecured telephone for such compromise of Safeguards Information.. has'no choice but to delete these items information is prohibited. A steel filing cabinet secured with a from the rule. Another com= enter stated that the locking bar and a GSA approved One cc=menter suggested that rule conflicts with the requirements of combination lock or a GSA approved . information developed during the course i 73.71 regarding the telephonic, security container both satisfy this of probabilistic risk assessments be reporting of physical security events. objective. On the other hand. locked file protected under this rule.ne The events for which reporting is cabinets, desks, and ordinary doors can Commission, while agreeing that such required are considered to be be entered with little difficulty and information might have value to a extraordinary conditions in themselves without leaving any indic'ation that potential saboteur, has concluded that and therefore exempt from the compromise has occurred.ne objection on balance the public interest is better. restrictions. An exoticit statement was ' to storing anywhere in a contrclied served if all safety-related studies are added to the ru!e in this regard.ne access or protected area is based on the available for scrutiny. The question also Commission. afier careful consideration, free access this would allow to anyone arises concerning the legality of concluded that the restrictions on the in these areas. However, the rule has. withholding information under Section ' use of unsecured telecommunication been changed to delete the requirement 147 that is neither related to a licensee's circuits needs to be retained in the rule that the security storage container be in ph'ysical protection program not to assure that Safeguards Information is - a locked room when inside a controlled produced in response to security not lost or compromised without the access or protected area. - considerations. Enowledge of the person responsible for Other commenters objected toThe (7) Deletions of Cer'tcin Types of Its protection. Here is no indication requirement for control of Safeguards Information-One commenter suggested that these restrictions will unduly Information by an individual while in that it would be unlawful to include. burden the licensee or the NRC staff use within a controlled access or information regarding oE site response during routine licensing matter or protected area.ne Commission agrees forces, shipment schedules and. transport activities. For example, that some relaxation is warranted on locations of safehavens in that these periodic call ins required during this matter: however, the basic items are not " security measures" as set shipments can be made using requirement has been left in the rule and forth in section 147.The Commission prearranged signals or an operating guidance has been provided to indicate disagrees on this point. NRC regulations code. that under certain conditions the general require licensees to make arrangements (4) Restricticas on Use ofADP control exercised over controlled access with State or local police forces for Systems--Corr.menters stated that the and protected areas woc!d satisfy the response to safeguards emergencies. For meaning of an "ADp system" was not requirement fixed sites these arrangements are clear. that facilities without on-site' One commenter noted that the documented and become part of the capabilities we:Id be excessively requirements to keep Safeguards facility physical security plan. For - burdened, and that the restricticas Information in locked security transport of spent fuel and Category i I r.hould be removed.ne Commission containers would have an adverse l disegrecs noting that the problem impact on the availability of the security s cwrewer ! bcmS-Hme. H usu. regarding unauthori:cd access to forte to respond to a threat or a h e mt.cr :s. ws. 4

51722 rederni Repi ter / Vol. 46. No. 2N / Thursday. Octcher 22. 1931 / Rules and Rnulations j quantitics of highly enriched uranium persons that reccise Safeguards C. Pctition for RulcmoAing end plutonium. route surveys are Information. On June 7.1977, the Northern States conducted by the NRC staff in order to Require records to be kept for any Power Company and Wisconsin Electric detctmine what police response could Safeguards Information transmitted off-Power Company glitioned the Nucle.ar be expected in an emergency. the site. Regulatory Cornmission to amend to location of safe havens. and zones of Require that a list be kept of persons CI'R 50.34(c) so as to include plant weak radio telephone communications. who have a need.to.know. security information within the The information gathered is documented Note that distribution, reproduction. definition of Restricted Data.or and transmitted to the licensee for end destruction of Safeguards alternatively within the dcfinition of inclusion in his physical protection plan. Information need not be documented. National Secu !!y Infermation. to amend, in this regard, the U.S. District Court for Include a document exclusion list in 10 CFR 2.905 so cs to assure that the Distlict of Columbia has recently the rule. discovery of plant security information upheld the Commission's position that. Add attomeys to the occupation list is subject to the protections o!Subpart 1 3 l police response capabilities and contained in i 73.21(c): (not necessary in to 10 CFR Part 2. to amend Subpart I to telephone shortcomings are legitimate that attorneys are already included in 10 CFR Part 2 to explicitly recognize that l 3 Its protections extend to information not Items for withholding under section 147 (c)(i) and (vi)). of the Act.' Amend the definition of Safeguards under Commission control and to delete Another commenter stated that it Information to add " controlled" before 10 CFR 2.790(d)(1). The' Commission's ', i Safeguards Information.

