ML20040D805
| ML20040D805 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1982 |
| From: | Aamodt M AAMODTS |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040D806 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8202020271 | |
| Download: ML20040D805 (14) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEE,0RE-THE ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING BOARD 4
In The Matter Of
)
Metropolitan Edison Company
)
Three Mile Island
)
Docket 50-289
(
Nuclear Generating Station
)
Unit I
)
AAMODT COM5!ENTS RELATIVE-TO THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS OF PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION OF DECEMBER 14, 1981 - EMERGENCY PLANNING ISSUES 8202020271 820126 O
PDR ADOCK 05000289 1
Q PDR y
I i
i-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES i
Information Transmittal 1
Public Education 2
Emergency Plans for Farmers 5
-i -'-
l t-
SUMMARY
The Aamodts contend that the Board's-Partial-Initial Decision.of December 14, 1981 - Emergency ~ Planning Issues is defective in its response'to three issues of this proceeding
- in which the'Aamodts made findings, that these deficiencies are substantial and that the Partial Initial Decision should not be made immediately effective.
These deficiencies are:
I.
INFORMATION TRANSMITTAL The Licensee's Emetgency Plan relies on the use of. ordinary telephone circuits to provide emergency notification and data transmicsion to the' surrounding counties during an emergency.
These lines can be~
'l 1
expected to be busy when called.upon, j
II.
PUBLIC EDUCATION The public information programs are deficient in four respects:
1.
Guidance has not been provided with regard to-content.
2.
Accountability for the' performance of the several responsible agencies is-not' defined.
3.
The plans fail to provide accurate or. suitable
. educational material relative to the health effects.of ionizing radiation.
l 4.
County and PEMA brochures are to be distributed lacking necessary revisions.
III.
EMERGENCY PLANS FOR. FARMERS The. Board grossly,.misappropriately and predjudicially mischaracterizes the Aamodt findings.
In addition, the Board essentially ignores the best evidence of active farmers, Veterinarians and county agents called by the 33 i
-ii-Aamodts.
Instead, the: Board-goes to-the-testimony; of inexperienced' bureau'crats to cite-_ support for its. findings.
As a result, the? Board finds'that; plan which: farmers, veterinarians and. county a
agents demonstrate to be. inadequate to'the extent that effective-protective action cannot be'taken is -- f ound to "not adversely affect" the health and safety of the farm-population.
. I.
INFORMATION TRANSMITTAL 1.
Board finding 1517.
Contrary to the Boards finding, Licensees' Emergency Plan does not provide for direct and immediate notification on emergency declaration to Dauphin County or, in the case of a general emergency, to all 5 counties in the plume EPZ.
The Board correctly notes that contact is made by telephone, and "if contact cannot be made by this method" by the various county radio systems.
The telephone circuits to be used can be expected to be " busy" Tr 14,12 3 (GI ANGIl Licensee failed to demonstrate conclusively that radio channels could not
.be over loaded.
Further, any delay can be disastrous because 1) rapid escalation.of action levels is possible Tr 14,119 (GI ANGI) and 2) this step-by-step approach at notification could result in failure to notify counties in the event of rapid escalation of action levels Tr 14,116(TSAGGARIS).
In view of the low cost involved in providing dedicated telephone lines to the 5 counties it boggles the mind to imagine why this simple solution is not provided.
~
2.
Board finding 1518.
The Board is in error in finding that " Licensee has provided for transmissions of data and plant... observations...to Dauphin, York and Lancaster Counties in a timely fashion".
The auto-dialer telephone uses ordinary telephone circuits which can be expected to be " busy" Tr 14,123(GIANGIl e
II.
PUBLIC EDUCATION 3.
Contention EP-1 addresses the issue of removal of the impediment of complacency.
Clearly, the most direct method to meet this objective to clearly inform the public of the risk it faces.
The relavent portion of EP-1 (AAMODT CONTENTION 4) states " Licensee must make information available which will allow appropriate actions to be takne to prot'ect persons...".
The Board in it's findings 1524-1537 fails to address the key element of this portion of the contention - "will allow...
action to be takne...".
The implicit concern is that
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the population at risk'c'an be~ expected to take " appropriate action" in the event of an emergency.
The NRC stated in response to interrogatories and affirmed on the record that "an advance educational program relating to the hazards of radiation" (couplcd with confidence and trust in local response agencies and prior instructions on emergency actions) will " provide assurance that proper.
protection actions will be taken by the public".
AAMODT Tr 14,517, finding Paragraph 7.
Further, NRC testified that the perception that nuclear power is " safe" can cause the public to not take notification seriously.
