ML20039F024

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IE Insp Repts 50-440/81-16 & 50-441/81-16,on 811117-20 & 1210,11 & 15.Noncompliance Noted:Inadequate Design Control & QC Insp for Svc Water Pump Seismic Restraints Inadequate Control on Issuance of Small Bore Design Procedures
ML20039F024
Person / Time
Site: Perry  FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/28/1981
From: Danielson D, Yin T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20039F012 List:
References
50-440-81-16, 50-441-81-16, NUDOCS 8201110731
Download: ML20039F024 (11)


See also: IR 05000440/1981016

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III

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Reports No. 50-440/81-16; 50-441/81-16

Docket Nos. 50-440; .,0-441

Licenses No. CPPR-148; CPPR-149

Licensee: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company

Post Office Box 5000

Cleveland, OH 44101

Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Perry Site, Perry, OH

Inspection Conducted: November 17-20, December 10-11 and 15, 1981

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Inspector;

I. T. Yin

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Approved By:

D. H.. anielson, Chief

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Materials and Processes Section

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Inspection Summary

Inspection on November 17-20, December 10-11 and 15, 1981 (Reports

No. 50-440/81-16; 50-441/81-16)

Areas Inspected:

Followup on previously identified unresolved items; review

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of piping suspension system installation and inspection program, QC inspec-

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tion records, and nonconformance reports; inspection of site small bore piping

design activities. This inspection involved a total of 44 inspector-hours

onsite and at the NRC - Region III office by one NRC inspector.

Results: Of the areas inspected, three apparent violations were identified.

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(Inadequate design control for seismic restraints installed on the emergency

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service water pumps - Paragraph 1.a; Inadequate QC inspection for the emergency

service water pu:ap restraints - Paragraph 1.b. ; Inadequate document control on

luaance of small bore design procedures - Paragraph 2.a.(2).)

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DETAILS

Persons Contacted

Site Inspections Conducted on November 17-20 and December 10-11, 1981

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI)

  • M. Edelman, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
  • R. L. Farrell, Manager, QA

E. Riley, General Supervisor, CQS

J. A. Kline, General Supervisor, Engineering

R. P. Jadgchew, Construction Manager

    • I. H. Totas , Manager, PPSD
  • d. D. Wahath, Quality Engineering Supervisor
  • T. G. Swansiger, Quality Engineer
  • J. Eppich, Senior Engineer
  • S. P. Tulk, CQE Supervisor
  • K. Combs, Senior Engineering Aide

M. A. Brown, Lead Construction Auditor

Gilberts Associates, In. (GAI)

  • J. W. Mehaffey, QA Program Manager
  • K. R. Pech, Assistant Project Manager
  • R. F. Williams, Piping Lead Quelity Engineer
  • E. F. Parker, Quality Engineer

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D. E. Dietrich, Piping Engineer

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R. Hollenbeck, Lead Auditor

K. Smith, Hanger Designer

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Pullman Power Products (Pullman)

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J. Miller, QA Manager

J. Stelle, AQAM

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R. Hunnicutt, QA Supervisor

C. Thomas, Hanger Engineer

R. Walter, Resident Construction Manager

Kaiser Engineering, Inc. (KEI)

M. E. Noffsinger, Construction Manager

  • P. L. Gibson, Project QA Manager
  • J. S. Kerr, Supervisor, CQSS
  • Denotes those attending the management exit interview on November 20, 1981.

Region III Meeting with Licensee held on Dece3ber 15, 1981

CEI

M. Edelman, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

R. L. Farrell, Manager, QA

E. Riley, General Supervisor, CQS

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GAI

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K. - R. Pech, Assistant Project Manager -

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R. F. Williams, Piping Lead Quality Engineer

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E. F. Parker,-Quality Engineer

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USNRC - Region'III-

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C. E. Norelius, Director, Division of Engineerina and Technical Inspection

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.C. C. Williams, Acting Chief, Engineering Inspection Branch

D. H. Danielson, Chief, Materials and Processes Section

L. McGregor, Acting Chief, Projects _ Section

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I. T.~ Yin, Reactor Inspector

Licensee Action on Previous Identified Items

(0 pen) Unresolved Items (440/81-13-01; 441/81-13-01; 440/81-13-02;

441/81-13-02): Questionable QC inspection program. Further discussions were

acid with the licensee representatives. The licensee committed to total up-

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' grading of the subject program.

