ML20040B131
| ML20040B131 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1982 |
| From: | Plotkin S, Pulido M JOINT INTERVENORS - DIABLO CANYON |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040B117 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8201250193 | |
| Download: ML20040B131 (18) | |
Text
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1 TESTIMONY OF 2
DR. SIIELDON C.
PLOTKIN
'82 JM 17 P7:19
.d AND 1
MR. MIGUEL PULIDO i
o 5
ON BEIIALF OF JOINT INTERVENORS 6
JANUARY 19, 1982 7
CONTENTION 1 S
9 Background
10 My name in Sheldon C.
Plotkin.
I received Bachelor of 11 Science degrees in Electrical Engineering and Aeronautical 12 Engineering from the University of Colorado in 1946 and 1949, 13 respectively.
In addition, I received a Ph.D. in Electrical 11 Engineering from the University of California at Berkeley in 15 1956.
My experience over the past 35 years has been at the 16 Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, U.S. Air Missile Test 17 Center, University of California, Energy Systems, University 18 of Southern California, Hughes Aircraft Company, TRW Systems, 19 and RAND Corporation, and in 1971, I established (and have 20 continued through the present) a private systems and safety 21 engineering consulting firm in Los Angeles, California.
22 My experience relevant specifically to the subject 23 matter of this proceeding includes many years of systems 21 engineering analysis, automatic highway system synthesis, 25 accident analysis (including highway design), and analysis of 26 dynamic human factors and behavior under emergency conditions.
27 Recently, I testified on evacuation planning and times 2S assessment before the Licensing Board of the Nuclear 1
i 8201250193 820111 PDR ADOCK 05000275 T
PDR n
i
s 9
1 Regulatory Commission in the San Onofre licensing proceding 2
(Units 2 and 3).
3 4
My name is Miguel Pulido.
I received a Bachelor of i
5 Science degree in engineering (with an emphasis in mechanical 6
engineering) in 1980 from California State University at l
7 Pullerton.
During the past two years, I have been employed as 8
an associate energy systems engineer for the Southern 9
Califoria Gas Company and, since 1980, as a mechanical 10 engineer with McCaughey and Cmith Energy Associates, 11 Consulting Engineers.
Specific experience has included 12 analysis of energy and engineering systems, computer 13 simulation programs, facility energy loads, and facility 14 energy consumption and preparation of feasibility studies and 15 reports and responses to requests for proposals.
Recently, I 16 have assisted in the preparation of a critique of the 17 evacuation times estimates report prepared by wilbur Smith and 1
i IS Associates in connection with the San Onofre Nuclear 19 Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, licensing proceeding.
20 21 Documents noviewed i
22 In the preparation of this testimony, we have reviewed i
23 three documents related to emergency planning for the Diablo 04 Canyon Nuclear Power Plant:
the voorhees and Associates I
j 25
" Evacuation Times Assessment for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear 26 Power Plant, Phase I and Phase II Reports" (September, 1980);
3 27 the TERA Corporation report " Earthquake Emergency Planning at i
1 2S Diablo Canyon," Chapter 4.0 (September 1981); and the San Luis i
- I l
4 1
Obispo County Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response 2
Plan, Revision B (October, 1981).
The testimony which follows 3
will, therefore, be limited to these documents, specifically 4
to their discussion and calculation of evacuation times for 5
the population surrounding the Diablo Canyon Plant in the C
event of a serious nuclear accident.
7 8
Discussion 9
We conclude that the calculation of evacuation times 10 estimates set forth and relied upon in the three documents 1) listed above is flawed in a number of respects, some more 12 critical than others but which, taken as a whole, draw into 13 question the utility of these documents as a basis for 14 determination of the appropriate protective actions to be I5 taken in response to a radiological emergency.
Before 16 describing some of their principal deficiencies in detail, 17 however, some general remarks regarding systems engineering 18 analysis are in order, noting that we are concerned here with 19 an evacuation system.
Proper understanding of system 20 performance can be acquired only by knowing both limiting and 21 anticipated or realistic conditions.
Although it is important 22 to be aware of limiting conditions -- e.g. optimum, on the one 1
33 hand, and worst case, on the other -- they pre many times 21 strictly theoretical in nature and are unlikely to be 25 achieved.