  • decision on the petition.in light of the l

might be impossible to prevent i disclosure of certain Information Add a definition for " composite plan." issuance of this rule, will be set forth in regarding local police forces."11e Limit withholding ofinformation on a separate Federal Register Notice. i Comm!ssion agrees in part and the rule, security system weaknesses to those D. Effective Dates J has been modified to more accurately items severe in nature. The Commission has decided to make reflect the originalintent that only (11) Comments Regarding Guidance-5 5 2.744(e). 2.79o(d)(1). 73.2(ji) and (11). details of the forces committed to A number of comments were received and 73.21(a). (b) and (c)(1) effective !q respond to a facility safeguards regarding guidance needed to implement immediately for good cause pursuant to j emergency need be protected. the rule. The specific items mentioned the exception provided by 5 U.S.C. (8) Withholding Spent fuelRoute by commenters were taken into 553(d)(3). The enumera'e.1 sections Vl Information-Two commenters consideration during the development of define the scope of Safeguards recommended that routes used for spent the guidance document. Information protected by the rules.- fuel shipments be withheld until the (12) Cost-Several commenters stated identify those persons who are shipments have been completed. This is that the estimated costs for permitted access set forth certain not a matter for Commission - Implementing the rule were too low. protections afforded by the Commission deliberation. Section 147 contains. an particularly in regards to storage during to such information, and provide certain explicit statement that "Nothing in th!s the construction ph'ase protection at protections for physical protection and Act shall authorize the Commission to licensee contractor facilities. and material control and accounting prohibit the public disclosure of recurring labor.The Commission has information not otherwise designated as information pertaining to the routes and revised its estimates as follows. (A Safeguards Information or classified as quantities of hipments of-irradiated value. impact analyses is available in the National Security Information or f, nuclear reactor fuel." Public Document Room.) Restricted Deta.These sections alone (D)1.imit Regulations to Ports 2 and impose no new requirements on n.! 9--One commenter suggested that the l n.-.c.=,o ' licensees or other persons outside the I. inu. licensed industry be allowed to devise a8ency. i its own methods of protection that t-*

  • W S~ ' Ca"**W'"*"**)

Immediate effectiveness of these specific requirements be deleted from gyea 524,,,q,,j"=a sections is warranted to avoid further 54.000 part 73. and that parts 2 and 9 contain delay in implementing the Congressional i tu st.ac. soc Tow 5535.000 directives that Safeguards Information sw. o-as eo s'*" intent in enacting Section 147 of the jk. be protected. As is stated elsewhere, the Tow sia. coo tw sus mo Atomic Energy Act to provide protection 3 h Commission believes that without from public disclosure for certain formal requirements (which are (13) Public Announcement-One specified types of Safeguards considered to be the mimmum commenter noted that some firms who Information. Since the rule also codifies restrictions that provide an acceptable may have Safeguards Information are current Commission procedure as to itvel of protection) there would be n not part of an information network that what types ofinformation are protected. assurance of uniformity or consistency. would inform them of the existence of immediate effectiveness of those j Comments received indicate there is n this new rule.The Commission agrees provisions will not adversely affect Eeneral agreement in the licensed that special effort is needed regarding Commission licensees or others in industry concerning what constitutes a public dissemination of the rule. In possession of Safeguards Information. mimmum level of protection. addition to the normal practica of The remaining provisions of the rule (10) Other Comments-Following is a publication in the Federal Register and will be effective on January 20.1931. l list of other cc=ments on minor matters distribution of NRC public E. PeperwotA Reduction Statement .l that were not incorporated into the final announcements the Commission intends There are no reporting or rule on the basis of no demonstratable to (i) encourage licensees to notify their recordiceping requirements contained l need or benefit: contractors, suppliers. and local police in this regulation and therefore it is not .c Show that the licensees are not response forces. (ii) send cut a special subject to Office of ManaEement and responsible for co=pliance by other mailing to nuc! car service firms that do Budget cicarence as required by Pub.L l

  • i mini s.Jo,a.h.cace s s Nnc ci it Action business with power reactorlicensees.

