ML20039G134

Speech Entitled Need for Public Health in Mgt of Radiologic Emergencies, Prepared for Radiation Safety Task Force, Health Planning & Resource Development Association of Central Oh River Valley 810119 Meeting in Cincinnati,Oh

ML20039G134
Person / Time
Site:	Zimmer
Issue date:	01/19/1981
From:	Macleod G PITTSBURGH, UNIV. OF, PITTSBURGH, PA
To:
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ML20039G130	List: ML20039G129 ML20039G133 ML20039G134
References
NUDOCS 8201150320
Download: ML20039G134 (69)

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{{#Wiki_filter:. -. - - -... T!E IED FOR RJCLIC IFALTil ll! TE IWWiBriff 0F PAD 10 LOGIC BIRGBlCIES* BY GORDON K. FACLEOD, M.D., F.A.C.P.** MY NAME IS 60RDON PACLEOD, k PHYSICIAN N4D PUBLIC HEALTH ADMINISTRATOR, WHO WAS APPditGED PENNSYLVANIA S SECRETARY OF HEALTH JUST 12 DAYS BEFORE THE ATIHREENILE}SLAND. I'CRE'THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE EVENT, liil POINTED UP GRAPHICALLY...AND ABRUPTLY... THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE PUBLIC HEALTH APPARATUS IN PENNSYLVANIA (NO P ELSEWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES). THE PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF NEA THE TOOLS TO DEAL WITH THE EXTRAORDINARILY SERIOUS HEALTH PROBLEMS FACING T STATE DURING MO AFTER THE ACCIDENT. DESPITE DECADES OF DAMAGE FROM MINOR ACCIDENTS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH HAD NO RADIATION HEALTH UNIT. INRESPONSETORADIATIONEXPOSURE,THEONLYEVACUATIONDRILL (r AV ILABLE HAD BEEN PREPARED IN TIE 1950'S AND THEN ONLY IN THE EVEIR OF A N ATTACK. IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE, HEALTH PROFESSIONALS HAVE A RESPONSIBILIT(-MO SOCIETY THE RIGHT-TO KNOW HOW RADIATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR EN THE HUMAN BODY AND ITS BEHAVIdR INSOFAR AS IT IS KfC N. Btn, WHAT IS KNOWN? IT IS KtDM THAT THERAPE'JTIC RADIATION HAS PROLONGED LIFE IN i:%NY INSTANCES-BUT IT CAN RESULT IN RADIATION SICKNESS, IrlCREASED BLEEDING AND INFECTION. IT IS KN0'.C THAT DIAGNOSTIC RADIATION HAS BEEN A BOON T0' MANKIN BLIT IT CAN RESULT IN FETAL ABf0RMALITIES. AND, TO DATE, NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY SAFE-BUT ACCIDENTAL RADIATION EXPOSURE C

• PREPARED FOR BRIEFING SESSION BEFORE THE RADIATION SAFETY TASK FORCE, CINCINNATI, OHIO, JANUARY 19,MENTASSOCIATIONOFT PLANNING AND RESOURCE DEVELOP

.1981.

• • PROFESSOR AND CHAIRtdN10F HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, %ADUATE SC ITTSBURGH, ?A.QMSSOR OF MEDICINE, SCHOOL Ol OF PUBLIC HEALF AND ASSOC ATE CLINICA L Z61.

UNIVERSITY OF rITTSBURGH, Q1 ago g33gg, G CK 0500o35g m NO PSYC110 LOGICAL DNMGE TO PEOPLE OVER A WIDE GEOGRAPHIC AREAJ IT IS LESS WELL KNOM4 TIMT SUCH EXPOSURE CAN CAUSE THYROIDITIS, HYPOTHYROIDISM, BENIGN THYROID ( NEOPLASMS, MO THYROID NODULES.1 WHAT'S MORE, THE UNITED IhTIONS SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION HAS REPORTED THAT THE fOST IMPORTANT EFFECT OF "LGV DOSES OF RADIATION IS THE OCCASIONAL INDUCTION OF MALIGNA?R DISEASES."2 Eve WIm ALL THAT IS IG40WN, THERE IS T4)CH NOT KN0hN. NOT MUCH IS KN0hN ABOUT AGE-REllTED RESPONSES TO LGV DOSE RADIATION EXPOSURE, NOT MUCH IS KN0hN ABOUT THE RESPONSE TO ON~~ TIME EXPOSURE VERSUS CONTINUOUS EXPOSURE, AND, MOST IMPORTNRLY, NOT VERY MUCH AT ALL IS KN0hN ABOUT THE PATHOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO BE INTERACTION OF LGV DOSE RADIATION WITH OTHER EXPOSURES. l WITHOUTANYPROFESSIONA!YChNETENTRADIATIONHEALTHPERSONNELIN PENNSYLVANIA'S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, IT WAS ILL-EQUIPPED TO RESo0ND TO THE ECFECTS OF EIEER LOW OR HIGH DOSE RADIATION EXPOSURE ROM A NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDC.NT. ~ IN ANY STATE OR LOCALE AT RISK OF EXPOSURE TO A NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT, { A RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH UNIT MUST NOV BE DEEMED ESSE! RIAL TO PUBLIC HEALTH ACTIVITY. LET US BRIEFLY CONSIDER THE FUNCTION OF STATE AND LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS IN PLANNING MO DIR$CTING RdSPONSES TO RADIOLOGIC EMERGENCIES. THE PRIMARY ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS IS PROTECTION OF THE., PUBLIC'S HEALTH. 'IN Pt.ANNING FOR A RADIATION EMERGENCY, THE FIRST QUESTION TO ASK IS WriAT ARE THE IWEDIATE NO LONG-TERM EFFECTS ON THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH. PREPLANNING ~ l REQUIRES ASSEMBLING BASELINE DATA AVAILABd TO MOST HEALTH DEPARTMENTS. HERE WE CN1 CALL UPON VITAL STATISTICS AND MORBIDITY DATA: PRIfMRILY LIVE BIRTHS, INFANT DEATH RATES, CANCER PREVALENCE AND HYPOTHYROIDISM INCIDENCE AS REPORTED CUT TO A RADIUS OF AT LEAST 20 MILES NO PERHAPS 50 MIES FROM A POTENTIAL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT SITE. ( h .n. IN ADDITION, PREPL1JINING REQUIRES KfCfi. EDGE OF WHAT fEALDI DATA ARE TO CE COLLECTED AFTER EXPOSURE, OF TFE DEMOGRAPilIC CWJtACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION AT RISK, AS WELL AS THE AVAILABILITY OF !OSPITALS, PHYSICI ANS~, ' AND OTIERIEDJCAL AND LOGISTICAL RESOURCES NEEDED TO HATOLE A RADIATION HEALili EfERGENCY. SUCH BASELINE REFEREf!CE DATA SHOU Q BE COLLECTED AROUND EACH NUCLEAR FACILITY EVEN BEFORE IT IS INSTALLED. IN ETERGENCY PLN4NING FOR A RADIATION EMERGENCY, THE RESPONSIBILITY Oh HEALTH DEPARTMENTS IS TO ENSURE RiAT THERE ARE SUFFICIENT PROFESSIONAL NO ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES AT THE STATE OR LOCAL LEVEL TO MEET hiMTEVER HEALTH EMERGENCIES fdAY OCCUR. SUCH PLANNING INVOLVES Ni ACTION PLAN FOR ALL POBLIC AfD PRIVATE HEALTH RESOURCES MO THE INITIATION OF APPROPRIATE STEPS TO ENSURE THEIR AVAILABILITY IN AN EMERGENCY. HEALTH PROFESSIONAL RESOURCES ARE ESSENTIAL NO MUST BE READILY AVAILABLE r FOR A RADIATION HEALTH B4ERGENCY PLN1 TO h0RK. IN CASE OF RADIATION EXPOSURE, HEALTH DEPARTMB4TS MUST GIVE PARRiOUNT ATTENTION TO ITS EFFECTS ON HlF#4S, AND THEY MUST ALSO WORK COOPERATIVELY WITH THOSE AGENCIES WHICH COLLECT DATA NO MEASURE CONTAMINATION OF THE AIR, WATER, SOIL, FOOD--AFFECTING OUR HJMES, OUR CROPS, OUR ANIMALS, ET CETERA. IN ESSENCE, THEN, PREPLANNING FOR A RADIATION EMERGBlCY PROVIDES A HEALTH DATA BASE FOR DECISION MAKING BEFORE, DURING, MD AFTER THE EMERGENCY. ATTHISPOINT,LETMESTATEMiYPOSITIONCLEARLY. ALTHOUGH I #4 UNALTERABLY OPPOSED T0 fluCLEAR WARFARE, I DO NOT PAVE A BIAS AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER. IfrilLE MANY MAY NOT SHARE MY POSITION TOWARD NUCLEAR E?!ERGY, I #4 SURE ALL WOULD AGREE THAT WE SHOUW BE PREPARED WERE A RADIATION EMERGENCY TO OCCUR. IPERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT. NUCLEAR PO!ER C#1 BE MADE REASONABLE SAFE IF WE DON'T DEt# T PUBLIC HF14.TH LESSONS OF THE PAST. ~ ( ( o g

El-DURING THE ACCIDENT AT llil, IT WAS REPORTED THAT.Tl!E iMXIl4LT4 ESTIt%TED' ( AIREORNE RAD!dTION EXPOSURE WAS VERY LO'.l EXCEPT AT Tile PLN4T WHERE SOME WORKERS RECEIVED SOMEMIMT HIGHER EXPOSURE. BUT IT WAS RECENTLY REPORTED THAT "fCNITORING' DEVICES AT.THE PB4NSYLVNilA Pl.RR HAD ' PEAKED' DURING THE -ACCIDENT, PREVENTING OFFICIALS FRO'1 DETERMINING ACCURATELY HOW MUCH RADIOACTIVITY HAD ESCAPED.3 BY DAY TIREE OF THE ACCIDENT, SOME 100,000 TO 200,000 PEOPLE HAD FLED FROM THE HARRISBURG AREA, MANY HOSPITAL WORKERS NONG THat. ONLYONEOUTOFSEVEN-HARRISBURG AREA HOSPITALS WAS PREPARED TO HANDLE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT VICTIMS. IT COULD HANDLE 25 TO 50 PATIENTS, PRESuiABLY WORKERS CONTN41NATED AT THE IIil PLANT., b!KEWISE, PRACTICING PHYSICIANS IN TIE AREA IERE NOT INFORMED ABOUT EITHER PREVENTIVE OR THERAPEUTIC f%NAGEMENT OF ANY PATIENTS EXPOSED TO RADIOACTIVITY. THERE WAS NOT EVEN ONE REGULARLY EMPLOYED PHYSICIAN, EXPERT IN RADIATION MEDICINE ANWHERE IN THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE GOVERif4ENT. DESPITE THE EXTENT OF POTENTIAL PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEMS, MOST HEALTH DECISIONS WERE BASED AIJ10ST EXCLUSIVELY UPON ENGINEERING DATA. FOR EXN FLE, THE FUiBER OF REPORTED MILLIREMS OR PIC0 CURIES WAS PRACTICALLY THE ONLY MEASURE FOR MAKING HEALTH DECISIONS ACCORDING TO THE NUCLEAR ENGINEERS AND RADIATION HEALTH PHYSICISTS. THEY SIMPLY WERE NOT 1 RAINED TO UNDERSTAND PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS FOR PREVENTING BOTH PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES FROM ENVIRONVENTAL HAZARDS. s ACCORDINGLY, MANY HEALTH DECISIONS WERE DELAYED, IMPEDED, OR BLOCKED BY RADIATION PHYSICISTS AND NUCLEAR EllGINEERS. ON DAY THREE OF THE ACCIDENT, IN THE FACE OF REPEATED HUMAN ERROR AT THE REACTOR, AS SECRETARY OF HEALTH I URGED THE G0vERNOR IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS TO CALL FOR THE DEPARTURE OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND YOUNG CHILDREN FROM N4 AREA WITHIN FIVE MILES OF THE llil PLANT. BuT, THE STATE'S RADIATION PHYSICISTS AND NUCLEAR ENGINEERS DID NOT AGREE WITH THE RECOFi4ENDATION. f n .9 THE RECUEETOATION FOR WOMEN Ato CHILDREN TO LEAVE THE Pll AREA WAS BASED ON SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS. IO BEGIN WITH, WE WERE DEALIt4G WITH A GREAT FW4Y UNKN0hHS--NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH STEMMED FROM CONFLICTING REPORTS ABOUT THE LEVELS OF RADIATION EMANATING FROM THE PLANT. FURTHER, WE WERE CGHITTED TO EXERCISING EXTREME CAUTION-EVEN AN EXCESS OF CAUTION--IN THE INTEREST OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH. WHAT WE DID KNOW WAS THAT RADIOISOTOPES OF ICDINE ARE AMONG THE MOST ABUNDAffi 0F THE FISSIONABLE PRODUCTS. ALSO, WE KtD.l THAT HIGH LEVELS OF RADICACTIVE IODINE CAN HAVE A DEVASTATING EFFECT ON THE FETAL THYROID GLAND AND ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNBORN BABIES. IF THE RECGHENDATION TO LEAVE THE AREA LATER PROVED TO BE IN ERROR, IT.WAS BETTER TO HAVE ERRED ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION. BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, h'E WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE RISING LEVEL OF PUBLIC CONCERN-IN SOME CASES OUTRIGKi PANIC -AS CONFLICTING REPORTS OF RADIATION FALLOUT MOUNTED IN THE NEWS MEDIA. I!E NfEri FULL KELL THAT FEAR OF RADIATION-- HOWEVER UNREASONED SOME MAY HAVE CONSIDERED THAT FEAR-COUW It0UCE HIGH LEVELS OF STRESS. THERE IS OBVIOUSLY A NEED FOR BOE NUCLEAR ENGINEERS AND FHYSICIANS TO BE INVOLVED IN HANDLING NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS-NdCLEAR ENGINEERS WORKING WITH HARDVARE-3 PHYSICIANS WITH HEALTH CARE. PADIATION HEALTH PHYSICISTS SHOULD h0RK UTCER THE DIRECT, SUPERVISION OF A PHYSICIAN SPECIALIZED IN RADIATION 14EDICINE. OPTIMALLY, PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION'S HEALTH FRGi RADIATION SHOULD BE DIRECTLY UtOER THE SUPERVISION OF PHYSICIANS h0RKING C00PERATIV5LY WITH RADIATION EIOLon!STS, RADIATION FH(SICISTS, NUCLEAR ENGINEERS AND THE LIKE. PUBLIC HEALTH DEFICIENCIES WERE NOT LIMITED TO STATE GOVERtFBIT. 'lT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY CGHISSION HAD NO PHYSICIANS ON ITS STAFF, MUCH LESS A PHYSICIAN SCHOOLED IN THE FIELD OF RADIATION MEDICINE. THISISA SAD COFi4ENTARY ON THE PRIORITY GIVEN TO PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS INVOLVING NUCLEAR REGULATION. ONE HEALTH CONCERN WAS THE ITNERSE RELATIOilSHIP BEWEEN IODIN ( IHYROID PRODLEMS TURNED UP AMONG IhRSHALL ISLN!DE AND AGE. TO RADIATION FROM THE HIGH LEVEL OF FALLOUT FROM A THE PACIFIC ON EhRCH 1,1954. THE FIRST CASES DISCOVERED NINE YEA 1WO CHILDREN, UNDER FIVE AT THE TIME OF EXPOSURE, WHOSE THYROID G DISAPPEARED'.5 FORTUITOUSLY, IN MID-1978, WE PENNSYLVANIA HEALTH DEPARTMENT SEVENTEEN CASES OF DEPRESSED THYROID FUNCTIO NEWBORNS FOR THYROID DEFICIENCY. SURPRISINGLY, WERE REPORTED NO TREATED IN THE NINE MONTHS PRIOR TO T THE NLNBER OF CASES J1EPE'D TO 27 DURING THE NINE M THE INCREASE WAS CONCENTRATED DOWNWIND OF THE R OF INTEREST, THE Nt1SER OF C SES DOWNWIND HAS REMAINED E (SuDE !a, 2, Ate 3 - INCIDENCE OF HYPOTHYROIDISM BEFORE AND AF SINCE WE Eli ACCIDENT, A f%JOR CONCENTRATION OF THYROID DEFICIE ( ( HAS OCCURRED IN l.ANCASTER COUNTY-IMMEDIATELY THESE CASES ARE ABOUT 8 TO 12 TIMES MORE T REACTORS. EXPECTED FOR PENNSYLVANIA. SUCH AN UNUSUAL VARIATIO EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE WHETH ~ INBREEDING, FROM ENVIR0tF. ENTAL CONTAMINATION OF WATER AND FOO RADI0 ACTIVE IODINE, OR FROM SOME OTHER INDUSTRIAL OR MEDICAL IT'S PREMATURE TO BLAME THE INCREASE ON RADIOACT EN0 UGH INFORMATION CONTINUES TO TRIC11E IN T BE RULED OUT. QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER WE STATE IS DOING ENOUGH OFTHEACCIDENTb (SUDE #4 - RATIO OF HYPOTHYROID CASES TO NEWBORNS) l WHETHER THERE IS AN INCREASING INCIDENCE OF HY ITISUNC OVER TIME, A VARIATION IN INCIDENCE AR0Ute NUCLEAR REACTOR SIT STATISTICAL VARIATION. { ~ L