In contrast, realistic or anticipated conditions 26 comprise the most likely operational mode, an analysis of 27 which will provide the most useful evaluation of system l
28 adequacy.
Briefly stated, therefore, the specific system,
1 1
conditions requiring study are the following:
2 (1) optimum (unlikely);
3 (2) realistic or anticipated (likely);
4 (3) catastrophic or worst case (unlikely) 5 An evaluation of each of these conditions is beneficial to a 6
full understanding of system performance, whether an 7
evacuation system or any other type of system.
8 These general principles are particularly important in
()
this proceeding because the Voorhees Evacuation Times Reports, 10 the TERA report, and the San Luis Obispo County Plan (which 1]
refers to and relies on those documents) base their 12 conclusions solely upon an analysis of the evacuation system 13 ope r a t i r, at an optimum level.
Although they included a 11 number of small variations or " scenarios," these were all 15 subsumed within the optimum evacuation time category because 16 of the limited extent of the variation considered.
For i
17 example, perhaps the primary factor in determining evacuation 18 times is the highway capacity, for which the optimum condition 11) requires an accumption of no flow restricting factors (e.g.,
20 accidents or malfunctions).
Voorhees/ TERA assumed both that 21 any accidents, blockages, or malfunctions could and would be 22 quickly cleared and that all entrances to principal evacuation 23 routes would be strictly controlled, thereby maintaining the 21 optimum highway speed of 35 miles per hour average.
Those 25 theoretical anr;umptions in turn result in an optimum 26 evacuation rate of 3,600 vehicles per hour on both North and 27 South Ili Jhway 101 and 1,800 vehicles per hour on North Highway 28
- 1. -.
1 These conclusions contrast sharply with those derived 2
from an analysis of the realistic or anticipated evacuation 3
system condition, a condition, we submit, substantially more 4
likely to occur.
Such an analysis includes the uncertainties 5
of human response under emergency conditions acompanying a 6
cevere nuclear power plant accident, for example, the 7
possibility that highway entrance controls will be ignored, 8
that directives to use specific evacuation routes will be 9
disregarded, or that road clearance personnel or highway 10 entrance control personnel will be unavailable or leave their 11 posts in order to assure the safety of their own families.
12 Such an analysis anticipates also an increased likelihood of 13 rear-end collisions, along with at least a normal number of 14 stalled vehicles, resulting in increased highway congestion due 15 to lane blockage, ineffective access control, inadequate 16 access by tow trucks to stalled or damaged vehicles on major 17 evacuation routes, and very substantial numbers of vehicles 18 attempting to evacuate in fear of radioactive contamination.
[
19 These factors are likely to result in substantially 20 reduced traffic speeds of between 0 and 10 miles per hour, the 21 average speed being about 5 miles per hour.
Using Bureau of 22 Public Roads traffic flow data for such reduced speeds, the 23 traffic flow rate is similarly reduced from the 1,800 vehicles 21 per lane-hour maximum assumed by Voorhees/ TERA to 25 approximately 600 vehicles per lane-hour.
Assuming blockage 1
26 of one lane in each direction, the total vehicle flow rate on 27 Highway 101 reduces from the theoretical maximum of 3,600 28,
vehicles per hour in each direction to a realistic or i
(
I anticipated rate of 600 vehicles per hour.
Assuming no 2
serious lane blockage, the anticipated flow rate would be 3
approximately 1,200 vehicles per hour.
Similar reductions in 4
flow rate could be expected on Highway 1 North.
This factor 5
alone -- the reduced traffic flow expected in the realistic or 6
anticipated evacuation system condition -- results in an 7
increase in total evacuation time for the Basic EPZ from 8
between 4 and 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, calculated by Voorhees and incorporated U
into the County Plan (Table I.5-6), to between 15 and 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> 10 (assuming no serious lane blockage) or between 21 and 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 11 (assuming one lane blocked on liighway 101 each direction).
12 The catastrophic or worst case system condition involves i
13 a major natural disaster, such as a tidal wave, tornado, or L
14 major earthquake, accompanied by a serious accident at the 15 Diablo canyon plant leading to a substantial offsite release 16 of radiation.
