ML20039H065

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Estimated Airborne Release of Radionuclides from Bmi Jn-1b Bldg at West Jefferson Site as Result of Postulated Damage from Severe Wind & Earthquake Hazard, Increment of Analysis
ML20039H065
Person / Time
Site: 07000984
Issue date: 11/30/1981
From: Ayer J, Mckinney M, Mishima J
Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION
To:
References
20037, PNL-4095, UC-11, NUDOCS 8201190490
Download: ML20039H065 (39)
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3 }0 $. 0$Aln tll, An increment of Analysis 'N, ,/ ~ x o \\ Estimated Airborne Release of x B'\\ l Radionuclides from the Battelle m ac Memorial Institute Columbus OEcy3,g8'*g, l.aboratories Jn-1b Building at the ~ ,,,g'm 1 West Jefferson Site as a Result of mar 5%;, /l; Postulated Damage from Severe s C Wind and Earthquake Hazard Prepared for Division of EnvironmentalImpact Studies Argonne National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830 Pacific Northwest Laboratory Operated for the U.S. Department of Energy t by Battelle Memorial Institute i 1r OBaHelle i rrr m n e -- )ag { s J 20087 E

NOT1CE ihn report was prepared as an ac count of work sponsored by the United States Covernment Neither ihe United States nor the Department of Energy. nor any of their employees nor any of their contractors. Subcontractors. or their emplo,ees, makes any warranty. empress or implied, or auumes any legal liabilit) or responubility for the accuracy. < ompleienew or usefulness of any informatson, appara.us, product or process dnclosed, or represents thit its ;ne would not intringe prnately owned rights lhe sien. opinions and concluuons contained in this report are those of the contractor and do not necessarily represent those of the L;nited States Government or the L;nited States Department of Energy. PACIFIC NORTHWEST LABORATORY operated by BATTELLE for the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY tinder Contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830 Ponted en the Lnited States of America Asailable from National Technical information Servue t neted Staics Department of Commer< e $285 Port Rosal Road sprengtield. Virpnaa 22151 Pr et e Prenied Copy $ '. Wroh< Fe $) 00 a Nil 5 'Pages Selling Pre < c 901 025 $4 00 026 450 $4 50 051-O'S $525 076 100 $6 00 101 125 $6 50 12b 150 l' 25 151-175 $8 00 176 200 $9 00 201 225 $9 25 226-250 $9 50 251-275 $10 75 27 & 300 $1100 4 e

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\\ c& An Increment of Analysis ESTIMATED AIRBORNE RELEASE OF RADIONUCLIDES FROM THE BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE COLUMBUS LABORATORIES JN-lb BUILDING AT THE WEST JEFFERSON SITE AS A RESULT OF POSTULATED DAMAGE FROM SEVERE WIND AND EARTHQUAKE HAZARD J. Mishima J. E. Ayer(a) M. A. McKinney, editor November 1981 Prepared for Division of Environmental Impact Studies Argonne National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC06-76RL0 1830 i Pacific Northwest Laboratory Richland, Washington 99352 (a) Advanced Fuel and Spent Fuel Licensing Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 000;?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS v INTRODUCTION 1 BUILDING AND PROCESS DESCRIPTION 3 BUILDING DESCRIPTION 3 PROCESS AND EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION 5 ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEMS 9 INVENTORY-AT-RISK 10 DAMAGE SCENARIOS 13 WIND HAZARD 13 EARTHQUAKE HAZARD 14 APPROACH AND FACTORS USED IN ESTIMATING SOURCE TERMS 17 FRACTIONAL AIRBORNE RELEASE OF PARTICULATE MATERIAL 17 ATMOSPHERIC EXCHANGE RATE 20 SOURCE TERM RANGES 22 SOURCE TERM ESTIMATES 23 WIND HAZARD 23 EARTHQUAKE HAZARD 29 REFERENCES 31 4 i iii

LIST OF TABLES 1 Source Term Estimates for the Battelle Memorial Institute Columbus Laboratories JN-lb Building for Wind and Earthquake Hazard. vi 2 Fractional Airborne Release Factors. 18 LIST OF FIGURES 1 Plan View of the JN-1 Building. 4 2 Plan View of the JN-lb Building. 6 3 Isometric Drawing of the JN-lb Facility.. 8 4 The Range and Type of Damage Postulated for the JN-lb at a Nominal Wind Speed of 75 mph. 24 5 The Range and Type of Damage Postulated for the JN-lb at a Nominal Wind Speed of 95 mph. 26 6 The Range and Type of Damage Postulated for the JN-lb at a Nominal Wind Speed of 115 mph and Linear Accelerations in Excess of 0.25 g. 28 l I h iv

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS The potential airborne releases of radionuclides (source tenns) that could result from wind and earthquake damage are estimated for the Battelle Memorial l Institute Columbus Laboratories JN-lb Building at the West Jefferson site in Ohio. The postulated source terms will be useful as the basis for estimating the potential dose to the " maximum" exposed individual by inhalation and to the total population living within a prescribed radius of the site. The respirable fraction of the airborne particles is thus the principal concern. The estimated source terms (Table 1) are based on the damage to barriers containing the radionuclides, the inventory of radionuclides at risk, and the fraction of the inventory made airborne as a result of the loss of containment. In an attempt to provide a realistic range of potential source terms that include most of the normal operating conditions, a "best estimate" bounded by upper and icwer limits is calculated by combining the upper-bound, best-estimate, and lower-bound inventories-at-risk with an airborne release factor (upper-bound, best-estimate, and lower-bound if possible) fur the situation. The factors used to evaluate the fractional airborne release of materials and the exchange rates between enclosed and exterior atmospheres are discussed. The postulated damage and source terms are discussed for wind and earth-quake hazard scenarios in order of their increasing severity. The largest postulated airborne releases from the JN-lb building are for the maximum wind hazard (nominal wind speed 300 mph) and for linear accelera-tion exceeding 0.25 g. Both scenarios postulate complete failure of the struc-ture and compromise of the High Energy Cell integrity. A crushing of the secondary HEPA filters in the Mechanical Equipment Room can make a significant contribution to the airborne release. Wind and earthquake hazards using higher wind speeds and linear acceleration should not result in substantially higher source terms. The source terms are expressed in uCi as radionuclide bearing particles 10 um aerodynamic equivalent diameter or less, released up to four days after the events. v

TABLE 1. Source Term Estimates for the Battelle Columbus Laboratories Jn-lb Building as a Result of Wind and Earthquake Hazard pcl REJASED AS PARTICLES 10pm AED'88AND LESS LOWER 80UNO BEST E5flMATE UPPER BOUND ALPHA BETA-GAMMA ALPHA BETA-GAMM_A ALPHA BETA CAMMA WINO HAZARD NOMINAL WIND 5 PEED N mph (33.5 m/su4 Lkl0-I!yr =

