ML20039F960
| ML20039F960 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1981 |
| From: | Sargent I, Bomberger C Franklin Research Ctr, Franklin Institute |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039F959 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TER-C257-72, TER-C5257-72, NUDOCS 8201140231 | |
| Download: ML20039F960 (34) | |
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TECHNICAL EV LUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY DRESDEN STATION UNITS L 2, AND 3 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-10/237/249 FRC PROJECT C5257 NRC TAC NO. 43989/07987 FRC ASSIGNMENT 3 FRC TASKS 72/440/441 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-79-118 Preparedby Franklin Research Center Author: C. Eomberger The Parkway at Twentieth Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader:
I. H. Sargent Preparedfor Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer:
F. Clemenson October 15, 1981 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government.nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.
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. Franklin Research Center 8201140231 011215 A Division of The Franklin institute PDR ADOCK 05000010 Th+ Bentarrun Frankhn Parkway. Phda Pa. 19103 (215) 448-1000 P
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TER-C5257-72/440/441 CONTENTS Section Title Page 1
INTRODUCTION.
1.
1.1 Purpose of Review 1
1.2 Generic Background.
1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background 2
2 EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3
2.1 General Guidelines.
3 2.2 Interim Protection Measures.
18 3
CONCLUDING
SUMMARY
21 3.1 General Provisions for Load Handling 21 3.2 Interim Protection Measures.
26 3.3 Susunary.
27 4
REFERENCES 29 iii A
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TER-C5257-72/440/441 1.
INTRODUCTION s
1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW This technical evaluation report documents the Franklin Research Center's (FRC) review of gene'ral load handling policy and procedures at Commonwealth
- Edison's Dresden Station Units 1, 2, and 3.
This evaluation was performed with the following objectives:
o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1],
Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of 4
NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.
i 1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads ar.d to recommend necessary a
changes in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.
The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear lower Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measuras to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causer of load handling accidents and should be upgraded.
In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first portion of the-objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure tha' t all load handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their probability of
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r TER-C5257-72/440/441 failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0,612, Articles 5.1.2. through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load-handling ' accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.
Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.
The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth and is summarized as follows:
1.
provide sufficient operator training l handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system 2.
define safe load travel paths tnrough procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.
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3.
provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or -in proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.
Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.
1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to Commonwealth Edison, the Licensee for Dresden Station, requesting that the Licensee review pro-visions for handling and control of heavy loads at Dresden Station, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. On June 22, 1981, Commonwealth Edison provided the initial response (4) to this request. N Frank!in Research Center A Dusan of The Franadin insatute o
TER-C5257-72/440/441 2.
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FRC's evaluation of load handling at Dresden Station is divided into two categories. These categories deal separately with the general guidelines of Article 5.1.1 and the recommended interim protection measures of Article 5.3 of NUREG-0612. Applicable guidelines are referenced in each category. FRC's conclusion and recommendations are provided in the summary for each guideline.
2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:
o Guideline 1 - Safe Load Paths o Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures o Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training o Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices o Guideline 5 - Lif ting Devices (not specially designed) o Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) o Guideline 7 - Crane Design.
These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The Licensee's verifica-tion of the extent to which these guidelines have been satisfied and FRC's evaluation of this verification are contained in the succeeding paragraphs.
2.1.1 Safe Load Paths ' Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(1) ]
" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated branklin Research Center A won or m rr.c.e innu.
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e TER-C5257-72/440/441 fuel'in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the. extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.
Deviations from defined load paths.should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has evaluated safe load path locations for Dresden Station Units 2 and 3 (reactor and turbine buildings) and for the Unit 1 fuel building. While load paths are not defined for all loads, the Licensee states that load movement follows the safest and shortest route with the load as close to the floor as practical.
Due to the configura.tions and number of load paths, the Licensee states that marking the paths on the floor is generally not feasible nor would such markings contribute to the health and safety of plant personnel.
Safe load paths for the spent fuel shipping cask were determined as a result of' the spent fuel cask drop analysis and are defined in Dresden Unit 1 Fuel Handling Procedure DFP 800-32.
Load paths for other casks have been addressed in a previous submittal to the NRC (S] in a response to the NRC's request for additional information on the control of heavy loads. Several other handling systems have been listed, including Units 1, 2, and 3 refueling platform hoists, Unit 1 fuel storage vault bridge, and Units 2 and 3 new fuel storage vault jib cranes, which have sufficient capacity to carry heavy loads; however, the Licensee states that none of these hoists are used to conduct lif ts of any items heavier than a single fuel assembly.
b.