This condition assumes complete or near 17 complete blockage or destruction of principal evacuation 18 routes as a result of the natural disaster and the consequent 19 inability of a major percentage of the population to evacuate.
20 Under such circumstances, evacuation times estimates could 21 reasonably be expected to fall within the range of several 22 days to a week.
In other words, under this condition, 23 evacuation cannot be considered a viable protective action for 24 the public.
25 A related deficiency which pervades each of the 20 documents cited above is the largely implicit and unsupported 27 assumption that the evacuation can and will be accomplished 28 smoothly by these ordered to do so.
The Voorhees Phase II 1
Report, at pages 54-55, raises briefly the question of public
" willingness" to abandon the area if directed to do so without
- 1 first " gathering their families, important personal
'I belongings, and pets, and without securing their houses," and it acknowledges that such a directive might lead to "a great 6
deal of panic," thereby rendering the evacuation 7
" unmanageable."
With this limited exception, the reports 8
assume a level of evacuation discipline among the population 9*
which, we believe, could be justified only by public 10 participation in annual full-scale evacuation drills.
Just as 11 with any system, testing is necessary to determine the I
system's ability to function.
Without the kind of annual 13 testing and training suggested here, the voorhees/ TERA assumption of minimum evacuation times is a questionable 15 foundation for emergency response decision-making.
I" l Experience at TMI indicates that a substantial number of II people outside the designated evacuation zone will leave the 18 area voluntarily.
None of the three documents here allows for this possibility, despite the fact that many of these
.,9,
l additional " voluntary" or " spontaneous" evacuees will
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l necessarily une the same principal evacuation routes -- e.g.,
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North and South Ilighway 101 and North Highway 1 -- as persons l
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actually ordered to evacuate.
This added population could og increase the likelihood of highway congestion and evacuation o0 delay inside the designated zone of evacuation due to
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ot accidents, stalled vehicles, blocked lanes, or simply
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increasing the number of vehicles on an already over-burdened
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l highway system outside the evacuation zone.
Some segments of
_7_
4 1
the population may even seek to enter the evacuation zone in 2
order to assure the safety of friends or relatives residing 3
there.
The Voorhees/ TERA evacuation times estimates do not 4
allow for these potential complications.
5 The Voorhees/ TERA calculations of the number,of vehicles 6
are questionable for several reasons.
First, in the Phase I 7
Report, on page 28, and the Phase II Report, on page 15, the 8
assumption that (1) only 50% of the two-car households would 9
use both cars during an evacuation and (2) none of the 1,
households with three or more cars would use more than two 11 cars is not sufficiently conservative.
By this assumption 12 alone, Voorhees has potentially underestimated the number of 13 vehicles from car-owning households by approximately 6,724 11 vehicles, or 21 percent, for the areas covered by the Phase I 15 Report.
(Because no breakdown of the car-owning households is 16 provided in the Phase II Report, no similar percentage can be 17 calculated.)
We cannot accept so large a discount of the car-18 owning population, particularly in light of the absence of any 19 stated empirical basis for it.
20 l Second, the number of vehicles and vehicle trips likely 21 to be generated by institutions (e.g., schools, hospitals, 22 convalescent homes, and the California Men's Colony) are not 23 accurately computed in any of the documents.
Although the 21 Phase I and Phase II Reports, at pages 31-38 and pages 17-25, 25 respectively, include some discussion and tables with vehicle 26 estimates listed for various types of institutions, those 27 reports acknowledge that the institutional populations will 28 require special transportation and care.
For example, I
ambulance trips for hospitalized persons are not included in Tables IV-4 of Phase I and Phase II, although an unexplained
- 3 725 " Hospital Direct Evacuation" trips are added in Table IV-5 4
of Phase I.
Neither the basis for this amount, the type of
- 5 vehicles (e.g.,
ambulances) assumed, the number of such I' Vl vehicles, nor their capacity are accounted for.
Similarly, 7
availability of buses is assumed for evacuation of schools and 8
come institutions, including the California Men's Colony.
O Where those buses are to come from is not addressed nor are the number of trips necessary to evacuate inmates, patients, 11 and staff from convalescent and prison institutions included in the vehicle totals in Table IV-5 of the Phase I Report.