90-511. The promu! ation of these l No SWn Fd:.ary M 1M1[Pruently under and (iii) invite certam associations to E i! .m.t j notify their rnembers. amendments would not result in any i l [ e

i i i Tederal Rc;ister / Vol. 4G. No. 204 / Thu sday. Octcher 22.1Pb1 / Rc!cs and Repulauons '51723 4.r iuty that diccts the environment. received and possessed by a party other USC 200ttoll and the Lws re!c red to in ?.-rnrdm.i. the Comminien has than the Commission staff,it shall also Arrendices.

  • M rr.ined under the National be protected according to the
5. Section 50.3: is amcr.ded by adding Ib ironment.il Quality guidelines and require =cnts of 173.21 of this chapter.

s new pd.igraph (c) to reed as ic!!ows: the criteria of10 CFR 51.5(dj that neither The presiding officer may also prescribe en a nvironmcntalirnpact statement nor such additional procedures as will { 52.34 Contents of applicctiont; tec'hnical

Wermahon, e m i*onmental impact appraisal to effectively safepard and prevent sqport a negative declaration for the disclosure of Safeguards Infor=ation to proposed amendments to Title 10 is unauthorized persons with minimum (c) Each applicant for a license to ra;uired.

impairment of the procedural rights cper.ite a production or utilization Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of which would be available if Safeguards facility, who prepares a physical 1954, as amended, the Energy Information were not involved. In srcurity plan. a safeguards contingency Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, addition to any other sanction that may plan, or a guard qualification and and sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the be imposed by the presiding officer for training plan, shall protect the plans and United States Code. he follo~ wing violation of an order issued pursuant to other related Safeguards Information amendments to.~.de 10. Chapter 1. Code this paragraph, dolation of an order against unauthorized disclosure in of Federal Regulations. Parts 2. 50. 70. pertaining to the disclosure of acccrdance with the requitec'ents of and 73. are published as a document Safeguards Information protected from i 7321 of this chapter, as appropriate. subject to codification. disclosure under section147 of the

6. Section 50.54 is amended by adding Atomic Energy Act, as amended, may be a new paragraph (v) to read as follows:

PART 2-RULES OF PRACTICE FOR subject to a civil penalty imposed DOMESTIC LICENSING PROCEEDINGS pursuant to i 2.205. For the purpose of { 50.54 Conditions of licenses. 1.The authority citation for Part 2 is imposing the cMnal penalties revised to read as follows: containedin section 223 of the Atom,ic (v) Each licensee subject to the Energy Act, as amended any order requirements of Part 73 of this chapter aI953$nd sY3 [ - Issued pursuant to this paragraph with shall ensure that physical security, SC o(p 70 and =31): sec.191. as amended. Pub.L 67-respect to Safeguards Informahon shall screguards contm, gency and guard be deemed an order issued under qualification and training plans cud sts. 7s Stat. 409 (42 US C 2241); sec. 201, as e mended. Pub. L 93-435. 83 Stat 1242 (42 section161b of the Atomic Energy Act. other related Safeguards Infer =ation are protected against unauthorized U.5 C son)(5 USC 552). unless otherwise - noted. Sections 2203-2.200 also issued under

3. Section 2.793 is amended by disclosure in accordance with the sec.1BC Pub. L 85-703,68 Stat 955 (42 USC revising paragraph (d)(1) as follows:.

requirements of i 73.21 of this chapter. =36) and sec. 236. Pub. L 93-438. Ba Stat. as appropriate. 12:0 (42 U.S C 554c). Sectices 2.500-2.808 { 2.793 Public insp ections, ezen ;itions, also issued under 5 UAC. 553. Section 2.809 requests for withholdin9-PART 70-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF^ sho issued under 5 USC :53 and sec. 29. as SPECIAL NUCLEAR IAATERIAL amended. Pub. L 85-256,71 Stat. 579, and Pub. L 95-209. 91 Stat 1483 (42 USC 2039). d) * *

