ML20041D285
| ML20041D285 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041D283 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8203050133 | |
| Download: ML20041D285 (4) | |
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c UNITED STATES 8'
NUCLEAR HEGULATORY COMMISSION n
h WASHINGTON. D. C. 20556 4*....f SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NCS. 65 AND 47 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-53 ".ND DPR-69 BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER ILANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318 Introduction By application dated December 7, 1981, the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E) requested changes in the Technical Specifications for Calvert Cliffs i
Units 1 and 2.
The changes in the TS address the operability.and test require-ments for the containment purge intake and exhaust isolation valves. These requirements were submitted in response to our letter of October 20, 1981 which addressed generic concerns associated with containment purging and venting and the related issues of Item II.E.4.2, " Containment Isolation Dependability," of i
NUREG-0737, the TMI Action. Plan. We herein present an evaluation of the status of the purge and vent issue, and Item II.E.4.2, for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2, as reflected by the BG&E submittal of Dccember 7, 1981.
In addition to issues associated with the above topics, BG&E has prnoosed additional requirements which address channel-specific surveillance rec.uire-ments for containment isolation valves.
Discussion and Evaluation In our letter of October 20, 1981, we indicated our concern that the Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 containment purge inlet and exhaust valves might not be capable of closing under post-LOCA conditirns. In addition, we requested.
specific information concerning the ability of these 48",. resilient seal, i
valves, t.o close under post-LOCA conditions.
In the BG&E submittal of December 7, 1981, the licensee indicated the purge air inlet and exhaust isolation valves were maintained in the closed nosition during plant operation, with air to the air operatot isolated.and the solenoid air supply valve deenerg'ized,.These measures effectively prevent operation of the valves and thus these valves would not be exposed to post-LOCA conditions when in the.open position. Proposed TS 3.fi.1.7 requires the purge supply and exhaust valves to be maintained in the closed position, with the air to the air operator isolated and the solenoid air supply valve deenergized, in all reactor operating modes except modes 5 and.6, cold shutdown and, refueling modes, re-spectively. The corresponding surveillance requirement,. proposed TS 4.6.1.7, requires that the purge supply and exhaust' isolation valves be verified to be in the closed position at least once per 31 days.
i 8203050133 820201 PDR ADOCK 05000327 P
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. 1 OurreYiewofthelicensee'sproposedTS3.6.1.7and4.6.1.7indicatessub-stantial conformance with the model TS which were contained in our October 20, 1981 letter.
In addition, the licensee has proposed changes to TS Table 3.3-3,." Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation,".in-order to provide consistency between the. operational requirements for the contain-ment pur ge valves, proposed TS 3.6.1.7, and their manual and high radiation actuation devices. We find these changes to be acceptable in that the actuation devices should not be required to be operable under conditions 'or which the actuated equioment is not required to be operable.
The proposed TS 3.6.1.7 and 4.6.1.7 effectively resolve our conce ns regarding post-LOCA mechanical performance of the purge inlet and exhaust valves. Sheild BG&E desire to utilize the purge inlet and exhaust isolation valves during reactor operation, a submittal would be required which responds, at a minimum, to our request for information contained in Enclosure.3 of our letter of October 20, 1981. In addition, since the purge isolation valves are closed during reactor l
operation, our review of the adequecy of closure of these valves.on high radiation is no longer required (Item II.E.4.2(7) of NUREG-0737). Our review of item II.E.4.2(7) will be reinitiated should BG&E desire to utilize the purge isolation valves during reactor operation.
c An additional concern presented in our letter of October 20, 1981 invoivesthe
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deterioration.of the purge isolation valve resilient seals. In Enclosure 1 of our October 20, 1981 letter, we indicated that industry experience has shown some unsatisf actory performance associated with the resilient seal material utilized in containment purge isolation valves. We further indicated that purge isolation valves that are closed during reactor operation should be leak tested at least every six nonths.