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v t RATIO 0F tE0 NATAL HYP0lHYi10IDISH TO NEWBnP!JS IN PENilSYLV#llA WesTERNPA EASTERNPA i, JUNE 20,1978TO 1: 6,805 1 ; 6,564 MARCH 28,1979 MARCH 28,1979TO 1 7,955 1: 3,021 DECEMBER 31,1979 JANUARY 1,1980TO 1 1 7,231 1: 2,746 AucesT31,1980 l ALL NEWBORN HYP0THYRotD CASES REPORTED BY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMEN 0F HEALTH SINCE INITIATich 0F NEONATAL HYP0 THYROID SCREENING PROGRAM, JUNE 20,1978 danL SUGUST 31,1980. NEVERTIELESS, THESE FINDINGS WARRANT CONTINUED SCREENING OF NBGORNS. IN i THE VICINITY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND IN ANY POPULATION EXPOSED TO NUCLEAR RADIATION ACCIDEIRS. YET TO BE EXPLAINED IS WHY FIVE-AND-TEN MILE INFANT DEATH RATES DURING THE SIX FO RHS FOLLONING THE ACCIDENT CLIMBED SHARPLY COMPARED TO THE SAME PERIOD IN PREVIO'JS YEARS. (SLIDE 15 - INFANT DEAm RATES - APRIL-SEPTEGER,1979) FIVE-MILE RATES WERE 6.7, 2.3 no 16.2 INFANT DEATHS PER SAND LIVE BIRTHSFORTIMEFRAMESFROMAPRILTHROUGHSEPTEMBERIN 1977,1978 no 1979, RESPECTIVELY. YllTHIN TEN MILES-INCLUDING HARRISBURG-DEATH RA,TES WERE 10.5, 7.2 AND 15.7 DURING LIKE TIME FR#ES. STATEWIDE LEVELS FOR THE SAE THREE YEARS WERE 13.9, 13.5 AND 13.6, RESPECTIVELY. HADTHEINFANTDEATHRATEREMAINED UNCHANGEDOREVENDECREASED,I'TRUSTTHOSEFINDINGSWOULDHAVEBEENWELLPUBLICIZED. THE INCREASE IN INFNCDEAE RATES COULD BE A STATISTICAL VARIATION OR COULD'EE INDUCED BY CAUSE. THESE FIfCINGS ARE STATISTICALLY HIGu Y SIGNIFICANT AND SURELY WARRANT CAREFUL ATTERION IF NOT FURTHER STUDY. OTHER HEAL DEPARTMENT DATA REVEAL INCREASES IN NEONATAL DEATH RATES AFTER THE ACCIDE BE EVEN MORE SIGNIFICNR THAN INCREASE IN INFANT DEATH RATES. PROBABLY THE MOST DISTURBING EXAMPLE OF BUREAUCRATIC DELAY CAN BE FOUND IN THE STATE'S EFFORT TO CONDUCT STUDIES ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF THE ACCIDE EVEN THOUGH THE GOVERNOR HAD DESIGNATED THE DEPARTMBE OF HEALTH AS TH COORDINATING AGENCY FOR THE HEALTH STUDIES, OTHER DEPARTMENTS WISHED TO CotoUCT THEIR OWN STUDIES INDEPENDENT OF THE HEALTH DEPARTMENT BECA FRACFENTED HEALTH SERVICES. THE OFFICE OF IbiTAL HEALTH LOCATED IN THE DEPARTMENTOFYlELFAREISACASEINPOINT. BUT THE FIRST "METRAL HEALT DID NOT BEGIN UNTIL NOVEMBER 1979, MORE THAN SEVEN M0fRHS AFTER THE ACCIDEIK. DATA COLLECTED SO LONG A5TER THE ACCIDEf6 ARE ALMOST MEANINGLESS. ( s.

~ (Stids f5) o INFANT DEAT!!S PER 1,000 LIVE BIRT}ls A/ (ACTUAL DEATHS IN PARENTHESES) 5 MILES FROM TMI 10 thLES FROM TMI ALL PERL9MUA 1977 6.7 (3) 10.5 (20) 13.9B/ 1978 2.3 (1) 7.2 (14) 13.5El 1979 16.1 '(7) 15.7 (31) 13.6C/ - f A/ APRIL THROUGH SEPTEMBER H/ ANNUAL RATES C/ JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1979 e 8 h 9 e e 9 e h YET, A SEDY OF HEALTH RELATED BEHAVIORAL liiPACTS, IMMEDIATELY C0f441SSIONED t BY THE HEALTH DEPNmiENT, REPORTED A SURPRISING PERSISTENCE OF ANXIETY N10NG A LARGE PART OF THE POPULATION NEAR ImEE MILE ISLNO FORE THAN A YEAR AFTER EE THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF THIS DISTRESS INCLUDED INCREASES OF 113 P ACCIDENT. IN THE NUMBER OF PERSONS USING SLEEPl!!G PILLS NO 88 PERCENT IN THOSE USIN TRANQ'JIO_IZERS. ALSO,14 PERCENT USED MDRE ALCOHOL NO 32 PERCB4T SMOKED CIGARETTES.7 OTHER STUDIES INITIATED BY BE DEPARTFE.NT OF HEALTH INCLUDE A POPULATION REGISTRY FOR LATER INVESTIGATION OF SOME 50,000 PERSONS WITH A 5 MILE RADIUS OF TREEMILEISLAND. THIS WAS COMPLETED ABOUT 3 FOtmiS AFTER THE ACCID EVALUATION OF PREGNNJCY CUTCOME WAS INITIATED WITHIN 10 MILES OF TM UNFORTUNATELY, MANY NEONATAL HYPOTHYROID CASES OCCURRED IN W E 10-20 MILE RANGE. SIMILARLY, A SURVEY FOR CONGENITAL AtO POSTNATAL THYROID DISEASE IN A 10 MILE RADIUS MAY NOT INCLUDE CASES BEY 0tO THE PERIMETER OF THE STUDY A 7 \\ DOSE ASSESSMENT STUDY WAS LIMITED BY INSUFFICIENT INFOPliATION ON HUW MUCH RADICACTIVIT( ESCAPED.3 FINALLY, A LONG TERM DI'SEASE SURVEILLANCE NO MON'ITORING STUDY WAS PROPOSED WHICH WILL REQUIRE CONTINUING FUNDING OVER 20 IFALL SWDIES WERE ACCURATELY REPORTED AND REVEALED NEGATIVE DATA, THE RESEARCH EFFORT WOULD HAVE BEEN WORTHWHILc FOR HAVING ALLEVIATED ANXIETY NO FOR POINTING THE HIGH DEGREE OF RADIATION SAFET(. ADDITIONAL STUDIES ARE IDENTIFIED IN APPENDICES F NO G OF THE REP 0RT OF THE GOVERNOR'S C0f44ISSION O ISLNO CHAIRED BY LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR WILLIN4 W. SCRNT UNTIL ALL STATES HAVE DEVELOPED A WELL-PLANNED HEALTH CARE DATA COLLEC SYSTEM TO STUDY THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO GROPE FOR DIRECTION IN ASSESSING THE HEALTH IMPACTS OF SUCH AN ACCIDENT. PRIOR TO TMI, IT WAS EASY TO O'ERLOOK THE LACK OF PREPAREDNESS IN THE PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR FOR DEALING WITH A MMOR NUCLEAR ACCIDENT (O f ~ MINORONE). h

1 g_ NOW,THEQUESTIONIS: HHAT IW) PENS IN THE EVENT OF FUTURE NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS? HOW DO WE PROTECT THE PUBLIC'S llEALm? SHORT OF Ibi4EDIATE CESSATION OF ALL NUCLEAR ACTIVITY, WHICH IS WELL NIGH IMPOSSIBLE, THE COUNTRY MUST NOT REPEAT THE MISTAKES OF TMI AND SHOULD BE FAR BeitER PGEPARED THAN PENNSYLVANIA THE PRESENT TIfdE. MoR'E0VER, THE PEOPLE OF PENNSYLVANIA ARE NO BtiitR OFF THAN THEY WERE BEFORE THE RADIATION RELEASE AT IIll ON MARCH 28,1979. THERE IS STILL NO BUREAU OF RADIATION HEALTH, NO POTASSItJ4 IODIDE AVAILABLE TO PREVENT THYROID DISEASE, AND INADEQUATE RESOURCES FOR RADIATION HEALTH PREPAREDNESS. THE LACK OF PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS FOR ANOTHER NUCLEAR ACCIDENT HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY CITED--BUT TO NO AVAIL. IN W E EVENT OF ANOTHER NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, STATE HEALTH DEPARTMENTS SHOULD AT LEAST:

• COLLECT BASELINE HEALTH DATA AROUND NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, PARTICUU\\RLY ON THE INCIDENCE OF HYPOTHYROIDISb.