Tr 15,408(GRIMES)
The Board in its finding 1525 correctly summarizes the goal of (the) public information program to include " educational materials on radiation...and...information for special groups..." and correctly states that "these materials should be so designed that the information is easily understood by the public".
4.
Board finding 1526.
The Aamodts do not call for an " overly detailed public information program".
Further, the Board assertion that "the Aamodts would have a detailed program
+
on the health effects of ionizing radiation" is a gross
-mischaracterization of Aamodt findings Paragraph 7,8,9.
- Rather, Paragraph 7 calls for an advance educational program relating to the hazards of radiation.
Paragraph 8 asserts that this in formation has not been made available to the public.
Paragraph 9 asserts that the Commonwealth's brochure (to be distributed by Licensee) in its final form is misleading, Tr 18078-80 (Com'ey) Tr 18,980-1 (Ad le r).
The Aamodts do noc call for "too much detailed information" but for accurate, complete and relavent public information material.
Specifically, the Aamodts contend that the analogy of ionizing radiation (emitted from a nuclear power plant) to sunlight is misleading in the context of the PEMA brochure (Commonwealth Exhibit 3).
This analogy fosters a perception of innocuousnes's which is grossly inapproprite.
Beyond this, the Aamodt case simply calls for a forth-right statment of the unique hazard faced by more susceptible groups such as pregnant women and individuals who had been previously exposed (infra).
This information could be included in two paragraphs of 50 words or less - hardly a
" detailed program on the health effects of ionizing radiation".
5.
Regard finding 1527..The requirement of NUREG-0654 for general information on the effects of radiation has not been met.
The more susceptible members of the population are not considered Tr 14,135 (ROGAN),
6.
Contrary to the Board's finding 1528, there are no criteria available to PEMA with regard to quality or content of public in f o r ma t i o'n programs as they relate to the effects i
. of radiation.
Tr 14, 134 (ROGAN).
Further, the assign-ment of responsibility for the public information programs to a' troika of " responsible agencies" is not sufficient.
The fact remains that specific legal authority with regard to determining, implementing and maintaining a public information program rests with no agency Tr 14,131 (ROGAN).
Accountability rests nowhere.
The Board addresses accountability in the time frame of this proceeding.
Finding 1528 is further flawed in that it makes no provision for continuing accountability.
(11 inf ra).
7.
The Board errs in finding that the Commonwealth "has set forth a comprehensive public infomration program" implying sufficiency,' finding 1529.
The record clearly shows that this information is deficient-(5 supra).
8.
Board finding 1533.
The Licensee public information program is deficient in it's failure to heighten the awareness of the public to the hazards of radiation (4.5 supra), (9 infra).
9.
Board finding 1534.
The PEMA pamphlet is not acceptable in content.
The analogy of ionizing radiation to sunlight is undul, strained and misserves the public (4 supra).
10.
Board finding 1536.
The Board errs in denying the Commonwealth's requirement that distribution of county and PEMA brochures be withheld until all changes and revisions desired by the Commonwealth are made.
The ad-ditions and changes sought by the Aamodts should be included (4.5 supr a).-
11.
Board finding 1537.
The Boa'rd errs in it's conclusion that sufficient guidelines are in place about which to structure (the) public information program (4,5,6 supra).
III. EMERGENCY PL NS FOR FARMERS 1.
The Board's se'cond Partial Initial Decision is severely faulted in its findings concerning emergency plans for farmers in the vicinity of.TMI-1.
Partial Initial Decision, December 14, 1981, paragraphs 1919 - 1932, 1934, 1937, 1940.
2.
The Board makes apologies for the deficiencies in the agricultural emergency response plans, hoping that the farmers, county agents and veterinarians on their own initiative will overcome the deficiencies.
Id.,
paragraph 1940.
3.
The Board, contrary to the record evidence, finds that the admittdd deficiencies in the agricultural emergency plans can, in the event of a radiological emergency, only adversely affect the health and safety of livestock and cannot affect the health and safety of the caretakers of the livestock.
Id.
4.
The farmers, county agents and veterinarians who test-fied before the Board clearly made the point that farmers are constrained in taking protective action for themselves because of their humanitarian concern for their livestock.
The bonds between the animals and their caretakers are firmly established, and those bonds will cause the farmers to be the last'to leave, if they leave at all.
Consider the testimony of the witnesses:
Paul Lytle:
We know them (his'100 cows) all by name because we grew up with them.
They are members of'our f amily j ust - like you have employees and we treat them as such and respect them as that. Tr. 18, 691.
Dr. Robert Weber, DVM: I think that most times they would rather die than leave their animals there, and I think they.would stay.