In 13 fact, that report states that (1) sheltering "would be the 11 most likely occurrence" for the over 2,500 inmates at I
California Men's Colony (pages 31-32) and (2) a " detailed analysis of the school busing situation was not performed in the study.
(page 43).
Both statements suggest a need for further planning by voorhees.
19 Third, according to Table I.5-3 of the County Emergency oo Plan, there are 3,828 households without automobiles. Each of
~
"1 the documents provides that this population is expected to 22 evacuate with friends and relatives or to gather at designated i
t oU.
collection points; those who cannot are to phone for
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o assistance.
There is no mention in this figure of car-owning l
households with automobiles out of service or otherwise og l
unavailable. More important, however, the number of vehicles,
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vehicle trips, or phone calls necessary to evacuate this
~
9g population is never calculated, nor is the total time to
_9_
1 complete those actions stated.
Once again, the availability 2
of buses and drivers is simply assumed, as are adequate phone 3
lines for assistance calls and personnel to staff them.
The
'I number of phone lines is never specified, a fact which may 5
affect the evacuation time.
For example, assuming ten II available phone lines and average one-minute calls from just 7
50% of the carless households listed in the County Plan, over S
three hours would be needed just to handle the calls, to say 9
nothing of the evacuation itself.
There is no indication that 1()
thin potential time factor was considered by either Voorhees 11 or TERA.
33 Voorhees' recommendation (f or example, Phase I Report, 13 page 93; Phase II Report, page 51; County Plan, Table I.5-5, 11l 1.7.5-1) that under certain circumstances " wrong-l 15 way" traffic flow be used on evacuation routes as a possible 1(i means of reducing evacuation times is erroneous.
This reverse 17 flow technique increases the risk of accidents -- especially 18 head-on collisions -- as a result of drivers attempting to use 19 the route in the normal direction, even assuming that traffic 20 control measures are promptly implemented.
As we discussed 21 above, any accidents could substantially complicate the 22 j
evacuation process due to blocked lanes or routes, and
[
evacuation delays would undoubtedly result.
21 The discussion of various evacuation scenarios involving l
20 differing routes (Phase I Report, pages 81-94; Phase II 26 Report, pages 39-52) is problematical in its implicit UI l assumption that re-routing of evacuation routes at the time of 28 the emergency can be accomplished without causing great kt
l
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l confusion among the evacuees and, consequently, increasing I
evacuation times.
To the extent possible, evacuation routes U
should be predetermined and as simple and explicit as possible.
Each segment of the population should be informed 1
l
- 5 of the routes repeatedly and well in advance of any serious 6
accident so that decisions such as which evacuation route to 7
take need not be debated during an actual emergency.
Each b
driver should, if possible, have only one evacuation route in 9'
mind.
10 The voorheen assumption that 100% of the population will 11 be notified of the need to evacuate withino45 minutes after the sirens sound is not sufficiently conservative.
The I
assumption seems to ignore such complications as notification 11 of the deaf or hard of hearing, notification of persons 1.5 outside the sound of the sirens, notification of hikers in I0 remote regions of Montana de Oro State Park, and notification 17 at night when the majority of the populace is asleep.
A 1
I' conservative estimate of time necessary to notify is important 19 because, as the Phase I Report acknowledges, delay in "O
notification means at least an equal delay in evacuation time
~
og (page 47).
Actual testing of the notification system would
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~~ l provide a more reliable empirical basis for this factor.
i Z: 1 ot
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Conclusion In light of the deficiencies discussed above, we do not og j
believe that the Voorhees/ TERA evacuation times estimates are
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sufficiently conservative.
Rather than realistic estimates of i
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evacuation time, those assessments assume generally optimum
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evacuation conditions which are unlikely to be realized in an l
3 actual accident situation without periodic full-scale 3
evacuation drills.
We conclude, therefore, that they do not i
j 4
provide a reliable basis upon which to make decisions about i
1, 5
evacuation of the public in the event of a serious nuclear 3
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accident.