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(0 pen) Unresolved Item (440/81-13-03; 441/81-13-03):

Control of concrete

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expansion type anchor bolts submerged in water. The inspector reviewed the

GAI letter (PY-K&H/CEI-4697) to CEI, dated November 6, 1981, where it stated

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that there were no cafety-related pipe anchors installed underwater. During

the managment exit meeting the licensee stated that four support brackets

were installed in the water with concrete expansion type anchor bolts. and

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that evaluation for adequacy of the installation had been initiated.

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(Closed) Unresolved Item (440/81-13-04; 441/81-13-04): Control measures to

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upgrade nonsafety-related systems. The inspector reviewed ECN 3945-45-91,

dated February 15, 1980, and ECN 2982-45-58, dated October 3, 1979, relative

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to the augmented QA inspection program for the fire protection system and

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the N-64 off gas system. These requirements vere recommended by NRR Branch

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Technical Positions; however, the systems involved were not required to be

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upgraded to the safety-related system category.

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(Closed) Unresolved Item (440/81-13-05; 441/81-13-05): One ECN was found not

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included in the construction drawing at the work station. 'The inspector

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reviewed the CEI Program Audit Report No. 556, audit of Pullman at the site

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during August 5-18, 1981, and the Pullman Process audit, QA Site Internal

Audit Report No. QASS-2, dated October 1, 1981, and considered the licensee

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measures to be adequate.

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.(Closed) Unresolved Item (440/81-13-06; 441/81-13-06): Specific training

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to be provided for the working level piping suspension system installers.

The inspector revi'ewed training records conducted on October 24, 1981 and

October ~31, 1981 at the site for the foreman, genera 1Eforeman, field engineers,

superintendents, quality engineers. The training was entitled, " Quality,

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Pullman's Promise,.Everyone's Concern." The specific support and restraint

installation instructions were discussed in Session No-. 6, " Pipe. Hangers /

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Support' Indoctrination," and Session No. 7, " Installation / Fabrication of

Piping (including acceptable tolerances)."

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Functional or Program Areas Inspected

1.

Installation of Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pumps

The inspector reviewed installation and inspection records of the

rollowing safety-related reismic restraints installed at the vertical

pumps inside the Emergency Service Water (ESW) Building:

ESW Screen Wash Pumps

Pump P49-C00A

Restraint IP49-H001 (12" dia. at shaft flange)

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Restraint IP49-H002 (12" dia. at shaft flange)

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Pump P49-C002B

Restraint IP49-H003 (12" dia. at shaft flange)

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Restraint 1P49-H004 (12" dia. at shaft flange)

Large ESW Pumps

Pump 1P45-C001A

Restraint IP45-H397 (35" dia. at pump flange)

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Restraint IP45-H398 (34" dia. at pump flange)

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Pump 1P45-C001B

Restraint IP45-H399 (35" dia. at pump flange)

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Restraint IP45-H400 (34" dia. et pump flange)

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Pump 2P45-C001A

Restraint 2P45-H037 (35" dia, at pump flange)

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Restraint 2P45-H038 (34" dia. at pump flange)

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Pump 2P45-C001B

Restraint 2P45-H039 (35" dia. at pump flange)

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Restraint 2P45-H040 (34" dia. at pump flange)

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Small ESW Pumps

Pump 1P45-C002

Restraint IP45-H401 (14.5" dia. at pump flange)

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Restraint IP45-H402 (12.5" dia. at pump flange)

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Pump 2P45-C002

Restraint 2P45-H041 (14.5" dia. at pump flange)

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Restraint 2P45-H042 (12.5" dia. at pump flange)

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All the restraints were inspected and accepted on October 13, 1980

except 2P45-H037 which was accepted on October 30, 1980. The instal-

lation and inspection of these restraints were basad on Pullman Perry

Project Procedure IX-6, " Installation and Inspection of Section III

Pipe Supports," dated. July 25, 1980.

