ML20041B684

Summary of 820107 Meeting w/C-E & C-E Owners Group in Bethesda,Md Re Emergency Operating Procedure Guidelines & Staff Comments on Technical Guidelines Submission (CEN-152 & CEN-156).List of Attendees Encl

ML20041B684
Person / Time
Issue date:	02/05/1982
From:	Goodman M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8202250054
Download: ML20041B684 (13)

Text

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ISTRIBUTION Central F11es 3 TRS'Ileading NRC PDR LPCrocker MGoodman FEB 0 51982 BClayton WMiddleton DChaney WKennedy MElX)RANDUM FOR: Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief JClifford.

Procedures and Test Review Branch Division of Human Factors Safety original signed by THRU:

H. Brent Clayton, Acting Section Leader Section A - Procedures tn g

Procedures and Test Review Branch a

Division of Human Factors Safety i

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FROM:

Michael J. Goodman

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.g Section A Procedures

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40 Procedures and Test Review Branch 7

Division of Human Factors Safety

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s AND COMBUSTION ENGINEERING OWNERS' GROUP ON k [d

SUBJECT:

SUMMRY OF MEETING WITH COMBUSTION ENGINEERING EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE GUIDELINES, JANUARY 7,1982 On July 24, 1981, a meeting was held with Combustion Engineering (C.E.)

and the C.E Owners' Group to discuss staff coments on their technical

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guidelines submission (CEN-152 and CEN-156). As a result of this meeting a letter was sent to the C.E. Owners' Group on September 15, 1981, outlining staff concerns.

In response to this letter a meeting was requested by C.E. to discuss the incorporation of staff concerns into their guidelines program. This meeting was held in Bethesda on January 7, 1982. A list of attendees is enclosed (Enclosure 1).

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C.E. presented their program.using a series of viewgraphs (see

-. ), from which it appeared that the operator is provided with both an " optimal recovery path" and " functional recovery path."

l With the onset of an accident, a decision is made to choose one path over another, depending upon whether the operator "knows" the i

initiating event. Where such a diagnosis is not immediately possible, the functional recovery path is chosen. Where the event is "known,"

the optimal recovery path is chosen. The functional recovery path is structured so that the status of Critical Safety Functions (e.g.,

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reactivity control, RCS inventory control, RCS pressure control, 9,h i RCS heat removal ~and core heat removal)'are checked, restored and

/ gu maintained.

For the optimal recovery path, where it is determined g

that the diagnosis is incorrect or that specific critical safety

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functions based on the assumed event are not being fulfilled, U

t operator actions are channeled to the function recovery path.

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G is.,.i... dia v.;i li h.Tule widle in Unw Fundiun s

""c'>.I.eco.very. Mh....the..o.p.erAtor...is.. chance) ed..to...the..appn pr.i nte........

.uorp optimal recovery procedure.

8202250054 820205 PDR TOPRP ENVC-E C

PDR NRC FORM 318 HO,801NRCM O240

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T Dennis L. Ziemann FEB o g 199g In the oral presentation, C.E. stated that after a plant transient the operator entered both the optimal recovery path and the functicnal recovery path. The staff indicated that it was proferable to enter the function recovery path regardless of whether the event was known because the "known" event may be incorrect or multiple events may occur.

C.E. responded that it was their intent to do so and their diagram would have to be modified to reflect this.

Some other concerns that were expressed by the staff are as follows:

1.

It was not clear whether the monitoring of all functions' status would be carried out while operating in the optimal recovery path.

In addition, it was questioned whether the list of critical functions for each optimal recovery procedure covered all the possible functions of concern by the operator.

2.

The staff indicated that additional information on C.E.'s method for validating the technical guidelines (using workshop seminars) would be needed before the acceptability of their approach could be determined.

3.

The frequency of monitoring critical safety functions while in an optimal recovery procedure needs to be justified.

The staff indicated that the approach proposed at the meeting appeared to be a significant improvement over the previous submission, and the C.E. Owners' Group agreed to consider the concerns outlined above in finalizing their approach.

Since a formal submittal of the Technical Guidelines was not made, the adequacy of the program could not be determined by the staff.

C.E. indicated that more coraplete information would be available on the functional recovery guidelines by April 1, but a final submittal would not be available until some time after that. The staff indicated that it would not be necessary to resolve every outstanding issue by April 1.

It was agreed that the staff would work as closely as necessary with the C.E. Owners' Group to resolve any outstanding issues, and the meeting was adjourned.

"M l signed by i

Michael J. Goodman Section A - Precedures

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Procedures and Test Review Branch Division of Human Factors Safety Fnclosures-1.