FRC Evaluation FRC's review of the Licensee response and drawings submitted indicates that Guideline 1 criteria have not been satisfied at Dresden Station, based upon the Licensee's respor.se that load paths have not been developed for all l
heavy loads which have been identified. FKC does not concur that movement of heavy loads following the safest and shortest route is an acceptable substitute l
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a TER-CS257-72/440/441 for the development of specific load paths for the individual loads. Load paths which have been developed for the drywell head, reactor vessel head, dryer, and separator are acceptable based upon FRC's review and should be used as an example for developing load pathways for the remaining heavy loads identified by the Li'censee."
For those specific handling systems identified by the Licensee as being limited to carrying loads weighing less than those defined by NUREG-0612 as heavy loads, FRC concurs that development of detailed load paths, procedures, physical markings, and drawinsa is not required.
The LicentSe's position on the unfeasibility of marking load paths on the floor is not accepc ole.
Load path markings are meant to be used by load handling operators and their supervisors as a means for monitoring proper execution of load handling evolutions, as well as clearly identifying those areas where movements of heavy loads will take place so that personnel not directly involved in load handling will be alerted to keep these pathways clear of non-related materials. By consolidating the various load paths, the Licensee should be able to develop a systematic sequence of pathways for the movement of heavy loads to their lay-down or staging areas which is not overly complex or confusing to operators and supervisors, thus contributing to the general safety of plant personnel by minimizing interference with loa,d handling operations.
No information has been provided by the Licensee to verify that devia-tions from established load paths will require written alternatives which must be approved by the plant safety review committee.
c.
FRC Conclusions and Recommendations
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Dresden Station does not comply with Guideline 1.
In order to adhere to the criteria of this guideline, the Licensee should perform the following:
1.
develop safe load paths for all heavy loads identified by the Licensee, similar to those already established for the drywell and reactor vessel heads, the dryer, and the separator 2.
incorporate these load paths into load handling procedures and equipment layout drawings A, bbnklin Research Center A Onas.on of The Fm wae
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TER-C5257-72/440/441 3.
clearly mark safe load paths on'the floor in areas where the loads are handled 4.
verify that deviations from established load paths require written alternatives which are approved.by the plant safety review committee.
2.1.2 Load Handlind Procedures (Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(2)]
" Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.
These procedures should include:
identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions A detailed list of heavy loads and procedures governing the handling of each load has been supplied by the Licensee, who states that these procedures meet the intent of Section 5.1.l(2) of NUREG-0612 and generally include sections such as equipment description, purpose, references, initial condi-tions, and appropriate precautions or limitations. Although most loads are governed by specific procedures, all loads are also handled in accordance with Dresden Maintenance Procedure (DMP) 5800-3, " Safe Rigging Practices." DMP 5800-3 will be revised by the Licensee to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the spent fuel pool or over the open reactor cavity unless a specific procedure has been written directing or permitting such action.
The Licensee states that procedural control in Units 2 and 3 turbine buildings is accomplished for those major turbine or generator components identified, using general procedure DMP 5800-3 and applicable General Electric j
(GE) drawings, (containing proper rigging sizes and instructions).
In addition, all major turbine / generator maintenance is performed under the cognizance of a GE field engineer who is thoroughly familiar with heavy load rigging practices.
For the inf requent movement of loads in the Unit 1 fuel building, procedural control is considered by the Licensee to be appropriate and t
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TER-C5257-72/440/441 adequate on the basis of a previously performed spent fuel cask drop analysis and Dresden Unit 1 Phel Handling Procedure DFP 800-32.
b.
FRC Evaulation FRC concurs that specific procedures identified by the Licensee for load handling in the reactor building and new fuel storage vault satisfy the criteria of Guideline 2 with the exception that safe load paths have not been developed for movements of each heavy load.
For those heavy loads in Units 2 and 3 turbine buildings, the Licensee has provided insufficient information for FR'C to determine if all criteria specified in the guideline have been satisfied by use of the general procedure for rigging (DMP 5800-3) and instructions contained in the GE drawings for respective components.
As previously noted in FRC's evaluation of Guideline 1, FRC concurs that detailed procedures need not be developed for the Units 1, 2, and 3 refueling platform hoists, the Unit 1 fuel storage vault bridge, and the Units 2 and 3 new fuel storage vault jib cranes since these hoist are not used to lift heavy loads as defined by NUREG-0612.
c.
FRC Conclusions and Recommendations Dresden Station partially complies with Guideline 2.
To comply with the remaining criteria of this guideline, the Licensee should perform the following :
1.
incorporate defined safe load paths into all current procedures 2.
certify that general h'andling procedure DNP 5800-3 and instructions contained on applicable drawings satisfy the guideline crite,ria, including safe load path definition, or incorporate these items into procedures which comply.
2.1.3 Crane Operator Training (Guideline 3r NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(3))
" Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [6]."
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u TER-C5257-72/440/441 a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Dresden Station's crane operator training program is substantially in compliance with ANSI B30.2-1976.