  1. MBA51LITY OF OCCURKENCE INSTANTANEOUS h104 (4:10-4 # 8 10-4 (1 04 # 8:104(4:10 # 8x104(a4A 8x104 (404A a0814 A 4

ADDITH/AL ACTIVITY RELLASED IN NEXT! HOURS 6:104 64104 6:10 4 6:10-4 6sl(r5 6:104 ADDITIONAL ACTIVITY RELLASED IN NEXT 6 HOURS 2Id 2 10-4 2:10-5 2:104 2x10-4 a0 A00lil0N% ACTIVITY RELIASED IN MXi16 HOURS 5s104 3s104 kl04 kl04 kl0-4 a05 A00lil0M1 ACilVITY RE11ASED IN NEXf 3 0AYS 2x104 2:104 2x104 4 02 2x104 (L2 4 NOMINAL WIND SPEED 95 mph 142.5 miset is10 /yr PROBA8ttliY OF OCCURRENCE 4 4(4:10 A 8104 (0.04 # 3:10-414:10 # E01 <a4 A al 10 4 INSTANTANEOUS Sul0 A00lfl0NAL ACTIVl!Y RELIASED IN NEXT 2 HOURS 6:104 6:10-5 1:10 4 6:104 2 104 EOS A00lil0NAL ACilVITY RELLASED IN NEXT 6 HOURS 2:16 2x10-4 2:104 2x104 6:104 Q2 A00lil0NAL ACilViiY REllASED IN NEXT 16 HOURS 5:104 5 10-4 6:104 5s104 QO2 0.6 ADDlil0NAL ACTIVITY RELIASED IN EXT 3 DAYS 2:104 2:104 2:10-4 4 02 aall 3 NOMINAL WIND SPEED 115 mph (5La m/sul, 3:10-4/yr PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE 15:10 A 2:104110s# 8:10~4I4:10 s4 b a07ta5A 3 100 IN51ANTANEOUS 8x104 4 A00lil0NAL ACilVITY RI11ASED IN NEXT 2 HOURS 4x100 4:10-4 4:10-4 4:104 6:104 al A00lil0NAL AJilVITY RELfASED IN TXT 6 HOURS 1:104 1:104 1:104 4 01 4 02 43 1 A00lil0NAL ACTIVITY RELEASED IN NEXT 16 HOURS 3:10-4 3:104 3:104 0,04 1 05 (L9 AD0lil0NAL ACTIVITY RELIASED IN NEXT 3 0AYS 2x104 a02 a02 0.2 12 4 4 NOMINAL WIND SMED 300 mph (134 mised,1:10 tyr PROBASILITY OF OCCURRENCE INSIANTANEOUS E01 1 al 10 4 200 A00lil0NAL AcilVITY REllASED IN NEXT 2 HOURS 6:104 2x104 6:104 a02 8 104 13 A00litCNAL ACTIVITY RELIASED !N NEXT 6 HOURS 2x10-4 6:104 2x104 aab 4 03 48 ADDITIONAL ACTIVITY RELIA 5ED IN NEXT 16 HOURS 4:104 a02 4:104 42 E06 2 A00lil0NAL AcilVliY RELIASED IN NEXT 3 DAYS 3 104 (LO9 QO3 49 43 9 EARTHQUAKE HAZARD 4 LINEAR ACCELIRAil0N IN EXCESS OF E25 g LESS THAN 5:10 /yr PR08ACilliY OF OCCURRENCE INSTANTANEOUS 2x10414:10-4A 2:104(aGl# al 10 4 200 A00lil0NAL ACilVITY REllASED IN NEXT 2 HOURS a01 1 6:10^4 0,02 8:104 a3 A00lil0NAL ACilVITY RELEASED IN NEXT 6 HOURS 6:10 4 5:10 4 2x104 a06 (103 a8 ADDlil0NAL ACilVITY RELLASED IN NEXT 16 HOURS 1:104 40; 4x104 42 (LO6 2 AD0lil0ML ACTIVeiY RELIASED IN NEXT 3 OAYS 7:104 4 07 aO3 49 (L3 9 AERODYNAMIC EQUlVALENT OIAW1ER: EXHIBITING AERODYNAMIC BEHAVIOR OF A UNii DENSITY SPWRE OF STATED SIZE TOTAL RAD 10ACilVITY RELIASED f O I Vi l

I INTRODUCTION If the structure and equipment that provide for the containment of radio-active materials fail because of the stresses imposed by the impact of a natural phenomenon, the downwind population can be subjected to a radiological hazard from the airborne material. The estimated airborne releases of con-tained radioactive material to the environment form the basis for calculating dose, which is one component of an overall risk analysis. l This report is a part of an interdisciplinary study sponsored by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Consnission (NRC) and coordinated by the Divi-sion of Environmental Impact Studies of the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL). It is one increment in a series dealing with the potential airborne releases of radioactive materials from licensed facilities. The study estimates the i potential release from the JN-lb (High Energy Cell) addition of the JN-1 build-ing at the Battelle Memorial Institute Columbus Laboratories West Jefferson site in Ohio from the impact of severe wind and earthquake hazard. The estimates of airborne radionuclide release were developed by identi-fying the damage sustained by the structure and equipment at varying severities of wind and earthquake. The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL)(a) staff used data developed by other special'ists. The Engineering Decision Analysis Company (EDAC 1979b) provided data on the potential responses of the structure and equipment to various severities of an earthquake hazard. The Disaster Research Institute of Texas Tech University provided similar information for wind hazard (Mehta, Mcdonald and Alikhanlou 1981). i The primary concern in the calculation of downwind dose for this study is inhalation (McPherson and Watson 1979, p. 3). In this increment of the series the primary emphasis is the release of radionuclides as particulate material 4 (a) Pacific Northwest Laboratory is cperated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Battelle Memorial Institute. 1

of a size range that can be carried downwind and inhaled. Particles of 10 pm aerodynamic equivalent diameter (AED)(a) or less are conservatively assumed to be the respirable fraction. Such an assumption overstates the potential effect by a factor of 1.5 to greater than an order of magnitude, depending upon the lung. deposition model chosen (Mercer 1977, Figure 1). The behavior of the structure and equipment in accident situations is not precisely understood. With such uncertainties, the estimates of airborne releases tend to be conser-vative; that is, estimates are probably greater than the releases that would ~ 4 actually be experienced. .t (a) Aerodynamic equivalent diameter: Particles exhibiting the aerodynamic behavior of a unit density sphere of the stated size. 3 2 i ( i

i l BUILDING AND PROCESS DESCRIPTION l The initial step in estimating the potential airborne release of radio-nuclides is to determine what radionuclides and equipment are present in the structure and to identify those features that could influence the release. The West Jefferson site of Battelle Memorial Institute Columbus Laboratories (BCL) is composed of two areas-the Nuclear Sciences and Engineering Areas. All the radionuclides are found in the Nuclear Sciences Area, which is composed of four faciliti'es: i e JN-1 Hot Laboratory [ l e JN-2 Formerly the Critical Assembly Laboratory, it currently houses the Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) vault. No significant quantities of SNM are found here since cessation of the Pu fuel development program. e JN-3 Formerly the Reactor Building. The reactor has been decommissioned I and drumed waste from the Pu fuel development operation was stored l l in an area of the basement constructed for this purpose. e JN-4 Plutonium Laboratory. Currently, all accountable quantities of plutonium have been removed from i j the JN-4 facility and only trace quantities of contamination involved with structural components (i.e., drains, etc.) remain. All plutonium handling equipment and enclosures have been removed and there are no plans to reinstall such equipment in the facility. BCL has agreed to repetition if such equip-ment is reinstalled. Thus, JN-1 is the only building in the Nuclear Sciences Area currently holding significant quantities of radionuclides. BUILDING DESCRIPTION (EDAC 1979a; BCL 1972; Mehta, Mcdonald, and Alikhanlou 1981) l-The JN-1 building was constructed in phases over a period of years with the type of construction varying significantly between phases. The approxi-2 mately 22,000-ft building consists of two sections (JN-la and Ib) with essentially no structural ties between the sections. Figure 1 is a plan view of the facility. 3