DEVELOP A RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR THE e HEALTH ASPECTS OF A N'JCLEAR ACCIDENT dNCOMPA_SSING EVACUATION AND SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR SPECIFIC SECTORS 0F SOCIETY, PARTICULARLY INSTITtRIGNALIZED OR HOME-l BOUND PATIENTS. L ~ ESTABLISH A RADIATION HEALE UNIT (THIS MAY REQUIRE l RECRUITMENT OF PHYSICIANS, EXPERT IN THE FIELD, OR THE l 1 RETRAINING OF STAFF PHYSICIANS IN DEPARTMENTS OF HEALTH). COORDINATE STATEWIDE RADIATION HEALTH ACTIVITY UNDER THE l CHAIRMANSHIP OF A HEALTH PROFESSIONAL, NOT NECESSARILY A SPECIALIST IN RADIATION MEDICINE. DESIGN SPECIAL TRAINING PROGRN4S FOR THE MEDICAL I = C0ffiUNITY (INCLUDING MEDICAL STUDENTS), OTHER HEALTH CME EXPERTS, AND THE RELIGIOUS COFTiUNITY SO THAT THEY ARE BETTER PREPARED TO DEAL WITH ANOTHER NUCLEAR ACCIDEfff. l i l . CONDUCT SIMULATION EXERCISES OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS TO ' PROTECT AND SAFEGUARD THE PEOPLE AGAINST RADIATION EXPOSURE. PREPARE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT AtO DISTRIBUTION OF POTASSIUM j IODIDE, PARTICULARLY AROUND NUCLEAR REACTORS.-

• DEVELOP AGE SPECIFIC HEALTH EDUCATION PROGRAMS FOR ALL AGE GROUPS FROM PRESCHOOL CHILDREN TO THE GERIATRIC POPULATION (SPECIAL ATTalTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO PUBERTY AND PREGNANCY).

' STIMULATE RESEARCH FOR ANTIDOTES, FOR CLINICAL MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES AGAINST FISSIONABLE PRODUCTS, AND FOR MASS CLINICAL MANAGEMENT OF PATIENTS EXPOSED TO RADIATION. i CONSIDER REDESIGNING HOSPITALS AS FALLOUT SHELTERS FOR TREA'R4ENT OF PATIENTS WITH RADIATION EXPOSURE. 7 lhGE HEALTH DECISIONS BE f%DE BY PHYSICIANS, NOT NUCLEAR a B4GINEERS, RADIATION PHYSICIST.S AND OPERATORS OF NUCLEAR REACTORS. IT IS ONLY THROUGH EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A SOUND SYSTEM OF PUBLIC FOR ALL KINDS OF RADIATION EXPO,SURE WILL WE EVER BE ABLE TO ADDRESS EFFECT THE MANY. PROBLEMS THAT COULD RESULT FROM A MORE SERIOUS NUCL IIll. $ND, UNLESS WE ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS SO'ON, WE MAY WELL FIND OURSELVE l 10 OR 20 YEARS HENCE PONDERING THE SAME P'UZZLES WAT CONFRONT US t 9 "e. -m

n-Rittje!CES NO NOTES ( 1. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION ATO MEASURE?iENTS, EERTF4UQN -OF TNE TH.EQHLGMO_IN THE EVFNT OF RELFASES OF R,A_0_LQIODINE, (REPORT NO. 55, NATIONAL COUNCIL PADIATION, AUGUST 1977).

2. th!TED IhTIONS SCIENTIFIC Co mITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATICN, UNITEDl!ATIONS,NatYORx,(1977).

3. M. GOODWIN, NEW YORK TIMES, ObvsMBER 28, 1980), P. A-1.

4. Ree0RT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMISSION.ON THE SCCIDENT AT ISEE MILE ISLAND,(0CTOBER 30,1979), p.118.

5. V. COHN, WASHINGTON Post, (FEBRUARY 21,-1930), P. 2.

6. V. LOEB, PHILADELPHIA ItDOIRER, (APRIL 2,1980), p. 3-B.

(

7. B.A. FRANVd.IN, N=w YORK TIMES, (APRIL 18,1980), P..U8.

8. W.W. SCRANTON III, REPORT OF THE 60VERWENT'S COMISSION ON TREE MILE ISLAf02.[EBRUARY 26, 1980, APPENDICES F, G.

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\\ ^ Tioe red end nmifim2 12 Y y l 3 r l 'J r-T l f jl{I 'J I...,a r, r,' ] i John G. Kemeny, Chairman ( President, Dartmouth College i i - Harry C. McPherson Bruce Babbitt Partner Governor of Arizona Verner, Liipfert, ' Patrick E. Haggerty Bernhard, and McPherson Honorary Chairman and Russell W. Peterson General Director President. Texas Instruments Incorporated National Audubon Society f Carolyn Lewis Thomas H. Pigford Associate Professor Professor and Chairman Graduate School of Journalism Department of Nuclear Columbia University En:dneering Paul A. Marks Vice President for Health Sciences University of California at Berkele.y and Frode Jensen Professor Theodore B. Taylor Columbia University Visiting Lecturer Cora B. Marrett Department of Mechanical Professor of Sociology and and Aerospace Engineering Afro-American Studies Princeton University University of Wisconsin-Madison Anne D. Trunk Lloyd McBride Resident President Middletown, Pennsylvania United Stechvorkers of America I i o

e e s r, ,v .3ib) J J ClF CCNmXR Preface 1 Oveidw7-Commicsiw2 Findings 27 CanmicsimzRecamnendatimzr 61 AccozmtaftheAccident 81 AfhenClices FxeMive Order 131 Canmbsion Ot>entions &Nethodolce,155 Canmkioners'Bioemphies 137 StaffLht16$ Glkcary173 i l

o COMMISSION FINDINGS ( ~ Y B. HEALTH EFFECTS 1. Based on available dosimetric and demographic information: It is estimated that between March 28 and April 15, a. the collective dose resulting from the radioactivity released to the population living within a 50-mile radius of the plant was approxi-The estimated annual collective dose to mately;2',000 person-rems. this. population from natural background radiation is about-240,0007.3 Thus, the increment of radiation dose to persons ( tperson-rems'. liVing within a 50-mile radius due to the accident was somewhat less than one percent of the annual background level. The average dose to a person living within 5 miles of the nuclear plant.was calculated to be about f'l0 percent of' annual' background radiation and - ~~ ~ ~ ~ - - probably was less. b. The maximum estimated radiation dose received by any one ind.ividual in the off-site general population (excluding the On the basis plant workers) during the accident was 70 millirems. of present scientific knowledge, the radiation doses received by the general population as a result of exposure to the radioactivity rele'ased during the accident were so small that there will be no detectable additional cases of cancer, developmental abnormalities, or genetic ill-health as a consequence of the accident at TMI. l During the period from March 28 to June 30, three TMI l workers received radiation osses of about 3 to 4 rems; these levels c. l exceeded the NRC maximum permissible quarterly dose of 3 rems. d. 'The process'of recovery and cleanup presents ad'ditional sources of possible radiation exposure to the workers and the general population. There were deficiencies in instrumentation for measuring 2. the radioactivity 'releasedr particular19~during'ihe early stages of ~However, the's'e" deficiencies did not af fect the ~ thea[ccident. ' Commission staf f's ability to estimate the radiation doses or health effects resulting from the accident. p I

COMMISSION FINDINGS The health effects of radiation dose levels of a few rems 3. Estimates of the potential health effects of or less are not known. the TMI accident are based on extrape Wtions from the known health effects of higher levels of radiation. The major health effect of the accident appears to have 4. been on the mental health of the people living in the region of There was immediate, Three Mile Island and of the workers at TMI. short-lived mental distress produced by the accident among certain The groups of the general population living within 20 miles of TMI. highest levels of distress were found among adults a) living within 5 miles of TMI, or b) with preschool children; and among teenagers a) living within 5 miles of TMI, b) with preschool siblings, or c) Workers at TMI experienced more whose families left the area. distress than workers at another plant studied for comparison This distress was higher among the nonsupervisory purposes. employees and continued in the months following the accident. s e e f g b D e e S e e e e e G e e O O O O 9* 4 e 6 G 9 e l g O ( h et, e 35 t

COMMISSION FINDINGS C. PUBLIC HEALTH 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission has' primary responsibility and regulatory authority for health and safety measures as they relate to the operation of commercial nuclear plants. While the NRC has certain requirements in connection with radiation exposure and medical monitoring of workers at nuclear plants, it has no requirements for medical examination of workers other than licensed reactor operators', and even those examinations are only performed to assure that the operatcrs do not have physical or mental conditions that might impair their ability to perform their jobs safely. Metropolitan Edison's (Met Ed) administrative. procedures go beyond this NRC requirement and provide that all radiation workers receive routine medical examinations to asress any possible radiation-related illnesses. The NRC only requires monitoring and reporting of radiation exposure for workers who, in the utility's view, tre likely to receive doses beyond NRC-specifica levels. Met Ed does not keep, and the NRC does not require it to report, a record of the total radiation exposure of workers from l both occupational and nonoccupational (for example, medical and dental) sources. 2. The Public Health Service agencies of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (EEW),*/ whose sole mission is protection and promotion of the public health, have very limited respcasibilities with respect to radiological health matters relating to the location, construction, and routine operation of commercial nuclear power plants. 3. Although there were designated channels of communication and specific responsibilities assigned for federal agencies responding to the radiological emergency at TMI (for example, Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan), the existence of these channels and responsibilities was generally unknown to many high-level federal officials. In several instances during the course of the accident, some federal agencies were unaware of what other federal agencies were doing in providing support personnel and yesources. ~~ ~

• /

Now the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 36 -g

COMMISSION FINDINGS 4. Research on the biological effects of ionizing radiation-is conducted and/or sponsored by a number of federal agencies. In fiscal year 1978, the feceral government spent approximately $76.5 million an such research. More than 60 percent of tnis fundin3 was provided by the ".S. Department of Energy.- With the ~ exception of potassium iodide, there are no drugs presently approved by the Food and Drug Administration for the prevention or mitigation of adverse effects of ionizing radiation. 5. States have primary responsibility fer protecting the health and safety of their citizens. Pennsylvania public health officials and health-care providers in the TMI area did not have sufficient resources to respond to the potentially serious health consequences of the accident at ihI. Responsibility for radiological protection in Pennsylvania rests with the Department of Environmental Resources (DIR). At the time of the accident, the Pennsylvania Department of Health was not organized to respond to radiological emergencies, and maintained no formal liaison with DER on radiological health matters. 6. During the accident, TMI-area hospital administrators found no one at the state level with authority to recommend when to evacuate patients and when to resume normal admitting procedures. /~ The Pennsylvania Secretary of Health viewed his department's role with respect te aren hospital: as infor=ational, not advisory. t 7. During the first days of the accident, Met Ed did not notify its physicians under contract who would have been responsible for the on-site treatment of injured, contaminated workers during the accident. The emergency radiological medical care training provided to.these physicians to provide.on-site emergency care to such workers was inadequate. 8. Met Ed experienced several radiation protection problems during the accident: a) the emergency control center for health physics operations and the analytical laboratory to be used in emergencies was located in an area that became uninhabitable in the early hours of the accident, b) there was a shortage of respirators; 'and c) there was an inadequate supply of uncontaminated air. 9. NRC regulations on health physics education of nuclear power plant workers leaves the details of such things as course content, frequency, and attendance to the discretion of the licensee, subject to NRC inspection. Similarly, NRC regulations for environmental radiological monitoring leaves the details and methods of how these requirements are to be implemented (for example, types of dosimeters, kind of sample analysis) to the discretion of the, licensee, subject to NRC inspection and approval. (s e 37

Q COMMISSION FINDINGS I. ^ a D. EMERGENCY RESPONSE 1. Planning for the protection of the public in the event of a radiological release that extends beyond the boundary of TMI was highly complex. It involved the utility and government agencies at the local, state, and federal levels. That complexity posed problems in the case of the accident at Three Mile Island; some of the written lans_that e,xisted had not been coordinated.and containe different_syit_ ems for classifyiag accidents and different gtiidelfiies fo Enotifying government officials. I 2. In approving sites for reactors, the NRC has required licensees to plan for off-site consequences of radioactive releases ~ only within the " low population zone"'(LPZ), an area containing " residents, the total number and density of which are such that there is a reasonable probability that appropriate protective ~ measu~res could be taken in their behalf in the event of a serious accident." As calculated for the design-basis accident for TMI-2, this zone was a 2-mile radius. 3. Emergency planning _had a low priorit.y in,the..NRC, and the l AEC before it. There is evidence that the reasoi.s for this included their confidence in designed reactor safeguards and their desire to avoid raising public concern about the safety of nuclear power. 4. The NRC has not made the existence of a state emergency or l evacuation plan a condition ~for-~61aEli?c'e'nsing. A state may volun- ~ l 'E3rfly subsit a response plaf ~to NRC for concurrence, and if the plan meets NRC guidelines -- which do not have the force of law -- the state receives a formal letter of concurrence. At the time of the accident, P(nnsylvania did not have an NRC concurred-in plan. l-The NRC concurrence program has been called ineffective by federal l and state emergency preparedness officials? 5.' The utility has the responsibility to prevent or.to mitigate of f-site _ radi.ati.on_ releases and to Hoi.'ify tfic-~ bvernr:ent g j agencies designated in,,its emergency plan in the event that an emergency is declared. (ederal, sta_te _and_lo. cal agencies are t responsibl..e for. o.f f-site.-.rE._spohse to radia tion releases. At the ~ 38 1 L

C0KMISSION F1NDINGS time of the TMI accident, the local and county governments had the primary action role once nocified of the emergency. None of the local communities within the 5-mile raaius of the plant had emergency plans, and the existing county _ plans did.not_includet_d.etaileA_ evacuation jplans._ 4 6. .At all levels of government. a lanning for the off-site, cons _equences of radiological emergencies at nuclear power plants has bee'n chi'r'a~ct'erEed-bia lack of coordinatiion and urgency. Fo r' ~ ~ ~ example, a federal responsr plan in preparation since 1974 by federal emergency preparedness agencies was unfinished at the time of the accident because of an interagency jurisdictional dispute and lack of com=unication. Pennsylvania did not begin to develop a radiological emergency plan until 1975, even though nuclear power plants had been operating within its borders for at least a year prior to that time. People who attempted to generate interest in. radiological emergency. planning at the local level near TMI found local officials apathetic. Part of the reason for this was the attitude fostered by the NRC regulatory approach, and by Met Ed at the local level, that radiological accidents having off-site consequences beyond the LP2 were so unlikely as not to be of serious concern. '7. Interaction among NRC, Met Ed, and state and local emergency oilihiiaEions in the develop ~ cent, review,~and' drill of CEEfgenty plan's Gas' insufficient to ensure an adequate level of \\ prepsredness for 4 serious radiological incident at TMI. 8. Although NRC personnel were on-site within hours of the ~ declaration of a site e=ergency and were in constant contact with the utility, the NRC was not able to deter =ine and to understand the true seriousnesind nature of the accident for about 2 days, when s ~~ ~ the fact of extensive core da= age and the existence of the hydragen bubble were generally recognized within NRC. 9. During the first 2-\\ days of the ace'ident co==unications s between the NRC Incident Response Center in Bethesda,' Maryland, where the senior management.was located,'ind'the site were such that senior management officials found it extre=ely difficult to obtain up-to-date information. Communications were so poor on Friday morning that the senior maaagement could not and did not develop a clear understanding of conditions at the site. As a result,'an evacuation was recoc= ended t-the state by the NRC senior staff on lI the basis of fragmentary and partially erroneous infor=stion. Communications did not improve until Harold Denton, designated the sole source of'information, arrived on the site and communicated with NRC headquarters, the Governor's office, and the White House by White House coanunications line.