Subsequent to the review, the inspector stated that he had the following

findings:

a.

Inadequate Design Control

(1) The pump installation drawing, GAI No. 4949-22-017-4 (Gould

Pumps Drawing D2326, dated September 14, 1976), showed that

clearance between the pump flanges and the seismic restraints

should be 3/16" all around with tolerance given in Note 3 of

the drawing.

"Telerance on all dimensicas is

1/8"..."

GAI

Field Engineer contacted the Gould Company and revised the

tolerance to i 1/16" and - 3/16" through a Field Question (FQ)

No. 7952, dated June 19, 1980. Neither the Gould or FQ gap

tolerance conformed with the Pullman's Procedure IX-6 require-

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ment of maximum gap on seismic restraints to be 1/8" (in

comparison with maximum of 1/2" per the FQ and maximum of 5/8"

per Gould).

Such deviation was not reviewed and approved by

the GAI design engineering organization.

(2) In review of the installation packages, it was identified that:

(a) carbon steel bolts and studs were installed for underwater

use without material protective coatings,

(b) there was no requirement for installation and QC inq ection

to ensure full thread engagement at the sleeve nuts embedded

into the concrete, and

(c) torquing was not specified for t;.e sleeve nut stud instal-

lations, that were subject to loosening under vibratory

operating and seismic conditions.

This is an apparent violation identified in Appendix.

(440/81-16-01;

441/81-16-01)

b.

Inadequate QC Inspection

The inspector reviewed the QC inspection packages dated October 15,

1980 for the pump seismic restraints and found no detailed inspec-

tion checklists and/or measurements. A subsequent field engineering

inspection for Restraint IP45-H399 conducted on December 3, 1980

measured some of the gap clearances between the pump flange and the

restraint to be in excess of 0.25".

This was in nonconformance with

the Pullman Procedure IX-6, Paragraph 8.4.1.1, which states in part

that, " Clearance dimension for a given restraint direction...to 1/8"

maximum. Any combination adding (up to) 1/8" is permissable for

maximum tolerance."

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This is an spparent violation identified in Appendix.

(440/81-16-02;

441/81-16-02).

c.

Questionable Gould Pump Seismic Analysis

The design SSE loads for the seismic restraints installed on the

Gould pumps were as follows:

2P45-H037 and H039 18,254 lbs.

2P45-H038 and H040 26,836 lbs.

2P45-H041 760 lbs.

2P45-H042 838 lbs.

1P49-H001 and H003 624 ibs.

IP49-H002 and H004 350 lbs.

Sussequent to review s: the Gould stress analysis report, the

inspector had the following questions:

(1) The analysis is based on Gould vertical pump model VIT 20 x 30

BLC 2 stage. The design representation and modeling technique

for all these types of Gould vertical pumps required further

review and evaluation. Further review was conducted at the

site on December 10-11, 1981, where stress reports for all

three different types of pumps were presented to the inspector.

See Paragrapa 3.b. of this report for details.

(2) Paragraph 4.5 of the report stated that, "The pump is analyzed

for 3/16" radial clearance at supports located at Joints 11 and

13," and yet zero displacements were observed in computer output

at these joints. Subsequent review conducted at the site on

December 10-11, 1981, where Report No. ME-454, Loading No. 4

showed one restraint movement of 3/16" and the second restraint

movement of - 3/is".

The inspector stated that the loss of

motion within the restraint gaps was not modeled in the computer

calculation. However, in discussion with the GAI Assistant

Project Mar.ager, he agreed that the restraints will be in-

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spected to verify that the maximum total gaps along a diameter

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should not exceed 3/16".

2.