L "" U m 5 E 5 I f U __ A 1 dl I " ~ ~ -MTC l 3L E m. l 1I IL uC--- ---ste E U I HEC { m r= -t. t_l 61 1 l n [ } __ mmm m s a s JN - 18 JN - 1A g GROUND (FI RST) FLOOR LEVEL FIGURE 1. Plan View of the JN-1 Facility The sole function of JN-1 is the post-irradiation examination of spent-fuel elements by destructive (10%) and nondestructive (90%) methods. Almost all the work is on light-water-reactor (LWR) fuel, mostly uranium oxide but some mixed oxide. All work is performed in hot cells. There are four hot cells'in JN-la and one in JN-lb. Due to the differences in possession limits (the highest rated cell in JN-la is the High Level Cell, which is rated at 7 10 curies of 1 MeV gansna vs. 4-12 irradiated LWR fuel assemblies in JN-lb; BCL 1972), the JN-lb is the principal concern. This analysis is limited to that facility. 4

i Figure 2 is a plan view of the JN-lb building. This building is a one-story, high-roof, steel-frame structure housing the High Energy Cell (HEC) and its support systems with a low-roof, 45-ft x 30-ft extension in the northeast corner. The main portion of the building, which is 86 ft x 74 ft in plan dimensions and approximately 62-ft high, is constructed of a three-dimensional steel frame with metal roof deck and an 8-in. concrete floor slab poured on j grade. From the ground level up to the 10-ft level, the 12-in.-thick exterior walls are made of 8-in. unreinforced concrete block fitted between the exter-ior columns and a 4-in. brick veneer. The remainder of the exterior walls are 3-1/4 in thick, double-layered metal panels with several inches of insulation. The roof system consists of a 1-1/2-in. metal roof deck with 1-1/2 in, of rigid insulation and built-up roofing supported by a long-span open-web steel joist, roof beams and roof girders which are supported by the building columns along the periphery. PROCESS AND EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION (BCL 1972, EDAC 1979a) The process conducted in the building is the examination of irradiated fuel. The destructive and nondestructive testing is performed in the HEC with nondestructive examination and handling of fuel assemblies performed in the Fuel Storage Pool. Spent fuel in casks are brought into the facility via the truckway in the Service Area, which is the high-bay portion of the facility. The Service Area is. a " suspect" area (radiation levels slightly above normal are anticipated) and consists of the truckway, the Poolside Area, and the Loading Vestibule. Casks are lowered into the pool where the spent fuel is unloaded and the emptied cask is decontaminated in the Cask Wash-Down Area. The Fuel Storage Pool is 20 ft x 20 ft x 45-ft deep with a 14-gal dye-penetrant-tested stainless steel liner. It is a contaminated area (radioactive materials are directly handled). Water in the pool is continuously treated by filtration and ion-exchange units located in the Pool Mechanical Equipment Room. While the facility is in nomal operation, the water is extracted from the bottom of the pool, but when the facility is unattended, the water is extracted at the 6-ft level to prevent inadvertent emptying of the pool. The 5

45 '- 0" - lllllllll TRUE E NORTH I k P00L MECH. LOADING D EQUIPMENT VESTIBULE 30' - 0" -N-\\ ROOM s 69 REFERENCE NORTH .) SERVICE AREA Y CASK POOL g WASHING 74' - 0" i i w t. f.,,,- .lg L...) I..

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+ 4* pool is connected to the HEC by a 4-ft-wide x 45-ft-deep channel. Fuel trans-fer is made via a stainless steel arm-and-basket arrangement. The pool is equipped with a " tornado proof" cover which can be bolted in place. The Cask Wash-Down Area is located adjacent to the northeast corner of the HEC and is 14-ft x 14-ft x 18-ft high. The walls are 12-in.-thick solid con-crete block. This area is also considered a contamination area. Normal access to the HEC via the 20-ton door is from this area. All the destructive and nondestructive testing performed on spent fuel is, done in the HEC. Its exterior dimensions are 47-ft long (east-west dimension) by 19-ft wide by 30-ft high. It is constructed of reinforced cast-in-place concrete walls and ceiling. The south and west walls are 4>ft-thick high-density concrete with a 1/2-in.-thick interior and exterior steel liner. The north and east walls are 6-ft thick normal-density concrete with a 1/2-in.- thick interior steel liner. The ceiling is 4-f t-thick normal-density concrete. There are four operating stations on the front face (south wall) of the cell which have lead-glass, oil-filled viewing windows and manipulators. There is one operating station in the west wall to aid fuel transfers. The front face of the HEC is the north wall of the Operating Area. Several other types of penetrations are found in the HEC. A 9-ft x 9-ft sealed opening is located in the east end of the ceiling. There are two 6-in.- diameter " drop-in" tubes (lazy-S type) located on the front face and a single " drop-out" tube (normally sealed with a plasti'c bag during use) on the rear face. There are also various access ports (step-type) for cable and tubing. Nonnal access is provided by the 20-ton door on the rear face which is equipped with an interior steel door to provide a seal. Fuel is stored in a 17.4-ft-deep pit in the floor of the HEC. The center opening is 4 ft in diameter surrounded by six 8-in.-diameter holes. The HEC is a contaminated area. All of the air in the JN-lb building except for that from the Pool Mechanical Equipment Room is exhausted via the HEC. There are six sets of pre-and HEPA-filters recessed in the rear (north) wall of the cell. A pair of pre-and HEPA-filter sets are combined and exhausted via a secondary HEPA filter and 2500-cfm blower located in the Mechanical Equipment Room (see Figure 3). l l 7 l l l l l l

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Tests and work done in the HEC are conducted from the Operating Area located on the. south side of the HEC. It is SS-ft long by 16-ft wide by 18-ft high and is located directly below the Mezzanine. The Operating Area is a non-contaminated zone and special procedures are used for the occasional change-outs of faulty manipulators. The Mechanical Equipment Room, located in the mezzanine above the Operat-ing Area, is also a noncontaminated zone. This room is separated from the Service Area by a metal panel wall extending from the top of the HEC to the ceiling. The room houses the fresh-air intakes, the heating and air condition-ing units, the secondary exhaust filters and fans, and the main exhaust stack. The Pool Mechanical Equipment Room and the Make-Up Water Storage Room 4 along with the loading Vestibule make up the low-bay portion on the northeast corner of the JN-lb. The Pool Mechanical Equipment Room houses the 18 ion-exchange columns, filters, and pumps used in the continuous treatment of the Fuel Storage Pool water. The room holds the two stages of HEPA filtration and the fans used to exhaust the room air directly to the atmosphere. The 1500-gal make-up water tank is located in the adjacent room. ENGINEEREDSAFETYSYSTEMS(BCL1972;Mishima1980}, Ventilation and Exhaust Conditioned outside air from the units located in the Mechanical Equipment Room is supplied to three areas-the Service Area, the Operating Area, and the Mezzanine. Air for the Pool Mechanical Equipment Room is drawn from the Ser-vice Area via louvered openings. Air from all areas except the Pool Mechanical Equipment Room is drawn into the HEC through existing penetrations and leaks. t The Pool Mechanical Equipment Room has its own system for discharging the exhaust to the atmosphere. Exhaust from the HEC is discharged via the Main Exhaust Stack. All exhausts are filtered at least twice by HEPA filters prior to discharge. Fire Protection The HEC has an automatic water, on-and-off cycle, sprinkler system. Water enters the system when the heat detectors see 190*F. Sprinkling is activated 9