10. The reality of possible evacuation was quite different from the theore,tical planning requirements imposed by the NRC and

( Pennsylvania before the accident. The 5-mile emergency plans were developed according to a Pennsylvania requirement for emergency planning within a 5-mile, radius of nuclear power plants. The Pennsylvania requirement was st'ri'cter than'that prescribed by NRC, ~ 39

o COMMISSION FINDINGS I which only required TMI to have a plan fer a radius to 2 miles. (See finding D.2.) It is known that the consequences of a postulated major release to the atmosphere from a reactor accident could lead to significant doses of radiation being received many At TMI-2, although the tens of miles from the site of the accident. radiation releases were significantly lower than the design-basia accident, evacuation was being considered for distances much greater During the TMI accident, NRC believed that the than 2 miles. consequences of7h_e accident migIt extend 7ar-beyond the 2 or ~ ,As a result, evacuation plans were hurriedly 5-mile radius. deve15 ped for distances of 10 and 20 miles from the plant. the NRC

11. During the most critical phase of the accident, was_ working under extreme pressure in an atmosphere of uncertainty.

The NRC staff was confronted with problems it had never analyzed One result of before and for which it had no immediate solutions. these conditions was the calculational errors concerning the hydrogen bubble, which caused the NRC to misunderstand the true conditions in the reactor for nearly 3 days. On Friday and Saturday, certain'NRC officials incorrectly 12. concluded that a hydrogen bubble in the reactor vessel would soon contain enough oxygen to burn or explode. Ignoring correct information supplied by a B&W employee and cer ain members of its own staff, NRC relied instead upon incorrect information supplied by ( other members of its staf f and by others that suf ficient oxygen was being formed from water radiolysis to reach a concentration Based-on this information, the sufficient for a burn or explosion. NRC co=missioners began formulating new recommendations for On Sunday, NRC staffers obtained infor=ation from evacuation. several national laboratories and from General Electric and The Sunday Westinghouse that sufficient oxygen could not form. information ended the concern about oxygen formation and evacuation. This incident suggests that NRC lacks sufficient knowledge and expertise in water radiolysis. The role of the NRC commissioners and their 13. decision-making process during the accident were ill-defined. Although the commissioners on Friday assumed responsibility for making recommendations to the Governor concerning protective action,- there was no apparent procedure by which issues and staff The commissioners were recocmendations were explored and resolved. l preoccupied with matters such as the details of evacuation planning and the drafting,of a press release.

14. Existing emergency plans were not designed to meet the-demands _of_a_protra.cte.d_qrisis._, The plans had no mechanisms for l

esta61ishing reliable communications among the on-site and the i several of f-site organizations responsible for various aspects of j 1 the emergency response. There were no hospitals within 5 miles of TMI, but there 15. were several hospitals within the expanded, proposed evacuation it would be able to give officials a The NRC estimated that l few hours " lead time" for evacuation. liut hospital administrators zones. 40 l t

~ COMMISSION FINDINGS estimated they would need substantially more time to evacuate patients. . 16. During the TMI accident, the actual radiation levels outside the plant were low, but there was. uncertainty about the possibility of serious releases on short notice. Federal and state officials disagreed about the nature of the information on which to " base evacuation decisions and other protective actions during the emergency. Some officials based their decisions on actual radiation exposure levels, while others based their decisions on concerns about potential releases of large amounts of radioactivity. For example, the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection told the Governor on Friday that radiation levels indicated that no protective action of any kind was required; on that same morning, NRC Chairman Hendrie recommended that pregnant women and young children be advised to leave the area near the plant because of his concern about possible releases of radioactivity.

17. At approximately 12:30 p.m., March 30, Governor Thornburgh advised pregnant women and preschool aged children to leave the area within a 5-mile radius of TMI until further notice.

A substantial number of other persons, including health professionals,. voluntarily left the area around the plant during the weekend of March 30 through April 1. The advisory to pregnant women and preschool children was lif ted on April 9.

18. Throughout the accident, the Pennsylvania Emergency

( " nage=ent Agency (PEMA) received reperts concerning :enditient at the site from the Bureau of Radiation Protection. During the first 2 days of the accident, however, the director of PEMA also received background information on the status of the plant from the Governor's office by attending meetings and press conferences and-relayed that information to county organizations, which, in turn, informed the local civil defense directors. Starting Saturday, the PEME director was no longer included in these meetings with the ~ result that PEMA and county and_ local civil. defense organizations had to rely primarily on the news media for information about co'naitions at the site'.' They' found this an unsatisf actory source of i'6formafioE aEd '6Elie'ved' that this arrangement compromised their effectiveness in responding to the accident.

19. _The TMI emergency plan did not, require the utility to notify state or local health authorities in the~ event of a ra'diological accident. (See also finding C.7.)

20. For over 25 years, the use of blocking agents such as potassium iodide to prevent the accumulation of radioiodine in the thyroid gland has been known. The effectiveness of potassium iodide administration for thyroid gland protection in the event of releases of radioiodine was recognized by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement in 1977. The Food and Drug Administration authorized use of potassium iodide as a -{ thyroid-blocking agent for the general public in December 1978. However, at the time of the TMI accident, potassinm iodide for this use was not commercially ava.i_l.a_b__l.e._.i_n._t.he.. U. nited Sta tes._ in ) g g a MS .*8 E g .I

• • f*

o COMISSION FINDINGS osantities sufficient for the population within a 20-mile radius of TMI. At the time of the. accident...Me* Ed had no supply of potassium iodide 'on-site. A' crash effo-t_by..the_ federal. government and private i.1dustry reiEf tid in delivery of substantial supplies of potassium iodide to Pennsylvania'within 2 days of the decision to obtain such supplies. e h i f s O e 6 0 Q i 42 a w m-ye 's-w* 4sv-w-- --+--v-- ev--'4 M' a .--p~

a.... o COMMISSION FINDINGS s i t i I f ,t I H. THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO PUBI.IC INyOPJ'ATION 1. The quality of information provided to the public.in the event of a liiililcar plan't'c.ccident h: 3_a significant, bea. ring 'on, t.he capacity of~ peoE e to. respond to.the. accident, on.their mental l ~ i health, and on thsiF willingness ho accept guidance from responsible public officials. 2. Be~ ore the accident, Met Ed had consistently asserted the overall safety of the plaat, although the co=pany had made I information concerning cifficulties at TMI-2 public in weekly press releases. This infor=ation was not pursued, and often not understo.od.,. by the_ local _ news media in the area; andj he local news media generalIv failed to publish or broadcast inve~stigative stories i un the'Ta'fetfIft.,the' plant. ' ~ ',' ~ ~ ~ 3. Neither Met Ed nor the NRC had specific plans for providing accident information to the public and the news media. l. 4. During the accident, officialisources_of_infor=atinn were - o_f ten con _f_us.ed_ ar..igno rant _o f,, _the. f a cts. News media coverage often -l reflected this confusion and,igno_rance. 5. Met Ed's handling of infor=ation during the first 3 days l i of the accident resulted in loss of its credibility as an information source with state and local officials, as well'as with the news media. Part of the problem was that the utility was slow to c o n f i rm _" p e s s imi s_t_1 c "._n ew s_a b o u.t_.J.h e_a c c i d_e nt. i* 6. In accordance with an informal agreement worked out between Governor Thornburgh and the White House, the release of l information was -centralized b'eginning on the third day of the accident. Under the agreement, !!arold Denton of the NRC would issue all statements from the site on plant status; the Governor's office . would be the sole source of comment on protective action and ( q evacuation; and the White House would coordinate comment on the i federal emergency relief effort. This agreement limited the number i of sources availabic to the acvs media and while it brought some i 57 I I

~ COMMISSION FINDINGS order out of the chaos in public information, it raised two ( problems. First, information on off-site radiation releases was not centralized in any source so that it would be readily available to the news media and the public; and second, the plan provided no specific public information role for the utility. [ 7. During the first days of the accident, B&W made a i conscious decision not to comment on the accidenc, even when company officials believed that misinformation was being made available to the public by others. 8. The reporters who covered the accident had widely divergent skills and backgrounds. Many had no scientific background. Because too few technical briefers were supplied by NRC and the utility, and because many reporters were unfamiliar with the ^ technology and the limits of scientific knowledge, they had difficulty understanding fully the information that was given to them. In turn, the news media had difficulty presenting this information to the pablic in a form that would be understandable. t o a. Thia difficulty was particularly acute in the reporting of information on radiation releases. b. They also experienced difficulty interpreting ~ language expressing the probability of such events as a meltdown or a hydrogen explosion; this was made even more difficult when the sources of information were themselves uncertain about the i probabilities. 9. The Lopression exists that in news coverage of the accident, the news media presented r more alar =ing than reassuring view of events. Without attempting to assess how alarming the accident.may i3 fact have been, an taalysis of the sources quoted in l the news media reveals, overall, a larger proportion of reassuring than alar =ing statements in the coverage concerning the status of the accident. In choosing quotations from both official and unofficial sources, the news media did not present only " alarming" views, but rather views on both sides of issues related to the accident.

10. A qualitative survey of 42 newspapers from around the country showed that the vast majority covered the accident in much the same way as the major suppliers of news, such as the wtre l

services, the broadcatt networks, The New York Times, and The Washington Post. A few newspapers, bowever, did present a more irightening and misleading impression of the accident. This impression was created through headlines and graphics, and in' th'e selection of material to print. I I I i 58 I j ,e = =.. L

COMMISSION REco$dENDATIONS l I t I E. WORKER AND PUBI.IC HE.ETH AND SAFETY { l. The Commission recommends the establishment of expanded and better coordinated health-related radiation effects research. This research should include, but not be limited to: I biological effects of low levels of ionizing radiation; a. b. acceptable levels of exposure to ionizing radiation for the general population and for workers; f' l. develop =ent of methods of monitoring and surveillance, 't c. including epidemiologic surveillance to monitor and determine the i consequences of exposure to radiation of various population groups, i including workers; d. develop =ent of approaches to mitigate adverse health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation; and I genetic or environmental factors that predispose ~ l e. individuals to increased susceptibility to adverse effects. This effort should be coordinated under the National Institutes of Health -- with an interagency committee of relevant federal agencies to establish the agenda for research efforts - ' including the commitment of a portion of the research budget to meet the specific needs of the restructured NRC. l 2. To ensure the best available review of radiation-related health issues, including reactor siting issues, policy state =ents or regulations in that area of the restructured NRC should be subject to mandatory review and comment by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. A time limit for the review should be established to assure such review is performed in an expeditious manner. 3. The Commission recommeads, as a state and local responsibility, an increased program for educating health professionals ( j and emergency response personnel in the vicinity of nuclear power plants. 1 74

O CotetISSION RECOMMENDATIONS ' 4. Utilities must make sufficient advance preparation for the sitigation of emergencies: I Radiation monitors should be available for monitoring of a. _ routine operations as well as accident levels. 1 e f b. The emergency control center for health physics i i operations and the analytical laboratory to be used in emergencies should be located in a well-shielded area supplied with uncontaminated air. '?here must be a sufficient health-related supply of c. instruments, respirators, and other necessary equipment for both routine e and emergency conditions. t d. There should be an adequate maintenance program for all such health-related equipment. 5. An adequate supply of the radiation protective (thyroid blocking) agent, potassium iodide for human use, should be available regionally for distribution to the general population and workers affected by a radiological emergency. ~ D l l I s j 1 75 S s

l i COMMISSION RECONTE.VDATIONS - l F. EMERGENCY PLANNING AND RESPONSE i 1. Emergency plans must detail clearly and consistently the actions public officials and utilities should take in the' event of off-site radiation deses resulting from release of radioactivity. Therefore, the Commission recommends that: i. 5 a. Before a utility is granted an operating license for a. new nuclear power plant, the state within which that plant is to be g sited must have an emergency response plan reviewed and approved by the i Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The' agency should assess r the criteria and procedures now used for evaluating state and local I ( government plans and for deter =ining their ability to activate the plans. FEMA must assure adequate provision, where necessary, for multi-state planning. b. The responsibility at the federal level for radiologic.al emergency planning, including planning for coping with radiological l releases, should rest with FEMA. In this process, FEMA should consult with other agencies, including the restructured NRC and the appropriate health and environmental agencies. (See recommendation A.4.) c. The state must effectively coordinate its planning with the utility and with local official, in the area where the plant is to be located. i d. States with plants already operating must upgrade their plans to the requirements to be set by FEMA. Strict deadlines must be established to accomplish this goal. 2. Plans for protecting the public in the event of off-site radiation rele'se's should be based on technical assessment of various a classes of accidents that can take place at a given plant. a. No single plan based on a fixed set of distances and a. fixed. set of responses can be adequate. Planning should involve the identification of several different kinds of accicents with different ( possible radiation consequences. For each such scenario, there should be clearly identified criteria for the appropriate responses at various 76

A ( COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS i ) distances, including instructing individuals to stay indoors for a period of time, providing special medication, or ordering an evacuation. 1 1 I } b. Similarly, response plans should be keyed to various j possible scenarios and activated when the nature and potential hazard of a given accident has been identified. Plans should exist for protecting the public at radiation i c. l levels lower than those currently used in NRC prescribed plans. - d. All local communities should have funds and technical i support adequ. ir preparing the kinds of plans described above. 3. Research should be expanded on medical means of protecting the This research public against various levels and types of radiation. should include exploration of appropriate medications that can protect against or counteract radiation. 4. If emergency planning and response to a radiation-related emergency is to be effective, the public cust be better infor=ed about nuclear power. The Cocsission recommends a program to educate the -(- public on how nuclear power plants opertt'e, on radiation and its health effects, and on protective actions against radiation..Those who would be affected by such e=ergency planning must have clear information on actions they would be required to take in an e=ergency. 5. Commission studies suggest that decis!.on-makers may have over-esticated the human costs, in injury and loss of life, in =any cass evacuation situations. The Commission reco= mends study into the hu=an costs of radiation-related mass evacuation and the extent, if any, to which the risks in radiation-related evacuations differ from other typ-s of evacuations. Such studies should take into account the effects of improving emergency planning, public awareness of such planning, and costs involved in cass evacuations. 6. Plans for providing federal technical support, such as radiological monitoring, should clearly specify the responsibilities of the various support agencies and the procedures by which those agencie: Existing plans for the provision of federal provide assistance. l assistance, particularly the Interagency Radiological Assistance plan and the various memoranda of, understand #.ng among the agencies, should be reexamined and revised by the appropriate federal authorities in the light of the experience of the TMI accident, to provide for better coordination and more efficient federal support capability. i. I .i

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS I i 6 G. TE FUBLIC'S RIGHT TO INFORMATION 1. Federal and state agencies, as well as the utility, should ~ make adequate preparation for a systematic public information program so thit in" time of a radiation-reIated emergency, they can, provide tim,ely sed ~recurate in'for=ation to the news media and the public in a form that ~ is understandable. There should be sufficient division of briefing responsibilities as well rs availability of informed sources to reduce confused and inaccurate infcrmation. The Co= mission therefore recommends: Since the utility must be responsible for the management } a. of the accident, it should also be primarily responsible for previding f / information on the status of the olant to the news media and tn the \\ ~ public; but the restructured NRC 'should also play a supporting role and be available to provide background information and technical briefings. b. Since the state government is responsible for decisions concerning protective actions, including evacuations, a designated state l agency should be charged with issuing all information on,this_ subject. Tufs agincy~ is also charged with the development of and dissemination of accurate and timely information on off-site radiation doses resulting from releases of radioactivity. This infor=ation should be derived from appropriate sources. (See recommendation F.1.) This agency should also j set up the machinery to keep local officials fully informed of g developments and to coordinate briefings to discuss any federal ihvolvement in evacuation matters.'~ l ' - - ~ - ~ ' ~ ~ i 2. The provision of accurate and timely information places special responsibilities on the official sources of this information. The effort must meet the needs of the news media for information but 4 without compromising the ability of operational personnel to manage the accident. The Commission therefore recommends that: Those who brief the news media must have direct a'ccess to a. informed sources of information. b. Technical liaison people should be designated to inform the briefers and to serve as a resource for the news media. ( O 78 a _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ m c

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS k The primary official news sources should have plans -for c. the prompt establishment of press centers reasonably close to the site. These must be properly equipped, have appropriate visual aids and i reference materials, and be staf fed with individuals who are I knowledgeable in dealing with the news media. These press centers must I l promptly upon the declaration of a general emergency or i l .be operat ona its equivalent. The coverage of nuclear emergencies places special respons-3. ibilities on the news media to provide accurate and timely information. The Commission therefore recommends that: All major medi:n outlets (wire services, broadcast a. networks, news maga ines, and metropolitan daily newspapers) hire and train specialists who have more than a passing familiarity vita resrtors and the language of radiation. All other news media, regardless of their size, located near nuclear power plants should.atte=pt to acquire similar knowledge or make plans to secure it during an emergency. Reporters discipline themselves to place comp 1'ex b. information in a context that is understandable to the public and that allows members of the public to make decisions regarding their health and safety. Reporters educate themselves to understand the pitfalls c. Those covering an in interpreting answers to "what if" questions. I accident should have the ability to understand uncertainties expressed by sources of infor=ation and probabilities assigned to various possible dangers. State emergency plans should include provision for creation of 4. local broadcast media networks for emergencies that will supply ti=ely Arrangements should be made to maic available and accurate infor=ation. knowledgeable briefers to go on the air to clear up rumors and. explain l conditions at the plant. Communications between state officials, the i j utility, and the network should be prearranged to handle the possibility of an evacuation announcement. ~i The Commission recommends that the public.in the vicinity of a S. l l . nuclear power plant be routinely informed of local radiation acasurements that depart appreciably from normal background radiation, l whether from normal or abnormal operation of the nuclear power plant, from a radioactivity cleanup operation such as that at TMI-2, or from 3* other sources. I i 8 79 S 0

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t' i { Introduction 3 All processes for the conversion of material into energy produce some degree and type of pollution. At some point the resultant r effect on the environment is so damaging to public health and ( a:wnities that it outweighs the values gained from the use of the A sound environmental policy involves VisJ decisions to l P' energy. e determine the point at which the generation of energy produces more harm than good. ".( The Energy Subco=mittee has limited its consideration of pollu-tion from energy processes to the one area of electrical power. 4' In that area, two somewhat different situations exist today. r 1. Fossil fueled plants generate well known and relatively serious air and water pollution. Though not all the h. effects are obvious, the pollutants can be seen, tasted g'y and smelled. g T.l 2. Nuclear power generation, the alternate method now in the most advanced stage of development, does not pro-Q,. duce pollution that people can sense. Eowever, it does discharge radiation into the air and water. There may a be both long term genetic effects and pcssible accidents 4.l 1 that could destroy all life within a 100 mile radius of .i*.c j i I. the plant, I gg, Minimizing the day-to-day damage and the possible catastrophy to e - public heal *h and safety from electric power generation takes two F.J One is the conventional approach of designing primary forms. Jf. new plants and =odifying existing ones to create as little pollu-f-1. D tion as possible. This is very costly and soon encounters limi-(),, tations in the technology of the process itself. l h. The alternate which is gaining rapidly in acceptance is to use energy with improved efficiency. Electrical energy is extremely ' J. clean at the point of use but severely polluting in generation Qt and transmission. Higher efficiency at the point of use means i l ". less generation and transmission and the environmental improve-K'; ment is significant. pck. l- .More than half of the electrical energy generated is used in J* Therefore, heating, air conditioning and lighting of buildings. J39; the design and operation of residential, c - arcial and industrial ~ buildings is closely related to the total quantity of energy that

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its building codes and other actions. This represents a Inost fruitful and as yet largely unused authority of cities to reverso Q'. environmental deterioration and, in f act, to upgrade the urban g, t-envirenment. Mr. S. Ted Isaacs, Chairman Dr. Boyd T. Riley l Mrs. Sylvia Miller Mrs. Helen Black 7- ^ Mr. I,awrence Kessler -kJ Dr. Michael Grossman - 5 .e m e

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153 a 1: Power Plant Resolution City Council should pass a resolution stating that C.C.sE. keep Council and the City Manager continuously and fully informed of all its plans for power plant co-tstruction. 1 Presently, C.G.&E. 's plaas call for the construction of the Wililam H. Zi=mer Nuclear Power $tation at Moscow, Ohio approxi-i mately 25 miles east of Cincinnati. Before construction permits were issued the AEC held two hearings, one on the safety f actors and the other on the environmental i. pact of the proposed plant. The City did not actively participate in either of these hearings. p 31nce this plant is ir. close proximity to the Ohio River (Cincin-nati water supply) and to the City of Cincinnati, it would seem 'i reasonable to cssume that this plant or any other type of power plant could have so=e effect on *he general populace. It is for this reason that we feel the City should have participated in ,5 the previously discussed hearings. If the aforementioned res.olu-i" tion is enactad, the City nuld have more than ample time and f infor=ation to consider the advantages and disadvantages of any [;,' particular situation that might arise. E-

• ne following are so=e of the concerns that the proposed Zir=ler Nuclear Station has brought forth:

/ 1. Under ideal cperatiny condition Nuclear Pcver Stations vill release a certsin amount of radioactivity. (See ,.p Appendix Nc.=ber E-1.) o 2. The effect of this relatively small amount of inyreased E background radioactivity is not precisely known. t 3. Stziet controls ir, all containment procedures and in all . technical processes is i= perative to safety yet some scientists insist taere is real and ce=pelling danger of accident such as loss of coolant or throuJh human error.2 (See Appendix Nu=ber E-2.) I I The storage or burial of radioactive wastes is a probler.3 4. The relatively long life of radioactive wastes coupled with the geological changes that occur from time to ti=e 9 could at some point cause problems. There is also some controversy as to whether thgre exists 5. 4~; a container strong enough to hold these wastes. 6. Assuming there was an accident at the Zimmer Plant, it has been discovered that C.G.EE. will not bear the' financial liabilities in the event injury to citizens and damage to + their property occurs. The Price-Anderson Act does pro-vide some financial recourse. In the event of an accident, regardless of the severity, the Price-Anderson Act has decreed that no more than $560 million dollars will be paid out. In an AEC report (WASH-740 known as the Brook-i haven Report) the maximum calculable accident was theorized as creating 7 billion dollars worth of damage. Hoping that this accident never occurs but assuming one does, the return to the citizen will be approximately 7 cents per l 7, dollar of damage.5 j e dee s

i 154 1* it a. d! i' [ s A great deal of rhetoric has been voiced regarding a _ concern' for i '1 i tha deve hpment of new energy sources. Federal rosearch and de-velopment funding figures seem to betray this rhetoric. In fiscal G year 1972, nuclear research and development expenditures approached 500 million leaving less than 550 million for all other federal energy research and development. Included are the areas of coal production, gasification and liquification petroleum extract.4.on i technolo w, solar and geothermal energy, oil. shale development, cleaner fuel, improved energy systems, mining heulth and safety and alternative energy resources.4 l; .0 - - The most practical alternative to nuclear power may still be the A fossil fuel power plants. In the past these plants ware conde.sned p because of their obnoxious emissions. Great progress has been j -f .J and is being made in abating these emissions. Those responsible -1 for this saculd be co=nended and encouraged to continue the use ]l of fossil fuel power plants. ,h r 1* i-j T) 4 .w- 'l I I i, e g q i l F i q i L .i . ) .is si g j i r- [.' = l ' ;....-j p -a s I is b. b .leww a . ~.. -., =. -.,

1C5 9 2: Radiation Monitoring The City should establish a Department of Radiation Monitoring and Safety reporting directly to the City Manager. t W;. During the deliberations of the Environmental Task Force questions

. ave arisen as to the issue of monitoring of radiation to which public may be exposed through the air, water, food and sol 3d p

Our conclusion is that the problems do not break down ~ tha i d I' into the usual categories of air pollution, water pollut on anRather than have this wastes. f. so on but are very closely inter-related. important function dissected and cast into existing agencies, it ~ I is our position that one agency would best serve this purpose. h. Some of the factors to be considered ares a-nd food Radioactive materials can enter the air, wt.ter and 1. supply as a result of th'e operations of nearby h:r remote power plants as 9911 as from other nuclear in-E sta11ations. p* Laid controversy, there has been sonne research that shows A-that radioactise materials tend to concentrate in food M." 2. 7.? particularly in milk at higher levelu than the radiation Animals that drink the i-present in the ground and water. water and eat plants have even a higher radiation level. 5' f " f h:ff -(3ee Appendix Number E-3.) 'h Some questions have been raised about tha safety of p_. - ^' 3. nuclear installations and the probability of radio-activity entering the environment as a result of acci - m dents.B (See Appendix Number E-4.) Although thers is considerable controversy on this point, F.6 4. some research indicates that levels of radioactivity, only recently considered safe, may have very extensive effects particularly on fetuses and young children. { if. 9 Birth defects and leukemia seems to be a possible f , ~. - (See Appendix Number E-3.) t fr problem. A single department would be more efficient and less costly than any attempt to carry out the same work through L~ 5. several existing agencies. This arises largely from l d- [! - the fact that the technology of monitoring is rapidly Well trained Ki;. ', changing because of its inherent complexity. Efficient and personnel and equip ent are expensive.