In addition, a requirement for periodic re-placement of the purge valve seals should be established.
In responso to the above cincern, the BG&E submittal of December 7, 1981 pro-posed that the containment purge isolation valves be leak tested at least every six months. This. test is described in proposed TS 4.6.4.1.4.
In addition, proposed TS 4.6.4.1.3 requires.that containment purge isolation valves, and i
all other specified isolation valves, be response time tested as part of the i
Inservice Test Program. With regard to replacement of the valve seals, the l
December 7,1981 BG&E submittal indicates that no f ailure or unacceptable leakage of containment purge isolation valve seals has been observed. For this i
reason, no seal replacernent program has been proposed..
We haYe reviewed the test Fethods described in. Enclosure 5 of the licensee's December 7,1981 submittal, and proposed.TS.4.6.4.1.3 and TS 4.6.4.1.4 and find these to be acceptable. With regard to valve seal replacement, we conclude that as a result of acceptable valve seal. performance at Calvert Cliffs, and due to a lack of guidance from the valve vendor, no seal replacement Trequency can be established. Should seal failure occur, the,six month test. program to be est ablished in conformence with TS 4.6.4.1.4 would detect such failure.
Should a purge isolation salve exhibit excessive leakage, TS 3.6.1.7 would re-quire the leakage to be r(paired within.24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or the reactor would be placed l
in cold shutdown within tre following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.. A. period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to per-form repairs is justified due to the conservative nature of the purge isolation j
f valve test. Since air is. injected between the isolation valves, the air. pres-suretendstounseatthevalvesprovidingaconserhatiYeindicationofYalhe leakage.
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The licensee has further indicated that should a seal replacement recommendation be established by the purge isolation valve vendor, the licensee will evaluate this recommendation and propose a TS change. if appropriate.
Based upon the information presented in the December 7, 1981 submittal from BG&E, we conclude that the proposed Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements associated with the. containment purge isolation valves provide re-sonable assurance that these valves will not compromise containment integrity.
This evaluation satisfies our requirements concerning Item II.E.2.(6), "Contain-ment Purge Valve operability, and Item II.E.2(8), "Contaioment Purge Valve Tech-nical Specifications," of NUREG-0737.
In addition our review of purge and vent issues for Calvert Cliffs is concluded.
The final issue addressed i n the December 7,1981 BG&E submittal relates to the testing of containment isolation valves via the various isolation signals.
At the present time, TS 4.6.4.1.2 requires isolation valve testing via a con-tainment isolation test signal and a containment bigb-radiation. test signal.
The proposed TS 4.6.4.1.2 provides for isolation valve testing via.the following test signals: (1) containment isolation Channel A or Channel B. (7) cont alnment high-radiation Channel A or Channel !!, arul (3) safety inject ion artnat inn Channel.A nr Channel B.
lhe ident if Ication of the isolation valves, I'. lahle 3.6-1, is proposed for modifIcallon to include a description of the test sip al and channel that actuates each valve. A clarifying note is also proposed f oi the containment purge and isolation valve entries of TS Table 3.6.-1 to indicate that the operability and isolation times for these valves are only applicable during reactor. Modes 5 and 6, consistent with the material presented previously, herein. We have reviewed the proposed modifications to TS 4.6.4.1.2 and TS j
Table 3.6-1 and conclude that.the proposed changes represent an improvement to j
the containment isolation valve surveillanw requirements. The changes require j
the containment isolation valves to be test"d via the function that would actuate these valves under accident conditions. Thus, the proposed changes in-crease the assurance that the containment isolation valves will automatically respond to the appropriate signals, when required.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that t he.onend.nent s do not authorite a t.hange in ef fluent types or total amounts nor an ini rcase in power level and will not resul t in any signif icant environmental impact.' Having made j
i this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an. action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR $51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement'or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of t.hese amendments.
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Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, thatt (1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assu'rance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date:
February 1, 1982 Principal Contributor:
David Jaffe 1
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