i by the melting (212*F) of a fusible link at the sprinkler heads. Dampers at the inlet and outlet automatically close. JN-lb is also provided with smoke detectors viewing air flowing from the Operating Area to HEC and from the ser-vice to operating areas. INVENTORY-AT-RISK Process radionuclides are normally considered the inventory-at-risk for these types of analysis for mixed-oxide fuel fabrication. The requested pos-7 session limit for JN-lb is approximately 1.9 x 10 curies (3 Pressurized Water Reactor fuel assemblies irradiated 1100 days at 40 MW/MT, and cooled for 60 days) with 7 kg U , 9 kg Pu , and 2.3 kg Pu241 (BCL 1972). Most 235 239 of the material is encapsulated and all is contained in some fashion. Only small quaatities of materials are subjected to destructive testing, which only comprises 10% of the work. The fuel is not a finely divided powder after irradiation, and, although it may be less coherent than the original fuel pel-let, a minute quantity of particles in the respirable range is anticipated. Furthermore, as will be discussed later, the two locations where these mater-ials are stored (the HEC and Fuel Storage Pool) do not suffer catastrophic failure which could subject the fuel to impact and crush stresses. Thus the fuel cannot be considered in jeopardy. Accumulations of radionuclides are found in three areas suffering col-lapse: the Pool Mechanical Equipment Room, the Cask Wash-Down Area, and the Mezzanine. The HEC d9es suffer impact during the loss of the JN-lb building and from vibratory motion during earthquakes. The materials-at-risk in this analysis are described in the following paragraphs. Radionuclides are found in 3 forms in the Pool Mechanical Equipment Room:

1) as damp particles caught in the filter, 2) as particles held on the ion-l exchange resin, and 3) in the water as dissolved materials and particles. All l

three forms are contained. The resin is also bagged and routinely checked for radiation readings (BCL 1972, p. 26). Both resin and filter are periodically [ replaced. Water is found in all three forms and its adhesive force can be overcome to generate particulates in the respirable range. Additional force 10 I

i would be required to subdivide the solid. Therefore, the contaminated pool water was chosen as the material-at-risk. It is estimated that there are 80 liters of water in the Pool Mechanical Equipment Room with concentrations of alpha emitters in the range of 1.5 to 2.5 x 10-6 pCi/ml and beta-gamma emitters in the range of 1 to 5 x 10-4 pCi/ml. The source of the radionuclides is irradiated fuel elements " crud" buildup, water and cladding irradiation products and leaking fuel material. The specific radionuclides are a function of the material irradiated, the irradiation level, and the time since irradiation. The alpha emitters cover the transuranic isotopes but will be assumed to be plutonium--one of the most abundant and radiotoxic. Strontium-89 and -90, and Cesium-134 and -137, among the most frequently detected radionuclides in this material, are of concern, and will be assumed to be the beta-gamma emitters. For the purposes of this analysis, the range of concentration is extended to alpha emitters 10-6 to 10-4 pCi/ml and beta-gamma emitters 10-4 to 10-2 pCi/ml. Surface contamination is the form of radionuclides found in the Cask Wash-2 Down Area. Smears indicate a level of 20 to 500 dpm/100 cm for alpha 3 4 2 emitters and 10 to 5 x 10 dpm/100 cm for beta-gamma emitters during and immediately following dec mtamination operations. For the p;rposes of this 2 4 2 analysis, the range is assumed to be 10 to 10 dpm/100 cm for alpha 3 6 2 emitters and 10 to 10 dpm/100 cm for beta-gamma emitters. The same assumptions are applied to their composition as were applied to the material in pool water. Essentially all the materials passed through the filter sets in the cell wall. Contamination was carried into the duct work during filter changes and accumulated in the six 2-ft x 2-ft secondary HEPA filters located in the Mechanical Equipment Room. The filters have not required changeout since their installation and periodic inspections indicate no significant radiation level. Thus the level of accumulation is small. It is estimated (by analysis of a series of smear samples) that the total inventory of radionuclides beyond the primary filters in the cell wall (duct 11 l

work, pienums and secondary filters) for alpha emitters is 0.017 uCi (3.77 x 4 5 10 dpm) and for beta-gamma emitters, 0.54 pCi (1.2 x 10 dpm). In all previous analysas, the filters were always assumed to be fully loaded since the accumulation on the filter at any given time was difficult to ascertain. In this analysis, a value for an interim loading level for the secondary filters is available. Due tc the period of time required to attain this level (8-9 years), it is used as an average value. A " rule-of-thumb" for beta-gamma 137 ~ emitters such as Cs is that a mci will result in a radiation level of 1 mR at 1 ft. Readings of the filters are done at the surface of the filter and it is assumed that the secondary filters would be changed out due to age prior to that time required to accumulate a significant inventory of radio-nuclides. Thus ar. alpha-emitter level of 0.03 mci and a beta-gamma level of 1 mci are assumed as the upper bound inventory. The lower bound (immediately following changeout) is assumed to be zero. The same assumptions that are made regarding their composition are also applied for estimating radionuclides in Fuel Storage Pool water. The potentially largest inventory of radionuclides at risk in this study is present as contamination on the interior surfaces of the HEC. The most 3 2 recent values (as determined by smear samples) are 2.3 x 10 dpin/100 cm 5 2 for alpha and 2.2 x 10 dpm/100 cm for beta-gamma emitters. Due to the strong relationship between surface contamination in the HEC and opera-tional parameters (fuel characteristics, type of operation, time since last 3 housekeeping etc.), the inventory is expanded to a range of 10 to 5 2 5 7 10 dpm/100 cm for alpha emitters and 10 to 10 for beta-gaaima emitters. The interior dimensions of the HEC are 38-ft long by 9-ft wide by 25-ft 2 high, giving an approximate interior structural surface area of 3034 ft 2 3 (282 m ). The nominal volume of the HEC is 8550 ft3 (242 m ). If the total interior surface area is assumed to be twice the structural area (to compensate for equipment and interior partitions), the estimated total inven-tories would be 0.025 to 2.5 mci of alpha emitters and 2.5 mci to 0.25 Ci for beta-gamma emitters. 12