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{". tion of such experts and equipment to achieve maximun h useage in this specific field. A A major error in the monitoring of radiation emissions ~_ d. could result in a civic disaster of some proportions. This could occur suddenly in the event of an accident 4. If the monitoring is Ql or in a slow, progressive manner. there is nore b spread throughout the existing agencies, [; of a chance for error. 'f Effective protettion will depend on the cooperation and foresight Therefore, from the very outset and of many City departments. in the future, the City Manager must insure that this proposed department cooperate and receive the cooperation of all other This coordination must cover the flow of informa-departments. ~. -/ 1. .o a h_______________.___.__________'__________._ "9. ~ * ~

• i 156 tion, the formulation of plans of action, the simulacion testing I

of said plans and, above all, action witho.:.t hesitation if and when an emergency condition should occur. The duties of this proposed department would be tot 1. Maintain up-to-date information on the technology of radiation monitoring and research work in the field of radiation effects on populations. 2. Monitor the environment of the city for radiation in j all areas including food, water, air and land. e e

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. n t -f-i.X.. ? I i ~: ~ The City of Cincinnati should obtain standing as an intervenor 5 in the hearing that must be held by the Atomic Energy Co= mission f: previous to the granting of an operating license for the Zirner 4 Station and in all future hearings regarding nuclear power t, pi licensing in this general area. u ~~g h;; .8 LJ n N- .;g i t.. 2 2 The City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania has gained such standing .j in forthcoming operation and construction licensing hearings in their area. Information can be obtained by Cincinnati from p Mayor Pete Flaherty of Pittsburgh. .i Standing as an Intervenor does not mean that the City would necessarily oppose the granting of licenses. Such standing is, c..- d however, the only way that the City can take part officially g,. Witnesses at the hearing can be questioned on in the hearings. matters of safety, monitoring, the supplying of monitoring data m, by AEC and the licensee and other similar matters. I $2 Such standing would be of very great value to the proposed City I g-.l. Depart =ent of Radiation Monitoring and Safety, the creation of 9 which has been reco= mended elsewhere in this report. d.- Y' 1 4 i 4 o t l%.' k. x i 3-

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.i. t t m s* It is our recommendation that City Council make a detailed 3 independent study of the reported se,fety and public health f' hazards of nuclear power plants, and also maintain up to date '4- ? inforaation on this subject. n. ([. At the hearings held by the Energy Conservation Subcommittee, J C-strongly divergent opinions on safety and environmental effects Ef; of nuclear power plants were presented. Since many of the i ? , 7, pecple who appeared at these hearings have what seem to be g* - equal expertise. The only possible conclusion is that the 5:?f safety and environmental effects are not fully understood at this time. Q' l 75-I Materials contained in the appendix of the Energy Section of l }f'. this report seem to bear this out. ( U.ader such circumstances, it seems essential that the City l collect and maintain as nearly a complete and current infor-i mation as possible. This information can serve as a guide J ]? to the City Council and City Manager in their decisions relative to nsclear installations. -+- 3 2 Mr. O. Ted Iscacs ME Mr. D. David Altman Mrs. Helen Black - i,' Dr. Boyd T. Riley, Jr. 52 .Dr. Michael Grossman . s-Dr. David F. Surber ( i Mrs. Sylvia Miller ~ i. k .2 .r, e 1 bh. .j-F"-

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+ - eeen. w hg m... N ' ~.T '- " Minority Peport - ~ _ - ..-;;: n - ('...~__T'. = ^ ' .----K r W " ? z-t k-, p i,- M-- +4 ? : ~.. - - ._. w,Until the existing environ. mental questions are fully answered, the City of Cincinnati should exert every effort to forestall operation of the Zir::::er Power Station and other nuclear power .~" 2: - stations t!.at could affect the environnent of this city. M M - The Atcz:df: Energy Conctis tion has stated repeatedly that the ' probability of accident at a nuclear power pisnt is extre=ely 6 low, but not i: possible. AEC reports also show that, in the event of such an accident, hundreds to thousands of lives + r S:, - would be lost, and damage could be in the billions of dollars R- - for a' dista;:e of more than 100 miles from the plant. .7-N The Atomic Energy Cor::uission also states that the radiation contamination of the air, water, and food supply during r. Q~ nor=al operation of the nuclear pcwer plant is too low to Rf have any noticeable effects. However, there are a nunber of capable and sincere authorities, seme of them AEC employees, -ic' Oii. - who disagree with that claim. ~. Until such ti: e as ti.sse questions are clearly resolved, it W q-does not seem prudent to expose a large population to such ? (

C preat potential hazards.

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i 171 i s'- e. l. Minority Report 1 I At the April 26, 1973 meeting of the Environmental Task Force, a number of recommendations regarding nuclear safety and health were i proposed by the subcomittee on Energy and Nuclear Power to the Task Force for discussion and final approval. One of these recom-0- mandations was modified by deletion of two paragraphs: one of them was withdrawn by the committee after discussion and subse-3 {y.. quent voting approved three out of four recommendations. e Several Task Force members voiced the opinion that the recomenda-h tions were acceptable but that the added comments and arguments l were unduly pessimistic and presented a strong bias which could not I s be accepted by them. In this respect, we fully concur and we wish I to present our statement as a minority stand. .-v 2 It would be foolhardy not to recognize the potential dangers which accompany the use of radioactive materials used in power generation in nuclear power plants. To take all reasonable precautions, both

• f in prevention of accidents and in monitoring the after effects of G'

.any unforeseen eventuality is incumbent upon the operators of such -J, plants and the officials of the communities which are imminently ';'r affected by such events. Hence, we are entirely in agreement with cj. - the recomendations that suggest a close watch by City officials [f - on the data arising from monitoring procedures on the air and water i. environment of the City. We also agree that, so far, not enough 3" has been done by local of ficials and departments to insure the 4, ( future safety of our citizens. @q. On the other hand, we are also fully aware of the need for new fez sources of energy and of the careful research and planning that have gone into the development of nuclear reacto: s and nuclear 1.t power plants. To close one's eyes to the existeace of safe -fi. operating facilities and overwhelming expert testimony regarding

• C the safety of such plants and to emphasize repeatedly only the negative and often hearsay questions raised, is not in the best 1

[-Y; interests of the community as a whole. .W-7 It is unfortunate that the members of the Nuclear Power and Energy ~ U-Subcomittee displayed what appears to us a strong bias in their deliberations that existed from the outset of their activities. It -- I, has only been through the voicing of concern by other members of the Task Force throughout the year that this bias has, to a certain M. degree,'een moderated. We do not question the sincerity of the individueis involved,but we cannot permit the statements made to l be mistaken as representative of our points of view. '~ E;. In brief, although we concur with the three above named rece==enda- '7, tions of the Energy Subcommittee, we have not been in agreement .c with the unduly pessimistic and negative attitude of that comittee 7 from the start of its deliberations and we think that we express the opinion of several of the Task Force members in this respect. w,, d Mr. Steven Ackerman N Mr. Paul Farber 11 Dr. Richard J. Carascia 5.' Mr. Allen Reed Mr. Peter J. S trauss Dr. Pasquale V. Scarpino Dr. James M. Morand Mr. Robert L. Steiner j. W b I b. .-m _.-_%,._m.-, _ ~_.-,_,- - r ._m..,.,.,

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l i i Foreword on May 10, 19 72 Cincinnati's City Council by ordinance 207-3972 established the Environmental Task Force for the City of Cincinnati. The idea for the establishnent of such a Task Force evolved from the creation of a similar such body in Covington, Kantucky which was known as the Covington Environmental Commission. The Environ-2 mental Task Force for the City of Cincinnati is made up of twenty-seven citizens appointed by Council and serving without pay. There i are two staf f me=bers who are paid through federal and city funds. The mandate of the Environmental Task Force, pursuant to Crdinance 207-1972, was to study all aspects of the current status of the environment within the tincinnati area and to make reco=mendations by May 30, 1973 to Council which would help protect each citizen's right to " clean air, pare water, the scenic, natural and a esthetic l qualities of his environment, and freedom from excessiva and un-j necessary ncise." l I Almost i= mediately after the passage of this ordinance, the Environ-mental Tast Force organized itself into six subce=mittees and at n the same time adopted a strict set of internal by-laws through which the organi:ation functioned during its short year of existence. The six subco=mittee structure worked so well administratively that g the internal organization of this Report is divided inte seven [L separate sections covering the six subco==ittee topics of Air, Water, Noise, Land Use, Energy, and Solid Waste as well as a General section. l After a year of extensive study, we are indeed ready to report back ( to City Council and the citizens of Cincinnati regarding the status of the environmant within the Cincinnati area. We feel very strongly that our City is in great shape environmentally at the present time. This is a testimony to the courage and foresight of our dedicated .j public servants not only in City Council but also in the City [ W administration who have worked so hard to make life in Cincinnati l a pleasurable experience. Furthermore, it is a testimony to the~ \\ I abundance of natural and man-made resources (such as the Hillsides, a Ohio River and Fountain Square) which make our City stand above;other b metropolitan areas ir terms of environmental quality. 3 We are indeed fortunat e. However, this is not to say that the present state of environmental quality will continue or that we can-not have an even better environ =ent in our City. It is to this g 4gg( basic premise that we of the 'Eavironmental Task Force have addressede a f ourselves; and as a result thereof, we have arrived at the following .g objectives for our works (a) preservation of those attributes of our environment which should be preserved; (b) creation of new imaginative attributes or conditions within the City which will create an even greater environment. With these objectives in mind we have already made some eleven reco=mendations and reports to City Council over the past year most I of which have already been acted upon favorably by City Council and I by public spirited induatry. One such notable example was our h opposition to a high voltage power line which was to proceed across K the Chio River near' Eden Park's " Ohio River Overlook". Cincinnati l Cas and Electric, in a characteristic show of public spiritedness, l agreed to fcrestall the construction of such a line until plans for an alternate route could be devised and implemented. This type of industry response to the concerns of the citizenry is the element present in. Cincinnati that in many ways make it unique from other cities. We want to thank Cincinnati Gas and Electric for their response to this issue. l( t. J

5, j t l Again, with the same above-mentioned objectives in.nf ad submitted additional recommendations, many of which have included , we have in the Appendix the actual ordinance whien should be enact d b ( I City Council in order to implement the recommendatior l e y approaching and analyzing the environmental problems outlined in In i fair as possible to all sides of a particular issuethese rec i ve and 4 became very clear as we proceeded in our study that thare was no In fact it such thing as an exclusively environmental issue.

~

mental proolem presents a myriad of factors and considerations Every environ-y which are of ten not easily discernible on the surface but which - j must be considered in a full study of the problem. be derived versus the detriments are just a few factors Such factors ---l come to mind. l If these factors are not considered, tions of the problem could well be worse than the probl the resolu-e i For this reason, we have attempted to avoid the mental strait j l em itself. jacket of thinking that everything the so-called envi ists want is good and everything in response thereto by indust I ronmental-is bad and vice versa. l recommendations will not please environmentalists and othersIn fa ry ~y will not please industry: however, we felt from the outset the only reasonable way to respond to environ = ental probl m that + to weigh all sides of the issues and in many instances reach ~ e s was compromise. in this Report.We hope that such a balanced view has been achieved a Also, we are well aware that this balancing process will conti M as City Council considers our recom=endations. t nue our reco=mendations against budget requests ithat Council 3 programs such as poverty and health programs.nvolving other City is just so much money to go around and as such some of our more In the end there expensive reco=mendations may be delayed in implementation by (, Council. However/ the overwhelming majoritg of our reco=mencations ( l require little by way of capital expenditure and as such t should be implemented by Council forthwith. l are concerned, we expect City Council, the City Manag Insofar as the citizens of Cincinnati t to give the Report their close attention and to then fairly determine which measures should be implemented ,p and when. At the behest of City Council, twenty-seven unpaid Accordingly, we are confident that the City will not wa sincere efforts to help better our community. ~. V Finally, as a personal note, I would like to thank publicly each i. and every namher of the Environ = ental Task For i. selfish devotion to this task for over a year.ce for their un-i lead them in this endeavor.a more dedicated group of citizens and it has been I have never met t L 1 Berning, our secretary.me=bers, John Snow, our administrative as (l' and Marilyn themselves in their work and have spent many hours over andThese tw g-normal working hours on Task Force business. above g working with them. It was a pleasure i V 1' Mr. Vincent B. Stamp, Chairman ,i l3 3 i i l I. o l e j

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b .. ~ -. .~ ' Memb$rs of the Citfzens' Task ' Force on Invironmental Quality h 1. Mr. Vincent B. Stamp, Chairman Attorney with the law firm of Dinsmore, Shohl, Coates & Deupree. -3 2. Mr. Lawrence Kessler, Vice Chairman Professor of Environmental Law at the University of Cincinnati. i i l 3. Mr. Padl Farber Chairman, Environmental Committee, The Ohio Valley Section of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers. Mr. William'LeMaster ~' 4. Former member of the Governor's Task Force on the Environment; Former'Co-Chairman of,the Tri-State Air Com:sittee Educatlon Director of the United Auto Workers i { 5. Dr. Richard J. Garascia Professor of Chemistry at Xavier University Former member (7 year term) of tt.a Ofacionati Air Pollution t Control Board. i 6. Mr. Austin H. Phelps, Jr. Procter & Gamble Comparj, Corporate Manager of Air Pollution Control. I/ 7. Mr. Robert S. Vogt k Consulting Engineer.at Vogt, Sage ti Pflum. 8. Dr. Sta'nley Hedeen Assistant Professor of Biology at Xavier University President, Southwest Ohio Sierra Club. 9. Mr. Dennis A. Mann Assistant Professor Architecturs at the University of

• Cincinnati.

