ML20040E234
| ML20040E234 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/19/1982 |
| From: | Debons A Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Ward D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-CT-1399, NUDOCS 8202040046 | |
| Download: ML20040E234 (4) | |
Text
O I- /5 Vf TO:
Dr. D. Ward, Chai nnan ACRS Subcommittee on Human Factors Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 FROM:
Anthony Debons, Ph.D.
Professor of Infonnation Science Consultant to the ACRS Subcommittee /
DATE:
December 2,1981
SUBJECT:
Consultation Report SCRS Meeting of November 2,1981 1.0 General Overview An individual assessment of the overview presented by the staff of the Di /ision of Human Factors Safety (DHFS) provided the following conclusions:
1.1 Human factor problems related to reactor safety have been identified in several amas.
1.1.1 Imorovement in human discrimination functions to insure improved reaction times and error detections is acknowledged in msearch program.
1.1.2 Data overloading in operator dysfunction remains uncertain both as to function and significance to overall system performance.
1.1.3 Available documentation provides a " reasonable" scenario for estimating human breakdown in crisis situations, but these are at present insufficiently addressed as to ameliorative measures (consistent with human limits) that should be tested and guidelines established for such circumstances.
1.2 There is a lack of a comprehensive information system to guide the decision making and problem solving functions of the envi ronment.
8202040046 820119 PDR ACRS CT-1399 PDR
i i 1.3 There is insufficient representation of human factor specialists to guide the continuing evolutionary development of the nuclear plants.
2.0 Specific Human Factor Considerations 2.1 Discrimination Capabilities 2.1.1 It is not possible to comment on the worthiness of present color coding capabilities for the specific envi ronment. Many of the military specifications are based on data gathered from military aircraft, submarine, etc. An assessaent of color coding schenes should be based on lighting conditions encountered in nuclear plant operations.
This consultant will undertake a study of present documentation and submit a separate assessment as an addendum to this report.
2.1.2 The extent of displays available to the nuclear plant operator requires experiments that are multidimensional in scope.
Few conclusions on coding standards are possible based on data that have been generated on limited display envi ronments.
It is presumed that as data loading increases, coding formulations demand greater sensitivity for discri-mination.
2.2 Data Overloading What is clear from the many available reports is the massive amount of data that requires responsiveness by operators.
This item relates to the need for a comprehensive system i
analysis in generating an information system for the respective i
plants. The technical aspect of this issue is discussed at length in section 3.0 of this report.
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d k 2.3 Crisis Scenarios Simulation of plant operations provide a basis for the study of a number of variables (related to both human factors and inforaation management).
It was not possible to study these scenarios in time for this report.
A separate state-ment will be submitted as an addendum to this report.
3.0 Information Management 3.1 The most striking conclusion derived from the review is the absence of a comprehensive information system to guide the operation of the nuclear plant.
A comprehensive schema of data flow through the system along the following model of an information system is not discernible.
Event - the classification and categorization of circumstances directly impacting on the nuclear plant.
Acquisition - those sensing mechanisms available to elicit the event for which the total environment (system) is required to be responsive.
1 Transmission - those mechanisns that provide the transporting of signals from the environnent (event) to the I
processing component (computer).
This includes electronic display devices that serve as transporters.
Processing - the hardware / software capabilities for processing the events critical to the plants.
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The interlinks between the foregoing components of the system are the control mechanisms which are implicit in a viable, operating system.
The objective of such a system is to aid the problem solving and decision making functions implicit / explicit in the operational requirements of a nuclear plant.
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..l Utilization - the formal decision, problem solving rules that are antecedent to action. Thic involves both machine and human interfaces in such functions.
Transfer - the mechanisms for the implementation of the action.
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