1 DAMAGE SCENARIOS The responses of the JN-lb building and equipment to severe wind and earthquake events were developed by Mehta, Mcdonald and Alikhanlou (1981) and EDAC (1979b), respectively. The wind-induced damage ranges from failure of the low-bay portion in the northeast corner of the building at 75 mph to complete collapse of the building and partial loss of the HEC integrity at 300 mph. No significant damage is postulated for earthquakes until collapse of the struc-ture at linear accelerations in excess of 0.3 g. Estimates of the specific hazard conditions and postulated damage are described below. WIND HAZARD (Mehta, Mcdonald, and Alikhanlou 1981, pp. 35-37) The damage to the JN-lb building from winds ranging from 75 mph (33.5 m/sec) to 300 mph (134 m/sec) is postulated to range from collapse of the Pool Mechanical Equipment Room to collapse of the structure and a partial loss of HEC integrity. Nominal Wind Speed of 75 mph (33.5 m/sec), 1.5 x 10-IPer Year Probability of Occurrence. The load-bearing north wall and the non-load-bearing west wall of the low-bay portion of the JN-lb building collapse. The roof collapses downward, crushing equipment in the rooms. The low-bay area houses the ion-exchange columns, filter and pumps for purifying the water in the Fuel Storage Pool. There is no significant damage to the remainder of the building. Nominal Wind Speed of 95 mph (42.5 m/sec), 4 x 10-3 Per Year Probability of Occurrence. The exterior masonry walls on the north and west walls of the high-bay portion of the JN--lb building collapse, and the metal panels in the corner areas yield but remain in place. Collapse of the masonry walls creates a 10-ft opening along the bottom of the north and west walls which ~ allows wind to blow through the facility. The equipment in the Mezzanine (Mechanical Equipment Room) could be displaced and ordinary connections sev-ered, but the equipment is not crushed or broken apart. The low-bay portion is destroyed at a lower wind speed (75 mph). The HEC does not sustain any significant damage. 13.

Nominal Wind Speed 115 mph (51.4 m/sec), 1 x 10-7 Per Year Probability of Occurrence. The low-bay portion collapses at a lower wind speed fol-lowed by the masonry portion of the north and west walls of the high-bay por-tion of the JN-lb. The structural frame of the high-bay portion collapses at this wind speed with most of the metal wall panels and roof decking remaining attached to the frame before it collapses. The impact of the collapse could tear the roof decking and crush all equipment outside the HEC. (TI.a radio- ~ active material involved is not likely to be exposed to the full impact of the wind.) There are no additional unfiltered pathways from the HEC created by wind-induced pressure or impact of structural members. Nominal Wind Speed 300 mph (134 m/sec), 1 x 10-7 Per Year Probability of Occurrence. All damage postulated for scenarios at lesser wiad speeds is presumed to have taken place. Only the HEC is assumed to remain standing. The HEC structure is capable of withstanding the atmospheric pressure change and the impact of windborne debris. The atmospheric pressure change could pull 2 out port units and manipulator plugs creating openings as big as 7 ft, Filters recessed in the walls of the HEC are not likely to be pulled out. EARTHQUAKE HAZARD (EDAC 1979b, pp. 5-1 to 5-4) No significant damage is postulated for the JN-lb due to ground shaking until collapse of the entire facility at linear accelerations in excess of 0.25 g. Linear Accelerations in the Range of 0.03 to 0.09 g, 1.4 x 10-2 to 1.4 x 10-3 Per Year Probability of Occurrence. There is no noticeable damage to the JN-lb building below 0.03 g. Cracks will appear in the base of the masonry wall in the region of 0.08 g and some weakening of the diagonal ^ members of the north-wall bracing. No damage to any structure or equipment j leading to the airborne release of radioactive materials is postulated. Linear Accelerations in the Range of 0.11 to 0.23 g, 9 x 10-4 to Less than 5 x 10-4 Per Year Probability of Occurrence. Uplift of the HEC l footing begins at 0.23 g but the integrity of the cell remains intact. No failure of the cell filters or fans is postulated. 14 l

Linear Acceleration in Excess of 0.25 g, Less than 5 x 10-4 Per Year Probability of Occurrence. The 10-ft-high masonry walls fail at a linear l acceleration about 0.27 g. At a linear acceleration of 0.3 g, the JN-lb l building collapses crushing all the equipment outside the HEC which remains intact. In the region of 0.3 to 0.4 g linear acceleration, some of the plugs I may be shaken out of the HEC, providing unfiltered pathways from the cell. l 1 t I 1 I l 15 t

APPROACH AND FACTORS USED IN ESTIMATING SOURCE TERMS Source terms are estimated to provide data for the calculation of poten-tial radiation dose to the general population from the JN-lb. A principal concern is that fraction of the airborne particulate material that can be ~ transported downwind, inhaled by humans, and deposited in the deep lung (alveolar) region. In addition, the remaining fraction of airborne particulate material (on the order of 100 to 200 um AED) that is redistributed beyond the area of the facility is also considered in this study since it poses a poten-tial surf ace-contamination and long-term resuspension probl sn. Several questions must be answered before a source-term estimate can be determined:

1) How much material can be affected by the event? 2) What is the size distribution of the airborne material? 3) What is the behavior of the airborne material in the time span required for release? 4) What are the I

release rates and characteristics of the airborne material released to the ambient atmosphere? The factors and censiderations used to answer these ques-tiens fall into two broad categories: fractional airborne release of mater-ials, and, if the material is injected into a constrained volume, the exchange rate. The factors involved in these categories are discussed below. A des-cription of the upper and lower bounds placed upon the estimates is also I presented. FRACTIONAL AIRBORNE RELEASE OF PARTICULATE MATERIAL The various factors applied to estimate the airborne ' release of plutonium as a result of the damage scenarios are listed in Table 2. Some considerations that influence the applicability of these factors for the five damage situa-tions described are noted in the following paragraphs. Spray Formation During Crush of Liquid Filled Equipment and Splashing of Aqueous Solutions. No experimental studies defining the size distri-bution of the liquid spray generated under these conditions were identified. In previous studies, factors of 10-4 for drops 10 um AED and less and 17 i 4

~ TABLE 2. Fractional Airborne Release Factors Event Factor e Spray fonnation during crush of 1x10-4 as drops 10pm AED or less liquidnfilled equipment 5x10-3 as drops 100pm AED or less e During puncture of ilEPA Filter 1x10-2 inventory e During crush of ilEPA Filter 1x10-1 inventory e During crush of a cement wall Formation of particles 10pm AED and less - lower-bound 1.3x10-4 fraction - best-estimate 8.6x1Q-4 fraction - upper-bound 1.6x10-J fraction Formation of particles 100pm AED and less - lower-bound 7x10-3 fraction -best-estimate 2.1x1g-2 fraction - upper-bound 3.5x10- fraction e Dislodged from surface of IlEC 10-4 m / by impact of debris i 5 x 10-3 for drops 100 pm AED and less have been used (Mishima, Schwendiman and Ayer 1978, p. 33). These factors are applied in this study for this type of situation. Crush and Break-Up of Contaminated Surfaces. One of the inventories-at-~ risk is the surface contamination on the walls of the Cask Wash-Down Area. The four walls and ceiling could be subdivided by the impact of structural members and debris during the failure of the JN-lb building. From 0.013 to 0.16 weight i percent of three types of cement impacted at two levels (4.8 and 9.6 kg-m) were found as particles 10 pm AED and less. The fraction as particles 100 pm AED or less ranged from 0.7 to 3.5 weight percent (Wallace and Kelly 1976, Table 4, p. 11). Material Dislodged from Filter During Damage of IIEPA Filters. Only the secondary filters located in the Mechanical Equipment Room are involved in the JN-lb. I 18 l l l

e Crushing of HEPA Filters. Although the filter material (glass fiber mats) is fragile, the particulate material accumulated can be embedded in the filter and associated with other materials such as dust, condensed organic vapors, etc. The material may not be readily dispersed in a respirable, transportable size-range. A conservative airborne fractional value of 10-1 of the accumulated material released is assumed in the absence of experimentaldata(Mishima,Schwendiman,andAyer1979,p.46). e Perforation of HEPA Filters. A reduced fractional airborne release factor of1%isappliedtoreflectthereducedleveiofstressrequiredforthis' level of damage (Mishima, Schwendiman, and Ayer 1979, p. 47). e Contamination Dislodged from HEC Interior Surfaces by Impact of Structure and Debris. In previous analyses, the dislodgement of surface contamina-tion from gloveboxes has been the concern. Much of the glovebox construc-- tion is of metal, which has much more elasticity than the reinforced concrete of the HEC. Thus it is assumed that for equivalent forces, more surface contamination could be dislodged from gloveboxes than from the HE'C but much more force is required to produce equivalent damage. The HEC is not punctured in any of the scenarios but punctures were the lowest level of damage evaluated. A resuspension factar of 10-4/m was applied for such cases and is used in this study (Mishima, Swendiman and Ayer 1980,

p. 18).