10. Mr. Robert L. Steiner - Former President of Kenner Products. 11. Mr. Samuel V. Noe, Jr. Hayden B. May.and Samuel V. Noe, Urban Design and Planning Consultants. ~ 12. Mr. D. David Altman Executive Director, Cincinnati Recycling Center, i 13. Mrs. Sylvia Miller Womens City Club, Ecology Committee. U 14. Dr. Michael Grossman Resident in Radiology, Cincinnati Ceneral Hospital. 15. Dr. Boyd T. Riley, Jr. Former EPA employee in Solid Waste Management Program, Private Environmental Consultant. I 16. Mr. S. Ted Isaacs I President, The Isaacs Cocpany 'l Chemical Engineer. s 17. Mr. Alexander Brown Chemical Engineer (retired). 8 o t 1

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- r--se = _ - l -- _;g j ... ~. --. c'__. - 6 j _:,m s e ._18 ; Mr. Steven Ackerman -- r-J President, The Ohio Society'of Professional Engineers. ( _ -e ( !g 19), Dr. David F. Surber. [ --J President, The Izaak Walton League (Kentucky Chapter) ' -d Chairman, Tri-State Air Committee 't "_] Former Chairman, Covington Environmental Comission. $ I l +I ~ 20j Mr. Thomas B. Brush 3 Attorney with the law firm of Cunningham, Heile, Kelly & l} / ._] Brush. Member of the Cincinnati Recreation Co= mission. _.4 Member of the Mayor's Task Force to Save Union Terminal. n -3 I 21t Dr. Pasquale V. Scarpino Q Professor of Microbiology and Environmental Engineering at i,j a the University of Cincinnati. i I ' :l t, a l 22i Mr. Allen M. Reed a. i General Electric Company, Air and Water Quality Manager .4 2 23r Mr. Martin Horwitz i Student at the University of Cincinnati. j4 -3 Former member of Student Senate. J; 4

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24; Mrs. Helen Black 5g J Little Miami Inc. .i, l 1 Environmental Lecturer ij i At large member of the Ohio Environmental Con: mission. . -) 25 ;- Mrs. Marian Resor j-League of Wemen Voters, Environment Committee. i ] 26. Mr. Peter J. Strauss / j j jj Attorney with the law firm of Graydon, Head and Ritchey. Member of the Cincinnati Bar Association Environ:nental 4, i il 4 Law Committee. i i' 27.. Dr. James M. Morand ( Associate Professor' of Civil Engineerir.g at the University qj 1 of Cincinnati. i r il Staffs Mr. John S. Snow, Ad.tinistrative Assistant. l Miss Marilyn R. Berning, Secretary. l l l "J.. h E l l I I 1 r i E "e 1 s'. n + -l e'l' \\ li W u.' l ll k e-

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v I B. Adninistrative Assistant and Secretary (Hired by Chaire.an of the Task Force) C. Vice-Chairman of the Task Force (Appointed by Chair-man of the Task Force) I D. Six Subcornittecs: 1. Air 2. Energy Conservation 3. Land Use Planning 4. Noise j 5. Solid 'faste 6. Water E. Subcom.ittee Chairmen. (The Task Force Chairman will appoint a temporary subconcittee chair =an to conduct first meeting and subco.:nittee will chose own per.anent chairman.) F. Me-bers of Subcernittees. (Selected by Chairnan and Vice Chairman of Task Force based on preferences as much as possible.) G. Responsibilitics and Procedures cf Sach Subec-nittec t 1. Subnit reports at each co-nittee nf whole meeting in regard to present status of project. 2. In order to conduct of ficial subcomittee reeting, at least one half of the subcommittee members must be present. 3. In order to take any action, a najority of the subcomittee me:-bers present at the of ficial meeting must vote in faver of the action. 4. Each subco:nittee shall conduct at least one public hearing. (Council Chambers are available for such hearing.) 5. Minutes of each official subco==ittee neeting shall be kept by the Task Force secretary and copies of such minutes shall be sent to each of the me..bers of the committee of the whole. 6. Submit a final report for approval by the comittee of.the whole by March 1, 1973. t. 7. Each subcommittee is encouraged to submit final reports on particular aspects of its problem as soon as possible so that a number of items can be handled well before the March 1,1973 deadline. 3. All arrangements and details in regard t subconnittee reetings and public hearings shall be arranged through the Task Force Administrative Assistant. 9. Final subcoenittee reports shall include the following structure: 0 ~.3 ____g_________________

,1, _._ . _;4.. - u #q. -- x ii 1 q.-T - M.. . M G ' . :,f,. ~ &.5 t . -. -1 .. g ,']b State,ent of particular problem in terms of a. the facts. .M - SE b. i d-- L Current Federal Ohio, Hamilton County and LI J k -.. L.__

- 'g City laws and regulations dealing with problem

--J t on local level. 4A 44 . s M_ - i4-Suggested legislation an.1/ar other solutions to [ _L. -- @ -5 c. alleviate problem. 3 ~. ~i P l - ~ " ' ' '. - d. q,1 e 2 .d Problems of any kind which proposed legislatio? .h and/or other solutions will cause and how ' ~ ~ ~ )) comittee resolved these problems. .P. i { '~- e e. Minority report, if there is any. q f. Suggested attacks to educate public of analyzed i problems and suggest activities of citizen i participation toward solving appropriate problen area. ,'i 10 All other aspects of subcomittee function shall be left totally to the discretion of the subcomittee ',1 8 chairman. }' j i g H. Responsibilities and procedures of the comittee of the whole j. I ,j 1. In order to conduct a meeting, at least one half of the merbers entst be present, t 2. In order to take action, a majority of the me bers present at an official comittee meeting nust vote i in favor of the actics, f \\ 3. Minutes of each ee-.mittee meeting shall be kept by the Task Force Secretary, ccpies of whic!. shall be a1 distributed to each eember prior to next neeting. 4 The final co==ittee report shall include the folicn<ing e str1acture: 4 I a. Statement of particular problem in terms of t the facts. I. b. l Current Federal, Ohio, Hamilton County and j City laws and regulations dealing with problen on local level. l' ? { Suggested legislation to alleviate problem. c. i 1 d. Problems of any kind which proposed legislation will cause and how comittee resolved these 3 problems. d I Minority report, if there is any. i: e. l f. j Suggested attacks to educate public of analyzed 0j[ proble=s and suggest activities of citizen participation toward solving aepropriate problen tg area. iy i i t 5. All other aspects of the comittee of the whole functions [ f shall be left Force Chair an. totally to the discretion of the Task 6. Only the report of the comittee of the whole shall be submitted to council. i e "l. r e e dh .e

A. e XIII q. I. Responsibilitics of Administrative Assistant and l Secretary: 1. Both aalaried employees of the Task Force will WW be available for coc=nittee or subcomittee business l at any reasonable time. k 2. Both employees will be available to subcomittee g chairmen for research projects. Any subcomittee l chairmen interested in having such research done should submit a memo to Chairman of the Task Force stating details of project. The Chairman of the Task Force will schedule the salaried ecployees' I time as efficiently as possible so as to take care I of these requests. 3. Any conflicts regarding salaried employees' time will be resolved by Chairman of the Task Force. 3 3 3 D 3

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o BIBLIO@APHY ( \\- IKEPITAL PLANNING Vinsel,- B. Douglas, " Hospital Must Plan for Nuclear Accidents", Hospital / August 16, 1980. Breo, L. Dennis, " Nuclear Scare Tests Hosoitals' Disaster Plan", Hospitals, J.A.H.A., May 1, 1979. E.K. Emergency

Services, "Hosoitals Precare Radiation Plans in Kake of Division Nuclear Plan Accident," Modern Healthcare, July, 1979.

Divison of Vocational Education, State Department of Education, Emeroencv Vi etim Care - A Training Manual for Emeroency Medical 'Ibchnicains. ~ Galvin, Jr., Joseph Michael, Hosoital Makes Itself Center for ' Treatment of' Radiation Victins. Hospital, J.A.H.A./May 1, 1979.

Saenger, L.

nigene, Padioisotope Iaboratory, University of Cincinnati Medical Center. Hosoital Preoaration for the Manacement of FaMation Accidents.

Saenger, L.

Eugene, IDSC, Emercencv Care For Radiation AccidentL for the ( Non-Physician, July, 1979. National Council en Padiation Protection and Measurernent. Protec-don of 'Ihyroid Gland in the Event of Release of RadiciodLT, ICPP Peprt Ib. 55. I L 4 e. G 0 --.-.-e ,y.,, - _ ~. - ,~,.y._. ,,,...----,.._,...,,,-,...--.,,,.mm,%.-. w~ r-,.-_< ,m.---<y

BIBLIOCRAFHY HEALTH EHuld Health Resources Planning and Develoment Association, Public Hearing Personal Health Effects of the 'Ihree Mile Island Accident. May 22, 1979 and May 24, 1919.

Maxon, R.

Harry. 1979, " Nuclear Power and Health," Annals of Internal Medicine. Vol. S1, Nos. 8. U.S. Depart;nent of HEN /Public Health Service. Center for Disease Control, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 1979. "Ieukemia Amonc Persons Present At An Atmoscheric Nuclear Test (Snokv)" Vol. 28/ No. 31. Sternglass, J.

Ernest, 1972

" Environmental Radiation and Htrnan Health." (Freprinted frcn the succ,hiings of the Sixth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability). Sternglass, J. Ernest, Cancer tbrtality Chances Around Nuclear Facilities in Connecticut. '1bstimony presented at a Congressional Satunar on Iod-Ievel Radiation, Feb. 10, 1978, Washington, D.C.

MacIecd, K.

Gordon, 2e Need for Public Health in the Manacement of Radio-locic Emercencies Prepared for Briefing Session of the Radiation Safety Task ( Force of CORVA. \\ mipple, G. Ibyt. Iod Invol Radiation: Is mere A Ueed to Reduce the Li-it. University of Michigan, Ann Artrr (For presentation at the Atomic Industrial Forum Conference on Nuclear Power: Issues and Audiences, Ibuston, Texas, Septerber 10-13, 1978). Land, E. Charles,1980, Estimating Cancer Risks frcm Ioa Doses of Ionizing Radiation." Science, Vol. 209. Sterglass, J.

Ernest, 1977, Health Effects of Environnental Radiation",

~ Cincinnati Engineer and Scientist, Vol. 2, tb.1. Upton C: Arthur, M.D., (Director National Cancer Institute) Inverview: "Iow Ievel Radiation." CA-A Cancer Journal for Clinicians Vol. 29, Ib. 5,1979. Solon, R. Iconard, Ph. D. (Director, Bureau of Radiation Control, New York City Bureau of Padiation Control, Departrent of Health) and Sidel W. Victor, M. D. (Chairperson Department of Social Medicine, Ibntefiore Ibspital and Medical Center, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Bronx, New York) " Health Imolications and Mulcear Power Production." Anmis of Internal Medicine, Vol. 90, Ib. 3. American Nuclear Society, 1980. Congressman and Scientist Agree: Radia-tion Risk Exaqqerated. Marx, L. Jean, Ioa IcVel Radiation: "Just How Bad Is It? - (The controversy ( - over ' he Effects of Iow IcVel radiation hs been sparked by several recent - t but highly disputed) _, studies. Science, Vol. 204, 1979. 7 g

_4 y.- g p . 7 %= ..Mg., Q.*.. ,.. =. g ~.,.g... . so b. A = *. -. ..h _ZM ~~ ~ ~.-Q,.. aemy-pVy w=; ~~6 - y ---.4 s t %.lfs#-.y*Q::l1,1 * ~. a y ~..- 2.: w.-- .,g .;-4,.. S

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BIBLIOGRAPHY -%-.=A. e - s. y *:=...- m.; c. .w.- (. Ccrrnittee on the Biological Effects of Inizing Radiation. National Academy of Scien The Effects on Potulations of Mosure to Iow Ievel of Ionizing Radiation:- 1980. s-O'Neill, John. "fIW Recort 'And Witnessei; Put Radiation in Perscective" Nuclear Industry, Wil,1979.

Holden, P.

John. "Enercencv: Calculating the Risks", Science, Vol. 204. O e. e 4 O 6 d .,a6g. e-e O. 6 ew-e

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g- - . ; - -.._y. - ; - -5$~bl. li-@s&..-Qm;$j--- \\lf--c5 w ~~_.~-, -.x. n _ y- - ~ _ m_ _.-. u- -.-M 3 .m..- - _+2- .-.-s r ' =. W.=..- : -:. m z.- z - -; ---h-,. _ ~1.5. BIBLIOGIAPtiY -.g..- -g~_L -Me.. ;...w. E' FIIERAL/ STATE /IfCAL eINVOLNT

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-=. : ..t= g. s w. - c-.- . c.:.. Kentucky Stia'Ee FHalth Plani 198041985 (DbifE). Issued by the Statew:Ldc Health Coordnating

Council, Corwanity Health Prcs,otion and Protection Services Subsection: Radiation Safetv.-

-m Inland Counties Health Systens Aciency, (Riverside, Col.) Radiation Safety Services, Section Bill, April 16, 1979. U.S. Depart:,ent of Health, Education and Welfare, (Public Health Service, l Focd and Drug Ad:ninistration). (Recort of State and Iccal Radiolocical l Health Procra: s, Fiscal Year,1978. State of Illinois, S. B. 1084 enr.""Illionis Nuclear Safety Preoaredness Act". (Senate Signed - Sept. 1979), (Public Act 81-577). State of Illinois, Amendment S. B.1084. " Illinois Nuclear Safetv Precared-ness Act." ~ ' Menczer, William B. (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccrmission). Presentation: 'Ihe Role of the NPC in Incidents Pesconse and PMirw tive Material Transoort. Federal Energency Management Agency. Dneroency Manacenent Newsletter. .7 (_ Region V. Vol. 1, Issue 4. s Federal D'erge:v:y Managment Agency. Region V. " Introduction to Radiolocical Dneroency Plannina, Reculation, and Criteria. Nureg 0654/FDIA-1 and Fev.1. e E e e a ~ g m-e e e-e,,, r..Y ( 8 e -e -____-.ed..