  • crespondence and reports to or
7. The authority citation for Part 70 is
2. Section 2.744 is amended by addinS from the NRC which contain information revised to read as follows: '

a new paragraph I 2.744(e) to read as or records concerning a licensee's or Authoritp Secs. 51. 53.161'm.183. 68 I0lIOW8: applicant's physical protection or. Stat.s29,930, as amended 943. as amended. material control and accounting program 953, as amended. S54 (42 US C. =71. 2073, {2.744 Production of NRC records and d t for special nuclear material not =o1. 23. 33): Secs. E. 2. 68 Stat 12H. 124Sf 2 USC 5842. 5846) unless o otherwise designated as Safeguards Information w classified as National (e)In the case of requested documents the p' eses d sec.*'3 M Sut. 958, as Secunty Infctmat,on or Restricted Data. amended (42 USC 2273).11 m3. 70.10(c). i and records (including Safeguards m21(c). 70.22 (a). [c). [d}-{k). 7024 (a) and Information referred to in sections 147 and 181 of the Atomic Energy Act. as (bh m32(a) [3h (5), and (i).m35.7039 (b) PART 50--LICENSING OF and (c). 70.41(a) ro.42(a) and (c). 70.55, are amended) exempt from disclosure under PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION. issued under sec. : sib. c5 stat. 94s. a s i 2.793, but whose disclosure is found by amended (42 USC 01(b)): 1170 loa (dL FACILITIES the pres. ding officcr to be necessary to a m32(a)[e). (c). (d). (e). a nd (gl. mss. 70.51(c)- i proper dects:ca in the proceeding, any

4. The authority citation for Part 50 is (g). 70ss, mS7(b) a nd (d). 70.5e(s)-{g)(31 and order to the Executive Director for revised to read as follows:

(h)-{J) are bsued under sec.tet, ca Stat. 949. Operations to produce the document or as amended (42 Uit 2201(i)). and, records (or any other order issued iI m32[h) 70.51(b) and (i) 70.52. M53,254 cs S L 93 937 G48 953 54 955 S55,as .a55. m5s[g)(4)S) and % ms9. are hsuei ordering production of the document or a mended (c USC 2n3. 2134. =:n =32. -

  1. 'cc.161o 03 5 tat.950. as amended (42

""."C. ol(o)). records) may contain such protective 2233.2239): Sees. 2o1,202. 206. 8S Stat.1243 US terms and ccaditions (including 1244.1245 (42 USC 58 tl.55u. 554GL unless. affidasits of non. disclosure) as may be o'herwise noted. Section Sc38 also issued B. Section 70.22 is akended by adding necessary and appropriate 1o limit the under Sec. n2. c8 Stat. 939 (c Uit 21521-a new paragraph (!) after paragraph (k) disclosure to parties in the proceeding. Sections so.co-sael also issued under Sec.. to read as follows-- to interested States and other 1s4. cs Stat. 954. a s amended:(c Uit cd as 51103-50.1021ssued under {7022 Contents of appflhtlons. Fovernmental entitics Partici ating Sec.Its. E4 Stat 955; (c USC 236).For the P pursuant to i 2.715(c), and to their npses M Sm n3. M Sut.953, as qualified witnesses and counsel When a mended. [42 USC E73L I 50.54(Q hsued (1) Each apph. cant for a license to Safeguards Informstion protected from under sec.1c11. ta Stat. S49; (42 Uit Possess. use, transpert, or deliver to a disclosure under section 147 of the rot [QL 115010,50.71. and 50J8 issued ~ carrier for transport formula quantities Atomic Enemy Act, as amended. is under Sec.1clo, ce Stat. sso, a s amended. (42 of strategic special nuclear material..

