ML20040B928

Spent Fuel Shipping Cask Accident,Dec 8,1971

ML20040B928
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	07/31/1972
From:	Chandler J OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY
To:
Shared Package
ML20040B925	List: ML20040B924 ML20040B926 ML20040B928 ML20040B929
References
CON-W-7405-ENG-26, FOIA-81-373 ORNL-TM-3844, NUDOCS 8201260599
Download: ML20040B928 (58)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. k .g' ',i ORNL-IM-3844 Contract No. W-7405-eng-26 1 METALS AND CERAMICS DIVISION 1 THE PEACH BOTTOM SPENT TUEL ELEMINT SHIPPING CASK ACCIDENT DECEMBER 8, 1971 i l John M. Chandler i .5 JULY 1972 OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 operated by UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION for the U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 8201260599 810928 PDR FOIA s. BIRNDAU91-373 PDR . ?"

iii CONTENTS e Pare Abstract 1 Introduction. 1 Description of Cask and Contents 1 Description of Accident 5 Accident Reporting and Handling 14 Recovery of Cask. 15 Retrieval of Cask frc= Roadside Ditch 15 Further Assessment of Accident Da= age and Unloading of RIE-7 23 Repairs to Cask Da= ages 30 Cenclusions 31 Recemmendations and Suggestions 34 Reccc= ended Revisions to Shipping Cask License Requirements 35 Emergency Procedures - Reco=mendations. 36 Co=unication and Liaison Between Investigators 37 Final Report of Accident 38 Long Range Items to Consider. 38 Acknowledg=ents 39 APPENDIX: Documents Related to the Shipping Cask Accident 41 e O I l f

DIE PEACH BOTTOM SPENT FUEL ELEMENT SHIPPING CASK ACCIDENT 2 DECEMBER 8, 19 71 John M. Chandler ABSTRACI The loaded Pead Bottom Singic Element Shipping Cask DOT-SP-5938 was involved in a highway accident while en route to Oak Ridge National Laboratory from the Peach Bottom Reactor. This document describes the actions taken to report and investigate the accident and to prevent radiation damage to the environment. Pictured and discussed are the actions taken to safely retrieve the loaded cask from the ditch, complete its shipment to ORNL, perform detailed inspection of and correct minor damage to the cask support ring, and prepare the cask for prompt reuse. Procedures are reco= mended for iustructing people involved in the shipment of highly radioactive ~ =aterials. Preventive maintenance and periodic inspection plans for assuring shipping cask integrity are discussed. INTRODUCTION The loaded Peach Bottom Single ' Element Shipping Cask,' also known to so=e as the Hallam Cask, was involved in a highway accident while' en route to ORNL. This report describes the actions taken to safely retrieve the cask from its resting place in a ditch, deliver its contents (RTE-7) to ORNL Building 3026 (Dismantling and Examining Hot Cells), perform inspection, make repairs, and return the cask to service as soon as practical. DESCRIPTION OF CASK AND CONTENTS - The Peach Bottom spent fuel element shipping cask was originally designed and f abricated by Atomics International for the Hallam reactor. Subsequently Gulf General Atomic leased the cask from the AEC for trans-porting irradiated fuel and other reactor components from the Peach Bottom

2 Reactor, located near Delta, Pennsylvan1a, to the Gulf General Ato ic hot cells for pos tirradiation examination. It was necessary to modify the cask to satisfy the requirements of Title 10, Part 71 of the Code of Federal Regulations, " Packaging of Radioactive Materials for Transport." These modifications along with structural and thermal analyses done on the cask to demonstrate its co=pilance are presented in a report

• sub-mitted to the Division of Materials Licensing, USAEC, with the license application. The license is recorded in Docket No. 70-72, AEC License No. SNM-69 A=end=ent No. 71-13.

Subsequently a Department of Transporta-tion (DOT) special per=1t No. 5938 was issued for this cask. ORNL was registered September 15, 1971, per our request, as a shipper under the terms of the DOT per=it (No. 5938). The cask as modified is shown in Fig.1. It weighs approximately 23 tons and is about 20 ft long x 2 ft in diameter. The central part of the cask is a hollow lead cylinder 204 in. long encased berbeen a 24-in.- diam carbon steel tube 0.75 in. thick and a 5.5-in.-ID stainless tube 0.25 in, thick. These cylinders are encased with 1-in.-thick stainless ~ steel flange plates. The cask closure end heads are both 30 in. in diameter, made of carbon steel, and attached to the. central part with sixteen 1-in.-diam bolts on each end. The bottom head is 23.5 in. thick and surrounds a plug valve loeding port. The top -head is 14 in thick and houses a grnpple tool. Both heads have elastomer O ring seals and bolted flanges over the end openings. The top head has an additional protective end cap. The cask rests in a shipping cradle assembly while in transit and is detached from the cradle 'during loading and unloading. 'The cradle is made of structural steel and supports the cask on four 4-in.-diam trunnions, which are velded to and protrude from the carbon steel end heads., The trunnions rest in saddles and are bolted to the skid. A center girdle, which serves as an intermediate holddown support, rigidly connects the cask to the cradle during transport. Mats of Fiberfax 'D. R. Butremer and J. F. Petersen, Structural and Thermal Analyses of the Peach Bottom Single Element Shipping Cask Licensing, GAMD-8894 (July 4,19 71).

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= 4 4 4 1 l ther=al insulation 2 in. thick are encased in stainless steel wire gauze wrapped around the central portion of the cask and bolted together on the bottom side. End caps of this same insulation are placed over both end heads and joined to the other insulation to co=pletely encase the cask. A canvas tarpualin is wrapped around the insulated cask and tied in place with hemp rope. The fuel element is shipped contained inside a hermetically sealed steel-lined aluminum canister. A shock pad is screwed onto the' canister's A leading end and the grapple is attached to the shock pad and locked to hold both the canister and shock pad firmly in place during transit. There are several inches of clearance between the canister lid and the element. For this reason the cask is inclined at a 10* angle to prevent: shif ting of the element during sudden stops and on steep grades. The cradle supporting the cask is tied down to the trailer by heavy chains locked in place by boomers. Total weight of the tractor-trailer and ' cask assembly discussed here i was 78,200 lb. The loaded cask plus cradle weight was 49,000 lb. The fuel element plus the canister weighed about 200 lb. The fuel element,. a test fuel element designated RTE-7, contained 135 g ** *U,13 g * * *U, ~ and 1000 g Th; it had been irradiated for 252 days in the Peach Bottom Nuclear Reactor in core II position E 10.06. 4 The shock absorber pad is made from a 5-in.-0D by 0.062-in.-wall cylinder of 60614r;.'.luminum alloy tube 21 in. long with 0.75-in.-thick flat end caps. Tt 4%tains a piston plunger extending 14 in. inside. The plunger is embeloed in 280 psi crushing strength hexa-honeycomb shock-absorber material on one side and loco psi absorbing material on the other side. The 1-in.-diam piston rod extends through one head a distance of I 4.25 in. ter=inating at the grapple head end. A 5/8-in.-diam NC s teel belt is velded to and extends 1.5 in. from the opposite head of the shock j absorber pad. The grapple head end is in the shape of a frustum of a l cone about 3 in. high and is center tapped 1.75 in deep for 5/8-in. NC threads. This shock pad grapple head is clasped in the claws of the grapple during loading and unloading frem the cask of the canister. The 1