., @ ~.y v .. _..-. w s.- .u - z 2 n. . ms - ::.~.~.,;- ~~..+4.+-4.- :.W.- a - :.m..-, :. :.-d >.=~.-n. - .wE.-. __. -a.C-;,. ; r. _KF.J.W ' #..-,. w.. H.;. *G * : ;.;.L.% *il'. :.. ... w... g BIBLIOGRAPHY . -U ' I:- _.t,:Ldx=.-d._-,M..IE + ~ ' k t M .kT _ -. - -M.'... 2_-,..- . THREE MILE ISIR O _&:4 ...s:- -- -_ w -.r. - c,,-e mt - - 3: . Maxon, R. Harry, 1979, " Fallout at Utree Mile Island," Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol-.- 91, !bs.r;3. Dhlrcr.inental'Coalid.cn cm Ibclet Power (E!CP). Newsletter - EDIP and .Miree Mile Island (Editor: A m a b.L,) Peach Bottcm, PA. .. _ ~ Health Resources Planning a'nd P'elopmnt (C mp Hill, PA.) Various Articles Sent Frcm the Health Systav , Jy: 1. "Studv Shows Middistown Nuclear Dancer" 2. "Recort Cits Health Perils" 3.. '" Refined Health Data on Radiation Effects." '~ ~ -Marshall, Eliot. " Assessing the Dancer At 'IMI", Science, Vol.,202, May 11, 1979. Marx, L. Jean. "The Crisis At tiree Mile Island: Nuclear Risks Are Considered", Science, Vol. 204, April, 1979. ( Ianodette J. William, " Nuclear Power-An Uncertain Future Grow Dirrner Still", National Journal, 4/28/79. (-

Bogovin, M.,

Framptcm, G.T.,

Cornell, E.K.,

DeYo.:ng R.C.,

Budnitz, R.,

7

Merry, P., Three Mile Island: A Remrt to the C = icsion and to the P611c, i

Conclusions and Recomendat. tons, NUREG ICR - 1250, Vol.1. 1 d 4 i

BIBLIOGrd WIY a TRANSNRTATICN OF RADICACTI E MATERIAL Depardet of Transportation, Federal Register, Vol. 46, Ib.12, January 19, 1981/ Rules RcJulation. Radioactive Materials; Routino and Driver Trainina 1%L*CR.11rements. Citizens Against A Radioactive Envi.mt, Radioactive Paterial Transcort Fact Sheet. Critical Mass Energy Project. Project Director, richard P.

Pollock, Research and Writing: Allan Cien. Accidents Involvino Radioactive Transmrt,1979, October,1980.

Critical Mass, Energy Project. News Release Firday A.M. October 31, 1980. Increase In Transcortation Accidents Involvinc Radioactive Materials Revealed in New Recort. U.S. Department of Transportation. 1980 Dnercency Rescone Guidebook, Hazardous P2.terials. (DOT. R 5800.2) U.S. Departnent of Transportation, Bureau cf Paterials Transmrtation, Office of Hazardous Paterial Operation. A Review of the DT Reculations for Transportation of Radioactive Materials. Oct.,1977. ( .g< O e a ( e 9

i BIBLIOGRAPfiY RADIOACTIVE IGSTE [ Union of Concerned Scientists Sponsors. Radioactive Waste: 'Ihe Grim Lecacy of the Atmic Age. Vol. 2, Nos. 3, March-April,1980. MLNTANEOUS Muller, R.N., and Sprugel, D.G.. " Distribution of IM.al and Statioscheric Pluttniin '.n Ohio iscils." Health Physics, Vol. 33 (November) pp. 405-409.

Meehan, L.

Richard. (President ~ Earth Sciences Associates). Nuclear safety: Is Scientific Literacy the Answer? Vol.

204, tbs.

4393, 1979.

1 4 f G e + t i l l

RM-.NDATION III-A The oublic information to be precared and distributed be icintly precared by 7-state authorities and ZPS-1 and conta2.n: Descriptions of the various costulated accident situations; a. b. Information on reculatorv provision that mandate the utility to recort all emercencv events to local authorities, state authorities and tne Nuclear Reculatory Commission; and Information as to the availability of monitoring data on c.. radiation releases to the state of Chio, state of Fantucky and Clernant Countv. Part a of Recamendation III-A is going to be included in the public infor-mation brochure. Presently, however, it is not yet certain whether b and c will also be incin M. RE030ENDATIOtl III-C s Any cress releases concerning the status of the olant: Contain information indicating that state and local author-a. lties have been notified and are aware of the situation; or .r-( s b. Be precared jointly with off-site authorities as succested _in NUREG. 0754 (FE:%-Rec.-l. Rev. 1), L~.Jendix 1. Cincinnati Ces and Electric has indicated that any press releases during an anargency will contain one of the above. RECDM:5DATIOtt III-D The task force rehends that whenever the utility, ZPS-1 provides cress releases to the public, the distinction that the utility is resronsible for providing information on the status of the olant and that the states are resconsible for infor: ration on oublic protection b3 made clear to the public. Cincinnati Gas and Electric has indicated that distinctions in the respon-sibilities of the state and CG&E during an energency will be made clear to the pcblic. / 'e ~

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SECTION II I O e m o e ( e -,r,.,,...----------~~ .---a-,.. ~-- - - - r

MINUTES RADIATION SAFET. Y TASK EOFCE { OC'KEER 27, 1980 MEMBERS PRESD?r: Hendrik D. Gideonse, Ph.D., Dean - College of Education Ibbert Alexander, Director, Campbell County Disaster Services Liore Maccarone,

Director, Hamilton County Civil Defense Eugene Saenger, M.D., Professor, Departnent of Radiolcgy, U. C. Mical Center John Woliver, Attorney, Clermont County Iegal Aid Services Genny Dennison, Citizen of Clerrent County Maggie Erbe, Citizen of Clermont County Fen Cmover, DLrector, Clermont County Disaster Services MEMBERS ABSD7f:

Peter Heile, Assistant City Solicitor, City of Cincinnati Gary Miller,

Director, Disaster Services American Red Cross REPRESCTTATIVE FRPM Greg Ficke, Engineer, Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co.

CD&G: {'. CDRVA STAFF: Sera Merete, Health Services Planner ,( C'ha.:, Wasser, Senior Health Planner INIwOuzdON: h first r:eeting of the Radiation Safety Task Force - was held on Oc h 27, 1980 at 3:00 p.m., in the CORVA offices. Dr. Gideonse, the Chairperson, started the meeting by introducing himself which was followed by self-introduction of the other msnbers. a INTRODtI.TICN 'IO Sera Merete gave a brief presentation on CORVA, outlin CDRVA: ing its regulatory and planning functions. CORVA's regulatory function involves the review for approval or disapproval of: 1. Federal funds applications for health pro-grams; 2. Capital expenditures for health facilities; and 3. Appropriateness of existing institution services. CORVA undertakes health planning through the develop-ment of the Health Syste-s Plan (HSP) and the Annual Implenentation Plan (AIP). Fera Merete noted that the HSP defines improvenents ard cnanges that need to be brought about in the health status of the papulation and the health delivery system. The HSP is a very \\ otznprehensive plan addressing a variety of health v services.

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Chas Wasser further addressed the policy develogrent ~ process. (See attached - Overview of Policy Develop-ment Process.) he absence of 'a renber from the Policy Developnent Ccmnittee on the Radiation Safety Task Force was noted by Dr. Gideonse. TASK MRCE Members of the task force renewed the Radiation Safety EXPECIATIONS: Task Force Expectation Sta*mt. Ccriments were made ard gaestions raised on the scope of the subject radia-tion safety, CORVA's leverage in implementation, legis-lation affecting radiation safety, public educaticn, preparedness of our states relative to others, the need for public ccment, cost / benefits of certain mea-sures...etc. NEED WR BRIEFING: Dr. Gideense irdicated that a series of briefings on different aspects of radiation safety *would b appro-priate. Dr. Saenger had noted earlier that briefings could be done through individual presentations, handout material or staff sumary. Menbers of the task force were in agreenent on the need for conducting a series of briefings. Dr. Gideonse indicated that sera Merete and he would plan at least one briefing for the next necting and prepare a listing of other possible brief-ings for task force review. As the meeting continued, it was apparent that several g. members of the task force had a wealth of pertinent y information'that could be shared with the task force ac a whole. Dr. Gideonse suggested that members contact Sera Merete prior,to the next meeting to inform her of information they would like to share with the task force. Dr. Gideonse irdicated the same procedure be followed for issues members would like to have addres-sed. See the action listing below for specific action steps each task force mcmber is requested to ecmplete and submit to Sera Merete by November 18, 1980. Se task force regaested that Sera Marete propose a future meeting schedule for the task force. We next ~ ~ meeting of the task force was set for Ibycmber 24, 1980, at 3:00 p.m. ADJOUR?MEtTT: Me neeting was adjourned at approxirately 5:00 p.m. 11/5/80 g a J

..J } ~ RADIATION SAFETI TASK NOFCE (' NCr/DBER 24, 1980 Hendrik D h h nse, Ph. D., Dean, College of MEMEERS PRESD?r: mucmon Wrt Alexander, Director, Campbell County Disaster Services Gary Miller,

Director, Disaster Services American Red Cross John ibliver, Attorney, Clermont County Legal Aid Services Genny Dennison, Citizen of Clermont County Rita Kaufmen (for Liore Ibecarone)

Carl Gandola, M, D. E 1% fo 4 wor ik.a.M bg Eugene Saenger, M. D, Professor, Department of Radiology, U. C. Medical Center MDSERS ABSENT: Peter Heile, Assistant City Solicitor, City of Cincinnati Phggie Erbe, Citizen of C.'.ermont County Ken

Conover, Director, Clermont Cc6nty Disaster Services Liore Maccarone, Director, Hamilton County Civil Defense

( REPRESD7IA'.'IVE FRO 1 CG&E_:, Greg Ficke, Engineer, Cincinnati Gas and '( Elertric Cb. CORVA STAFF: Sera Merete, Health Services Planner APPROVAL CF ED UTES: 'Ihe second meeting of the PaMation Safety Task Force was held on Novenber 24,1980, at approximately 3:00 p.m. at the CORVA offices. The meeting was begun with the review of the October 27, 1980 minutes. Robert Alexander l suggested that the organization affiliation of each msnber of the task force be noted by the list' of nxrnbers in the minutes. Dr. Gideonse suggested that minutes of the October 27, 1980 neeting be sent out again to maters with suggested additions. I 1 l 'Ihe Task Force reviewai the draft notice for public ccmnent and suggested changes were made. 'Ihe Task Force decided to set Ebccmber 15,1980 as the deadline date for subnitting coments. It was also decided l that the notice in addition to.being put in all the editions of the Cincinnati Enquirer and the Cincinnati Post, would also be put in all of the county newspapers. v ( ~ e L

\\ DISCUSSION CN BRIEFING ISSUES The next items to be discussed were the lists AND MEC"ING SCHEDUII: of briefings and issues (cmpiled frcm sug-gestions received from members of the Task Forec) and the proposed meeting schedule. Dr. Gidecnse noted that the briefing would need to be conducted in a time frame that would allow sufficient time for the Task Force to address issues and to provide rectn-mendations. L1 reviewing the list of breif-ings, a lengthy discussion gMed which fu, M on: a) the areas in radiation safety to be addressed by the Task Force, b) use of federal guidelines (Criteria for Evaluating Emergency Preparedness of Nuclear Power Plants) 'as a primary method for breifing the Task Force and c) contents of suggested breifings (i.e. status of Zinmer Hearings, monitoring sys'm). SCOPE OF ISSUES: We Task Force agreed to limit the scope of radiation safety concerns to those relating to the transportation of radioactive material and to nuclear power plants. It was agreed that raliation safety issues resulting frca madbl and industrial use of radiation, important as they were, would not be address by the Task Force due to: a) the greater e potential for disaster from accidents in-C volving the transportation of radioactive (' material and nuclear power plants and b) the time constraints faced by the Task Force. NEXT BP.IE!'ING: Dr. Gideonse suggested that Sera Merete and he select briefings frcm the suggested list and schedule the on the briefing dates (see below) that had been suggested by the Task ~ Force. The Task Force agreed to adopt- ~ Schedule A which proposed two breifing ses-sions (January 19 and 28, 1980) with mcmthly I meetings up until May, 1981 (see attachment for adopted meeting schedule). Me next meeting ~ of the Task Force was to be held on Decmber 22,1980 at 3:00 p.m.' We Task Force agreed to Dr. Gideonse's sugges-tion to have briefings on local disaster plans frcm Robert Alexander and Ken Conover for the next meting. J i ADJOURRENT: We meeting was adjourned at approximately 5:00 p.m. der I i 3 L ~}}