ML20040D048
| ML20040D048 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1982 |
| From: | Albert W, Dodds R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040D049 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-508-81-19, 50-509-81-19, NUDOCS 8201290530 | |
| Download: ML20040D048 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000508/1981019
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U. S. hCCLEAR REGUL\\ TORY C0!ciESSIO?i
OFFICL OF I!;SI'ECTIO 1 A :D E!! FORCE!iE!.'T
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REGIO!! V
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Report !!o. 50-508/81 19, 50-509/81 19
Docket !!o. 50-508 & 50-509
License rio.
CPPR-154/155
Safeguards Group
Licensce: Washington Public Power Supply System
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P. 0. Box 1223 -
Elma, Washington 98541
5'acility Itame: WNP-3 and WNP-5
WNP-3/5 Side,Elma, Washington
Inspcetion at:
Inspection conducted:
, November 1-30, 1981
Inspectors:
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M.G.ybertfhr.Residentinspector
'Date Signed
Date Signed
Dato Signed
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Approved by:
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R. T. Dodds, Chief ~, Reactor Projects Section 2
/ Date Signed
Date Signed
Summary:
Inspection during the period of November 1-30, 1981
(Report Nos. 50-508/81-19 and 50-509/81-19)
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by resident inspector
of construction activities including observations off-shft and
on a weekend.
Principal areas inspected included: (1) open items
related to erection of structual steel; (2) Licensee reported events
including replacement of sliding base plate for south stea a generator
of WNP-3; (3) integrity of concrete repairs in WNP-3 Reactor
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Auxiliary Building (RAB); (4) concrete placements incluaing
preplacement and curing activities; (5) weld filler metal controls;
and (6) lay-up activities for WNP-5. The inspection involved 94 man
hours on site by one NRC inspector.
Results1 Of tim six principal areas inspected, one item of non-compliance
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was identified in the area of weld filler metal control.
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RV Form 219 (2)
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8201290530 920111
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PDR ADOCK 05000500
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
The inspector interviewed various engineering, management, inspec-
tion and construction personnel of the organizations listed below,
Key personnel, including those who attended the exit interview are
specifically identified below:
a.
Washington Public Power Supply System
- R. S. Leddick, Program Director, WNP-3/5
- J. A. Puzauskas, Quality Assurance Engineering Supervisur
- 0. E. Trapp, Project Quality Assurance Manager
N. F. Blaisc, Senior Project Quality Engineer
D. R. Coody, Project Quality Engineer
R. E. Jurbala, Project Quality Engineer
D. A. Kerlee, Quality Assurance Audits Supervisor
N. C. Kaufman, Project Start Up Manager
- E. L. Stephens, Senior Project Quality Engineer
C. H. Tweksbury, Quality Assurance Surveillance Supervisor
J. A. Vanni, Senior Project Quality Engineer
J. M. Walker, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer
b.
Ebasco Services, Inc. (Ebasco)
L. F. Adams, Senior Project Quality Engineer
L. A. Bast, Project Quality Engineer
- A. M. Curtona, Deputy. Project Quality Assurance Manager
G. E. Ellis, Civil Design Engineer (ESSE)
M. R. Harris, Quality Assurance Engineer-
J. W. Hassett, Project Quality-Engineer-
R. G. Peck- Quality Assurance Engineer
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T. F. Tully, Lead Project Quality Engineer, Audits
D. E. Patterson, Lead Quality Engineer, Records
c.
Morrison-Knudsen, Inc. (MK) (263 Contractor)
R. Davis, Project Qaulity Manager
G. Hill, Quality Control Manager
S. Schuerman, Quality Assurance Manager
d.
Morrison-Knudsen/ESI/ Lord-Joint Venture (MK/ESI/ LORD)
M. Cepkauskas, Project Welding Engineer
M. Grayson, Manager Quality and Tech. Support (Corporate Office)
W. Holcombe, Project Quality Assurance Manager
C. Johnson, Deputy Project Quality Director
E. Johnson, Senior Materials Engineer
R. Lawrence, Project Director
L. Murray, Wilding Superintendent
C. Rapp, Construction Manager
J. Sowers, Project Quality Director
- Designates those attendh.g exit interview held on November 30,
1981.
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2.
Site Tours
Daily tours of some portion of the construction site were conducted
by the resident inspector.