Aerodynamic Entrainment. Powders and liquids can be entrained in the air e passing over their surfaces. Particle suspension results from the initiation s of movement in larger particles which subsequently transfer momentum to parti-cles in the size-range that allows suspension. Under similar icr.ditions of air flowoveraliquidfilm,dropletsaremuchlesslikelytha2particlestobe airborne because of the higher energy required to break up the film and form droplets. l ..a e Powder by Air Velocities Greater than 5 mph (2.2 m/sec). A conservative ~(' suspension rate (10-8/sec), measured for a homogeneous bed and with wind velocity variations over a year's duration, is applied (Mishima, khwen-diman and Ayer 1978, p. 39). 19 T

s. t ,\\ \\ N. ~ \\ .+ e, Powder by Air (Velocities Less than 5 mph (2.2 m/sec). A suspension rate A \\ U(10-{0/sec), measu Nd;for a homogeneous bed at these velocities, is s applied (SehmelandlLloyd1974,p.853, Figure 3). Liquidsbykir'VelocitiesGreaterthan5 mph (2.2m/sec). A conservative e measured suspension rate i, applied. It is consistent with the assumed larger energy input required to disperse liquids of 10-9/sec (Mishima, e5 Schwendiman and Ayer'1978, p. 39). Liquids by dir Velocities Less than 5 p h (2.2 m/sec). The suspension 'e rate applied for higher air velocities (10-ll/sec) was reduced by a -factor consistent with the reductions found for powder. s ~ ATMOSPHERIC EXCHAhGE RATE After the particulate material is injected into the air, it requires air-flow to move 4t'from its point of generation to the ambient atmosphere. Dif-1 fusion 1:; only a serious consideration for particles less than 1 pm (Dennis '1976,pI52). There are two situations in which the airflow may influence the quant!ity of radionuclides r'eaching the atmosphere--when the secondary flEPA [ ' filters are damaged but the JN-lb building remains standing (95-mph wind scenario) and during the complete collapse of the building (nominal wind speed 300 mph and/or in excess of 0.25 g earthquake scenario). In both cases, both the rate, ati which the material airborne is released to the atmosphere and the velocity at which the air passes over the exposed contamination (aerodynamic. entrainment).are 'of concern. During Dkmage of the Secondary HEPA Filters. In the nominal wind speed (95 mph) damage scenario, the 10-ft-high masonry portion at the bottom of the north a'nd west walls is postulated to fail. If air enters the building from j the noi'th (86-f t-long wall) at the ambient speed (8360 fpm), the volumetric 6 airflow rate is'approximately 7.2 x 10 cfm. Tha cross sectional area in the 2 ~ L north-south direc' tion is 5332 f t, giving a calculated velocity of 1348 fpm 5 3 or around 15.3 mph. The volume of the building is 3.95 x 10 ft, and, at a ? the calculated volumetric flow rate (and assuming no pressure losses), the air ~ L, Nithin the facility is exchanged 18 times per minute. Particulate material l S s; 20

y 9

y ~ t n 4

1 made airborne within the building would be released rapidly to the atmosphere. The velocity within the building dictates the application of the higher 'entrainment factor. As a Result of Compromising the Integrity of the HEC. Although the HEC retains its structural integrity under all the situations covered in this study, its integrity can be compromised in two scenarios (nominal wind speed 300, mph and linear accelerations in excess of 0.25 g) due to the generation of unfiltered leak paths from the cell, i.e., loss of plugs and manipulators. The wind fields for the two situations can be quite different. j' " ', For the nominal wind speed (300 mph) scenario, which is a tornado situa-l tion, the wind speed cited is the sum of the translational, tangential and vortex velocities. For the maximum total wind speed of 300 mph, the transla-tional velocity is approximately 65 to 66 mph (Fujita 1978, Table 7.10,

p. 111). The tornado remains over a given spot for a very short period of time, and it is assumed that the integrity of the HEC is lost during this time.

The wind speed experienced by the HEC following the passage of the tornado funnel is closer to the translational velocity than the 300 mph cited. The 2 postulated opening in the HEC is 7 ft, and, if air at the speed of the translational velocity enters an opening of that size, the volumetric flow rate 3 would be 40,656 cfm. The volume of the HEC is 8550 ft ; the equivalent of the entire cell volume would be released to the facility 4.76 times per minute. The smallest cross sectional area for the cell (in the east-west direction) is 2 225 ft, resulting in a wind speed of 2 mph for flow in this direction at this flow. The air flow is more probable in the north-south direction since the exhaust outlets are located in the south wall. The cross sectional area 2 in this direction is 950 ft, which would give lesser wind speeds. Thus the lower entrainment factor is applied for this situation. The wind field situation is not defined for the earthquake scenario. The average wind speed at this location is 7.6 mph (NRC 1981, Table 2, p. 6) and is used for the best estimate calculation. A wind speed of 1 mph is assumed for the lower bound since no airflow would result in little if any airborne release. A wind speed of 85 mph is used as the upper bound because it is in j 21

the range of the 1000-year wind (Fujita 1977, Figure 2, p. 6-7). The volume-tric flow rates into the HEC at these velocities are: lower-bound, 616 cfm; best-estimate, 4682 cfm; and upper-bound, 52,360 cfm. The air in the HEC is exchanged once every 13.9 minutes for the lower-bound wind speed; once every 1.8 minutes for the best estimate; and 6.1 times every minute for the upper-bound wind speed. It would take approximately 97 minutes to remove in excess of 90% of the material airborne in the HEC at the lower-bound wind speed (assuming exponential dilution); 12.6 minutes at the best-estimate wind : peed; and less than 2 minutes at the upper-bound wind speed. Materials airborne in the HEC are assumed to be released over the first two hours for the lower-bound conditions and " instantaneously" in the two remaining situations. As in the wind hazard scenario, the lesser entrainment factor is applied. SOURCE TERM RANGES In order to provide some quasi-realistic bounds to the quantity of radio-nuclides estimated to be released from the damage scenarios, three estimates are provided: a Lower-Bound Estimates - the inwer-bound inventory-at-risk is used. - the lower-bound wind speed estimates, if applicable, are used. - the lower-bound fraction of particles generated are used. e Best Estimates - the average inventory-at-risk is used. the average wind speed, if applicable, is used. ~ the average. fraction of particles generated is used. e Upper-Bound Estimates - the upper-bound or maximum anticipated inventory-at-risk is used. - the maximum anticipated wind speed, if applicable, is used. - the upper value for fraction of particles generated is used. 22 I