51 m rederal Regi>ter / Vol. 46. No. Col / Thursday. October 22. WS1 / Ru'r s and Repulations e l who pepires a physicsl security, 1 73.2 Denn!!bns. c; crate a nuclcar power reactor, or (3) s feguards continEency.or Fuard + tr nspntts, or dchvers to a carrier for quahfication end training plan shall (jj) " Safeguards Information" means transport. c formula quantity of stratet;ic rrotect these plans and other related information not otherwise classified as r;'ecial,nudcar material or more than Scfcguards Information against National Security Information or 100 grarr.s of irradiated reactor fuel, and unauthorized disclosure in accordance Restricted Data which specifically each persen who produces receives.or with the requirements of i 73.21 of this identifies a licensee's or applicant's acquires Safeguards Information shall chapter. detailed. (1) security measures for the - cnsure that Safegucrds Information is

9. Section 70.32 Is amended by adding physical protection of special rucicar pic!ccted ccainst unauthorized a new paragraph (j) to read as follows:

material or (2) security measures for the disclosure. To mect this general physical protection and location of performance rcquirement,licensecs ond { 70.32 Conditions oflicenses. certain plant equipment vital to the persens subject to this section shall safety of production or utilization establish and maintain an information f (j) Each licensee who possesses a facilities. protection system that includes the formula quantity of strategic special (kk) "Need to know" means a measures specified in paragraphs (b) nuclear material, or who transports, or determination by a person having through (i) of this section.Information .j delivers to a carrier for transport, h responsibility for protecting Safeguards protection procedures employed by l formula quantity of strategic special Information that a proposed recipient's State and local police forces are deemed } nut! ear material or more than 100 grams access to Safeguards Information is to meet these requirements. I of irradiated reactor fuel shall ensure necessary in the performance of official. (b)Informollon to beprotected. De I* ,t contingency, and guard qualifica tion employment. ~ documents, and reports that shall bc that phys, cal security, safeguards contractual, or licensee daties of i rpecific types ofinformation, r,i .I and traming plans and other related (ll) ** Person" means (1) any protected are as follows: l Safeguards Information are protected Individual, corporation, partnershi, against unauthonzed disclosure in firm, association, trust, estate, pub ic or (1) PhysicalProtection at Fixed Sites. Information not otherwise classified as 11; accordance with the requirements of private institution, group, government [ 73.21 of this chapter, agency other than the Commission or Restricted Data or National Security . j the Department of Energy (DOE), information relating to the protection of ','l PART 73-PHYSICAL. FROTECTION OF (except that the DOE shall be facilities that possess formu;a quantitics of strateg c special nuclear matenal, and PLANTS AND MATERIALS considere.d a person to the exte.nt th.at 10.ne authority citation for Part 73 is its facWties are subject to 6e !icemg p wer reactors.Specifically:[i)The L revised to read as follows: and related regulatory authority of the composite physical security plan for the Commission pursuant to scetion 202 of nuclear facility or site.

  • Authorit)- Secs. 53.147.161b.161L 1Llo-

. ketc. Site specific drawings, diagrams (II} hb L ss-7c3. t.s Stat. 930. woso, a s the Energy Reorganization Act of1974 s aes, or maps that substantially and sections 1m,105, and 202 of the \\s, Uranium Mill Tailings Radi.ation Control P ),,,se t the fmal des n features of t l' Pre . 5 at. ec, Pub 9 a h P y Pub. I. 95-235. 94 Sta t. 780. [42 U.S.C 2c73 Act of 1978), any state or political, ) subdivision of a state, or any politica (iii) Details of alarm sys showing location of intrus, tem layou Oct. 2167); sec. 201. Pub.1. 93-438,88 Stat. 1:42.1243 a s arnended. Pub. L 94-79. E9 Stat. subdivision of any government or ion detection f 413 it2 U.S.C 5841). For the purposes of sec. nation, or other entity; and (2) any lega) devices, alarm assessment equipment. =3. 08 Stat. 953, a s amended. 42 U.S.C 2273-kl 173.55 is issued under sec.161b. 68 Stat. 948, successor, representative, agent, or alarm system wiring, emergency power agency of the foregoing. sources, and duress alarms. N (mm)" Security Storage Container" (iv) Writt.en physical security orders 73 3 7 7 to 73 45, 4 "l,I 7333. 7355. and 73.e7 are issued under sec. Includes any of the following ,and procedures for members of the 161L 68 Stat. 949. as amended. 42 U.S.C repositories: (1) For storage in a building security organigation, durcss codes. and. C013); and i! 73 o(c)(i) 73.24(b)(i). located within a protected or controlled patrol schedules!