List of Attendees DHF

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LIST OF ATTENDEES JANUARY 7, 1982 COMBUSTION ENGINEERING / COMBUSTION ENGINEERING OWNERS' GROUP NRC Brent Clayton Don Beckham Dennis Ziemann Mike Goodman Bill Middleton Dennis Chaney Bill Kennedy l

Jim Clifford Hugh Thompson (Part-time)

C.E.

Vince Callaghan Gordon Bischoff Bill Burchill John Fogarty C.E. Owners' Group Larry A. Taylor, AP&L John Barrow, FP&L Joe Gasper, OPPD Jim Wilson, WPPSS Ed Sterling, APS Steve Scace, NU Al Rivers, MYAPC Rene Brunet, SCE John Carroll, BG&E Donald A. Crouch, LP&L Ray Burski, LP&L Joseph G. Edcards, Jr., LP&L Gary S. Pavit, BG&E INP0 i

Dennis L. Fadden 1

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7 C-E OWNERS GROUP EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES PRESENTATION TO NRC t

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JANUARY 7,

]982

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NORMAL OPERATION 1P LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION (S) if ASSOCIATE SYMPTOMS WITH i

l LOS3 OF FUNCTION YES OPERATOR NO UNDERSTANDS SYMPTOMS i

V 1r REACTIVITY CONTROL STATUS AND TRENDING DIAGNOSTIC l

REACTOR TRIP REACTIVITY CONTROL ATWS RCS HEAT REMOVAL RCS HEAT REMOVAL CON ROL I

LOSS OF FEED

, LOSS OF FLOW /NC EP S STEAM LINE BREAK PRESSURE AND INVENTORY CONTROL LOCA STEAM GENERATOR TUSE l

RUPTURE l

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EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATION

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LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION (S) 4.__

ASSOCIATE SYMPTOMS WITH LOSS OF FUNCTION F

YES PERATOR NO OPTIMAL UNDERSTANDS FUNCTIONAL HECOVERY YMPTONS RECOVERY PATri PATH iP OPERATOR SELECTS

'P CORRESPONDING PROCEDURE CRITICAL SAFETY F UNCTICN m

4 STA TUS CHECK OPERATOR IMPLEMENTS b

OPTIMAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE OPERATOR SELECTS IMMEDIATE ACTIONS THOSE SAFETY FUNCTIONS (INCLU0tNG STANDARD POST IN JEOPARDY TRIP ACTIONS) 4 h

OPERATOR SELECTS T'10SE OPERATO R IMPLEMENTS SUCCESS PATHS AVAILABLE OPTIMAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE TO RESTORE OR FULFILL FOLLOW UP ACTIONS SAFETY FUNCTIONS

1. VERIFY COMPLETION OF m

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IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 4

OPE R ATO R IMPLEME NTS RE' 0VER Y ACTIONS

2. VERIFY DIAGNOSIS USING EVENT SPECIFIC CRITERI A I

O!AGNOSIS NO CORRECT YES YES OPERATOR PERFORMS SYSTEMATIC DIAGNOSIS 1 CONFIRM ADEQUACY OF.

CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS i

YES O!AGNOSIS FUNCTIONS NO l

POSSIBLE FULFILLED NO PERIODIC CHECKS YES OPERATOR CONTINUES IMPLEMENTING CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURES FOLLOW UP ACTIONS LEAD TO SHUT 00WN TO SAFE SHUT 00WN

10. Every 10 minutes verify that all critical safety functions are being satisfied by comparing control bo:rd parameters to the criteria below; w

SAFETY FUNCTION NORMAL POST _ TRIP ACCEPTANCE CRITEI A R

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1)

Reactivity Control a)

Reactor power decreasing and b) 1/3 DPM start up rate and c) less than 10 CEA bottom lites not lit 2)

RCS Inventory Control a)

Pressurizer level > 10%

3)

RCS Pressure Control a) 2300 psia < Pressurizer Pressure < 1800 psia 0

41 Core Heat Removal a)

RCS Tave < 590 F and j

b)

Core exit thermocouples < 620 F i

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c)

Subcooled Margin Monitor > 20 F Subcooling i

5)

RCS Heat Removal a) 50% < Steam Generator Level < 90%

and b)

RCS Tave < 590 F

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11. IF the above Critir.al Safety Functions are satisfied THEN continue with the Follow-up Actions of this guideline.

IF NOT, implement the Functional Recovery Guideline.

12. Shut down the main turbine generator [in accordance with operating inst ru cti ons. ]

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Entry Conditions

1) Several concurrent. abnormal conditions with no immediately apparent diagnosis or cause 08

2) A reactor trip and unusual concurrent symptoms with no immediately apparent diagnosis or cause 0g

3) Any condition or pattern of symptoms which the operator considers serious and for which abnormal or emergency guidance cannot be identified.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

1) JJ[ the reactor has not tripped with power decreasing and a neoative startup rate THEN manually trip the reactor.