The Licensee states that operators had previously been required only to pass a practical operating examination and that the training pr'ogram currently being formulated will require a formal oral or written examination. Station employees currently undergo an annual physical examination for the purpose of respirator qualification. The Dresden Station medical director has compared this examination with that required by ANSI B30.2-1976 and has concluded that the current medical evaluation meets the requirements of the standard.
b.
FRC Evaluation Crane operator training and qualification programs at Dresden Station satisfy the criteria of this guideline on the basis of (1) the Licensee's-verification that the current program substant'ially complies with the standard and (2) Licensee statements that revisions are being incorporated into crane operator testing procedures. No information has been provided to verify that conduct of operators is monitored for conformance to the requirements of Section 2.3.1.7 of ANSI B30.2-1976.
c.
FRC Conclusion and Recommendations Dresden Station partially complies with Guideline 3.
In order to achieve full compliance, the Licensee should verify that suitable means exist to monitor crane operator conduct in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976.
In addition, when procedures have been revised to include the required formal examination, these procedures and program records should be readily available for review and inspection by the NRC staff.
2.1.4 Special Lif ting Devices [ Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, - Article 5.1.l(4) }
"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [7].
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This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above. :For operating plants certain nklin Research Center A Chamon of The Frenen insance a
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C TER-C5257-72/440/441 inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard.
In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static 'and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device."
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions a.
The Licensee states that all lifting devices were designed according to industrial ctandards using good engineering practices. Additionally, load tests have been performed on the following lifting devices to the weights specified:
1.
reactor head strongback - 129 tons (129% of load) 2.
moisture separator book box - 129 tons (180% of load) 3.
dryer / separator lifting rig - 130 tons (180% of load).
Special lifting" devices used in Dresden fuel pool modifications have been addressed in previous Licensee reports and have been found to meet the require-j ments of NUREG-0612.
b.
FRC Evaluation Dresden Station does not satisfy the criteria for this guideline.
The Licensee has not verified that any of these special lif ting devices have been -
evaluated with respect to the design, fabricat. ion, testing, and maintenance requirements specified in ANSI N14.6-1978 or with respect to the stress design i
factor identified in this guideline.
Insufficient information has been provided by the Licensee for FRC to verify that periodic testing is performed to maintain continuing compl,iance in accordance with Section 5.2 of ANSI although two of the three weight tests identified (for lhe N14.6-1978, dryer / separator lif ting rig and the moisture separator hook box) meet or exceed the required 150% load test requirement. Previous load tast of the reactor head strongback to 129% of load is not acceptable since it does not satisfy the requirement to load test the strongback to 150% of rated load.
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FRC Conclusions and Recommendations Dresden Station does not comply with Guideline 4.
In order to satisfactorily comply with the criteria,.the Licensee should perform the following :
1.
review actual design and fabrication of all special lif ting devices and evaluate all differences with respect to the requirements of ANSI, N14.6-1978 and the stress design factor of this guideline 2.
conduct 150% load test of the reactor head strongback 3.
verify that programs exist for all special lif ting devices which satisfy the requirements of Section 5 (Acceptance Testing, Maintenance, and Assurance of Continued Compliance) of ANSI N14.6-1978, 2.1.5 Lif ting Devices (Not Specially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1. l(5) )
"Lif ting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' [8).
However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' which produces the maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee states that all lif ting 6evices were designed according to industrial standards using good engineering practices and that Dresden Station complies with ANSI B30.9-1971.
l b.
FRC Evaluation Procedures for use and installation of slings at Dresden Station are acceptable based upon the Licensee's stated compliance with ANSI B30.9-1971, with the following exceptions:
1.
no information has been provided by the Licensee to verify that sling selection is based upon the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load
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l TER-C5257-72/440/441 no information is available to verify that the slings are marked with 2.
the static load identified as per guideline requirement 8
no verification has been 'made that slings restricted in use to only 3.
certain cranes have been clearly marked to so indicate.
FRC Conclusions and Recommendations c.
Dresden Station partially complies with Guideline 5.
In order to fully comply, the Licensee should verify the following:
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sling selection is based upon the sum of the static and maximum 1.
dynamic loads 4
slings are marked with the " static load" which produces the maximum f
2.
i static and maximum dynamic loads slings restricted in use to only certain cranes are clearly marked to 4
3.
so indicate.
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2.1.6 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) [ Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, j
Article 5.1.l(6)1 "The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the 3
- j exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12.to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation.
ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be f
performed daily gr monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the and maintenance should be performed prior to their l'
inspections, test, I
use)."
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions a.
Crane inspection, testing, and maintenance at Dresden Station comply with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976. All routinely operated cranes are given a documented monthly inspection and all hooks are examined using magnetic l
l particle inspection (or liquid penetrant, if appropriate) on an annual basis.
The Licensee states that special use cranes are inspected prior to their use.
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FRC Evaluation Dresden Station satisfies the criteria of this guideline on the basib of the Licensee's verification that crane inspection, testing, and maintenance programs comply with ANSI B30.2-1976.
c.