5 shock absorber and canister are attached before being drawn into the cask by the grapple. DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT The following description of the accident was obtained from on-the-scene witnesses, personal observation on the scene as we examined the shipping assembly in preparation to retrieving it from the ditch, an examination of the wreckage, a study of about 100 photographs taken at the accident scene and elsewhere by Frank W. Hoffman, Oak Ridge Operations photographer, and 25 photographs taken of the wreckage by the author. Photographs of the same shipping assembly and trailer taken during ship-ments before the accident were also studied to gain background information on prior shipments of this shipping assembly. The accident was apparently caused by an oncoming tractor-trailer which veered toward the lef t causing the driver of the vehicle loaded with the cask to steer his vehicle toward the shoulde r of the road, whereupon he lost con trol'. The vehicle negotiated about 300 ft of a 150-f t radius curve while the driver was attempting to regain control; he was, however, not able to, and the vehicle overturned in the ditch beside the road and came to rest upside down with the leading end of the cask embedded 3 ft deep in soft soil as pictured in Fig. 2. Flow of drainage water in the ditch was da==ed up by movement of the dirt and by the cask. It skidded.for about 30 yards down the ditch with the tractor-trailer st111' attached and. finally came to rest upside down. The tractor-trailer broke loose and traveled 52 ft before coming to a stop. The wreckage is pictured in Fig. 3. Figure 4 shows the position of the cask in the ditch and that of the tractor-trailer unit which traveled 52 f t beyond the cask. A close examination of the trees located on the right of the cask (see Fig. 4) and the' presence of bark from the trees embedded in the left rear of the trailer bed and in the lef t rear trailer wheel indicates that the trailer passed over the cask, struck the trees, and then traveled back toward the road. Note also in Fig. 4 the presence and location of the 4-by 4-in. vood skids that were used between the trailer bed and the cask support cradle to distribute the load uniformly l

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9 on the trailer. Also seen in the background of this photograph is a lif ting device stored, during transit, in the framework of the cask support cradle. The fact that no equipment that was carried on the tractor was found upstream of the cask resting place (see Fig. 3) plus the evidence pointed out previously indicate that the tie-down cables broke under the forces developed during the accident as the cask came to an abrupt stcp while bearing the weight of the tractor and trailer. Figures 2 and 4 show that the thermal insulation and canvas tarpaulin were torn from about 80% of the cask surface and that the cask center support ring broke loose. The ring remained entangled in the insulation, coming to rest about 3 f t from its initial position on the cask. :During the retrieval operation, the second half of this ring was found entangled in the insulation on the underside of the cask, as shown in Fig. 5. This evidence suggests that the ther=al insulation gatherec about this support ring and imposed a strong force on it causing the ring bolts and alignment pins to fail just before the end of the cask travel down the ditch. Insulation re=ained intact on both ends of the cask during the cask retrieval, as shown in Fig. 6. A point to be =ade here is that if a 1475*F fire lasting 30 min had occurred (the safety analysis hypothetical fire accident assmption), it is doubtful that damage vould have been done to the biological shield because about one-half of the cask was under a dirt-and-water shield and in a ditch 2 ft below grade (as seen in Figs. 7 and 8),, and the massive cask-support cradle vould provide significant ther=al insula' tion and thermal barrier against the fire. Only minor cask damage was discovered during the initial investiga-tion. Furthermore, no additional damage was found during the detailed visual inspection of the structural and load-bearing components of the shipping assembly conducted before the start of and during the retrieval operations. Only the center support ring bolts and dowel pins had been broken, and the tarpaulin and ther=al insulatie 2 were badly damaged by the. accident. No structural damage to the cask flange bolts, the cask flange peripheral velds, or to the cask axial velds was observed. No damage to the trunnion welds at the' head cornections or da= age to the

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14 tie-down bolts was noted. Finally, the load-bearing welds and bolts used for the asse=bly of the structural steel support had not been da= aged by the accident. ACCIDENT REPORTING AND HANDLING A copy of. the initial incident report prepared the day af ter the accident is presented in the Appendix. Formal notification of the Department of Transportation was made by Gulf 011 Corporation i= mediately upon receipt of notification of the accident. Other reports

• were prepared by me=bers of the Health and Nuclear Safety Branch of Oak Ridge Operations describing the findings by the group upon arrival at the accident scene and while conducting the initial radiological surveys of the wreckage.

A photographic record was made by the AEC photographer of the approach to and arrival at the wreckage of the AEC-ORO Health and Nuclear Safety Branch emergency crew. The accident occurred about 1:30 PM December 8,1971, about 3 miles north of Clinton, Tennessee. The Anderson County, Tennessee, Sheriff's deptrtue.nt arrived on the scene of the accident, noted radiation warning signs posted on and about the shipping asse=bly, halted traffic, and ev cuated the area to a distance of greater than 500 yards on each side of the wreckage, and at 1:55 PM cou fied AEC-ORD of the accident. The AEC-ORO e.ns.rgency squad arrived on the scene between 2:15 and 2:30 PM and determined that no radioactivity had escaped, that no con-ta=ination was present, and that the highest detectable dose rate was about 0.5 m1111 rem /hr of S-y radiation being emitted from the center of the cask. This was expected from the location of the element in the cask and its radiation exposure history. The Health and Nuclear Safety Branch allowed traffic to be restored by law officers, consistent with removal of the overturned tractor-trailer rig from the highway. 'J. A. Lenhard's report to J. H. Hill (internal memorandum). e

15 From bills of lading and the packing list found in the wreckage, the origin of the shipment was found to be the Peach Bottom Reactor, Delta, Pennsvivania, and the shipper was contacted to deter =ine more infor=ation on the nature of the shipment. From this telephone call and from the consignee designation on the invoice it was deter =ined that the shipment was to be received at ORNL and that upon arrival, J. M. Chandler was to be contacted for further instructions on placement for unloading cask contente. J. M. Chandler was centacted by J. A. Lenhard, Director of the Safety and Environmental Control Division of ORD about 2:45 PM, December 8, 1971. Chandler offered his services to aid in the retrieval of the cask, since he was f amiliar with its construction and aware of its contents. He was asked to come to the accident scene and help. Cask drawings, photographs of previous shipmeats, and other papers considered necessary (e.g., DOT per=1ts and cask safety analysis reports *) were taken to the accident scene for :eference. R. P. Ward, the health phyr,1cist in charge of the ORNL TURF radiation protection program and a member of the USAEC radiological assistance team, was asked by Chandler to accompany him to the accident site and to help with the retrieval. RECOVERY OF CASK Retrieval of Cask from Roadside Ditch Before any effort was made to lift the cask from its position upside down in the ditch, structural welds on the cask, bolts that fasten the cask together, and the trunnion bolts were inspected visually. This required digging some dirt away to expose buried parts. As the cask was lif ted, as shown in Fig. 9, close attention was focused on the cask and cradle to determine if all parts moved together; in the event they did corrective action would be instituted i=:sediately.

not, A 25-ton mobile crane was dispatched initially to the scene to lif t the 49,100-lb shipping asse=bly from the ditch. We were not allowed to place crane bracing feet on the shoulder of the road for fear of breaking E

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17 the main water line supplying a large area north of Clinton, Tennessee. Hence, a 50-ton mobile crane was dispatched to the wreckage, and this caused a 2-hr delay in recovery of the cask. While we waited for the large mobile crane to arrive, smear samples of the cask surfaces and a sa=ple of water from the small pond in which the cask was resting were taken back to OPSL, and their radioactivity content was deter =ined accurately. The smear results showed "no activity signi-ficantly different from background, *" which means that the cask surf ace contamination level was much below the 30 a disintegrations per minute per 100 c=* recognized as safe by ORN1. Analyses of the water showed no a or S y activity in the sa=ples. The day following the accident, Chandler and Ward revisited the' accident reene at the request of J. A. Lenhard, ORO, and surveyed the area for radi.cion and any damage that could have resulted from the accident. Nothing was found. We then went to Knoxville, Tennessee, again to inspect the tractor-trailer vreckage and to survey it for conta=ination. None was found. ~ The 50-ton mobile crane was used to lift the cask by its cradle (as shown in Figs. 9 and 10) until cables could be wrapped around the cask. These cables were then used to lif t it from the ditch and place it in the road, as shown in Fig.11. Additional rigging was completed to per-mit the assembly to be righted (see Fig.12). Before and d,2 ring each lift, the rigging crew was directed as to where lifting cables could be atta ched. In this f ashion no unexpected moves were made and the inspec- { tion of the in'tegrity of the cask.could continue as the lifting forces were applied. The cash was retrieved from the ditch safely and without event. l The cask was loaded on a trailer and hauled to ORNL (as shown in Figs. 13 and 14). A police escort was requested and granted, and permis-sion from the officer in charge was granted to move the load after dark, because the special permit under which the load was being hauled allowed only daylight travel. 'R. P. Ward's unclassified notebook A-6307, p. 28. 1 ,4 a y. ...7-