In addition to the active construction
zones of Unit 3, the tours during this report period included the
following:
a.
Main site warehouses
b.
Storage of equipment in Unit 5 Reactor Auxillary Building.
c.
General site tour on a weekend (Sunday, November 22,1981)
d.
Early unannounced arrival on graveyard shift (November 17,
1981)
No items of non-compliance were identified during these general
tours.
3.
Project Status
Construction on Unit 3 was approximately 42 percent complete at the
end of this report pariod.
Construction activity on Unit 5 has
completely stopped and only routine patrol or weather proofing
activities were observed during NRC tours of the Unit 5 Reactor
Auxillary Building.
An extended general power outage as a result of storm damage
occurred during the weekend of November 14 and 15, 1981.
Damage
was negligible. The replacement of the steam generator sliding
base plates (paragraph 4.b. below) was the only significant activity
under way at the time. This was unaffected by the high winds since
the weight of the steam generator was partially supported by crib-
bing. A second power outage of approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> duration
occurred on November 20, 1981.
4.
Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Construction Deficiencies
a.
Concrete Consolidation in Shear Wall of' Reactor Auxillary
Building (Unit 3)
On July 31, 1981, the licensee agreed to provide the USNRC
with a report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) on a problem
with concrete consolidation in the inner shear wall on the
north side of Unit 3' Reactor Auxillary Building (RAB). This
placement was identified as ABW-19-21, 428.50. ' The placement
extended from the 417.5 ft. level up to approximately the
430 ft. level and reached from the steam tunnel to the north-
west HVAC chase, a distance of approximately 70.ft.
The wall
varied in thickness from 3.5 to 4.0 ft. and had numerous
Thb extent of the voids resulting from the lack
of consolidation is described in the licensee's reports of
August 7. September 20 and November 11, 1981, and NRC report
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no. 50-508/81-13 for. the inspection conducted on July 27-31,
1981. The Licensca's final report dated November-11, 1981 was
received and reviewed during this report period. As a result
of this review certain-questions were forwarded from the NRC
regional office to the -1icensee with regard.to the engineering
evaluation, the disposition and the corrective action.
Repairs
to the wall and a subsequent'non-conforming condition resulting
from inadequate grouting of two embed plates, were examined by
the NRC inspector.
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In addition to the licensee's evaluation of the wall, during
the period of November 10-20, 1981, the NRC retained Parameters
Inc. to conduct an independent evaluation of the structual
integrity of the wall.
Parameters in turn utilized the services
of Construction Engineering Consultants (CEC) to parform sonic
testing of the wall.
CEC's final report had not been received
by the end of the report period.
The item will remain open pending receipt of CEC's final
report and answers to requests for additional information.
b.
Steam Generator Sliding Base Plate Deficiency (Unit 3)
On October 19, 1981, the Licensee reported that a potential
deficiency existed with regard to the sliding base plates
under the South Steam Generator installed in Unit 3.
The
deficiency was that documentation concerning the required
surface finish of the plates was contradictory.
It was
necessary to raise the steam generator and replace these
plates since the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Supplier
(Combustion Engineering) would not concur in a disposition of
this deficiency which accepted the highest of the contradictory
surface finish readings.
The NSSS Supplier believed that such
a finish would impose unacceptable restraint on steam generator
movement during thermal expansion of the primary system.
The resident inspector examined the disposition of this item
by review of procedures, observation of work and observation
of initial readings on the plates after they were removed.
The following MK/ESI/ LORD procedures were examined:
1.
F01-1024 Revision 0 " Verification of Lifting and Reset-
ting of Steam Generator."
2.
FCP-1071 Revision 0 " Lifting and Resetting of Steam
Generator No 2."
The following procedure of Lampson Inc. (rigging contractor)
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was examined:
1.
LUR-WP-29 Revision 1 " South Steam Generator and Sliding
Base Lift."
All questions of the inspector were satisfactorily answered.
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No deviations from the above listed procedures were identified
during the lifting and resetting operations.
Initial readings on the removed base plates indicated that
they did exceed the established tolerence for surface finish
of 125 rms.
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The operation of lifting and resetting the steam generator
with the sliding base plate attached was examined in accordance
with the NRC procedure for preplanning of complex construction
activity. This item will remain open until the final report
of the Licensee has been received and the corrective action to
prevent recurrence of similar situations has been reviewed.
c.