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i SilELDON C. PLOTKIN, Ph.D., & ASSOCIATES Systems Engineering Consultants 9911 Weu Pico finulevard, Suite 800 Los Angeles, Cahfornia 90015 (213)277 2793 11SUME Education BSEE fro,m the Univeruity of Colorado in 1940; BSAeroE trom the University of Colorado in 1949; and PhDEE from the University of California, cerkeley,_in 1956 Professional Experience (partial description only)
Private Connultink Practice -- 1971 to precent.
Alternate energy systems and smon-f ree engine ocvelopment.
Accioentland safety analyses includingj reconstruction, design, human factors, and.nathematical' formulation f or vehicle accidents, highway design, slip and Isil cccidents, human impact, elec-trical explosions, escalator and elevator safety, product desl n, tire f ailures,
i and criminal evidence.
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California -- 1969 t o 1971.
Senior Enginear in the En>,inee rinb Science s Depart mec.t working on development of a variety of systems, includini, communicat ion and transport atior:.
TnW Systrms, Redondo Beach, California -- 1967 to I W).
Senior Staf f Engineer, ESL System Enginte rirg Laboratorj, workivi. on autoiaatic highway and high speed ground transportation development, larse scale failure modes, automobile salety studies, and train air suspens,lon.
Also worh 6 on numerous c ivil system deve lopr-cr.ts.
19'7.
Hunhes Ai rcraf t Co hE, mu lve r Ci ty, Calitornia -- 1991 to a
Staff, Engineer for G6C Advanced Systems Lrboratory, :.(search labor atories.(Malibt),
and Mathematics Concultation Ix partment.
Performed dy'.wic analpes, advanced cont rol systenis design, communication s> t t em analyses, v.themat ical modeling, ano aut omobile sys tem develop:aent.
(Origin.<t ed IR radar concept for vehicle control.)~
University of Southern California, Los An>cles, California -- 1958 to 1961.
Assistant Profesnor in charge of both >raduate and unicrbraduate electronics cour:,es plus redesign et c lect rical engince rint laboratories.
Kotfman Electronics Corporation, Los Angeles, California -- 1959 to 1961.
Consu lt ant in the Communications Systems De pa r t n.cn s..
Energy Systems (l o nae r ly 1,c v i n t.h a l Electronic Prod.;c t s ), l'alo Alto, Califor-nia -- 1950 to 1958. Senior Project Engineer ior design end safety of hi),h voltage, high power pulse modulators.
University _of California, Berkeley, Calif ornia -- 1950 to 1950.
Teaching Assistant (1950 to 1954 ) in the EE Department.
Project t.ngineer (1954 to 1956) for the Cosmic Ray Laboratory in charge o f e q u i pu.e n t and' operation.
U.S. Naval Air Missile Test Center, Point I:ugu, California -- 1949 to_1950.
Conducted and evaluated missile flight tests as an Aero and Electrical Engineer.
pos Alamon Scientific Laboratory, Lou Alamos, New ' hexico,-- 1946 to 1947.
Design and construction of electronic equipment.
4 Professional Affiliations Professional Saf ety Enb neer, S.S.S.,
I.E.E.E.,
Pt Hu Epsilon, Eta Kappa Nu, i
and Sigma XL.
Publications and Seminars Many papers and reports in the public literatou or. various systems engineering, topics plus several hundred company-private documents. ACCIDENT AND PRODUCT FAILURE ANALYSES (book).
" Introduction to Accident, Safety, and Forens ic Ent,ineerinb" (semina r).
s I
i e
RESUME SHELDON C. PLOTKIN Telephone: (213)391-4223 3318 Colbert Avenue Los Angeles, California 90066 Marital Status: Married, 3 children EDt' CATION BSEE
- University of Colorado - 1946 BSAeroE - University of Colorado - 1949 PhD
- University of California, Berkeley - 1956 Major: Electrical Engineering PROFESSIOMAL EXPCPIE:CE Private Consultine.
1971 to cresent RA:,0 corporation, santa Monica, catirotutF - November 1969 to _1971 Engineer, Engineering Sciences Department Contributed toward development of control and monitoring of direct broadcast communication satellites, still-picture television, and various transportation system aspects. Also participated in an evaluation study of Project igile.
