ML20041D467
| ML20041D467 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1982 |
| From: | Mclendon G LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, W3K-82-0109, W3K-82-109, NUDOCS 8203050339 | |
| Download: ML20041D467 (4) | |
Text
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1.0UISIANA 142 ORARONDE SmHT POWE R & LIGHT P O BOX 6008
- NEW ORLEANS. LOUISIANA 70174 * (504) 366 2345
'?NU s?$4lI) u February 26, 1982 G D. McLENDON Senior Vice President W3K-02-0109 Q-3-A35.07.44 Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012 h ffa @[l7,ilfT'
SUBJECT:
Waterford SES Unit 3
- UI Docket No. 50-382 Revised Interim Report of Significant 1
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Construction Deficiency No. 44 "LPSI Pump Suction Valves" L
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Reference:
LP&L Letter W3K-82-0090 dated 2/15/82 to USNR
Dear Mr. Collins:
In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of a Revised Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 44, "LPSI Pump Suction Valves."
An editorial correction has been made in the " Description" section of the report.
It was necessary to delete the third paragraph as this did not coincide with the wording in the " Corrective Action" section of the report.
If you have any questions, please advise.
Very truly yours,
, d. Rl GDMcL:LLB:grf co Attachment 9
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un aM no enn n C. 20555 0203050339 820226 report)
PDR ADOCK 05000382 S
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LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 Interktn k$Nrt of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 44 LPSI PUMP 'UCTION VALVES S
Revieued by
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REVISED INTERIM REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 44 "LPSI PUMP SUCTION VALVES" INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50'55(e).
It describes a deficiency in the Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump Suction Valves.
The existing valves are not designed for the high differential pressure they would be subjected to during shutdown cooling mode of operation. This problem is considered reporta-ble under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).
To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory,, Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.
DESCRIPTION As a result of the TMI-2 accident, the NRC requires that the shutdown cooling system (SDCS) be designed for complete remote operation (the use of the manual TMI-2 system was hampered by high radiation level).
To accomplish remote manual operation, a number of SDCS valves were to be backfitted with motor operators, including the subject two valves.
While quoting the motor opctaiors, Fisher Controls Co., the manufacturer, revealed that in the closed position, these valves are capable of taking only 150 PSI differential pressure.
(LPSI pump suction valves C E Tag No.51-431 and 444 Ebasco Tag No. 2SI-E301A and 2SI-B302E).
This condition is unacceptable since the LPSI pump is lined up for shutdown cool-ing mode when the primary system pressure is about 370 PSIG at which time the LPSI pump suction valve is part of the primary coolant system pressure boundary.
The ASME code requires double isolation of piping connecting to the primary sys-tem.
The suction valve together with one check valve in series is to serve this purpose.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS I
Failure of the subject valves allows only single valve isolation of primary cool-ant (approximately 400 PSIG) during shutdown cooling mode.
Failure of a corre-spondent check valve subjects the balance of safety injection system piping to conditions beyond their design rating.
This condition could lead to loss of pri-mary coolant and loss of inventory in the refueling water storage pool (RWSP).
A primary coolant leak would result in a sic.'iicant radioactivity release; while j
the loss of the RWSP would jeopardize the abllity to safely shut down the plant.
Therefore, the present design of the LPSI pump suction valves, if left uncorrected, presents a safety hazard to the plant.
CORRECTIVE ACTION The following corrective action will be taken:
' 1.
Check Valves will be located on line 2SI20-4A and 2SI20-4B between RWSP/ SIS suction line and existing Check Valves (2SI-V331A and V332B).
2.
The originally proposed Motor Operators on the Butterfly Valves 2Sl-B301A and 2SI-B302B will be deleted and the velves will be locked open for normal operation and used only for maintenance isolation of the pump.
3.
The 300 lb. pressure class rating will be extended back to and will include the added Check Valves on the suction line.
Ebasco Site Nonconformance Report W3-3441 was issued on February 4, 1982, to provide tracking for the deficiency.
Corrective action shall be accomplished and a Final Report submitted to the USNRC on or before August 16, 1982.
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 Interkr*n"kepbrt of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 44 LPSI PUMP SUCTION VALVES Reviewed by
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r/)e, R. J.11Hhiser - Site Manager
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J.[a'rt-@rojectLicen'singEngineer ~
Date Reviewed by
/M 2"/h[L J/Gutierriz L f}. A. Site / Supervisor Date February 19, 1982 b,
REVISED INTERIM REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 44 "LPSI PUMP SUCTION VALVES" 4
INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50'55(e).
It describes e deficiency in the Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump Suction Valves. The existing valves are not designed for the high differential pressure they would be subjected to during shutdown cooling mode of operation.
This problem is considered reporta-ble under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory, Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.
PESCRIPTION As a result of the TMI-2 accident, the NRC requires that the shutdown cooling system (SDCS) be designed for complete remote operation (the use of the manual TMI-2 system was hampered by high radiation level).
To accomplish remote manual operation, a number of SDCS valves were to be backfitted with motor operators, including the subject two valves. While quoting the motor operators, Fisher Controls Co., the manufacturer, revealed that in the closed position, these valves are capable of taking only 150 PSI differential pressuru (LPSI pump suction valves C E Tag No. SI-431 and 444, Ebasco Tag No. 2SI-E301A and 2SI-B302E).
This condition is unacceptable since the LPSI pump is lined up for shutdown cool-ing mode when the primary system pressure is about 370 PSIG at which time the LPSI pump suction valve is part of the primary coolant cystem pressure boundary.
The ASME code requires double isolation of piping connecting to the primary sys-tem.
The suction valve together with one check valve in seties is to serve this purpose.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Failure of the subject valves allows only single valve isolation of primary cool-ant (approximately 400 PSIG) during shutdown cooling mode.
Failure of a corre-spondent check valve subjects the balance of safety injection system piping to conditions beyond their design rating. This condition could lead to loss of pri-mary coolant and loss of inventory in the refueling water storage pool (RWSP).
A primary coolant leak would result in a significant radioactivity release; while the loss of the RWSP would jeopardize the ability to safely shut down the plant.
Therefore, the present design of the LPSI pump suction valves, if left uncorrected, presents a safety hazard to the plant.
CORRECTIVE ACTION The follouing corrective action will be taken:
)
2-1.
Check Valves will be located on line 2SI20-4A and 2SI20-4B between RWSP/ SIS suction line and existing Check Valves (2SI-V331A and V332B).
2.
The originally proposed Motor Operators on the Butterfly Valves 2SI-B301A and 2SI-B302B will be deleted and the valves will be locked open for normal operation and used only for maintenance isolation of the pump.
3.
The 300 lb. pressure class rating will be extended back to and will include the added Check Valves on the suction line.
Ebasco Site Nonconformance Report W3-3441 was issued on February 4, 1982, to provide tracking for the deficiency.
Corrective actien shall be accomplished and a Final Report submitted to the USNRC on or before August 16, 1982.
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