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1 l 23 Delivery of the cask contents to ORNL was delayed only 7 hr by the accident. Delivery was =ade at ORNL at 10:45 FM, December 8,1971. The as-received dirty cask is shown in Fig.15 as it appeared at ORNL the next day. Turther Assessment of Accident Da= age and Unloading of RTE-7 On Dece=ber 9,1971, the re=aining portiens of the thernal insulation vere removed and the cask and cradle were washed to permit further visual inspection of the shipping asse=bly in search of accident damage to the cask. None was found. While the fuel element was still inside the cask, its radiation was used for the equivalent of a radiographic inspection of the cask to detect any breach of the biological shield or any radiation " shine" from any portion of the cask surf ace, including both heads and the associated flange openings. No abrupt change in S-y radiation was detected in a very careful survey' conducted by John V. Hilyer of the ORNL Health Physics Divisicn. While per=ission from Gulf 011 Corporation to proceed with the unloading of the cask contents was avaited, an incident report was com-8 pleted, as required by AEC and ORNL policy. Approval to proceed with the unloading of RTE-7 from the cask was given during a telephone conversation with Roy E. Norman of Gulf General Atomic. The cask was lovered to the horizontal position for unloading. No misalignment or damage was noted then. The protective cover en the grapple end (leading end during transit) was removed, and the element unloading operation proceeded normally and without in cident. Not one O ring seal had 1 caked, as was evident from the absence of dirty water inside the l cask. The health physics services were provided, and hot cell personnel l 1, unloaded the cask as prescribed by procedures prepared in advance. 'J. V. Hilyer, ORNL, personal communication. 'J. M. Chandler, Wreck of vehicle Carrving the "Hallam" Cask with HTGR Exnerimental Fuel Element RTE-7, Incident Report No. ORNL-71-46. I

[ = 24 Xe m g TMd.' N.\\ ' ' ~ ]. ORO-71-281-5 Y ^ \\ L

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25 The canister, with shock absorber attached, was pushed from the cask through a port in the 5-f t-thick concrete shield of the cel]. The grapple was pulled back into the crsk, and the ball valve was closed. Particular attention was directed to the operability of the plug valve and grapple to see if they had suffered damage. No damage was found. Slight longitudinal scratches were seen along the aluminum canister surf aces ; this is normal. No other marks or dents were visible on the canister or the shock absorber pad. Red letters on the can spelled out SN-15. The dimensional measurements taken of the shock pack plunger position indicated no movement of the piston in the hexa-honeyco=b shock absorbing medium. The =ediu= has 1000-psi crushing strength in the direction of loading.' The shock absorber was decontaminated and:pa'ckaged for reuse. The canister was sawed in two, and RTE-7 was removed from the canister without in cident. No damage was noted; the 12-ft-long caroon element came out in one piece, with no unusual marks or nicks or any visible breakage. This is evident from Figs. 16 and 17, which are photographs of the end and bottom of RIE-7. The element was disassechled by the Operations Division under the direction of R. B. Fitts of the M. cals and Cerandes Division, and he reported that no damage had been done to the element by the accident and that scheduled investigations of the RIE would proceed as originally planned. Af ter RTE-7 was safely delivered to the ORNL Dismantling and Examination Hot Cells, Building 3026D, for disassembly, our attention was directed to returning the Peach Bottom Single Element Shipping Cask. Nationwide interest by various USAEC installations, as well as com-pliance requirements of Federal Regulation 10-CFR-71, " Packaging of Radioactive Materials for Transport," guided the plans and dictated the rules by which our plans were made and carried out. First, we had to deter =ine the extent of' damage done to the cask by the accident (Group I); second, repairs needed to restore the cask to its operating condition ~ vere itemized (Group II); and third, we suggested to the holder' of the 'D. R. Buttemer and J. F. Petersen, Structural and Thermal Analvses of the Peach Bottom Single Element Shipping Cask Licensing, GAMD-8894 (July 4, 1971). ' Gulf 011 Corporation, P.O. Box 608, San Diego, California 92112.

26 R-59159 c. 2 =4.z p.m e1m.a na,4 - y 3 3 bY-m ^^. ,,r 7.. M _. tr=h-u,:x' _ ye. -_ -v s. m ~ ,y- , s9y ?. w. . 3: g, ' cer ~e .-. e y ~g.e-j kh. ~ ^ \\,. _ _ _ m - c- - _e 3_. 4- $t r.. w. W_ =. Fig. 16. RTE-7 Bottom End. ~ TdDMf"er!.&@" ist;3.'. ' 'c '.-/ R-59158 . - ~ -.. ^* y, h~-

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RTE-7 Top End. m

27 AEC license for the cask items that cight lead to safer future shipments using this cask (Group III). l A meeting was held to prepare reco= mended procedures for restoring the cask to service. Those in attendance included ORNL experts in fuel shipping cask design, inspection, and fuel shipping regulation and a cask design engineer from CGA, who is ce=pletely fa=iliar with the cask capabili-ties, as revised and certified by GGA to meet the conditions specified in Federal Regulation 10-CFR-73. These capabilities had been presented to the AEC for consideration in issuance of the license SNM-69(71-13) and were used by the Depart =ent of Transportation for their work in issuance of DOT SP-5938. Personnel from ORNL Field Engineering and Traffic Departments were askd to participate because they would be involved in repairing the cask and shipping it to its next use.r. Me=bers of the OPRL Traffic Department will also handle claims for recovery of the cost to restore the cask to service. A representative of the Health and Nuclear Safety Branch of the Safety and Environ = ental Division of AEC--ORO was invited to attend to contribute and observe, since members of this branch had conducted the initial radiological investigation of the accident and had also requested, J. M. Chandler's assis tance in retrieving the cask. The =inutes of the December 16, 1971, meeting were sent to j D. B. Trauger on December 17, 1971, and forwarded to R. J. Ledbetter, f GGA, on December 29, 1971. Copies of the letters are in the Appendix. While the paper work was being completed, verbal permission was granted by the AEC-ORO and ORNL canagement to execute Group I recommenda-tions, consisting of an examination to deter =ine accident-caused damage. It is both a requirement of the licensee and good safety practice that certain items of the cask be examined between shipments. All Group I exa=inations were conducted by members of the OPSL Inspection Engineering Division, who are experts in the exa=ination of No further accident-caused da= age was found structural materials. beyond that found at the accident site. D _m.