Morrison-Knudsen Structural Steel Bolting Problem (Units 3 and 5)
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In January 1981 the NRC was notified by the Licensee of a
potential 10 CFR 50.55(e) condition regarding the erection of
structural steel and the associated QC documentation.
The
Licensee has submitted that portion of his final report covering
the reinspection effort on Unit 5.
The remaining portion of
the report is to be submitted in January 1982.
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The partial report was examined in conjunction with the open
item resolutions discussed in paragraph 5.
However, this item
will remain open pending receipt of evaluation of a final
report addressing Unit 3.
There are no open questions as a
result of this examination.
5.
Licensee Action on Previous Unresolved Items or Items of Non Compliance
a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item-(50-508/80-06-01) M-K Addition of
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Unauthorized Welds
The resident inspector had expressed an uaresolved concern
because beam clips had been welded rather than bolted to a
column contrary to the applicable drawing.
Since the' weld in
question had not received final inspection, the matter was
considered unresolved. -Subsequently, the inspector noted
several other conditions which were identified as. items of
non-compliance. These were listed as separate items without
closing this item because of the extensive nature of the
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problem.
As a consequence, structural. steel inspection was
addressed and resulted in procedure changes, craft training,
inspector training, and a reinspection program. NRC inspection
report no. 50-508/80-13, paragraph 2a, addresses procedural
changes.
During this inspection, the inspector examined craft
retraining, Quality Control inspector retraining, and the
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reinspection program.
In addition, various checks were made
of ongoing inspection activity.
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Craft and inspector retraining was conducted as part of the
response to Corrective Action request No. 33 issued on January 23,
1981, two days after the M-K Co. issued a stop work order for
all bolting, welding and erection of. structural steel.
This
retraining included "...all construction, Quality Control
engineering and supervisory personnel involved with structural
steel erection...".
Training records were examined as follows:
1981 Date
No. of Atitendees
Subject
Jan. 15
5
MKProceduhes
Jan. 21
22
MK Procedures
Mar. 26
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Supply System . Training Film
Apr. 7
14
Turn-of-Nut-Method
Apr. 14
4
Turn-of-Nut-Method
Apr. 14
4
Turn-of-Nut-Method
Apr. 14
5
Turn-of-Nut-Method
Apr. 22
9
Specs and MK Procedures
Apr. 30
12
Structural Welding
Apr. 30
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Codes and QA Records
May 12
8
Turn-of-Nut-Method
May 18
7
Bolt Loading
The inspector found that the personnel covered and the material
covered was generally satisfactory.
However, a specific
determination of job responsibilities and qualifications
against the training received or required was not made.
The reinspection program for both Units 3 and 5 was examined.
This program also originated with Corrective Action Request
No. 33 (CAR-33) resulting from the stop work order of January 21,
1981. CAR-33 stated that "...all accessible structural steel
physical belted and welded connections in both units are to be
examined ty zones to verify conformance..." The reinspection
program also required records verification.
During this
report period, the inspector examined the records system for
the zone representing the floor beams at the 362 ft. level in
the northwest section of the Unit 3 Reactor Auxillary Building
between the inner and outer shear walls
(Ebasco NW7 G-3403).
Records of reinspection were readily retrievable utilizing the
Ebasco drawing as an index. The records selected for this
zone (about a dozen items) were of satisfactory quality. The
inspector questioned the fact that the connection between beam
294 F and the outer shear wall embed plate was not recorded on-
the index drawing and did not have a corresponding record.
It
was subsequently determined that the situation had t.een
covered by NCR 2587 and NCR 2686 which had been written
because excessive slope of the beam necessitated welding
rather than bolting as specified.
Another index sheet, specifically
for welded connections, listed the item.
The inspector found
that the records system for reinspection of bolted joints was
satisfactory. The records and their retrievability for the
original inspection of the same joints were not examined.
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Reinspection in the field was verified by observations made
during tours of the facility.
Reinspection was specifically
checked against records by a random sample of joints at the
362 ft. level in Unit 3.
Joints 274C to 405A, 274C to 245C,
267G to 243C, 272D to 267G and 272D to 266C were first examined
in the field and then compared to records with cross checks
between beam markings and drawing location, number of bolts
versus drawing, and notes with field QC marks (where available).