FRC Conclusions and Recommendations Dresden Station complies with Guideline 6 on the basis of the Licensee's verification.
2.1. 7 Crane Design (Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.l(7)1 "The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [9]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."
a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee states that the cranes used at Dresden Station were purchased to Sargent and Lundy Specification, which is based upon specifica-tions of the American Institute of Steel Construction, the Electric Overhead Crane Institute, Inc. (EOCI), and USAS Safety Code B30.2.0-1967.
Based upon a comparison between actual design specifications and those of CMAA-70, the Licensee states that the Dresden procurement specification meets the intent of
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CMAA-70.
Specific differences identified by the Licensee include the following:
the EOCI-61 [10] and procurement specifications require a design force equal to 15% of the rated. capacity'of the crene, while CKAA-70 specifies that the impact load be 0.5% of the load times the hoist speed (in fpm) and neither less than 15% nor greater than 50% of the rated capacity; therefore, Dresden cranes have been procured to a criteria which conforms to the requirements of CMAA-70 for a hoist speed of less than 10 fpm.
b.
FRC Evaluation Cranes at Dresden Station satisfy, to a considerable extent, the criteria of Guideline 7, since the cranes were procured to industrial standards at the nklin Research Center A Dmmon of Th Frankhn m m
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t TER-C52'57-72/440/441 However, Dasaden Station did not specificially address several of the time.
morg restrictive design requirements imposed by CMAA-70, which could affect the crane's ability to safely handle a h,eavy load.
FRC has compared the recommendations of CMAA-70 with those of EOCI-61 and has identified several areas where revisions incorporated into CMAA-70 may af fect crane safety and should therefore be evaluated to determine if the intent of NUREG-0612 is met. Of the following design recommendations, only one has been addressed by the Licensee This issue has been addressed by the Licensee.
1.
Imoact allowance.
Bowever, for cranes with hoist speeds in excess of 30 feet per minute, it is possible that the impact allowance applied under EOCI-61 will be less than that required by CMAA-70.
This variation is not expected to be of consequence for overhead cranes subject to this review since these cranes, in general, Insufficient information operate with hoist speeds below 30 feet per minute.
has been provided by the Licensee to verify that Dresden cranes operate with hoist speeds of less than 30 feet per minute.
CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.3 requires that twisting 2.
Torsional forces.
moments due to overhanging loads and lateral forces acting eccentric to the horizontal neutral axis of a girder be calculated on the basis of the distance between the center of gravity of the load, or force center line, and the EOCI-61 states that girder shear center measured normal to the force vector.
such moments are to be calculated with reference to girder center of gravity.
For girder sections symmetrical about each principal central axis (e.g., box the section or I-beam girders commonly used in cranes subject to this review),
shear center coincides with.the centroid of the gi'rder section and there is no j
Such is not the case for nonsymmet-difference between the two requirements.
j rical girder sections (e.g., channels).
Longitu[inal stif feners.
04AA-70, Article 3.3.3.2 specifies (1) the 3.
i maximum allowable web depth / thickness (h/t) ratio for box girders using longitudinal stiffeners and (2)- requirements concerning the location and minimum moment of inertia for such stiffeners. EOCI-61 allows the use of longitudinal stiffeners but provides no similar guidance.
Requirements of
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a TER-C5257-72/440/441 CMAA-70 represent a codification of girder design practice, and they are.
i expected to be equivalent to design standards employed in cranes built to EOCI-61 specifications.
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Allowable compressive stress.
CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 identifies allowable compressive stresses to be approximately 50% of yield strength of the recommended structural material (A-36) for girders, where the ratio of the l
distance between web plates to the thickness of the top cover plate (b/c I
i ratio) is less than or equal to 38.
Allowable compressive stresses decrease 4
linearly for b/c ratios in excess of 38.
EOCI-61 provides a similar method for calculating allowable compressive stresses except that the allowable stress decreases from approximately 50% of yield only after the b/c ratio exceeds 41.
Consequently, structural members with.b/c ratios in the general,
range of 38 to 52 designed under EOCI-61 will allow a slightly higher compressive stress than those designed under CMAA-70.
This variation is not expected to be of consequence for cranes subje,ct to this review since b/c ratios of structural me'mbers are expected to be less than 38.
5.
Fatique considerations.
CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 provides substantial guidance with respect to fatigue failure by indicating allowable stress ranges for various structural members in joints under repeated loads.
EOCI-61 does not address fatigue failure.,The requirements of CMAA-70 are not expected to be of consequence for cranes subject to this review since the cranes are not generally subjected to frequent loads at or near design l
conditions (CMAA-70 provides allowable stress ranges for loading cycles in excess of 20,000) and are not generally subjected to stress reversal (CMAA-70 l
allowable stress range is reduced to below the basic allowable stress for only f
a limited number of joint configurations).