28 It is pertinent at this point to discuss the choice of dye penetrant and visual inspection rather than x-ray examination of all cash structural velds. The velds important to the cask biological shield integrity were so located that meaningful x-ray exa=ination was i=possible, particularly with the 8.5-in.-thdck lead shield present. Furthermore, in an accident one would expect the welds to fail in such a way that any failure vould be detectable by dye penetrant methods. Fluorescence dye penetrant was also used to inspect for cracks in the cask head bolts and trunnion bolts because this method is reliable. less expensive, and f aster than x-ray exa=ination. It was reco== ended that the head bolts be replaced because of normal wear. No damage was done to them by the accident. It should be pointed out that the head bolts vill be replaced in the near future, probably before the cask is put into service again. Similarly, all 12 trunnien tie-down bolts were emdned, and no accident-caused da= age was detected. They are made of stainless steel and show very little wear from use. There is no technical reason for their replacement. The Appendix includes a copy of a 1etter from O. J. Smith to J. M. Chandler, reporting the inspection of the Peach Bottom single element shipping cask by the ORNL Inspection Engineering Division. It is noteworthy that the measurements of the trunnien center-to-center distances showed absolutely no deformation of the cask support cradle or the cask. During the cask examinations by the ORNL Inspection Engineering team, it was necessary to " rem:va much paint from the cask and cask support surfaces. This paint removal, that caused directly by the accident, and that during retrieval made repainting necessary for cask service under water and for appearance. Both the cask outer surface and the support structure are carbon steel. Initial pressure tests were conducted to verify that there was no leakage from the cask flanges before or during retrieval of the cask from the ditch. Although the soap bubble test at 10 psig air pressure and the " hydro" test at 50 psig water pressure showed no leakage from any llanges

29 or structural ne=bers, we chose to replace the four 0-ring seals broken during subsequent disassembly of the cask. There was a slight air leak detected fre around the threads of a 5/B-in.-diam bolt that locks the grapple in place. This leak was stopped by providing a s1=ple rubber gasket between the bolt head and the flange into which the bolt was screwed. This gasket could have been =isplaced during unloading, or else we may not have tightened the bolt securely. Since no nuddy water from the ditch was found inside the cask and no radioactivity was found in the ditch water, it is reasonable to conclude that no leak was present before or after the acc$ dent. Furthermore, it is dcubtful that water would have entered the cask cavity if the gasket ut.re omitted. During final air pressure testing of all cask seals, in which air was supplied to the cask cavity through a drilled out 5/8-in.-diam bolt screwed into this grapple locking screw threads, 50 psig air pressure was needed to get a reasonable flow of air to the cask cavity through the s=all annular clearance between the grapple tube and cask head. The cask center cavity was visually inspected and was exa=ined by passing a 4.75-in.-diam by 3-ft-long wood plus through the cavity. Steel wire was also drawn tight to the sides of the cask cavity to aid in the visual exa=ination of the bore. A si=11ar technique was used to measure the straightness of the cask outside surface. Dimensions of the cask were compared with Atomics International Dag, 7617-HM001, from which the cask was constructed in 1963. The operability of the grappler assembly was tested with the grapple-end heat off; the part worked satisfactorily. The ball valve functional test was conducted with the ball valve head off the cask. All movements were made with ease, with an S-in. Crescent vrench used to rotate the valve handle. No irregularities were observed as the valve was opened and closed. Photographs were taken of the grappler test and are on file at the TURF along with photographs of the dye penetrant test results, which 1 shcued no penetration by dye and thus no cracks in the velds tested. Detailed examination of the cask interior was possible because the j neasured dose rate was only a few =1111re= per hcur at 6 in, and the I transferrable e.onta=1 nation was less than 4000 dis / min per 100 cm'. i l

30 Repairs to Cask Da= ages Permission was received by GGA on Thursday, January 6, 1972, from the AEC-San Francisco (SANS) to repair the da= aged cask. We were pre-pared to make repairs and began i= mediately. Actually very little accident damage needed to be repaired, and the main item was to sand-blast and paint the cast for underwater service. The previously inspected head bolts and trunnion bolts were reused to assemble the cask. As a preventative =aintenance item, we replaced all 48 of the re=nining bolts, nuts, and washers that are removed and reused each time the cask is loaded at the reactor site and each time the cask is unloaded. The only items that actually broke during the accident, excluding the ther=al insulation, were the two 1-in.-diam steel dowel pins and the two 1-in.-diam steel bolts, which align and bolt together the cask center support girdle. These bolts and devels were replaced, and the support ring was installed around the girth of the cask. The cradle internediate support member was bolted to the support ring when the cask was inclined to a 10' angle from bori ental and loaded on the tractor-trailer rig, as shown previously in Fig.1. The painted 24.25-in.-0D shell of the cask was sandblasted to bare metal and given a primer and seal coat of Amercoat 69 paint and two sur-face coats of Amercoat 74 paint. This cask surface coating vill protect the steel cask during underwater loading. The cask shipping cradle, cask elevating cradle, and intermediate support were sandblasted lightly or scraped as deemed necessary to pro-vide suitable surface upon which ringle coats of the same Amercoat paints j vere applied. The shipping ca.k is detached from the cradle for-loading. so the cradle is not subjected to fuel storage canal water and does not = require a washable coating. During assembly of the cask af ter sandblasting and painting, all four of the contdinment 0-ring seals located in the heads were replaced as specified for the original construction of the cask by Atomics International [Dwg. No. 7617-ILM001 Cask Assy-(DESIGi SPEC FUEL ROD SHIPPING), HNPF). m a ~, -

31 Repairs were co=pleted about noon January 12, 1972, and the Peach Bottom Single Element Shipping Cask DOT SP-5938 was prepared for shipment and left ORNL at 3:45 PM leaded on Tri-State Trucking Company's " Low Boy" trailer 73090, which was drawn by tractor 563, as shown in Tiss.18 and 19. The final reco==endation, itemized under Group III, " Recommendations," s in the minutes of the December 16, 1971, meeting are planned to be acted upon as described below. Upon return of the cask to San Diego, California, on about February 7,1972, GOA intends to install new ther=al insulation, designed by GGA, which is acceptable by the authorities. The flange bolts are scheduled to be replaced by GGA in its maintenance shops before returning the cask to service. The cask and its support mechanism were shipped from ORNL to Denton, Texas, where a tractor-trailer rig designed specifically ' for this ( shipping asse=bly was fitted with the Peach Bottom single element shipping cask and its cradles. Then this shipping arrangement package was hauled to its designation in California. The new trailer has a low center of gravity, sn3 the load tie-downs are of a positive locking type. This rig was on order; in fact, it was ready for use at the time the accident. occurred and was to be used for subsequent shipments from the Peach Bottom Reactor to Gulf General Atomic Hot Cells and to ORNL. It is a coincidence that it features most of the items recommended in the initial incident report, which was prepared without knowledge of the new tractor-trailer rig. CONCLUSIONS After a thorough dimensional analysis of the cask and an examination of all cask welds at ORNL, we conclude that.there was no structural damage to the Peach Bottom Single Element Shipping Cast - DOT SP-5938. It, therefore, continues to meet the requirements of Federal regulation 10-CTR-71 if the need for a mantle of thermal insulation is included. The pairs of nonstructural bolts and dowel pins of the cask center gird 12 were broken and the girdle came loose from around the cask as a 4 e g

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= 34 result of bearing a heavy force exerted as the cask skidded upside down with tractor-trailer (weight 29,200 lb) attached for some 30 yards in soft soil. This girdle failure did not reduce the effectiveness of the cask's biological shield or its containment seals. The 2-in.-thick Tiberfax insulation and the tarpaulin that protects it from the weather were torn from 80% of the cask surface by the accident. Although the cask did not meet an unyielding object, it did skid about 30 yards in sof t dirt mixed with gravel and absorbed a tremendous amount of abuse without yielding. It appears from the evidence available that the heavy chain tie-downs with boomer locks did not become loose - the chains broke under ' severe force as the cask stopped suddenly. Had the chains broken allowing the load to shif t early in the accident, the driver would have atte=pted to s top the truck. There were no skid marks to indicate that the truck was decelerating. Certainly, the high center of gravity of the total load -- tractor-trailer, cask, and shipping assembly contributed adversely to the ability of the driver to regain control of his load. However, it must be kept in mind that this shipment and others like it have traveled =any miles and have negotiated much more severe curves than this one without overturning. l RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUCCESTIONS Some recommendations and suggestions originated from observations and experience gained in the work done pertaining to the accident. They ( are presented for the reader's consideration. They are thoughts of the author. only and do not necessarily represent any official views of the l AEC or any private organization involved in this accident. It is recommended that this Peach Bottom Single Element Shipping cask be mounted on the trailer at the Iwest possible inclined angle consistent with da= age-free movement cf the element inside the shipping canis ter.