No discrepancies were identified.
The inspector also examined the basic criteria and management
of the reinspection program.
It was found that the program
for Unit 3 dropped the requirement for a 20 percent check of
reinspected joints using a torque wrench.
This was done on
March 19, 1981 by M-K comunication No.10C-81-292.
The basis
for eliminating the requirement was that the percentage of
discrepancies found by the torque wrench check during its
initial use in Unit 3 was negligible (e.g. less than 1 percent).
In Unit 5, where more extensive problems had been found with
the initial inspections, all accessible bolts were checked
with a torque wrench and there was no mitigation of the require-
ment. No further items of concern were identified.
This item
is closed.
b.
(Closed) Item of Non-Compliance (50-508/509/80-06-02) MK Failure
to Establish Measures for the identification of Inspected Items
An item of non-compliance was issued in 1980 because the
structural steel contractor (M-K) had not established a
control system which insures each joint has received an
appropriate inspection.
See unresolved item a above which discusses the examination of
the reinspection system.
During tours of the plant several
structural steel joints were examined for proper assembly.
No
discrepancies were identified in washers, evidence of tighten-
ing or type of bolts (A-325).
All accessible joints (about 30)
on floor beams for the 417.5 ft. level of the RAB in the
northwest quadrant were examined during an off shift tour.
No
discrepancies were noted in these joints which represented
activity under the current quality control program (not reinspection).
The inspector concluded that the reinspection program for the
disposition of the item of non-compliance had been satisfactorily
completed.
The inspector also concluded that the corrective
action to insure adequate control over current structural
steel assembly had been satisfactorily implemented.
This item
is closed.
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c.
(Closed) Item of Non-Compliance (50-508/80-06/03)
MK Failure to Accomplish Welding in Accordance with Requirements
In this item of non-compliance the licensee was cited for
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failure of the contractor's inspection system to detect
undercut which had been masked by grinding.
Following this,
the resident inspector further examined structural welds and
noted an instance of oversize welding.
This item has been examined previously but not closed out
since the non-conformance report covering the oversize welding
had not been examined.
Examination of the non-conformance report no. 5292 disclosed
the weld to have been dispositioned " accept-as-is". The
reasons for this disposition was found to be stated in a
Quality Finding Report (QFR) issued on January 20, 1981.
The
QFR noted that the questionable beam clip had been reworked
without a controlling NCR. Therefore, NCR No. 5292 was
prepared on Feburary 18, 1981 to provide a record of the
discrepancy and provide for control of reinspection. A
reinspection report dated March 18, 1981 was examined.
The
inspector's questions were satisfactorily resolved and the
item is considered closed.
d.
(0 pen) Item of Non-compliance (50-508/509/80-13-01)
M-K Failure to Assure that Bolted Assemblies Meet Specification
Requirements
In the initial finding, the NRC cited an instance of loose
bolts in a structural beam which had been inspected and accepted.
In response the Licensee stated that the questionable joint
had been loosened to facilitate installation of other structural
steel.
Corrective action included procedure changes (IPCN-
095 to CP-05) and training classes (October 23, 1980 and
November 1, 1980).
In report 50-508/81-02 the inspector
verified correction of the joint but noted a discrepancy
between the date of full compliance stated in the response and
the actual compliance date for training and procedure changes.
Further, a question arose regarding the possibility that the
initial unbolting of the structural steel joint may have been
a deliberate act done for the purpose of embarassing the
cognizant Quality Control inspector. (See NRC report 50-508/81-04.)
From observations of the current structural steel inspection
program and the reinspection program, disposition and corrective
action appear satisfactory.
However, pending completion of
NRC reporting on it's investigation (separate from-inspection
reports) and the licensee's investigation of the deliberate
malpractice issue, the item will remain open. The malpractice
matter will be discussed in the licens e's : final 50.55(e)
report on the reinspection of structural- steel for Unit 3.
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e.
(Closed) Item of Non-compliance (50-508/81-02/01)
M-K Failure to take Effective Corrective Action ,
In January 1981, the NRC resident inspeckor conducted a
follow-up examination of bolting practices for structural
steel.
During this follow-up. inspection, there was evidence
of continuing problems with structural steel inspection records.
In a sample of twelve joints, one inspection report could not
be located.
The NRC resident inspector' considered this to be
a second item of non-compliance for essentially the-same
problem.
