ML20041B780
| ML20041B780 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1982 |
| From: | Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041B776 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-81-063, EA-81-63, NUDOCS 8202250194 | |
| Download: ML20041B780 (8) | |
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APPENDIX A NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES Boston Edison Company Docket No. 50-293 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License No. DPR-35 EA 81-63 NRC inspections at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Plymouth, Massachusetts, during the period June 15 to September 30, 1981 and information supplied by the Boston Edison Company identified a lack of management attention over a prolonged period of time resulting in (1) inadequate control of facility changes including design errors, modification and maintenance control breakdowns, and inadequate procedures and drawings, (2) a failure to notify t. e Commission as required, and (3) a material false statement being submitted to the Commission.
As a conse-quence certain safety related functions of systems relied upon to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents were not assured of being available in a post-accident situation.
This lack of attention was found in three areas.
The first area involved the inability to control combustible gases inside containment after a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
A series of breakdowns in design control and operating procedure review activities resulted in an inability to use the installed containment purging system after a postulated LOCA, and a failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.44 from November 27, 1978 to June 5, 1981.
The second area involved the failure to notify NRC of these deficiencies after subsequent design reviews identified them and also involved a material false statement associated with the containment purging system compliance with regulations.
Although Boston Edison Company management stated on October 19, 1979 that the containment combustible gas control system met the requirements and standards imposed by 10 CFR 50.44, information was available to them contradicting such a conclusion since successful operation of the system following a postulated accident was not reasonably assured because of limitations associated with reactor building accessibility.
This limiting aspect was previously recognized in 1974 in proposed FSAR Amendment 35 which was withdrawn by the Boston Edison Company on October 19, 1979.
Moreover, notwithstanding en NRC reouest to supply the basis of the October 19, 1979 statement and the existence of a March 1980 licensee analysis which contradicted the October 19th statement, the NRC was not informed of the error in the October 19, 1979 statement until May 1981.
The third area involved the containment isolation valves in the steam line to the turbine of the reactor core isolation cooling system.
This matter involved a breakdown in the control of planned maintenance activities which resulted in an unacceptable degradation of the reiiability of these valves to close on demand after a postulated steam line break accident.
Containment integrity l
could not be assured in the event of such an accident.
Failure of these valves to close when required during certain accident sequences would cause a significant increase in the amount of radioactive materials released to the environment.
8202250194 820118 PDR ADOCK 05000293 0
PDR L
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1 Appendix A (Continued).
in order to emphasize the need for management to assure that safety-related activities are properly carried out including exercising proper control of maintenance and design activities, making any required notification to NRC of i
design deficiencies, complying with regulatory requirements and submitting accurate information to the NRC, the NRC proposes to impt se civil penalties of $550,000 for these matters.
These penalties are proposed pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, ("Act"), and 10 CFR 2.205.
The violations have been categorized in accordance with the " Criteria for Determining Enforcement Action,"
which was sent to NRC licensees on December 31, 1974 and the Interim Enforcement Policy, 45 FR 66754 (October 7, 1980).
The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below:
I.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, states in part, "III.
Design Control - Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements for...those structures, systems and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions..."
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, states in part, "V.
Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.- Activities atte-ting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circum-stances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings..."
10 CFR 50.44 requires that a combustible gas control. system be providcd for control of post-LOCA combustible gas concentrations ar.d the system be designed to conform to the general requirements of Criteria 41, 42 and 43 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A.
Criterion 41 requires that the system have suitable redundancy in components and features to assure that its safety function can be accomplished, assuming a single failure.
10 CFR 50.59(a) allows operators of a licensed reactor facility to make changes in the facility and in the procedures, as described in the safety analysis report, without prior Commission approval, unless the proposed change involves an unreviewed safety question.
Proposed changes are deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if the consequences of an accident may be increased from those previously described in the safety analysis report.
Contrary to the above, an operable combustible gas control system capable i
of performing its safety function for postulated accidents was not provided l
and the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.44 were not correctly translated into the specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions for the contain-ment purging system to assure that its safety function could be accomplished, in that:
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Appendix A (Continued) a.
Between November 27, 1978, the effective date of 10 CFR 50.44, and May, 1980, the installed nitrogen purge system was incapable of performing the described safety functions (assuming a single failure) without reliance on local operator action.
Areas where the action was required would be inaccessible following certain loss of coolant accidents.
b.
Between April 13, 1979 and June 5, 1981, primary containment atmosphere control system operating procedure No. 2.2.70 specified that both one-inch local manually operated nitgrogen block valves for the make-up supply lines to the atmosphere control system be normally closed.
These valves would be inaccessible following certain postulated loss of coolant accidents.
After modification of the containment atmosphere control system to provide sufficient redundancy in May 1980, design control measures did not assure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.44 were correctly translated into procedures and instructions because, despite the fact that design requirements of the plant modifications required these valves to be open, operating procedure No. 2.2.70, Appendix A continued to specify that the block valves be in a closed position.
c.