Tr. 18, 787.
John.Snith, Agr. Agent:
..if they do not love and respect their animals, they are probably not doing a very good job.
(Farmers would be unwilling to leave their livestock) because of'their love of their livestock...It would be tough for them to walk away.
Smith ff. 18, 749 at.3.
-6 5.
.The Board finds'that,.although the farmer may'be faced with aEdilemmarin-the event ofla radiological emergency,'the
- farmer has~a' choice.
PID, paragraph 1937.
The Board finds that the farmer can choose to stay;and care-for his~1ivestock, arrange,on his own'for the evacuation of his livestock, or-evacuate and' arrange for.the_ care of his-livestock left behind.
Id.,-1927, 1925, 1928. 'The Board's assertions that'these are viable options was refuted by the best evidence in the hearing:
the testimonies of the farmers, county agents and veterinarians.-
Tr.-18, 682 - 18, 832;iTr. 20, 233 - 20, 278.
9 6.
The Board fails to acknowledge that plan,that was' proposed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to' guide.the-farmers 1
in caring for their livestock, was considered _to be totally unworkable,and hazardous to the-farmers and the livestock.
Consider the testimony of the witnesses:
Weber (The plan) is_ inadequate to protect the health and. safety of the livestock and the caretaker.
Weber ff. 18, 799, at 1.
Dr. Lawrence Samples, DVM:
You cannot shelter them-(livestock) as I see written'in this plan. Tr. 18766
-7.
Lytle (Concerning the plan's recommendation for providing water) No,-I could'not see how that would be possible.
Tr. 18, 695 - 6 (concerning provisions
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of plan for. sheltering -Are they adequate?) No, I would not think so. (Concerning plan for temp-ory shelter by building a wall of-hay)-No. You can not do it.
It would take an army to move every-thing around.
Plus the animals would be'in it just as fast as they can.
Tr. 18, 738.
Dr. Max Van Buskirk, DVM:
(Conctrning the plan's guidance for providing water) they (animals) mfght well spill And waste most of it in a short time.
Tr. 18328.
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7.
Considering the second option, the Board believes the farmer can choose to evacuate his cattle on his own.
Without fully detailed plans prior to an event, the possibility of successfully attaining this option is slim in view of the impaired communications during an emergency and contesting for the same-trucks.
Tr. 20, 240 (Smith); 20, 234 (Stewart);
18, 727 (Lytle).
Although one farmer who appeared as a witness took the iniative
'to arrange for relocation of his cattle during the TMI-2 accident, the other far.?ers considered the difficulties of this undertaking to'be enormous.
Lytle ff. 18, 749, at 1; Tr. 18, 729 -
30 (V. Fisher); Tr. 18, 731 (J. Fisher).
8.
The third option the Board believes is available to the farmer, evacuating and arranging for the' care of live-stock left behind, is severely undermined by the testimony of the witnesses.
The Board assumes that notification of the county agent will provide the needed agricultural assistance, whereas one county agent had no idea how he could supply emergency agricultural workers.
Stewart if. 18749 at 2.
The Board depends on testimony of ' bureaucrat, without farming a
experience, who assumes that " law: enforcement o f f i c e r s... ~. t h e - ' '
bulk,. are farmers...can be diverted".
Furrer, ff.18, 835,at 1.
Tr. 18, 853 (Furrer).
The Board cites the similar testimony of Commonwealth witness Dr. Cable (Tr. 18, 302 - 3), yet neglects to include the testimony immediately following:
Dr. John Cable, DVM:
(Assuming a scenario of a general evacuation ordered, the farmers gone, would there be sufficient personnel to aid the farmers?)
No.
No.
I have nothing to add.
PID, paragraph 1928.
Footnote 1 - The Board failed to take note of a plan that Dauphin ~ County had during the THI-2 accident, where trucks were located within the county with the capability of moving three-fourths of the livestock.
9.
The Board failed to resolve the FEMA testimony with what the Board considered to be available aptions to the farmers.
For instance, FEMA witnesses stated that livestock will not be relocated, that farmers will be instructed to leave with the general public, and that farmers may be allowed to return to care for their livestock, however without the provision of protective equipment and with the permission of local authorities.
PID, paragraph 1929; Adler and.* Bath, ff 18, 975, at 51.
10.
The Board notes that the Commonwealth has changed its position in planning to provide dosimetry and KI.
Footnote 214, paragraph 1925.
However, this plan was not examined in the hearing, thus its adequacy and enforcibility are not known to the Board or the parties.
Id.
Several obvious faults are that distribution of these minimal protective devises would follow declaration of an emergency and other devices (respira-tors, protective clething) were not mentioned.
