ML20040G027

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Comments on Draft Safety Evaluation of SEP Topic IV-2, Reactivity Control Sys. Comments Should Be Incorporated Into Revised Evaluation
ML20040G027
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 02/03/1982
From: Cagnetta J, Counsil W
CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-04-02, TASK-4-2, TASK-RR A02189, A2189, NUDOCS 8202110119
Download: ML20040G027 (2)


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CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY BERLIN. CO N N ECTIC U T P. O. BOM 270 H ARTFORD. CONN ECTICUT 06101 Yn a pwose s February 3, 1982 m

g DOCKET No. 50-213 NN MECStygg A02189 d

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9; a Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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I Attn:

Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief G)

Operatin), Reactors Branch #5 g

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission W

Washington, D.C.

20555

References:

(1) Letter, D. M. Crutchfield to W. G. Counsil dated December 23, 1981 (2) Letter, W. G. Counsil to D. M. Crutchfield, dated May 18, 1981 Gentlemen:

HADDAM NECK PLANT SEP TOPIC IV-2, REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTDIS Via Reference (1), the Staff forwarded draft evaluation for SEP Topic IV-2, Reactivity Control Systems, for the Haddam Neck Plant. The Staff's evaluation was based upon information provided by Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) in Reference (2). CYAPCO has reviewed Reference (1) and has the following comments:

Segtion V of Reference (1) states that as a result of a single failure, two banks of shutdown or control rods may move simultaneously instead of one bank. CYAPC0 acknowledges that two control banks may move simul-taneously, instead of one bank, as a result of a single failure, however, CYAPCO reiterates the statement from Reference (2) that no single failure will permit simultaneous motion of both shutdown banks. There are redundant interlocks which prevent selection of the other shutdown group when one shutdown group is already selected, and which block motion by preventing energization of the lift coils in the other shutdown group when one shutdown group is selected. Therefore, a single failure which could cause both shutdown groups to be selected would also prevent either shutdown group from stcpping in or out.

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CYAPC0 has concluded that the balance of the Staff's evaluation is Correct.

We trust these conunents will be appropriately incorporated into a re-vised Safety Evaluation Report for this SEP topic.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER ~ COMPANY-NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY 6

W. G. Counsil Senior Vice President t

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By: J(jPJ Cagnetta -ff Vice President Nucletf and Environmental Engineering I