6.
Hoist rope requirements.
CMAA-70, Article 4.2.1 requires that the capaci'ty load plus the bottom block divided by the number of parta of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength. EOCI-61 req 2 ires that the rated capacity load divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength. The,effect on crane safety margins of this variation depends on the ratio of the weights of the load block and the rated load.
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TER-CS257-72/4<0/441 7.
Drum design.
CMAA-70, Article 4.4.1 requires that the drum be designed to withstand combined crushing and bending loads. EOCI-61 requires only that the drum be designed to withstand maximum load' bending and crushing loads with no stipulation that these loads be combined. This variation is not expected to be of consequence since the requirements of CMAA-70 represent t.wcodification of good engineering practice which should have been incorporated in cranes built to ECCI-61 specifications although a specific requirement was not contained in EOCI-61.
8.
Drum design.
CMAA-70, Article 4.4.3 provides recommended drum l
groove depth and pitch. EOCI-61 provides no similar guidance. The recommen-dations in CMAA-70 constitute a codification of good engineering practice with regard to reeving stability and reduction of rope wear and "are not expected to l
differ substantially from practices employed in the design of cranes subject to this review and built to EOCI-61 specifications.
I 9.
Gear design. CMAA-70, Article 4.5 requires that gearing horsepower.
rating be based on certain American Gear Manufacturers Association Standards and provides a method for determining allowable horsepower. EOCI-61 provides no similar guidance. The recommendations in CMAA-70 constitute a codification l
of good engineering practice for gear design and are not expected to differ l
l substantially from the practices employed in the design of cranes subject to this review and built to EOCI-61 specifications.
10.
Bridge brake design.
CMAA-70, Article 4.7.2.2 requires that bridge brakes, for cranes with cab control and the cab on the trolley, be rated at least 75% of bridge motor torque.
EOCI-61 requires a brake rating of 50% of bridge motor torque for similar configurations. A cab-on-trolley control j
~
arrangement is not expected for cranes subject to this review.
1 l
11.
Hoist brake design.
CMAA-70, Article 4.7.4'.2 requires that hoist holding brakes, when used with a method of control braking other than mechanical, have torque ratings no less than 125% of the hoist motor torque.
EOCI-61 requires a hoist holding brake torque rating of no less than 100% of the hoist motor torque without regard to the type of control brake employed.
This variation is not expected to be of consequence for cranes subject to thir 4 bd Franklin Research Center
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TER-C5257-72/440/441 4
review since mechanical load brakes were typically specified for cranes f
procured when EOCI-61 was the standard. The addition of 1 holding brake i
safety margin in conjunction with electric control braking is a codification l
of good engineering practice. Some manufacturers provide holding brakes rated at up to 150t of hoist motor torque when used with electrical control braking l
l systems.
12.
Bumpers and stops.
OtAA-70, Article 4.12 provides substantial
(
guidance for the design and installation of bridge and trolley bumpers and i
stops for cranes which operate near the ends of bridge and trolley travel. No similar guidance is provided in EOCI-61. This variation is not expected to be i
of significance for cranes subject to this review since these cranes are not l
~
expected to be operated under load at substantial bridge or trolley speed near i
the end of travel. Further, the guidance of CHAA-70 constitutes the l
codification of good engineering practice and will be expected to be satisfied by equivalent requiremento for cranes procured. according to EOCI-61.
5 I
13.
Static control systems. CMAA-70, Article 5.4.6 provides substantial f
guidance for the use of static control systems. EOCI-61 provides guidance for magnetic control systems only. This variation is not expected to be of consequence because magnetic control systems were generally employed in cranes-designed when EOCI-61 was in effect and the static control requirements identified in OtAA-70 constitute a codification of the same good engineering practice that would have been used in the design of static control systems in cranes built to EOCI-61 specifications.
l 14.
Restart protection.
CHAA-70, Article 5.6.2 requires that cranes not equipped with spring return controllers or momentary contact push buttons be provided with a device that vili disconnect all motors upon power failure and will not permit any motor to be restarted until the controller handle is brought to the OFF position. No similar guidance is provided in EOCI-61.
This variation is not expected to be of consequence for cranes subject to this review since they are generally designed with spring-return controlle' rs or momentary-contact push buttons.
l l
A 0000 Franklin Research Center A Dmenon of The Frenhen Insesuae t
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. _. _. _. _ _ _ _ _. _. _,. -., _ _ _.. _ _.. ~. _ _, _ _ _ _, _.
a TER-C5257-72/440/441 FRC Conclusion Dresden Station complies with Guideline 7, to a substantial degree, on the basis of compliance with EOCI-61 criteria. However, insufficient informa-tion has been sede available to verify that the following CMAA-70 requirements have been satisfied for cranes subject to this review. The Licensee should make this information available or provide suitable justification for concluding that the requirements of CMAA-70 have been satisfied by equivalent means.