TRU S y s t e ms, Redondo Beach, California - October 1967 to 1969 Senior Staff Engineer, ESD Systems Engineering Laboratory Recently completed liigh Speed Ground Transportation study on the evolution of automatic highways. Also considered enhanced credit card ut ilization, communicacion aspects of power utility control systems, and contributed to a low-cost housing proposal. Previous work included a prison security system study, and evaluation of TRW internal security system proposals.
Publications include, "Ex:crnal Prison Security Study, Phase I," for the State of California,
" Automation of the liighways, An Overview" for the IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, and " Century Expressway, Preliminary Design" for the Department of Transportation.
Iluehes Aircraft Company - January 1962_'o October 1967 Staff Engineer, GEC Advanced Systems *.aboratory, Ma'11bu Research Laboratory Cornunications Department, and lbthematics Analysis Department of Data Processing Divi, ion.
Performed atudies of staclli x commur.ication and computer-controlled l
test systems; partially completed a software modeling of the GE265 tinc-share computer system using the IBM GPSS compiler. Various studies included hardware design details for the telemetry and com-mand system of the 11S-308 communication satellite, a mathematical 1
1
_.._._ _=.
l Sheldon C. Plotkin Page 2 i
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Continued maintenance model for an SST study, advanced computer-controlled applications for automobile diagnosis and on-board spacecraf t checkout studies. Additional work entailed study of modulation me th od s, interference problems, and atmospheric effects for satel-s lite communication plus linear / nonlinear ACC and control loop performance for fire-control systems.
Publications included J
several reports on satellite communications plus several papers on nonlinear ACC, automatic checkout for aerospace systems, and FM Sandwidth requirements.
(One patut t disclosure on automatic highways was submitted, but application was not pursued.)
i University of Southern California - September 1958 to June 1961 Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering In charge of both graduate and undergraduate electronics courses.
Published one paper on electrical engineering laboratories, i
ilof fman Electronics Corporation - June 1959 to September 1961 2
j Consultant Performed nonlinear circuit analysis, communication system devel-opment, and linear circuit synthesis. Gac paper, " Regenerative Fractional Frequency Generators" in the Proc. IRE received a national award. Additional published papers were on power ampli-d fier performance and broadband network synthesis.
Levinthal Electronic Products - 1956 - 1958 Senior Project Engineer Designed and developed high voltage, high power, magnetic and electronic pulse ruudulators.
Publications include one paper o.,
nonlinear circuit analysis and one repcrt on magnetic pulsers.
One hardware design of an electronic modulator remains unique to this day.
U.S. Naval Air Missile Test Center - 1949 - 1950 Conducted and evaluated naval missile flight tests.
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS IEEE, nME, ZX MILITARY SERVICE i
l Apprentice Seaman, U.S. Navy V-12 ' program, 1944-1946 Lieutenant J.G., U.S. Naval Rescrve (inactive) - 1946 - approx. 1953 i
I l
i i
PUBLICATIONS (Partial List) j J
"A Feasibility Study of liigh Power Magnetic Modulators," Final Report, Contract No. AF30(602)-ll77, October 1956.
I
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" Discontinuous Tra nsition Time Between Stable States in Ferro-i resonant Circuits," Trans. AIEE Pt. 1 (Communication and Elec-tronics), Vol. 76, pp. 410-421, September 1957.
l v
(
+
l
" Regenerative Fractional Frequency Cencrators," Proc. IRE, Vol. 48,
}
j pp. 1988-1997, December 1960. Co-author O. Lumpkin, j
i "A New Approach to Electrical Engineering Laboratories," Trans.
IRE-PG on Education, Vol. E-4, No. 1, pp. 9-11, March 1961.
[
"On Limitations of Broad-Band Impedance Matching Without Trans-
[
formers," Tra ns. IRE-PGCT, Vol. CT-9, No. 2, pp. 125-132, June j
1962. Co-author Dr. N. Nahi.
i
" Improving the Linearity of the Steady State Gain Characteristic by Use of Nonlinear Feedback," Trans. AIEE Pt. 2 (Applications and j
Industry), Vol. 81, pp. 277-282, Novembe r 1962. Co-author Dr. N. Nahi.
l "On Nonlinear ACC," Proc. IRE (correspondence), Vol. 51, p. 380, February 1963.