On or about April 13, 1979, Revision 11 to the primary containment atmosphere control system operating procedure No. 2.2.70, was approved for implementation without conducting an adequate safety evaluation to determine whether an unreviewed safety question was involved.
This revision resulted in changing the position of both one-inch local manually operated nitrogen block valves for the make-up supply lines from " locked open" to " closed".
Although reliance on local operator action inside the reactor building during routine operations may be appropriate, this change degraded the capabilities of the system such that there was not reasonable assurance that operators would have been able to control combustible gases within containment following a LOCA.
This change was made without seeking prior Commission approval, and without conducting an adequate evaluation of the safety significance of the change in order to determine whether an unreviewed safety question was involved.
d.
On April 13, 1979, following implementation of Revision 11 to i
primary containment atmosphere control system operating procedure No. 2.2.70, Appendix A, the licensee failed to ensure that related procedures and drawings affected by this revision were of a type appropriate to the circumstances in that:
(1)
System Drawing P&ID 6498-M-227 was not revised to show that the position of the two one-inch local hand operated nitrogen block l
valves was changed from " locked open" to " closed".
(2)
Emergency Procedure 5.4.6, " Post Accident Venting," was not revised to indicate that operators would be required to enter the reactor building in order to open the closed nitrogen block i
valves.
Appendix A (Continued) As a result of the above, the plant was operated at power for a total of 735 days (Appendix B) from November 27, 1978 until June 5, 1981 without an operable combustible gas control system which met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.44.
Each day of failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.44 while operating at power constitutes a separate violation.
Prior to June 30, 1980, the Commission's civil penalty authority was limited to imposition of a civil penalty of $5,000 per day with a maximum of $25,000 for any 30 consecutive day period.
Since June 30, 1980, the Commission has been authorized to impose a civil penalty of
$100,000 per day for each violation.
The Interim Enforcement Policy, published October 7,1980, provides penalties of up to $40,000 per day for violations of this nature.
After considering the significance of this case in comparison to those of other licensees where civil penalties were imposed, civil penalties of $250,000 are being proposed for these Severity Level III violations.
II.
10 CFR 50.44, Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light Water Cooled Power Reactors, requires that, effective November 27, 1978, the L
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station have an installed "... purging system...
provided that the purging system and any filtration system associated with it are designed to conform with the general requirements of Criteria 41, 42, and 43 of Appendix A to this part."
In a letter dated October 19, 1979 from the Boston Edison Company to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the statement was made that
" Based upon our analysis, we comply with 10 CFR 50.44 with existing equipment."
t Technical Specification 6.9.B.1(i) states in part, "1.
Prompt Notification With Written Followup.
The types of events listed below shall be reported l
as expeditiously as possible, but within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by telephone and con-firmed by telegraph, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the Director of the appropriate Regional Office, or his designate, no later than the first working day following the event, with a written followup report within two weeks.
...(i).. discovery during plant life of conditions not specifically considered in the safety analysis report or technical specifications that require remedial action or corrective measures to prevent the existence or development of an unsafe condition."
Contrary to the above, the statement in the licensee's October 19, 1979 letter is a material false statement within the meaning of Section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act.
It is false because the facility did not comply with 10 CFR 50.44 with existing equipment on October 19, 1979 in that the assumption that local operator action could be used to satisfy the single failure criterion was incorrect.
The statement of compliance contained a caveat that compliance was based upon an analysis, which implied that an appropriate analysis had been prepared, reviewed, and documented.
No analysis has been provided the NRC despite the Commission's October 30, 1979 request for the analysis supporting the October 19, 1979 statement.
In fact, operator access had been recognized to be limited based on habitability in prior submittals to the NRC.
Amendment 35 to the FSAR, I
dated January 28, 1974 contained a description of means and controls, in l
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Appendix A (Continued) addition to the existing installed system, to be provided for limiting combustible gas concentration in the containment following the postulated design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
Although this amendment was withdrawn by the licensee on October 19, 1979, the design criteria for the 1
proposed system indicated that personnel access to the reactor building for local actions following a LOCA was considered to be a limiting aspect based on expected radiation levels.
This false statement is material in that had the Commission been correctly informed on October 19, 1979 that the Pilgrim facility did not comply with 10 CFR 50.44, prompt remedial action would have been required.
Further, on or before March 28, 1980, the licensee determined that local operator action to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.44 could not i
be assured because post-LOCA radiation levels may cause the reactor building to be inaccessible, a condition not specifically considered in the safety analysis report or Technical Specifications, and that remedial action was required.
However, the licensee failed to report this determination as required by the Technical Specifications.
As a result of the above, the licensee knew from March 28, 1980 to May 29, 1981 that their October 19, 1979 letter contained inaccurate information.
The initial material false statement is a violation.
Each day of failure to correct the inaccurate information after becoming known to the licensee constitutes a separate violation.
Prior to June 30, 1980, the Commission's civil penalty authority was limited to imposition of a civil penalty of $5,000 per day with a maximum of
$25,000 for any 30 consecutive day period.
Since June 30, 1980, the Commission has been authorized to impose a civil penalty of $100,000 per day for each violation.