- 1. Hoist lif ting speeds do not exceed 30 feet per minute.
- 2. Nonsymmetrical girder sections were not used in crane construction.
- 3. Any longitudinal stiffennrs in use conform to the requirements of CMAA-70, and allowable h/t ratios in box girders using these stiffeners do not exceed ratios.specified in CHAA-70.
- 4. Girders with b/c ratios in excess of 38 were not used.
- 5. Fatigue faildre was considered in crane design and the number of design loading cycles at or near rated load is less than 20,000 cycles.
- 6. Maximum crane load weight, plus the weight of the bottom block, divided by the number of parts of rope does not exceed 20% of the manuf acturers' published breaking strength, i
- 7. Drum design calculations were based on the combination of crushing and bending loads.
- 8. Drum groove depth and pitch conform to the recommendations of CMAA-70.
- 9. Gear horsepower ratings were based on design allowables and calculation methodology equivalent to that incorporated in CMAA-70.
- 10. A cab-control, cab-on-trolley configuration was not used.
- 11. Mechanical load brakes or hoist holding brakes with torque ratings of approximately 125% of the hoist motor torque were used.
- 12. Crane operation under load near the end of bridge or trolley travel is not allowed or is compensated for by bumpers and stops which satisfy the intent of CHAA-70.
- 13. Any static control systems in use conform to the requirements of CMAA-70.
I l
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TER-CS257-72/440/441 I
- 14. Controllers in use are the spring-return or momenta:y-contact pushbutton type or are equipped with a device which disconnects all motors on power failure and will not permit restart until the controller liandle is brought to the OFF position.
2.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear powar plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist.
to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core j
or spent fuel pool. Four of the six interim measures of the report consist of a
Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; Guideline j
3, Crane Operator Trai~ning; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and I
Maintenance). The two remaining interim measures covu the following criteria:
3 f
1.
Heavy load technical specifications 2.
Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.
I Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection t
l measures 'is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.
2.2.1 Technical Specifications [ Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, Article 5.3 (1) ]
" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,
' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pcol Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."
j a.
Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee made no statements or conclusions regarding this interim protection measure.
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TER-C5257-72/440/441 b.
FRC Evaluation, Conclusions, and Recommendations i
Dresden Station does not comply with Interim Protection Measure 1 an'd l
should implement 'the criteria of this interim measure as specified.
li 2.2.2 Administratide controls (Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Articles 5.3(2)-5.3(5)]
l
" Procedural or administrative measures (including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection)...
can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for I
j completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 of [NUREG-0612}."
a.
Summaty of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Summaries of Licensee statements and conclusions are contained in discussions of the respective general gu'idel,ines in Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, and 2.1.6.
l b.
FRC Evaluations, Conclusions, and Recommendations FRC's evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, and 2.1.6.
2.2.3 Special Reviews for Heavy Loads Over the Core [ Interim Protection Measure 6, NUKEG-0612, Article 5.3 (6) ]
"Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include j
the following for these loads:
(1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movenert of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures."
nklin Research Center A Duman of The Franen hueue
TER-CS257-72/440/441 Summary of Licensee Statements and Cdnclusions a.
'the Licensee made no statements or conclusions on this interim protection measure.
b.
FRC Evaluation,' Conclusions, and Recommendations Dresden Station does not comply with Interim Protection Measure 6 and should implement the criteria of this interim measure as specified.
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TER-C5257-72/440/441 k
3.
CONCLUDING
SUMMARY
his summary is provided to consolidate the conclusions and recommenda-tions of Section 2 and to docust,st FRC's overall evaluation of the handling of 4
heavy loads at Dresden Station. It is divided into two sections dealing with general provisions for load handling at nuclear power plants (NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1) and the staff recommendations for interim protection, pending complete implementation of the guidelines of NUREG-0612 (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3).
In e...h case, recommendations for additional Licensee action, and additional NRC staff action where appropriate, are provided.
P 3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR IDAD HANDLING The NRC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the' reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage safe shutdown systems. Compliance with these guidelines is necessary to ensure that load handling system design, administrative controls, and operator i
training and qualification are such that the possibility of a load drop is very small for the critical functions performed by cranes at nuclear power plants. These guidelines are partially satisfied at Dresden Station. His l
conclusion is presented in tabular form as Table 3.1.
Specific recommen-i dations for achieving full compliance with these guidelines are provided as follows:
Guideline Recommendation Develop safe load paths for all heavy loads identified by the 1
a.
Licensee similar to'those already established for the drywell and reactor vessel heads, the dryer, and the separator.
b.
Incorporate load paths into load handling procedures and equipment layout drawings.
Clearly mark safe load paths on the floor in the areas where loads
}
c.
are handled.
d.
Verify that deviatic7s from established load paths require written alternatives approved by the plant safety review committee.