" Refined Method for Calculating Satellite Interferer.cc from Micro-wave Tm nsmitters," Report No. 2, Contract No. NASw-495, ilRL, Ma libu, Cali f., Novembe r 1962. Co-author Dr. S. G. Lutz.
I "The Coverage Over lap Area with Satellites of Equal licight," Report i
Nn. 3, Contract No. NASw-495, IIRL, Malibu, Calif., December 1962.
Co-authors Dr. S. G. Lutz and Dr. G. Dorosheski.
j "A Feasibility Study of Satellite Communication in the 15-20 Cc.
I Frequency Range," Report No. 4, Contract No. NAsw-495, llRL, Malibu, l
l Calif., January 1963. Co-author Dr. S. G. Lutz.
" Preliminary Study of Modulation Systems for Satellite Communication,"
Report No. 6R, Contract No. NAsu-495, IIRL, Malibu, Calif., June 1963.
i
" Preliminary Study of Compandors for Satellite Communication," in-l formal report on Contract No. NASw-495, llRL, Malibu, Calif., May 1963.
j "Some Overall Aspects of Automatic Checkout for Aerospace Systems,"
l Proc. Systems Engineering Conf., N.Y., June 8-11, 1964. Co-authors q
R.11. Lauschner and Dr. V. Mayper, Jr.
{
i I
j "FM Bandwidth as a Function of Distortion and Modulation Index,"
j IEEE Trans. on Com. Tech., Vol. COM-15, No. 3, pp. 467-470, June 1967.
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i
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" External Prison Security Study, Phase I," Final Report, State of Calif., Contract No. 1235, TRW, Redondo Beach, Calif., April 1968.
j i
" Automation of the flighways, An Overview," IEEE Trans. on Veh. Tech.,
[
VT-18, August 1969.
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N','.
KEY PEF.t0h'4EL Miguel Pulido Mr. Pulido is a mechanical engineer with McCAUGHEY & SMITH ENERGY ASSOCI ATES, INC. (MSEA), where he specializes in the analysis of energy systems, facility energy loads, and facility energy consumption fcr a wide range of energy conservation projects.
Recent energy conservation engineering projects in which Mr. Pulido performed the energy analysis or related work include the following:
Energy Audits of Existing Facilities:
Cerritos College - 12 buildings Santa Ana College - 5 buildings Corona Community Hospital Medical Arts Professional Office Building Cal State University, Fullerton - Boiler Room Pomerado Hospital Palomar Hospital Several industrial facilities B_uilding Energy Analysis (computer) for Design of New Facilities:
Southwest Woodbridge Passive Solar Elmentary School (using 00E 2.1)
Energy Systms Feasibility Study, Design, Start Up, and Testing:
El Toro Library Solar Heating and Cooling System El Camino Real School Solar Heating and Cooling System San Anselmo School Solar Heating and Cooling Systm V. A. Hospital, San Diego, Solar DHW System V. A. Hospital, San Diego, Solar Steam Generation / Water Distillation System Channel Islands National Monument Solar Space Heating and DHW System Southwest Fisheries Center Solar Sea Water Heating Systm Guidebook for Solar Heating of Municipal Swimming Pools Mr. Pulido has specialized in the application of computer programs used in the design and optimization of energy related parameters in buildings.
He has participated in teaching a workshop in the use of DOE-2 and BLAST computer programs for building energy analysis. He has had experience working with the integration of passive solar heating and cooling techniques.
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- g:6l :cy Miguel Pulido (con't)
Mr. Pulido's energy analyses have also included economic work to determine the cost ef fectiveness of different designs.
While an associate energy systems engineer with the Southern California Gas Company prior to his association with MSEA, he conducted energy audits on industrial facilities and medical facilities.
I Mr. Pulido is a menber of the following professional societies: Southern California Chapter of the Association of Energy Engineers, Los Angeles Federation of Scientists (executive board member), American Society of Mechanical Engineers (associate member).
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Mr. Pulido graduated from California State University, Fullerton, in June,1980, with a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering.
During his senior year at fullerton, Mr. Pulido was the head coordinator of a major solar j
i energy exposition on campus featuring commercial and developmental solar I
exhibits from throughout the Southern California area.
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