Other instances of inadequate inspection. records were noted.
Based on these observations, the contractor issued a stop work
order on January 21, 1981 for all structural steel assembly
operations as previously discussed in 5.a above. This was
followed by M-K corrective action request No. 33 and a directive
from the Supply System that specifed the corrective action and
reinspection program to be conducted.
As described for Open
Item 80-06/01, the reinspection program has been examined and
corrective actions verified. The item is closed.
f.
(Closed) Item of Non-Compliance (50-508/509/81-02/04)
M-K Inadequate Structural Steel Bolting Inspections
In January 1981, the NRC resident inspector found instances in
which inspection records did not reflect non-conforming conditions
in the field. This resulted in the actions described in items
5.a and above. These corrective actions have been verified as
described above. The item is closed.
g.
(Closed) Item of Non-Compliance (50-508/509/81-02/05)
M-K Inadequate Structural Steel Quality Records
In January 1981,. the NRC resident inspector found instances in
which the inspection records did not conform to actual configura-
tions in the field.
For instance, joints were noted which had
a different number of bolts from the inspection record. This
item 17 considered closed based upon the verification of the
corrective action taken as described in items 5.a and 5.e above.
6.
High Strength Anchor Bolting for Structural Steel Embed Plates
An Examination was made of "R P Plate" high strength stud bolts
utilized by M-K for anchors of embed plates in the Unit 3 Reactor
Auxillary Building (RAB), including certification reports of physical
and chemical properties of the bolts in actual use.
Initially, the
audit sample was selected by randomly choosing two sizes of bolts
in the field (1 " x 2'6" and 2" x 3'0", drawing piece marks RPAB 2
and 3 respectively).
Records of M-K transmittals to the plant QA
records vault for seven heat numbers (actually designated " Heat Codes"
by Lone Star Bolt Co.) covering these sizes and others, were obtained.
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The records were recovered and examined for the necessary verifica-
tion. All seven heat numbers, 10, 30, 4T, 6T, 9RJ, B18-6 and 7R
were found to comply with the requirements of ASTM A-193-78a.
Heats 4T and 9RJ represented the two sizes in the sample.
In
second check, four heat numbers (or codes) were selected from
markings on studs in the field.
Records for two of these were
available in the first sample. Two additional heat codes, 75 and
6RJ, were noted and records recovered and checked for physical and
chemical properties. All heat codes for bolts in the field were
checked against the applicable sizes of bolts in the field and as
designated on the purchase order.
No discrepancies were identified.
Based on the sample selected and the examinations made by the
inspector, it appeared that all bolts met ASTM A-193 as specified.
7.
Welding Material Control
The controls utilized by MK/ESI/ LORD for control of welding materials
were examined. MK/ESI/ LORD procures, stores and disperses weld
filler materials utilizing procedure FWP 500N Revision 2 titled
" Filler Metal Procurement and Control". This procedure is based on
Ebasco Specifications 884-WA-80, 884-WB-80, and 884-WC-80 which
provide requirements for welding nuclear pressure components,
welding non-nuclear pressure components, and structural welding
respectively.
The procedures also implement the requirements of
ASME Sections II and III and ANSI N45.2.2 as applicable for weld
filler metal control.
AWS D.1.1 is referenced for structural
welding in the Ebasco specification but is'not referenced in the
procedure since the MK/ESI/ LORD scope of work does not involve
structures. An examination of the procedure ~ was made. . Although
deviations between the procedure and' actual practice were noted as
described below, the procedure itself was found to be a satis-
factory document for the purpose inten'ded.
To examine implementation of the procedure, the inspector selected
three MK/ESI/ LORD purchase requisitions (Nos.--1093,1101 and 1102).
These requisitions covered the purchase of ten different items of
filler materials, including inserts and coated and uncoated electrods
totalling 30,260 pounds. The three requisitions resulted in four
procurement actions.
Each of these actions was examined for
engineering controls, QA approvals and provisions in the purchase
order, correspondence control use of approved suppliers, and use of
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code specifications.
One discrepancy was-noted; the procurement
data package could not account for 100 lbs of requisitioned E70S-2,
1/16" material. On further checking it was found that the material
had not actually been procured. The inspector observed that the
omission could be indicative of inadequate quality review since the
absence of quality data for the item had not been previously noted
as one might expect.