35 It is reco= mended that the cask and its supports be loaded onto a carrier that provides che levest center of gravity consistent with safe travel over the roads to be tuveled. The thermal insulation should be redesigned to provide protection from the weather and provide strength to withstand the accident. The insulation might take the form of a canopy or fire vall. It is recommended that the heavy chain cask support tie-downs be tightened by screw devices or other positive locking keepers; lever-type ~ boomers could become unlatched if struck or snared. Tie-downs should be anchored parallel and perpendicular to the direction of travel. How strong the tie-downs should be is a debatable ites should they hold the load under the accident condition or should they be only strong ' enough to prevent shif t of the load? My preference would allow the separation of cask from carrier under accident conditions for these reasons: Should there be a fire, the trailer engine lubrication and the fuel tanks would be the most probable source of fuel and would be farther from the cask if separation occurred. Retrieval of the damaged or undamaged cask would be simpler and safer without the added structure of the tractor-trailer or railroad equipment. g-Recommended Revisions to Shipping Cask License Requirements @4 All shipping casks in service for transport of radioactive materials w C should be put on a progra=med maintenance schedule with periodic notices c-sent to 'the license holder for action and a report back to the DOT (or m 2 other agency) ' that maintenance was performed. Some items need to be ~ visually inspected each shipment, while others, such as main structural me=b ers e,need to be thoroughly inspected at 1-to 2-year intervals. [ Some ite=s,-such as cask surface coating and ef ten used bolts, gaskets,. J.,.- etc., will' tEhire scheduled periodic repairs or replacements. This

• )

f progrs==e,d maintenance should include inspection, testing, and marking -'I of lifting \\ evice,s accompanying the cask. Special tools for loading or d unloading that Inccompany the cask should be clearly labeled and =arked. Cask tie-down e,quipment sizes should be specified; this includes the s L W 4 A k 8" W% y e s k. ~ ~.

o 36 size of chain, locking bolts, boomers, etc. used to hold the cask in place during shipment. This infor=ation should be listed on the DOT per=it and in the cask safety analysis repo -t. Minimum standards should be set for the type and size of equipment used to transport the shipping cask. This description should specify the number of axles on the tractor-trailer rig and loading limitations for the respective axles. Emergency Procedures - Reco=mendations The accident involving the Peach Bottom Single Element Shipping Cask occurred near where personnel fa=iliar with radioactivity and experienced in handling it were available. The law officer investigating the accident showed good judgment in handling the potentially dangerous accident by routing traffic away from the accident and keeping people away from the accident site until he had contacted the USAEC at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Other law officers, less faciliar with radiation and unaware of the facilities at Oak Ridge or elsewhere, might not have known what to do and whom to contact for help. The procedures recommended here are intended to aid one in handling an emergency and are based on 20 years of experience in the atomic energy field and on experience gained from this investigation and from d,iscussions with people involved in other accidents involving radioactive materials. The reco= mended procedures for use in an emergency include only those controllable by the shipper. They were prepared to aid law officers or anyone else arriving at the site of an accident involving the shipment of radioactive materials. Items discussed here are in addition to the usual radiation markings and signs required by present standards and procedures. The driver of the vehicle should be briefed on procedures to be followed in the event of an accident. These procedures and other informa-tion should accompany the shipment and be stored in a censpicious place in the vehicle and protected from fire. These procedures should list the name or na=es of persons to be contacted for help and those to.be notified in the event of an accident. The person to be contacted should have y e

37 knowledge of the cask structure and its contents and be available to take active part in the retrieval of the da= aged cask and contents. He should be aware of his responsibilities and know beforehand the route of travel and the time schedule of the shipment. The person or persons specified in the procedure to be contacted should be contacted by the emergency squad as soon as practical af ter they have conducted the radiation survey and before any lifting or handling of the shipping cask. If the cask and tractor-trailer unit are still attached, no atte=pt should be made to detach the cask until it has been cleared with the person familiar with the cask. Improper retrieval of the cask could cause a break of the contain=ent vessel at a place that had been weakened by the accident. Co=munication and Liaison Between Investigators once the retrieval operation is co=pleted and work is begun on investigating causes and assessing damage to the cask and its contents preparatory to making repairs necessary to certify cask for further service, one person should be selected to act as liaison and identified to all the agencies taking part in the investigation. This person vill keep all interested parties informed with the latest infor=ation and status of the work. All procedures for inspection and repair work should be trans=1tted through him, and he vill be responsible for' assuring that the work is being conducted according to the procedures specified. Experience has shown that uninformed people tend to be uncooperative and informed people are anxious to help expedite the work to completion. Also, the average lay engineer does not know all the people that should be consulted, notified, or keep informed to get the job done, quickly, econemically, and in a legally correct manner.

38 Final Report of Accident The final writeup of all information pertaining to an accident involving radioactive =aterials should be made by the person most familiar with the f acts. The report should be as informal as practical so that infor=ation contained vill be useful and beneficial to the people selected to handle similar accidents and to designers of reactor fuel shipping ass e=blies. Such a report would also be useful to the first-line supervisors who prepare for chipment of the loaded shipping assembly. Highly formal and politically oriented reports should be prepared, if needed, and distributed by reports groups who use information and facts from the basic report. There are many conversations, exhibits, and bits of information gathered from many sources during such an involved incident that are not published but should be retained for some several years or until any . legal proceedings resulting from the accident have expired. It should be the responsibility of the authors of the or1ginal report or someone designated to keep these records for reference. An example in this case of such an item is the sa=ple of water taken at the accident site. I.ong Range Items to Consider As the nuclear economy expands in this' country and the world', the inventory of fissionable materials.e_n route to and from the reactors and to the fuel fabrication plants from the enrichment plants becomes very large, there vill be need for a computerized dispatcher to route the shipments so as to prevent or to make incredible accidents in which a nuclear accident could result when two or more shipments become involved in a single accident. It is not inconceivable that a certain network of rails, roads, airways, or waterways (ocean included) be set aside at times for use 11=ited to fissionable materials. Shipments could be progra=med for maximum safety in handling and transport. Universal shipping assemblies might well be joined in trains that operate on this exclusive transporta-tion network.

39 ACKNOWLEDGMEh"IS The investigation reported here includes contributions from a large nu=ber of coworkers. In particular, I wish to acknowledge the contribu-tions of F. R. Bruce, L. B. Shappert, A. L. Walls, R. P. Ward, J. R. McGuffey, O. J. Smith, K. K. Klindt, E. M. Shufford, and E. L. Fair from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory; W. A. Pryor and F. W. Hoffman of the Oak Ridge Operations, U.S. Atomic Energy Co==ission; and C. R. Davis of Gulf General Ato=ic, San Diego, California. S e e f l-9

\\ APPENDIX Doctments Related to the Shipping Cask Accident 4 9 l l P W I e I I l

43 OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY OPERATED BY UNION CARBIDE CORPOR ATION NUCLEAR DIYlSION O PO5T OFFICE BOX X OAK RIDGE. TEP*NE55EE 37830 December 17, 1971 l Mr. Milton Shaw, Director ~ Divisien of Reactor Development and Technology U. S. Atomic Energy Co=tission Washington, D. C. 205h5

Dear Mr. Shaw:

Transmittal cf Incident Renort No. ORNL-71 h5 (Final) and ORNL-71 46 Enclosed are Incident Reports No. OENL-71 h5 (Final) and ORNL-71 h6, " Unscheduled Shutdown," and " Wreck of Vehicle Carrying the 'Hallam' Cask with FIUR Experimental Fuel Element RTE-7," which describe incidents occurring on December lh and December 8, 1971. Very truly yours, D. B. Trauger Associate Director D3T: HIN:ba Enclosures e e

L4 Mr. I'.ilten Shaw 2 December 17, 1971 Distribution AEC-Washincten-EDT ORNL Continued Directer,RDI(3) D. E. Ferguson Assistant Director, J. H. Frye, Jr. Project Manage =ent (2) W. R. Gall Assistant Director, W. O. Graves Reactor Engineering W. R. Gr1=es Assistant Director, W. O. Harms Plant Ensincerins V. O. Haynes Assistant Director, L. 3. Holland Nuclear Safety P. R. Kasten Assistant Director, W. J. Lecnard Engineering Standards A. L. Lotts F. C. Maienschein AEC-Washincten-DR C. K. McGlothlan C. A. Mills (12) P. W. McDaniel J. G. Morgan F. H. Neill (2) AEC-OR L. C. Oakes P. Patriarca D. F. Cope, RI7I-OSR-ORNL M. E. Ra=sey J. A. Lenhard, ORO M. W. Rosenthal H. M. Roth, ORO H. E. Seagren S. R. Sapirde, ORO L. 3. Shappert D. 3. Trauger (2) IMEC D. R. Ward W. J. Werner J. C. Cochran G. D. Whit =an ORNL R. G. Affel (15) C. W. A 6el A. E. G. Bates S. E. Beall M. Bender A. L. Boch C. J. Borkovski F. R. Bruce J. R. Buchanan C. D. Cagle W. R. Casto (6) J. M. Chandler W. 3. Cottrell J. A. Cox 7. L'. Culler (2)

45 l OAK RIIGE NATIONAL LA301ATORY INCIDDIT REPORT Initial X STATUS: Interim Final X Facility: Health Physics Researta Reactor Date of Incident: 12-lh-71 Report No.: ORNL-71 h5 Time of Incident: 9:hl

Subject:

Unscheduled Shutdown 1. Description of Incident and General Desienation of Apparent Cause: (Design Mat'l Personnel Procedure Other X) The reactor scra=med when the solenoid current and =agnet current reached their up scale trip points. 2. Ooeratine Conditions of the Facility at Time of Incident: The reactor was being taken to power and scra=med at a power of 2 W. 3 I==ediate Evaluation, corrective Action Taken. and Results: When the reactor scra=med it was noted that the meter pointers indicating solenoid and magnet currents were latched at their upper set points. All other instrumentation indicated that the power of the reactor was increasin6 at the expected reite at the time of the scram. The meter reset buttent were pushed, and the hands were observed to return to zero as expected. k. Is Further Evaluation or Corrective Action Necessary: No. 5 Evaluation: Since there was a momentary increase in both the solenoid current and the magnet current, it, was probably caused by a transient condition in a ec= mon power supply. The result is an automatic shutdown which is an inconvenience that occurs occasionally with this reactor protection system. ._-__J

L6 ORNL-71 h5 6. Te=nora: v Corrective Action Taken: Ma5 net and solenoid currents were checked to make sure they were within their nor=al 11=its. Then the reactor was re-started and the three-minute operation was co=pleted. 7 Per=anent corrective Action Taken or Recc== ended: None. S. si=1lar Incidents: . ] The most recent similar incident occurred on October 20, 1971 (ORNL-71-32). Ori inated by Date and Ti=e Reported: 12-lh-71 S D. R. Ward 9:h5 EPRR Operations Supervisor Approved by Date / 2 ~ # f' 7 I L.AJ. Holland, Supervisor Unshielded Reactor Area i Approved by W'$ Y $ Date

1

/ g - 7 l F. H. Neill 3 -r @ g Director, Quality Assufance I

e n e --,r

47 i OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY INCIDENT REPORT Initial /X/ STATUS Interim / / Final / / Facility: Peach Bottom Reactor Cask - RII-7 Date of Incident: 12-8-71 Report No.: ORNL L 6 Ti=e of Incident: 2:00 p.m. Incident

Subject:

Wreck of Vehicle Carrying the "Hallam" Cask with EIGR Experi= ental Fuel Element RTE-7 1. Descriotion of Incident and General Designation cf Apparent Cause: (Design Material Personnel Procedure ____ Other ) The vehicle carrying Hallam cask containing EIGR experimental fuel element RTE-7 from the Peach Bottom Reactor to Oak Ridge National Laboratory wrecked on U.S. Route 25W approx 1mately 3 miles north' of Clinton, Tennessee. The accident was apparently caused by an oncoming vehicle which veered over the centerline of the two-lane road. The driver of the cask vehicle apparently swerved his vehicle toward shoulder of the roadway and was unable to control his vehicle. The vehicle wrecked in the ditch beside the roadway. The impact, as the cask came to rest with the leading end embedded 3 f t deep in soil, broke the cask tie chains.. The tractor with trailer attached traveled 52 ft in the original direction of travel and was upside down when it skidded to a stop. The driver of.the cask vehicle was killed in the accident; no other injuries occurred. 2. Operating Conditions at the Time of Incident: i The Killion Motor Express equipment was delivering the loaded Hallam cask on a clear day at reasonable speeds around a curve with approximately 50 f t radius. An oncoming truck, according to witnesses, " crowded" him, causing the Killion driver to steer his vehicle to 3 avoid collision. 3. Total Operating Time to Date: Sinilar shipments using this same Hallam cask have been made previously without incident between San Diego, California and the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Plant, York County, Pennsylvania. RTE-7 was being transported to ORNL for postirradiation examination and other experinental work. 4 I= mediate Evaluation, Corrective Action Taken, and Results: ORNL was notified of the accident at 2:50 p.m., December 8,1971, by a telephone call to J. M. Chandler from Mr. J. A. Lenhard, Director, AEC Safety. Chandler and Paul Ward, health physicist, vere dispatched to the accident. Radiological surveys were made of the. cask, the vehicle, and the area; these indicated that leakage of radioactive material had not occurred. The cask was removed from - the ditch at 10:00 p.m. and transported to ORNL, arriving at 10:45 p.m., December 8, 1971. Page 1 of 3 i

48 5. Is Further Evaluation or Corrective Action Necessary? Yes _J,_ No If yes: Before Further Operation? Yes X No By Whom? 1. Fuel Cycle Technology Operation, Metals and Ceramics Division 2. Gulf General Atomic, San Diego, California 3. Philadelphia Electric Co., York County, Pennsylvania 6. Evaluation: 1. The incident resulted in no damage to the general public and no radioactive substances were dispersed. 2. The suitability of the cask for future shipments must await detailed assessment of any da= age. Repair to the cask should be made only af ter approval of Gulf General Atomic and the USAEC. 3. Assessment of damage, if any, to RTE-7 must await the removal of the element from the cask and preliminary postirradiation examination. 7. Temocrary Corrective Action Taken: No te=porary corrective action, other than that indicated above, is required. 8. Permanent Ccrrective Action Taken or Recommended: Use of a trailer allowing for lower center of gravity of the total load is reco= mended. Tiedown connections in all 360* is reccomended; tiedown tension devices should be locked by screw-type lock. Thermal insulation should be eliminated or made permanent. 9. Similar Incidents to Other Facilities (by Renort No.): None to our knowledge. Loaded UF. cylinders have survived similar accidents without spread of contanination to surroundings. /1[/3! / Originated by: Date: f/./M.Chtndler, Head

• Jorium-Uranium Recycle Facility Operations Group Metals and Ceramics Division Approved by:

Date: /.2 /o /7/ A.LfLotts, Supervisor Fuel Cycle Technology Operation Metals and Ceramics Division 6 Page 2 of 3

49 /j//3[7[ Approved by: Date: P. Patriarca, Head Nuclear Fuel Technology Section Metals and Ceramics Division Approved by: / d Date: /d F 7/ P. Rp. asten,41 rector / / / / Gas-vooled Reactor - Thorium Utilization Programs Approved by: l T&kJ/ Date: / b /3 [ e MetalsandCer/Di-feter J./E Frye, Jr. amics Division Approved by: N M- - m h, Date: / 2 //4 / 7 / W. J. Werner / QAC - Materials /2./ /6[7/ Approved by: Date: F. H. Neill, Director Quality Assurance, ORNL t Page 3 of 3

50 INTRA LABORATORY CORRESPONDENCE OAK RIDGE NATIONAL L ABOR ATORY January 5,1972 To: J. M. Chendler

Subject:

Survey of Peach Bottom Shipping Cask A very careful radiction survey en the Peach Bottom Shipping Cesk, DOT 5938, following rerum to ORNL, gave no indication of a change in the shielding qualities of the cask. There were no discontinuities in radiction levels to indicate a change in the shielding integrity as a result of the cecident. The transfercble contamination on the cask, when retumed to ORNL, was less then 30 a d/m/100 cm* and less than 500,B,y d/rg/100 cm8 as determined from the analyses of 26 smear samples. Maximum direct read-ings et the extemol surface of the cask were less then 0.5 mR/hr. 7/Yb ' w J. V. Hilyer Health Physics Division JVH:cm cc: R. L. Clark D. M. Davis t l l l r _.,c.. -e-

O 4 51 OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY optnatro av UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION NUCllAR DIVl310N PO5T OFFICE BOX X OAK RIDGE. TENNE 5SEE 37830 Dece=ber 29, 1971-Mr. R. J. Ledbetter, Contract k*- ".istratcr Gulf Energy and Envirc== ental Syste=s ?. O. Sex 606 San Diego, California 92112

Dear Mr. Ledbetter:

A report of a meeting held at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory en Dece=ber 16, cencerning GGA's Peach Bottc= Single Ele =ent Shipping Cask, DOT Special Femit No. 5938, is enclosed. C. R. Dr.vis of your crganizatics was in e.ttendance. Three sets of recc=endations which resulted frc= that =eeting in-clude:

1) an extensive inspection cf the cask by ORNL persennel,

2) appropriate cask repair as uncevered by the inspection, and 3) suggested changes in the shipping syste= which should i=preve future cask perfo rance under no m al or accident conditions.

We have cc=pleted apprcximately 95% of the inspections lis'ted in Group I recc==endations and have uncovered no functional damage so far. In order to centinue with Group II recc= endations, ve recuire GGA's approval and AEC's ceneurrence. I would appreciate your pro-viding us with these approvals as socn as possible. Sincerely yours, AN Y j D. B. Trange 7 Associate Director DET:DEF:at= cc: F. R. Bruce (2) F. L. Culler (2) D. E. Ferguson (14) P. R. Kasten (2) J. A. Lenhard, AEC-ORO (2) A. L. Lotts (2) M. E. Ra=sey (2) H. !!. Reth, AEC-ORO (2) i

o l l 52 INTRA LABORATORY CORRESPONDENCE OAK RIDGE NATIONAL L ABOR ATORY December 17, 1971 To: D. B. Tranger From: J. M. Chandler and L. B. Shappert

Subject:

Inspection and Repair of GGA's Peach Bottom Single Element Shipping Cask On Wednesday, December 8, the Peach Bottom Single Elenent. Shipping Cask, owned by the AEC and leased by Gulf General Atomics, was involved in an., accident. The cask was recovered, brought to ORNL, and unloaded into a cell in 3026D Bnming. After a rather cursory examination it appeared that the cask was only superficially damaged. However, it will be in:possible to tell whether the cask can be restored to the point where it meets the AID and Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations as originally approved without a thorough inspection. For this reason, a meeting was held on De'cember 16 with represen-tatives from GGA, ORD, and ORNL to determine what steps could be taken to determine, with a high degree of confidence, if the cask suffered significant structural damage and what repairs should be undertaken to restore the cask to its operating condition. Those in attendance at the meeting were: J. M. Chandler, Chem. Tech. Division, ORNL C. R. Davis, GGA E. L. Fair, Traffic, ORNL K. K. Klindt, Inspection Engineering, ORNL J. R. McGuffey, Inspection Engineering, ORNL W. A. Pryor, AEC, 070 L. B. Shappert, Chem. Tech. Division, ORNL E. M. Shuford, Plant and Engineering, ORNL O. J. Smith, Inspection Ihgineering, ORNL John Chandler described the accident with the aid of photographs supplied by ORO Safety Division, information received from eyewitnesses, and from a firsthand inspection of the accident site. The it:portant points were: 1 The thermal insulation that was intended to protect the cask in a fire was stripped away from the cask by the sliding action of the cask against the ground, exposing approximately 80". of the cask surface. The insulation on the ends of the cask rerained functional. 2. The chains used to tie the skid-cask combination to the trailer apparenOy snapped after the skid-cask-trailer combination had slid about 25 yards on its side. This seems to indicate that the load did not shift prior to the roll-over.

o 53 2 3. The center strap, used to prevent vibration in the 17-ft-long cask, was torn loose. This is not a structural support member. ~ h. Probes were made to check for excessive dose rates or possible contamination of the area surrounding the accident. The raxi:m:m dose rate was 0.5 crer/hr, measured at the cask reface, and no contamination was found. 5. Visual inspection of trunnion welds, end flange welds, and skid support welds were made prior to cask recovery. There was no apparent damage. 6. The cask was received and the fuel reseved into a cell in 3026D Building. There was no visual damage to the canister or to the graphite fuel that was inside the canister. Based on this inferration, a brief examination of the cask and GGA fabrication prints of the cask, the comittee divided its recomendations into three groups. The Laboratory should obtain ORO concurrence on Group I recommendations. F. R. Bruce has already approved Group I reconnendations for the Laboratog. Group I Reco=endations 1 There should be a visual inspection of all accessible welds on-the cask and skid. 2. A di..aensional check of the cask against the drawings should be made as follows: a. length even 90*. b. straightness every 90*. c. straigntness of beams in skid. 3. A 10 psi bubble test followed by a 50 psi hydro test prior to cask disassembly should be made, e h. A dye penetrant and visual inspection of all welds in the cask and of all principal load bearing welds in the skid should be made.- !i The massive steel end pieces will be removed to allow access to these cask welds. 5. Complete visual inspection of the cask inner surface should be made. 6. The cask should be reassembled, followed by a soap bubble test at 10 psi, plus a hydro test at 50 psi. 7. The welds on center strap should be inspected. 8. All moving parts should be checked for proper functioning. m

54 3 The Group II recomendations should be approved by GGA prior to their initiation. We suggest you contact Mr. Richard J. Lecbetter of their Contracts Division for his concurrence. G:cun II Recommendations 1 All bolts should be replaced in accordance with what was originally specified in the safety analysis, or approved equal. These original bolts were SA-193B7 with a ninimum yield strength of 105,000 psi. 2. Repair and install the center strap in accordance with GGA drawings. 3. Repair any welds that were damaged. h. Replace all 0 rings. 5. Repaint. The recomendations in Group III are merely suggestions which are made for GGA's consideration. Ihey reflect those ideas which con =ittee members felt might lead to safer shipments in the future. Group III Recommendations 1 Redesign the method of installing the thermal insulation in order to prevent its removal in another, si-ilar, accident. 2. Lower the center of gravity. This can be done by transporting the cask on a low boy and/or lowering the angle at which the cask is shipped. 3. Redesign the tiedowns to include positive locking clamps.. The comittee believes the inspectkons recomended in Group I could be com-pleted within 2 to 3 weeks after approval. Group II recomendations should not take ever 1 to 2 weeks unless significant weld damage, not revealed by the inspec t. ions already ma~ e, are uncovered. d It was estimated that Group I recommendations would cost less than $2000, while Group II recommendations would probably cost less than $10,000. C M I! l M'. Chandler 1 i 8

r. B. Shappert

// i JMC:LBS:msb cc: F. R. Bruce, Directors Div. A. L. Intts, M & C Div. D. F. Cope, Site Rep. J. R. McGuffey, I. E. Div. l F. L. Culler, Jr., Directors Div. F. H. Neill, Directors Div. j C. R. Davis, GGA R. E. Norman, GGA F. E.