    • 4 9

732t(b)(3). [h)(c), (i)(6). and (k)(4). 73.27 (a) access area, a steel filing cabinet ~ rommunications systems that are used (v) Deta'ils of the on-site and off. site t and (b). 73 40(b) and (d). 73.46(sits), and equipped with a steellocking bar and a .('1 (h)!!). 73.sa(gl!2). [3)(iii)(Bj end (h). three position. changeable combination, for security purposes. 731!(t)i:). and (4)tsii)(B). 73Jo. 73J1. and GSA approved padlock:(2) A security (vi) Lock combinations and S ede$4: filing cabinet that bears a Test mechanical key design. U 1 o). aa Certification Label on the side of the (vii) Documents and other matter that 11.Section 73.1 is amended by adding locking drawer, or interior plate, end is contain lists or locations of certain a new paragraph (b)[7] to read as marked. " General Ser. ices follows: safety-rclated equipment explicity Administration Approved Security identified in the documents as vital for { 73.1 Purpose and scope. Container" on the exterior of the top purposes of physical protection, as I., ' drawer or door:(3) A bank safe. deposit contained in physical security plans. g,,, boxi and (4) Other repositorles which in safeguards contingency plans, or pla'nt (r)This part prescribes requirements judgement of the NRC, would specific safeguards analyses for I for the protection of Safeguards pr vide comparable phys,ical protection. production or utilization facilities.. .i ' In!:=ation Ls the hands cf any person, I3. A new { 73.21is added to read as [v ii) The composite safcguards fg;; ws. whrther or not a licensec of the contingency plan for the facility ur site. Cc::=issicn. who produces, receives, or { 73.21 Flequirements for the protection et (ix)Those portions of the facility ac:pires Safeguards Information. safeguards information. guard qualification and training plan + + (a) Cenero/performence rcquirement. s.hich disclose features of the physical " Sectien 73.2 is amended by adding Each licensee who (1) possesses a security system or response procedures. new pa ag :rbs (jj). (kk),(ll) and (mm) formula quantity of strategic special (x) Response plans to specific threats 1o read as !:":ws: nuclear material, or (2)is authorized to deta!!ing size. disposition. response I J. l g I a

Federal Register / Vol. 46. No. 204 / Thursday. October 22. 1981 / Rules and Regulations 51725 i. timet, and armament of responding Commission, or the United States be destroyed by any method that 3 essures complete dcstruction of the forces. Government: (xi) Size. armament. and disposition of (ii) A member of a duly authorized Safeguards Information tht y contain. cn site reserve forces, commmittee of the Congress; (g) Externcitransmission of [xii) Size. identity, armament. and (iii)The Govemor of a State or documents end material. (t) Documents arrival times of off. site forces committed designated representatives: or other matter containing Safeguards to respond to safeguards emergencies. (iv) A representative of the Information, when transmitted outside Intemational AtomicEnergy Agency an authorized place of use or storage. (2) Physicalprotection in trcnsit. Inictrnation not otherwise classified as (IAEA) engaged m activities associated shall be packaged to preclude disclosure with the U.S./!AEA Safeguards of the presence of protected hformation. Restricted Data or National Security ,Q- - Information relative to the protection of Agr em nt who has been certified by (2) Safeguards Information may be shipments of formula quantities of ( ) A me%3e7 og,3,t, or joc3) jw transported by messenger-courier, United States first class. registered. strategic special nuclear material and enforcement authority that is express, or certified mail. or by any spent fuel. Specifically:(i) The responsible for responding to reouests individual authorized access pursuant to composite transportation phys. ica for assistance during safeguards' < j security plan. [ 73 22(c) eme e s l (ii) Schedules and itineraries fo.r i dual to whom disclosure (3) Except under emergency or specific shipments. (Routes and is ordered pursuant to i 2.744(e) of this extraordinary conditions. Safeguards quantities for shipments of spent fuel chapter. Information shall be transmitted only by are not withheld from public disclosure. (2) Except as the Commission may protected telecommunications circuits 8 therwise authorize, no person may (including facsimile) approved by the $d p; d s b shi ment of a currenIseries.) disclose Safeguards Information to any NRC. Physical security events required ther person except as set forth in to be reported pursuant to 1 3.71 are p ic features. Intrus. vehicle immobilization, paragraph (c)(1) f sech n. c nsidered to be extraordinary - (ii) Details of diig ion alarm devices, and (d) Protection while in use or storage. conditions. g M ' S f' p es f ocal p ce re ponse c ! a u e dual.