Id.
11.
The Board fails to note that the Commonwealth is depending on the farmers to protect the food supply.
Common-wealth Ex. 2 a.
ff. 20, 400, Appendix 7 at 18 and Annex B.
The Board fails to address the hazards this entails for the farmers, simply accepting the initiative / bhe Commonwealth as described in paragraph 10, supra, and hoping for initiatives on the part of the agricultural community.
PID, paragraph 1940.
12.
The Board failsl to adequately protect the food ingestion path through adequate emergency plans.
PID, paragraph 1932.
The commonwealth's plan for sheltering livestock and protecting feed and foodstuffs was simply distributed within the 10 mile EPZ, not within the 'EPZ plume' as the Board claims.
Tr. 20, 421 - 2 (Furrer).
Footnote 2 - EPA-520/1-75-001, June, 1980, page 1.45, states..
the planner should prepare for pasture or feed control in all directions from the plant out to five times the distance planned for evacuation and in predominantly downwind directions out to about 50 to 100 miles.
as
13.
The Board failed to examine any plan for the evacuation of livestock as a workable solution for protecting the food supply and the farmers.
The Board promotes the acceptability of sheltering despite-the fact that~ sheltering is not effective in the eventaof a severe radiological 3
emergency.
14.
The Board failed to obtain an accurate assessment of the number of farmers, farm workers and livestock residing i
within the 10 mile EPZ.
Tr.820,-404 (Fouse); Stewart ff. 20, 243 at 2; Smith ff. 20, 243, at 2.
The Board failed to bring to the Commission's attention the large population cf livestock in the five counties which lie within ten -Ilea af TMI.
Stewart ff. 20, 243, at Attach 2.
The efficacy or veracity of planning which fails to identify those to whom the plan is to be applied'must be doubted.
~. ?.
15.
The Board also fails to bring to the Commission's attention the valuation of the livestock in the five counties surrounding TMI, although Commonwealth and Staff witnesses considered the farmer's financial investment a considetation in his willingness to seek protection.
Bath and Adler ff.
18, 975, at 47; Cable and Van Buskirk ff. 18, 296, at 3.
No wonder, the livestock in the five county area (roughly the 50 mile EPZ) were valued at over 300 million dollars in 1979, yet no witness testified concerning availability of insurance against nuclear accidents.
In fact, one of the witnesses who raised the problem, failed to provide information concerning insurance options.
Tr. 19. 079 (Adler).
Footnote 3 - EPA-520/1-75-001, June, 1980, page 1.38..
if one compares the effect of seeking shelter with some other action such as evacuation on the basis of dose savings, it may be concluded that evacuation will save a far greater dose than seeking shelter.
Generally shelter provided by dwellings with windows and doors closed and ventilation turned off would provide good protection from inhalation of gases and vapors for a short period-(i.e., one hour or-less) but would be~ generally ineffect-ive after about two hours due to natural ventilation of the
- sh e l t e r. becsming inadequate.
16.
The Board mischaracterizes the Aamodt findings as being unsupported by the record.
Although a few typographical errors occured with regard to transcript page numbers, all witness citations were correct, causing the i
findings to be substantially tied to the record.
l l
l 17.
The Aamodt findings were, in large measure, based on the testimony of witnesses they themselves presented.
i These witnesses were in every sense independent, unknown to the Aamodts or any other parties prior to being approached to testify.
Further, the witnesses were all experienced practitioners of agriculture, including three farmers, two veterinarians and two county agents.
Their testimony provides the best evidence with regard to the appropriateness of suggested protective actions.
Although it is incumbent on the Board to give weight to the best e v id en c e which is reliable, probative and substantial (10 CFR 2. 760 (c), the Board almost overlooked the testimony of these agricultural experts.
The Board cites these witnesses in two places, and in both instances with misleading extrapolations from the testimony.
PID, Footnote 215 of paragraph 1926, paragraph 1927.
l Although the county agents are apparently key personnel in the agricultural response plans, the Board ignores their 58 pages of testimony.
PID, paragraphs 1922, 1925, 1928, 1929, 1932, 1940 refer to
" county agents" The Board also fails j
l to cite a single word of Dr. Robert Weber, a veterinarian in the TMI area for 34 years.
l l
18.
The Aamodts find that the Board (and the Staff) have exhibited incredible bias toward the Aamodt witnesses a n d, f i n d i n g_s and have failed to consider the b e.s t,,e v,i d e n c e bbncerning emergency plans for farmers.
Respectfully submitted, hh Marj o[1/ M.
January 26, 1982 Aamoit