SOURCE TERM ESTIMATES The previous sections of this document describe inventories of dispersi-ble materials in various areas, damage levels, fractional airborne releases, and atmospheric exchange rates required to estimate the source terms for the postulated damage scenarios. These components are combined in this section with the specific conditions postulated for each hazard to arrive at three source term estimates for each scenario--an upper-and a lower-bound and a best-estimate. The estimates are divided into the activity of airborne radionuclides as particulate material in the respirable size fraction released during five time intervals covering a four-day period. The quantity designated as instantaneous is the mass released from the facility within a few minutes following the haz- { ardous event. The mass est*.nated in the remaining four time periods comes from I two sources: the delayed celease of material airborne in enclosures, and the resuspension of dispersible materials exposed to the ambient wind field. Drawings are used to illustrate the type and range of damage in key areas that could result from the scenarios described. The illustrations are not an attempt to show what actually happens; the data available and the state-of-the-art are not sufficient to predict the precise levels of damage that would be inflicted upon each item. Certain details of the facility have been omit-ted for clarity in the drawings. The discussion is divided into wind and earthquake hazards in order of increasing severity. l SOURCE TERM ESTIMATES FROM WIND HAZARD Nominal Wind Speed of 75 mph (33.5 mph), 1.5x10-1 Per Year Probability of Occurrence. Collapse of the low-biy portion of the JN-lb building housing the Pool Mechanical Equipment and the Make-Up Water Rooms is the damage postulated for this wind speed (see Figure 4). The inventory-at-risk was determined to be the radionuclides in the Fuel Storage Pool water that circu-lates through the system. Their concentration range is assumed to be: 23

55' 4 ~- .G.>~- ,-HlGH , %cp {,; - . %@(J.,; / e [W'y J. cs li /{} ENERGY 1 DOUBLE SIDE ! T'~ q.- c CELL ,q .:s ~ v 4.y q 9 METAL PANEL 4 g } fggc(r{j j , -MECHANICAL / EQUIPMENT p) ' f,, [B. FUEL f f a: i ROOM 1 STORAGE {i f. 3! [ MEZZANINE} POOL I i . i . i i.',[ D-i / e t eOPERATING g E., -E. y CONCRETE l4 li ',y AREA g; q w N l', BLOCK WITH ,f,J y g BRICK VENEER @f p /., - l 7, N, s \\ N-j

p '

,f % g s dr p Nf' m .e% 4 c- .. q. ' !, i r, p. ,o, ,. ~ ..Tg,3 .- o y fl ' 2 ~J ,,.. g '/ x N- ,, e.- i 'N n m'- ), 4 y.,: g<.a 1 - n

x.,*1$

~ 'N 'c.o -- ..?.,,, 3s , T' N[ 2 ,e ..\\ s \\ s FIGURE 4. The Range and Type of Damage Postulated for the JN-lb at a Nominal Wind Speed of 75 mph

lower-bound--alpha 10-6 Ci/ml, beta-gamma 10-4 uCi/ml e best-estimate--alpha 10-5 uCi/ml, beta-gama 10-3 uCi/ml e upper-bound--alpha 10-4 uCi/ml, beta-gamma 10-2 Ci/ml. e The total volume of water in the Pool Mechanical Equipment Room is 80 liters. Particulate materials can be generated from the water in two ways-by the formation of a spray during the rupturing of equipment, and/or splashing; and by the aerodynamic entrainment from pools of released water. It is believed that much of the spray fomed and standing pools will be collected and shielded from the atmosphere by debris; but, for the purposes of this analysis it is assumed that the spray is immediately released to the atmosphere and the standing pools exposed to the ambient wind field. The f actors used for spray formation are 10-4 fraction of liquid formed into drops 10 um AED or less and 5 x 10-3 fraction fomed into drops 100 um AED or less. The aerodynamic entrainment factor for liquids subjected to wind speed 5 mph and above, 3.6 x 10-8/hr, was applied. The source term estimates for this scenario are tabulated in Table 1. Nominal Wind Speed 95 mph (42.5 m/sec), 4 x 10-3 Per Year Probability of Occurrence. In addition to the damage postulated at 75 mph, the 10-ft-high masonry walls that make up the bottom of the north and west walls fail and allow air to circulate within the JN-lb (see Figure 5). Equipment in the Mechanical Equipment Room in the mezzanine could be displaced and ordinary connections severed. The only inventory-at-risk in the room is the secondary HEPA filters and plenums. The three levels of inventory are: e lower-bound: zero e best-estimate: 0.017 uCi; beta-gamma 0.54 uCi e uppper-bound: alpha 30 pCi; beta-gamma 1000 uCi The fractional airborne release factor is 10-2 and the aerodynamic entrain-ment factor applied is 3.6 x 10-5/hr. The releases estimated for this scenario (the summation of these airborne releases and those estimated for the wind speed 75-mph scenario) are shown in Table 1. Since the lower-bound inventory-at-risk for the secondary HEPA filters is zero, the lower-bound 25

N~- N ..,4,.,' ' I ~, :....N

a "

k.., fA ~~ 2 ; " ~~ w ~ ' ' X Df' . M' yl Q, - ~ HIGH c DOUBLE SlOE % s ERGY METAL PANEL CELL 4%' {,# . g. O 'k j FUEL STORAGE I [ h{,s{'.s -5 lL.--" MECH, EQUIPMENT POOL l ROchi 4p 7 Q x(y s [ MEZZANINE) t - '~

j

/ ,. N H - - ..-g gN ,i \\ +

p

'x

f. CONCRETE

- c 'e Jrd 'l I >lf % N g/,8 - BLOCK WITH s BRICK VENEER d sN~ T y k i m M4 - 9[s A 2 ~ gw '( t d, .N AREA / .R?y O} p,A ,/ 'm., g 3 - es N(, w m .s - .g, N \\,I. s s x N Figure 5. The Range and Type of Damage Postulated for the JN-lb at a Nominal Wind Speed of 95 mph 8 e 4

airborne release is from the f ailure of the Pool Mechanical Equipment Room. The Pool Mechanical Equipment Room contribution is still the principal compo-nent of the best-estimate values. The upper-bound estimates are dominated by the contribution from the secondary HEPA filters. Nominal Wind Speed 115 mph (51.4 m/sec), 3 x 10-4 Per Year Probability of Occurrence. At this wind speed, the JN-lb building collapses (see Figure 6) but the HEC retains its integrity (no significant unfiltered leak paths from the cell to the atmosphere). The low-bay portion collapsed at a lower wind speed. Collapse of the high-bay portion of the building results in crushing of the equipment in the mezzanine and break up of the concrete block Cask Wash-Down Area walls. The inventories-at-risk at the three levels for this additional damage are: e Secondary HEPA filters: lower-bound--zero best-estimate--alpha 0.017 pCi; beta-gamma 0.54 uCi upper-bound--alpha 30 uCi e Cask wash-down walls: lower-bound--alpha 0.59 uCi; beta-gamma 5.9 pCi best-estimate-alpha 5.9 uCi; beta-gama 59 uCi upper-bound--alpha 59 uCi; beta-gamma 590 uCi The fractional airborne release factor for crushed filters is 0.1 with an aerodynamic entrainment factor of 3.6 x10-5/hr applied to the residue. The fractional airborne release factors applied for the subdivision of a concrete wall are: lower-bound--10 um AED 1.3 x 10-4; 100 um AED 7 x 10-3 e e best-estimate--10 um AED 8.6 x 10-4; 100 pm AE0 2.1 x 10-2 upper-bound--10 um 1.6 x 10-3; 100 um AED 3.5 x 10-2 e Since the airborne release factor is the quantity of particles of these sizes that are created during the subdivision of concrete by impact, an aero-dynamic entrainment factor should not be applied. An aerodynamic entrainment factor of 3.6 x10-5/hr was applied for the sake of conservatism. The estimates are listed in Table 1. 27