    • Y
  • E"#'"'

'E" " " * " l l fcrces, andlocations of safe havens.' - (2) While unattended. Safeguards syqm pm e a system is g (v) Details regarding limitations of Information shall be stored in a locked b, s b [ radio. telephone communications. security storage container. Knowledge on abo

  • f I an (vi) Procedures for response to of lock combinations protecting use of an entry code for access to stored j

safeguards emergencies. Safeguards Information shall be limited rma n. sWems may be used E. %y (3) Inspections, cudits and to a minimum number of personnel for appmnd for secur@y de E, 35 cvcluations. Information not otherwise operating purposes who have a 'need to (i) Removalfrom Safeguc :fs classified as National Security know" and are otherwise authorized Information or Restricted Data relatin access to Safeguards Information in l#[#.rmation category. Doc =ents. nginally containing Safegxds to safeguards inspections and reports. accordance with the provisions of this Inf rmatio> shall be removed from the Specifically: section. (i) Portions of safeguards inspection (c) Preparation andmotAing of . Safeguards Ir..[ormation caigory whenever the mformation n-longer reports, evaluations, audits, or documents. Each document or other meets the criteria contained in this investigations that contain details of a matter that contains Safeguards section. licensee's or applicant's physical Information as defined in paragraph (b) ,J security system or that disclose in this section shall be marked

14. Section 73.80 is revised to read as vE uncorrected defects, weaknesses, or

" Safeguards Information"in a follows: ' vulnerabilities in the system. conspicuous manner to indicate the h , 73,,3 y;,,,g;,,,, Information regarding defects, presence of protected information a lC weaknesses or vulnerabilities may be (portion marking is not required for the' An injunction or other com order releases after corrections have been specific items of information set forth in may be obtained prohibiting any.. rnade. Reports of investigations may be paragraph ! 73.21(b) other than guard violation of any provision die Atomic }' released after the investigation has been qualification and training plans and Energy Act of 1954, as ame: dad, or any

j completed, unless withheld pursuant to correspondence to and from the NRC).

regulation or order issued freunder. A other authorities, e.g the Freedom of Documents and o'her matter containing court order may be obtaind for the L f Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). Safeguards Information in the hands of payment of a civil penalty : posed (4) Correspondence. Portions of contractors and agents o! licensees that pursuant to section 234 o! ne Act for correspondence insofar as they contain we're produced more than one year prior viola tion of section 53. 57. E. 63. 81. 82.. "? Safeguards Information specifically to the effective date of this amendment 101.103.104.107.109. or 1r of the Act. defined in paragraphs (b)(1) through need not be marked unless they are or section 20s of the Ene7gr (b)(3) of this paragraph. removed from storage contain-s for Reorganization Act of17M :r any rule. C &,j (c) Access to Scleguceds Information. regulation. or order issued tzreunder. use. L (11 Except as the Commission may. (f) Reproduction and destruction of or any term. condition, orl=tation of' otherwise authorize no person may matter containing Safeguards any license issued there* or for any h@ p;TfS have access to Safeguards Information Information. (1) Safeguards Information violation for which a licenm =ay be unless the person has an established may be reproduced to the minimum revoked under section 18E :iie Act., "need to know" for the information and extent necessary consistent with need Any person who willfullyv:iates any is: without permission of the originator, provision of the Act or anpqulation or. s $G (i) An emp!oyce, agent, or contractor (2) Documents or other matter order issued thereunc'er mc he gidity of, a I::;, of an applicant. a licensee, the containing Safeguards Information may a crime end, upon convictc:. may be ..~ h

j I g- ~ 5172G - Tederal Registcr '/ Vol. 46. No. 204 / Thur.sday. October 22. 1931 / Itulco innd ist, ulations - - I 1"nished by line or imprisonment er both. ns presided by law. Dated at Washington.D.C this 19th day of, I i October.1951. { For the US Nucitat Regulatory Cc:ninissloa. Samuel). % i Secretary of the Commission' p r=.e>.acuorwdi m ees..! se c coct vs o.es es .\\. d 4 I + 1-1 i k-i e o j n r i [ 1 e a 4 9 e ..}}

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