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Receiving inspection of the procured material was examined for the
three purchase orders (one was cancelled). Reports 9007, 9044 and
9016 were examined and found to be in order. Two items totalling
9000 lbs had been placed on " hold" because the manufactures certi-
ficate of conformance did not correspond with purchase order re-
quirements. The inspector noted that the suggested disposition of
this document discrepancy may not be appropriate since it was based
on the original issue of the purchase order rather than a subsequent
revision which allows for procurement from a different manufactur-
ing site. The inspector had no other comments on receiving inspection.
Warehouse controls were examined to assure that storage met the
requirements of the referenced Ebasco specifications, the procedure,
and ANSI N45.2.2.
Materials were found to be segregated by type
and discrepant material was identified. The control system over
warehouse inventory was examined and found to adequately reflect
the actual quantity for the one type of filler metal and heat
number examined in the warehouse.
This was E 7018-Al material from
purchase order No. 9016.
Disbursement from the warehouse to the two MK/ESI/ LORD wire rooms
presently in service was examined.
It was found that form QA-034
was not being used as specified by the procedure.
Section 7.3.1 of
the procedure requires a three part form with distribution to:
Welding engineer
Warehouse
QA records
Actual practice was found to use a two part form with distribution
to:
Field wire rooms
QA records
No copies were retained by the warehouse or welding engineer.
Control and storage of weld filler material in the wire room
serving the west laydown area fabrication shop (west wire room) was
examined.
Discrepancies with the req'uirements'of procedure FWp-500
were noted as follows:
a.
Section 7.4.1 requires that an approved access list be posted
in each field wire room.
However, two lists were posted in
the west room, one by function and another by name. One
individual entered the room whose name did not appear on the
list but whose function appearedito require access.
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explained to the inspector that the name list was out of date.
On the other hand, the wire room attendant was confused as to
who was actually represented by _the functional or title listing.
It was noted that this wire room was also used as a tool room
which increased the potential for unauthorized access.
b.
Section 7.4.4 of the procedure requires that bare wire and
consumable inserts be kept dry and packaged until required for
use.
Contrary to this, one coil of bare wire was found to be
out of its package.
It was also observed that a large coffee
urn was in use near bare wire storage.
c.
Section 7.4.6 requires that all spooled wire for the GTAW
process be placed on pellets or shelves.
Contrary to this,
two stacks of bare wire were placed on top of sealed cans of
E-7018-Al electrodes.
Further one stack contained more than
one type of filler material.
d.
Section 7.4.8 requires that each oven or slot in the oven be
labeled with the applicable information for the material being
stored.
Contrary to this specific requirement, oven No. 2 did
not bear any content identification. Oven No. 3 did not
specifically relate the identification on the outside of the
door to the slots inside the oven.
There were no individual
slot identification tags inside the oven.
In addition to these specific procedure violations, the inspector
observed two calibration stickers on the oven temperature controls,
one of which was out of date.
An examination of the wire room
serving the Unit 3 construction zone did not reveal any discre-
pancies. This wire room is not used as a tool room.
Disbursement of filler metal to welders was examined. Two deviations
from procedure were identified in the west wire room during a
single element sample:
a.
Section 7.5.2 required that a pink copy of form QA-35 accompany
each portable container.
Contrary to this, welder T-16 withdrew
two portable containers, one with coated wire and one with
bare wire, from the west wire room.
However, only the coated
wire container bore a QA-35 form as required, since both types
of material had been listed on one form.
Examination of the
practice in the other wire room showed that two forms were
used in such cases.
b.
Section 7.4.11 requires that all GTAW welding wire be issued
I
in capped containers.
Contrary to this, a capped. container
was not used for the wire issued to welder T-16 on November 30,
1981.
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The deviations from procedure FWP 500N found in the practices
employed at the west wire room' are considered to be an-item of non-
compliance (50-508/81-19-01).
8.
Management Meetings
1
'
Weekly meetings were conducted with QA management or Supply System
Management representatives. A formal exit interview-with the
WNP Program Director and staff was held on November 30,.1981, to'
discuss the principal items in this report.
Following discussion
with the Supply System, a meeting was held on" December 1,1981 with
the management of MK/ESI/ LORD:to specifically- discuss problems with
the control of weld filler. materials.
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