HIGH ENERGY N \\[.[ ", - CELL 7 ^ q 9 34 f, p- ,,r w h [ 6' W. aw ~: w.. g,, k QY" .I _,[' OPERATING ~ .,*4 AREA .f W ' ? i o h N 4 f %.W_ Figure 6. The Range and Type of Damage Postulated for the JN-lb at Nominal Wind Speed of 115 mph and Linear Acceleration in Excess of 0.25 g The lower-bound estimates reflect the airborne releases from the breakup of the Cask Wash-Down Area walls. The best-estimate instantaneous releases are dominated by the airborne release during the crushing of the secondary HEPA filters while the time-dependent releases are dominated by the aerodynamic l entrainment from the residues of the break up of the Cask Wash-Down Area walls. The upper-bound estimates are dominated by the assumptions used to arrive at the upper-bound inventory-at-risk for the secondary HEPA filters. Nominal Wind Speed of 300 mph (134 m/sec), 1 x 10-7 Per Year Probability of Occurrence. At this wind speed, the damage postulated for the previous scenario occurs plus the integrity of the HEC is compromised by the loss of plugs. The inventory-at-risk in the HEC is the surface contamination and the inventories are: lower-bound--alpha 0.025 mci; beta-gamma 2.5 mci e best-estimate-alpha 0.25 mci; beta-gamma 25 mci e upper-bound--alpha 2.5 mci; beta-gamma 250 mci e 28

The airborne release factor is 10-4, and, at this wind speed, all the mater-ial made airborne in the cell is released to the atmosphere within a few minutes. The air velocity in the cell was celculated to be 2 mph with an aerodynamic entrainment factor of 3.6 x 10-7/hr applicd. The results are listed in Table 1. The instantaneous release estimates for the lower-bound and best-estimate reflect the release from the HEC. The upper-bound instantaneous release esti-mates are based upon releases from the HEC and HEPA filters. The effect of the HEC releases on the time-dependent estimates range from small (approximately 20%) to significant (over 50%). SOURCE-TERM ESTIMATES FROM EARTHQUAKE HAZARD _ Only one damage scenario involving an earthquake hazard results in an airborne release of radionuclides; it is the only scenario discussed. Linear Acceleration in Excess of 0.25 g, Less than 5 x 10-4 Per Year Probability of Occurrence. The damage postulated for this scenario is equivalent to the damage described for a nominal wind speed of 300 mph-collapse of the JN-lb building and compromise of the integrity of the HEC. Lower-bound, best-estimate and upper-bound wind speeds of 1, 7.6, and 85 mph, respectively, were selected. Under these wind speeds, only the lower-bound airborne-release estimates vary from those calculated for the 300-mph scenario. All lower-bound release estimates were recalculated and all estimates are listed in Table 1. l l l l 29

4 4 REFERENCES BCL. 1972. Addendum to BMI-PM-662 (Rev. 3), Procedures Manual for Batte11e's Hot Cell Laboratories Addition. Battelle Memorial Institute Columbus Labor-atories, Columbus, Ohio. -i, Dennis, R., ed. 1976. Handbook on Aerosols. TID-26608. Technical Information Center, Springfield, Virginia. EDAC. 1979a. Structural Condition Documentation and Structural Capacity Evaluation of the Battelle Memorial Institute Columbus Laboratories West Jefferson Site for Earthquake and Flood. Task 1--Structural Condition, EUAC 176-080.01. Engineering Decision Analysis Comp'any, Irvine, California. EDAC. 1979b. Structural Condition Documentation and Structural Capacity Evaluation of Battelle Memorial Institute Columbus Laboratories-West Jeffer-son Site for Earthquake and Flood. Task 2--Structural Capacity Evaluation. EDAC 175-080.02, Engineering Decision Analysis Company, Irvine, California. Fujita, T. T. 1977. Review of Severe Weather Meteorology at Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio. Under contract to Argonne National Lab-oratory, Argonne, Illinois. Fujita, T. T. 1978. Workbook of Tornadoes and High Winds. Department of Geophysical Sciences, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. McPherson, R. B., and E. C. Watson. 1979. Environmental Consequences of Postulated Plutonium Releases from the Babcock and Wilcox Plant, Leechburg, Pennsylvania, as a Result of Severe Natural Phenomena. PNL-2833, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington. Mehta, K. C., J. R. Mcdonald, and F. Alikhanlou. 1981. Response of Struc-tures to Extreme Wind Hazard at the Battelle Memorial Institute Columbus, Laboratories West Jefferson, Columbus, Ohio. Institute for Disaster Research, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas. Mercer, T. T. 1977. " Matching Sampler Penetration Curves to Definition of Fraction." Health Physics 33(3):259-264 Mishima, J. 1980. Identification of Features Within Plutonium Fabrication Facilities Whose Failure May Have a Significant Effect on the Source Term. Features Observed in Atomics International-Nuclear Material Development Facility at Santa Susana, California, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.

Mishima, J., and J. E. Ayer.

1980. Estimated Airborne Release-from the 102 Building at the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Vailecitos, California, as a Result of Severe Wind and Earthquake Hazard, ed. I. D. Hays. FNE-3601, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington. l 31

Mishima, J., L. C. Schwendiman, and J. E. Ayer.

1978. An Estimate of Airborne Release of Plutonium from Babcock and Wilcox Plant as a Result of Severe Wind Hazard and Earthquake. PNL-2812, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Washington.

Mishima, J., L. C. Schwendiman, and J. E. Ayer.

1979. Estimated Airborne Release of Plutonium From WEstinchouse Cheswick Site as a Result of Postu-lated Damage From Severe Wind anc Seismic Hazard. PNL-2965, Pacific North-west Laboratory, Richland, Washington,

Mishima, J., L. C. Schwendiman, and J. E. Ayer.

1980. Estimated Airborne Release of Plutonium from the Exxon Nuclear Mixed 0xide Fuel Plant at Richland, Washington, as a Result of Postulated Damage From Severe Wind and Earthquake Hazard, ed. E. L. Owzarski. PNL-3340, Pacific Northwest Labora-tory, Richland, Washington. NRC. 1981. Battelle Memorial Institute, West Jefferson Site, Description of Site Environment. Docket No. 70-8, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. Sehmel, G. A. and F. D. Lloyd. 1976. " Particle Resuspension Rate." Atmospheric Surface Exchange of Particulate and Gaseous Pollutants, eds. R. J. Engelmann and G. A. Sehmel, pp 846-858, National Technical Information Ser,vice, Springfield, Virginia. Wallace, R. M., and J. A. Kelley. 1976. An Impact Test for Solid Waste Fo rms. DP-1400, Savannah River Laboratory, Aiken, South Carolina. l l 1 32 e_

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