ML20040D319

Provides Status of NUREG-0737 Items II.F.1.1,II.F.1.2, II.B.2,II.D.3,II.F.1.4,II.F.1.5,II.K.3.15,I.A.1.1,II.F.1.3, II.K.3.13,II.B.3 & II.F.1.6,which Were Scheduled for Completion Prior to End of Current Refueling Outage

ML20040D319
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	01/25/1982
From:	Deacon W BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:	Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.A.1.1, TASK-2.B.2, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.D.3, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-2.K.3.13, TASK-2.K.3.15, TASK-TM 82-24, NUDOCS 8202010175
Download: ML20040D319 (3)

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,1982 BECo Ltr. #82-24 Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 License No. DPR-35 Duket No. 50-293 TMI NUREG 0737 C0i'J4ITMENTS

Dear Sir:

The purpose of this letter is to provide a status of NUREG-0737 items which

- Boston Edison Compar.y had previously committed to and scheduled for completion prior to the end of the current refueling outage. Three status categories exist at present; those items which are now complete, those items which we anticipate completing prior to the end of the current refueling outage and those items which probably will not be completed by the end of the outage.

The following items are complete:

II.F.1.1 - Noble Gas Monitors, II.F.1.2 - Particulate / Iodine Sampling II.B.2 - Plant Shielding (with the exception of TAP Item II.B.3 installation)

It is anticipated that the following items will be completed prior to the end of the current refueling outage:

II.D.3 - Safety / Relief Valve Indication II.F.1.4 -

Containment Pressure Monitor II.F.1.5 -

Containment Water-Level TI.K.3.15 -

Spurious Trips of HPCI/RCIC I.A.1.1 - STA Requalification Training Program I I . F.1. 3 -

Containment Hioh Ranae Monitors II.K.3.13 -

Remote Restart of RCIC However, two of the above items (II.F.1.3 and II.K.3.13) are in jeopardy and minor schedular relief may be required. The materials and supporting docu-mentation were ordered and the expected delivery dates supported our original commitment dates. The suppliers, General Electric Company (II.F.1.3) and Terry Corporation (II.K.3.13) have failed to meet their committed dates. To date, we have not received installation and calibration instructions, equip-ment qualification documentation and complete materials from General Electric.

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[30 TON EDl20N COMPANY Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director January 25, 1982 Page Two Terry Corporation material was not received until January 18, 1982, and the equipment qualification documentation was not received until last week. The lack of equipment documentation delayed issuance of the design package for implementation until January 20, 1982. Boston Edison Company will expedite implementation of these modifications and will promptly notify you of the need for schedular relief.

We do not anticipate completion of the following items prior to the end of the current refueling outage:

II.B.3 -

Post-Accident Sampling II.F.1.6 Containment 2 H [0 2 Monitor These items were scheduled for completion by January 14, 1982. This date was based on an integrated engineering and construction schedule. Boston Edison Company's resources have been severely taxed in response to additional NRC concerns such as NRC I&E Bulletins79-01B, 80-11, Fire Protection and Mark I containment integrity.

Our engineering effort was initially prioritized and sequenced to meet the con-struction schedule and preclude conflict with these concerns. During the Spring and Summer of 1981, as the engineering scope associated with these issues con-tinued to evolve, a myriad of engineering resource constraints became apparent.

Priorities were reassessed and adjusted, construction schedules were compressed, but the major scope of activities were forced into the 1981 refueling outage and were now to occur simultaneously with other refueling outage-related and modifi-cation projects. Construction progress against schedule has been adversely affected by lost productivity due to labor disputes and subsequent lower effi-ciency during extended hours worked in attempting to compensate for the schedule delays, and because the work .is being perfonned during a major outage when plant support services are strained to capacity. Installation of these systems is a major construction effort involving hundreds of craftsmen and hundreds of thou-sands of manhours. .Despite these complications, the design for these systems is complete and the installation is currently 60% complete.

Though completion of these items prior to the end of the current refueling outage is doubtful, it is believed that all outage-related portions of these modifications will be completed during the outage, and work to complete imple-mentation of these items will continue on a two-shift basis following startup.

Boston Edison Company will provide you with a schedule for implementation of these modifications prior to the end of the current refueling outage. It is anticipated that schedule relief of approximately six months will be required for implementation of these items.

Continued safe operation of Pilgrim Station without the new post-accident sampling system and H,07 monitoring systems is assured because the existing systems and interim procBdures will be adequate for events which would reasonably be expected J

to occur during the short period during which they are to be required for service.

,COOTON EDCON COMPANY-Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director January 25, 1982 Page Three Pilgrim Station has implemented interim procedures for obtaining primary contain-ment gas samples and reactor water samples after an accident. ' There are presently one oxygen analyzer, for measuring primary containment atmosphere oxygen content and two redundant hydrogen analyzers for measuring the drywell atmosphere hydro-gen content. These analyzers have remote readout in the Main Control Room.

Primary containment integrity is assured following a LOCA because the operators are provided with numerous indications which would enable the primary containment conditions to be assessed. The containment atmosphere dilution system would be implemented within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of a LOCA, thus 4% hydrogen volume in the containment would not be reached.

We trust this information is responsive to your needs; however, should you -have any questions, please ;all.

Very truly yours, ff fd-W W. ii. Deacon, Acting Manager Nuclear Ooerations Support Dept.

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