The Interim Enforcement Policy, published October 7,1980, provides penalties of up to $40,000 per day for violations of this nature.
In assessing the civil penalties in this case, the following circumstances were considered:
the significance of the material false statement, nacceptable action by the' Pilgrim management in not notifying the NRC that it had provided inaccurate in-formation to the NRC, and the fact that compliance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.44 was achieved soon after the NRC was notified on May 29, 1981.
In view of the above, civil penalties of $250,000 are being proposed for these Severity Level III violations.
III. A lack of proper management planning and control of maintenance activities resulted in a violation of the containment integrity limiting condition for operation.
As a result of the inspection conducted at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station on September 16-17, 1981, it was discovered that this breakdown in proper maintenance controls resulted in operation of the plant at power for approximately 89 hours0.00103 days <br />0.0247 hours <br />1.471561e-4 weeks <br />3.38645e-5 months <br /> with the containment isolation control logic for the two open RCIC steam supply isolation valves partially disabled.
This significantly reduced the assurance that the isolation valves would automatically close when required.
Failure of these valves to close when required during certain accident sequerices would cause a significant increase in the amount of radioactive materials released to the environment.
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Appendix A (Continued) Technical Specification 3.2.B, Core and Containment Cooling System Initiation and Control, requires that if the minimum number of operable instrument channels per trip system cannot be met for one of the trip systems, that system shall be repaired or the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after this trip system is made or found to be inoperable.
This Specification also requires closing of r
the isolation valves in the RCIC subsystem when the required number of trip systems are not operable.
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Technical Specification 3.7.D, Primary Containment Isolation Valves, requires that the reactor be placed in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if at least one primary containment isolation valve is not shut in a line which has an inoperable isolation valve.
Contrary to the above, between 10:38 p.m. on September 13, 1981 and 3:19 p.m. on September 16, 1981, the reactor was operated at power in the Run Mode with the two RCIC containment isolation valves (MOV 1301-16, and 1301-17) opened and inoperable, in that the number of operable instrument channels was reduced below the minimum required for the high temperature and high steam flow trip circuits and all instrument channels in the RCIC turbine steam line low pressure trip circuit were inoperable.
This is a Severity Level III Violation (Supplement I).
(Civil Penalty - $50,000).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Boston Edison Company is hereby required to submit to this office within 30 days of the date of this Notice a written statement or exp!anation, including for each alleged violation:
(1) admission or denial of the alleged violation; (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted; (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (4) the corrective steps wnich will be taken to avoid further violations; and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown.
Under the autho'.ity of section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, Boston Edison Company may pay the civil penalties in the cumulative amount of $550,000 or may protest imposition of the civil penalties in whole or in part by a written answer.
Should Boston Edison Company fail to answer within the time specified, this office will issue an order imposing the civil penalties in the amounts proposed above.
Should Boston Edison Company elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalties, such answer may:
(1) deny the violations listed in this Notice in whole or in part; (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances; (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalties should not be imposed.
In addition to protesting the civil penalties in whole or in part, such answer may request i
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7-Appendix A (Continued)
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3 remission or mitigation of the penalties.
Any written answer in accordance r
with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explana-f 4
tion in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate by specific reference (e.g., giving page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition.
Boston Edison i
Company's attention is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, i
regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalties due, which have been subsequently i
determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalties, unless com-promised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282.
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FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j l' / 6 f ~
Richard C. 0 Y ung, Di ctor i
Office of I ection and Enforcement Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this /j?
day of January 1982 F
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i APPENDIX B Days the Pilgrim Facility was Operated at Power During the Period November 27, 1978 to June 5, 1981 Month / Year Dates Unit Was Operating
- Number of Days Nov. '78 27 through 30 4
Dec. '78 1 through 31 31 Jan. '79 1 through 31 31 Feb. '77 1 through 28 28 Mar. '79 1 through 25, 30 through 31 27 Apr. '79 1 through 30 30 May
'79 1 through 12, 30 through 31 14 June '79 1 through 30 30 l
July '79 1 through 11, 17 through 27, 24 30 through 31 Aug. '79 1 through 31 31 j
Sep. '79 1 through 30 30 i
Oct. '79 1 through 31 31 Nov. '79 1 through 30 30 Dec. '79 1 through 31 31 Jan. '80 1 through 5 5
2 Feb. '80 Mar. '80 (Refueling Outa'ge)
Apr. '80 May
'80 19, 21 through 31 12 June '80 1 through 30 30 July '80 1 through 25, 27 through 31 30 Aug. '80 1, 3 through 30 29 Sep. '80 1 through 30 30 Oct. '80 1, 6 through 31 27 Nov. '80 1 through 6, 14 through 30 23 Dec. '80 1 through 31 31 Jan. '81 1 through 31 31 Feb. '81 1 through 28 28 Mar. '81 11 through 31 21 j
Apr. '81 1 through 30 30 l
May
'81 1 through 31 31 June '81 1 through 5 5
Total TE l
Data from licensee's monthly report submittals.