,.. UJ Franklin Research Center A h of the Fransen insonne
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a Table 3.1.
Dresden Station /MUREG-0412 Compliance Mattis c=>
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Meight Interia Interin pg or Guideline 1 Cuideline 2 Culdeline 3
- Culdettne 4 Culdeline 5 Caldeline 6 Outdeline 7 Measure 1 Measure 6
$3 Capacity Safe Imad Crane Operator Special Lifting Crane - Test Technics 1 Speciai EE Heavy loads (tonal Fatha Procedures Training Devic es
__Slgnea 6nd Inspection Crane Desteri Specifications Attention
- e. aN
- 1. Unite 2 and 3 125/9 MC C
I MC ug peactor g
Building Crane Drywell Shield 100 MC IEC
-=
leC MC v4 Pluge 34 Drywell Cover 65 C
C NC
=
MC Vessel Need 6
leC NC MC tsC Insulation Dryer 40 IIC' DC esc Separator sec Fit Stocks I
heactor Wessel 100 C
C MC MC U.
Need Steam bryer 32 C
C MC MC asc Steam 12 C
C IIC leC Dec Separator
- tsc Defeeling 12 Isc MC est
~
Chute Fuel Cask 100 IIC sc DIC tec IIF-300)
De w migh 9
IIC tec Isc lac lac e
=
Density Fuel packs Mlac. Equip =
DIC lac C
-=
Dec ment Fuel Fool 25 Isc IC IIC
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lec Gates C = Licensee action complies with IIUsSG-9512 Culdeline.
NC = Licensee action does not comply with esunEG-0612 Culdeline.
R
- Licenmee has proposed revisions / modifications designed to comely with 18USEC-0612 Culdeline.
1 = Insufficient information provided by the Licensee.
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Table 3.1 (Cont.)
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Meight Inte:Im Interim
- 3 or Guldeline 1 Guideline 2 Culdeline 3 Culdeline 4 Guideline $
Guldeline E Guideline 7 Measure 1
' Measure 6 Capecity Safe Load Crane Operator Special Lifting Crane - Test Technical Special IL 3 Meavy Imde (tonal Pathe Procedure s Training Deglees Slings and Inspec*!,,n Crane Deelen g iflections Attentlon 25' q
pefuel Slot 7
NC MC 4
E MC MC g
Plugo (g.
Service 5
NC MC 4-MC 5
h Platform
==
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MC 3
l 4
In-wessel 7
NC MC Nork Skiff MC
=
MC New Fuel Stor-5.5 BC MC IC MC age Vault Blocks Reactor Stud
- 1. 5 MC MC
=
MC MC pos I
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- 2. Unite 2 and 3 125/10 e
IC C
I Turbine 175/25 MC Blog. Cranea C
3 9
teu Pressure 51 It?
MC Turbine Inner
=
MC
==
==
Casings tipper / Lower 9
MC IC Diaphrages MC HP Turbine 72 teC BC Caelng MC
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IP Dotor 114 NC MC IIC MP Rotor 59 NC MC MC Generator 175 NC MC MC Rotor 1
IX Turbine 28 BC MC Outer Caelnge MC.
=
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Misc. Plant DC MC Equigenent MC O
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Meight Interim Interia; E
or Guideline 1 Culdeline 2. ' culdeline 3 Guideline 4 Culdeline 5 Culdeline 5 Guldeline ?
Measure 1 Measure 6 n, 5' Capacity Saf soad Crene o er tor Special s.lfting Crane - Test Technical Special v
g Meevy toede Itone)
Pathe Procedures Traintne Da ylces Stinge and Inspection Crane Deelen Specificatione Attention
,e MC j$
- 3. Unit 2 Eefuel WC C
I
[3 Ploor Matchmey 7
J1b Cranes O
re3 Misc. Plant MC MC ~-
~
MC' MC Equipuent g
I f
- 4. Unite 2 and 3 MC C
3 MC pefuel Platform j
Moloto Misc. Refueling E
MC' MC MC WC Tools and j
i Beactor Servicing f'
Equipment l
- 5. Unite 2 and 3 MC C
3 MC peector Service Platform Jib Crane Misc. RV MC MC NC WC IC Internale
?
Nort I
During Depair
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- 6. Unite 2 and 3 MC C
I MC g
New Puel e
Storage Vault Jib Crane i
- 7. Unit 1 Ref uel MC C
1
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i Ploor Meteturoy
+
J1b Crane Misc. Plant MC MC hC
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=
=
Equipment j.
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3 IL 3 Nr Table 3.1 ! Cont.)
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=h Neight Culdeline 5 Culdeline 5 Calde11ne 7 Nesoure 1 Neasure 6 Interin Interin 4
O or cuideline 1 Guldeline 2 Culdeline 3 Culdeline 4 Q
Capacity Safe Load Crane Operator Spectal Lifting Crane - Test Technical Special Heavy leads (tone)
Pathe Procedures
- Training Devices 81 t ng e and Inspection Crane Design Specificatione Attention *
[
8.