Dearing,

Site Rep. W. A. Pryor, ORO l D. E. Ferguson, Chem. Tech. M. E. Ramsey, Directors Div. J. A. Lenhant, OIO H. M. Ro th, ORO

e 55 INTRA LABORATORY CORRESPONDENCE OAK RIDGE NATloN AL LABOR AToRY January 6, 1972 TO: J. M. Chandler

SUBJECT:

Inspection of GGA's Peach Bottom Single Element Shipping Cask All inspections outlined in Group I Recommendations have been completed. AI Drawing 7617 HM001 Cask Assembly " Design Spec. Fuel Rod Shipping HNPF" was used for reference. 1. Visual inspection of all accessible welds on the cask and skid revealed no indications of damage. 2. The following dimensional checks were made on the cask: a. Length (flange face to flange face) O' - 16 ' 11 7/8" 90* - 16' 11 7/8" 180* - 16' 11 7/8" 270* - 16' 11 7/8" l b. Straightness of cask every 90*. ( The straightness checks along the length of the l outer surface of the cask indicated a variation of 7/32 inches. Outside diameter measurements, taken at corresponding positions, indicated an ~ out-of-round condition as great as 1/4 inch. l. Since these variations complemented each other, 1 they were considered to be an "as built" condition ( and not as a result of the accid'ent. c. Straightness of beams in skid. 1 l Alignment checks of the skid beams and support structure indicated no significant damage or dimensional change. Trunion center-to-center checked 17 feet 9 15/16 inches I on each side. t

56 J. M. Chandler 2. Jan. 6, 1972 3. A 10 PSIG bubble test followed by a 50 PSIG hydro-static test was performed prior to disassembly. Leakage was observed around the bolt at the center of the grappler cover during bubble test. It was determined that the gasket had not been replaced here after unloading. The gasket was replaced and the unit retested with no evidence of leaks. The 50 PSIG hydrostatic test was held for 30 minutes with no indication of leaks or loss in gage pressures. 4. A dye penetrant inspection was made on all accessible welds in the cask and the principal load bearing welds of the skid. Paint remover was used to remove the paint from the exterior welds of the cask and the support structure welds. No indication of cracks, separations or dimensional changes was noted. 5. Visual and dimensional inspection of the inner surface of the cask revealed no indication'of damage or dimensional changes. 6. After reassembly, a 50 PSIG hydrostatic test followed by a 10 PSIG bubble test was performed with no indication of leaks or drop in gage pressure. 7. The paint was removed and the plate to center strap welds were visually inspected. No indication of damage *was noted. 8. The trunion bolts and the head bolts were cleaned and inspected with fluorescence dye penetrant. This inspection re-vealed no indication of damage but did show signs of wear damage and some pitting and corrosion in the threaded portions of the head bolts. I would recommend replacement of the head bolts. The trunion bolts showed no signs of damage and are considered satisfactory for use. INSPECTION ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT . J. Smith OJS:gs cc: J. R. McGuffey K. K. Klindt L. B. Shappert

... o 57 INIERNAL DISTRIBUTION Central Research Library (3) M. T. Kelley ORNL - Y-12 Technical Library E, M. King Docunent Reference Section B. B. Klima Laboratory Records Department (10) K. K. Klindt Laboratory Records, ORNL RC W. J. Lackey G. M. Ada= son, Jr. R. E. Leuze W. Anderson T. B. Lindemer I. A. Arehart A. L. Lo tts S. E. Beall R. S. Lowrie M. Bender M. I. Lundin L. L. Bennett J. R. McGuffey D. S. Billington J. P. Nichols C. J. Borkowski K. J. Notz R. A. Ersdley A. R. Ols en R. E. Brooksbank J. R. Parrott F. N. Browder P. Patriarca W. E. Browning A. M. Perry F. R. Bruce C. F. Sanders W. D. Burch J. P. Sanders J. M. Chandler (10) J. L. S cott R. L. Clark J. D. Sease J. A. Conlin L. B. Shapp'ert (5) J. H. Coobs E. M. Shufford W. B. Cottrell M. D. Silverman F. L. Culler O. Sisman J. E. Cunningham M. J. Skinner H. J. de Nordwall O. J. Sndth S. J. Ditto J. W. Snider W. P. Eatherly D. B. Trauger E. L. Fair W. E. Unger D. E. Ferguson V.C. A. Vaughen R. B. Fitts J. W. Wachtec J. H Frye, Jr. A. A. Walls P. A. Haas R. P. Ward M. R. Hill (3) T. N. Washburn A. R. Irvine A. M. Weinberg J. D. Jenkins M. E. Whatley S. I. Kaplan G. D. Whitman P. R. K as t en R. G. Wyner EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION J. T. Alexander, AEC, Oak Ridge Operations W. A. Brobst, AEC, Washington, D. C. R. L. Chandler, AEC, Savannah River Operations Office, P.O. Box X, Aiken, South Carolina 29801

N o 58 D. F. Cope, RDT, SSR, AEC, Oak Ridge National Laboratory C. R. Davis (2), Gulf General Atomic, P.O. Box 608, San Diego, Calif. 92112 T. E.

Dearing,

RDT, OSR AEC, Oak Ridge National Laboratory E. G. DeLaney, RDT, OSR, Gulf General Atomic, P.O. Box 2325, San Diego, Calif. 92112 R. D. DeWitt, AEC, San Francisco Operations Office, 2111 Bancroft Way, Berkeley, Calif. 94704 H. B. Fry, AEC, San Francicco Operations Office, Berkeley, Calif. 94704 A. W. Grella. Department of Transportation, Office of Hazardous Materials, 400 7th St. SW, Washington, D.C. P. A. H alpine, AEC, Division of Reactor Development and Technology, Washington, D.C. 20545 F. W. Hoffman, AEC, Oak Ridge Operations W. A. Johnson, AEC, Oak Ridge Operations J. A. La=b, AEC, Oak Ridge Operations R. J. Ledbetter (2), Gulf General Atomic, P.O. Box 608, San Diego, Calif. 9211: J. A. Lenhard, AEC, Oak Ridge Operations C. L. Matthews RDT, OSR, AEC, Oak Ridge National Laboratory W. A. Nelson, AEC, Division of Reactor Development and Technology, Washington, D.C. 20545 R. G. Nor=an (5), Gulf General Atomic, P.O. Box 608, San Diego, Calif. 92112 W. A. Pryor, AEC, Oak Ridge Operations J. B. Radcliffe, RDT, SSR, Gulf General Atomic, P.O. Box 2325, San Diego, Calif. 92112 H. M. Roth, AEC,' Oak Ridge Operations W. Lee S chuster, Philadelphia Electric, York County, Delta, Pa. H. B. S tcwart, Gulf General Atomic, P.O. Box 608, San Diego, Calif. 92112 W. T. Ullrich, Philadelphia Electric, York County, Delta, Pa. Laboratory and University Division, AEC, Oak Ridge Operations Technical Infor=ation Center, OR (2) S u}}