2)',IF the turbine has not tripped THEN marually trip the turbine and verify the turbine stop valves are shut.

3) JF the turbine generator output breakers are not open THEN manually trip the turbine generator output breakers.

4) If the station loads are not transferred to offsite power THEN align offsite power to station loads.

5) jf, RCS pressure is less than 1300 psia THEN stop all reactor coolant pumps.

6) JF steam generator level is not within X% < S/G ivl < X%

THEN either:

a) initiate and take manual control of main feed to restore level to within X% < S/G ivl < X%

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initiate and take manual control of auxiliary feed to restore b

level to within X% < S/G lvl < X%.

7) CIRCLE the critical safety functions in the critical safety function assessment

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chart which are not beino fulfilled by comparing control board indications with the criteria.

Evaluate all the safety functions before going on to the plant resource assessment trees.

_a ASSESS g THESE FIRST

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R E SPONS&

SAFETY FUNCTION CRITERIA TREE 1

a) R PwR OECRE ASING l

ANO I

R E SPONSE 11 RE ACTivlTV CONTROL -

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bl 1/3 OPPA STARTUP R ATE iF NOT GO TO TREE A

I ANO c) LESS THAN CE A ROTTOM g

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R E SPONSL

2) RCS INVENTORY CONTROL 7'

a) X% > PRZ LVL > 10".

IF NOT GO TO TREE 8

l RESPok$E il RCS PRESSURE CONTROL

l al 2300 PSI A > PZA PRESS > 1800 PSI A IF NOT GO TO TREE C

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al Th T,<1@F l

46 CORE HE AT REMOVAL

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bi CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLES < 620*F iF NOT co 70 1

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1 cl SUSCOOLEO MARGIN MONITOR l

> 2fF SU8 COOLING TREE D

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al 90% > S!G LVL > SO% ANO l

CONST AN T OR INCR E ASING 15 NOT GO TO /

5) RCS ME AT RE uCV AL

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bl RCS T, < 50*F l

RESPONSE

64 COf*TAINMENT ISOLATION Tj al NO AREA R AO MONITORS AL ARMING IF NOT GO TO TREE g

E al CONT AINM(NT PRESSURE < 2 PSIG l

R ESPONSE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE ANO TEMPERATURE M M

IF NOT GO TO TREE h

L3 CONT AINUENT TEMPE R ATUf1E < 125'F

RESPONSE

l at ' PLANT SPECIFIC INFOI IF NOT GO TO TREE 81 MA4NTENANCE OF blTAL AUXILI ARIES 7,

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RESPONSE

al (PL ANT SPECIFIC tNFOI 18 NOT GO TO TREE 91 CONTalNMENT COMBUST 18LF G AS CONTRO', em$bl 8

RE SPONSE an ;PL ANT SPECIFIC INFO) tF NOT GO TO TREE 101 INOIRECT R AOlOACTIVE RELE ASE CONT ROL %

I 1P SAFETY FUNCTIONS Rs TRIP IN O

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g, xxx JEOP A R OY' YEt 1

FOR THOSE SAF ETY FUNCTIONS IN JEOPapOV. GO TO THE RESPONSE

$ INDICATED TO THE RIGHT. PERFORM THE RECOVERY ACTtONS FcR TwE FiRST RESPONSE TREE SEFO9E GOING ON TO THE NEXT.

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RECOVERY ACTION PROCEDURE RCSIC - 1 RCS Inventory Control - CVCS Charging 1.

Secure or minimize letdown.

2.

Start or verify running all available charging pumps to increase pressurizer level to > {10%).

3.

Verify adequate suction sources to the charging pumps.

If necessary, use the VCT, boric acid storage tanks and RilT.

PRECAUTIONS 1.

Do not increase pressurizer level >{X}%.

2.

Maintain RCS subcooling 3 {20 F + inaccuracies) and RCS pressure within the 0

limits of the P-T curve of Technical Specification (XX.XX}.

CRITERIA 1.

If the following criteria are met:

a)

Pressurizer level >{10%}.

b)

If (a) cannot be satisfied then reactor vessel level is above the core and; c)

Core exit thermocouples <{620 F) and constant or decreasing 0

then RCS inventory control is satisfied.

Go to the next safety function in jeopardy or to the diagnostic if all safety functicas are fulfilled.

2.

If the criteria are not met, then RCS inventory control is still in jeopardy.

Go to the next appropriate success path on plant resource assessment tree B.

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