Unit 1 Refuel HC C
I" Platform mlete l
itisc. Refue.ing NC RC HC Tools and peactor Servicing Equigment i
I l
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9.
Unit i Fuel NC C
1 M:
i B!dg. Overhead Crane
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I Fuel Cask 25 N:
HC NC NC i
Imaded Fuel 4
NC NC NC HC Basket i
New Fuel 1.5 NC NC NC NC
- 10. Unit 1 Fuel
=
==
NC C
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TER-CS257-72/440/441 Guideline Recommendation 2
a.
Incorporate defined safe load paths into all current procedures.
b.
Certify that general handling procedure DMP 5800-3 and instruc-tions contained on applicable drawings satisfy the guideline criteria, including safo load path definitions, or incorporate l
these items into procedures which comply.
l 3
Verify that suitable means exist to monitor crane operator conduct ~
in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976.
Review actual design and fabrication of all special lif ting -
4 a.
devices and evaluate all differences with respect to the I
requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 and the stress design factor of Guideline 4.
j i
b.
Conduct a 150% load test of the reactor head strongback.
Verify that suitable programs or procedures exist for all special c.
lifting devices which satisfy the requirements of Section 5 (Acceptance Testing, Maintenance, and Assurance of Continued Compliance), of ANSI N14.6-1978.
Verify that sling selection is based upon the sum of the static 5
a.
and maximum dynamic loads.
b.
Mark slings with the " static load" that produces the maximum static and dynamic loads.
c.
Clearly mark slings restricted 'in use to only certain cranes.
6 (Dresden Station complies with this guideline.)
7 Evaluate those criteria identified from CMAA-70 which have not been addressed by the Licensee to determine whether these items have been satisfied in design of cranes in use at Dresden Station.
3.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES The NRC staf f has established (NUREG-0612, Article 5.3) that certain measures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1 is complete. Specified measures include the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool;, compliance with nidin Research Center A DMeson of The Frenden kwamme e
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TER-C5257-72/440/441 Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lif ting devices to eliminate def fciencies that could lead to component failure. FRC's evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that the following actions are necessary to ensure that tha staff's measures for interim protection at Dresden Station are met:
Interim Measure Recommendation i
1 Implement the recommendations of this interim.
protection measure.
2,3,4 Implement the recommendations of Guidelines 1, 2, and J
3 contained in Section 3.1.
5 (Dresden Sta' tion complies with this interim measure.)
6 Implement the recommendations of this interim protection measure.
3.3
SUMMARY
NRC general guidelines and interim protection measures of NUREG-0612 have '
i not been fully complied with at Dresden Station.
Compliance with these guidelines has been noted only for Guideline 6 (Cranes - Inspection, Testing,,
and Maintenance).
The Licensee's respense indicates that the following l
guidelines have been substantially complied with and only verification or minor modifications are needed for compliance:
(1) Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedures; (2) Guideline 3 Crane Operator Training; and (3) Guideline 5, Lif ting Devices (Not Specially Designed).
Evaluation of the remaining guidelines and interim measures indicates that substantial revisions or. evaluations are required of the Licensee in order to meet guideline requirements, specifically in the areas of safe load paths, special lifting devices, and crane design.
In addition, Licensee action is required for compliance with the remaining interim protection measures concerning technical specifications for heavy loads over the spent fuel pool and special attention for heavy loads over the core.
Q dbb ranWin Research Center
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4 TER-C5257-72/440/441 In conclusion, the requirements of NUREG-0612 have not been satis-factorily complied with at Dresden Station and further Licensee action is required for full compliance on practically all of these guidelines and interim protection measures.
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4 nklin Research Center A Dumon of The Fremen tweewie e
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4 TER-C5257-72/440/441 4.
REFERENCES 1.
NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" NRC, July 1980 2.
V. Stello, Jr. -(NRC)
Ietter to all licensees
Subject:
Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NRC, 17 May 1978 3.
D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)
Letter to all licensees 22 December 1980 i
4.
E. Swartz (CE)
Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC)
Subject:
Heavy Load Movement Report
~
22 June 1981 5.
M. S. Turbak (CE)
Letter to V. Stello (NRC)
Subject:
Response to Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads j
13 July 1978 6.
" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1976 7.
" Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" American National Standards Institute, Inc.
j 15 February 1972 8.
" Slings" l
American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1972 l
9.
CMAA-7 0 l
" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" l
Crane Manufacturers Association of America, Inc.
1975 AN lbranklin Research Center A Dage.an of The Fe insoeute
(
,F a '
TER-C5257 ~12/440/441 10.
EOCI-61
" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" Electric Overhead Crane Institute 1961 I
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U ranklin Research Center A Omason of The FreM6n instause o.
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