Site Small Bore Piping Systems Desi_gn

During the November 17-20, 1981 site iuspection, the inspector reviewed

the subject matter and discussed the design criteria and acceptance bases

thraugh telephone discussion with the GAI Projec*. Piping Analyst. The

present site design responsibility was restricted to 2" diameter and

under piping systems 250 F and below design temperature. -Any systems

above 250 F, analyses are to be performed at GAI home office, and the

resulting load summary sheets will then be sent to the site for the

suspension system design and installation.

a.

Design Procedure Review

The following procedures were reviewed by the inspecter:

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(1) GAI Report No. 1962, "Sesimic Support Spacing Criteria,"

Revicion 2, dated May 26, 1981.

Paragraph 4.01, " Piping Design Criteria" in conjunction

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with C.1 series design tables provided maximum spacing,

deadweight, and seismic reaction forces design informa-

tion for various pipe sizes and schedules.

In discussion

with the Project Piping Analyst, it was stated that the

design table included water, insulation and stress

intensification factors, ex.

i = 2.1 for socket weld

joint for 2" and under piping, and that pipe spans were

generated by computer calculations based on response

spectra developed for different building structures.

Thermal stress considerations were provided in Para-

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graph 6.1, " Thermal spacing consideration (for both

C.S. and S.S materials);" Fig.

A-11, " Guided Cantilever

Chart"; and the sample calculations were contained in

Appendix A of the procedure.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

(2) GAI Attachment Specification SP-208-4549-00, " Technical

Requirements for Furnishing and Installing Hilti Kwik

Bolts," dated June 26, 1978. This is a part of the GAI

SP-44, " Installation of Safety Class Pipe," providing

requirements for installation, inspection, and test re-

quirements for the wedge type concrete expansion type

anchor bolts.

In review of the site procedures developed based on the

above specification, the following two noncompliances were

identified:

Memo from R. R. Brems to Distributien, "Use of Concrete

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Fasteners on Perry," dated December 5,1977, which was

included in the Piping Engineering Department Perry

Project Instruction, Section C - Support Design, had

not been approved for use.

In fact, the whole Section C

was without issuance, review, approval, and revision

control.

Hilti bolt design allowables developed at the site on

March 13, 1980 was without the same type of document

control provision as discussed above.

This is an item of violation identified in Appendix.

(440/81-16-03;

441/81-16-03).

b.

Design Personnel Qualification

The design personnel qualification verification procedure was

provided in GAI Management Policies and Procedures, No. V-04,

Subject: Employee Relations, Title:

" Educational and Employment

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Verification and Security Investigation," dated June 1, 1981.

The inspector reviewed the procedure, some of the employee's

resumes, and PNPP site design team indoctrination and training

records, and had no adverse comments. At the time of the

inspection, there was no contract employee working in the small

bore piping design group at the site.

3.

Meetings on December 10-11, 1981 at the Site

The inspector met with the site responsible staff on December 10-11, 1981

to discuss the problem areas identified during the inspections conducted

during November 17-20, 1981. Specific discussion areas included:

a.

Review of the Upgraded Procedure

The Pullman Power Products piping suspension system installation

and inspection procedure IX-6 was upgraded to provide timely in-

process hanger installation inspection requirements. The inspector

reviewed the draft copy of the procedure and had the following

comments:

(1) Phase II inspection should not be conducted until satisfactory

resolution of all the deficiencies identified in Phase I in-

spection.

Likewise, Phase III inspection should not precede

Phase II inspection deficiency resolution.

(2) Warning tags should be installed on the component assemblies

subsequent to the Phase II inspection acceptance to prevent

alteration and removal.

(3) Permanent identification tags should be installed subsequent

to the Phase III inspection acceptance for future ISI purpose.

(4) Statements should be added stating that no Hilti Drop-In type

concrete expansion anchors will be used in safety-related piping

systems.

(5) Torquing requirements stated in Paragraph 8.5.10 are for Hilti

Kwik bolts only.

(6) Minimum time required to soak the unused anchor bolt holes

before placement of grout should be specified in Paragraph 8.6.2.

(7) Reistive to Paragraph 11.0, " inspection," maximum time frame

should be determined between the completion of the hardware

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installation and the beginning of QC inspection.

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The inspector further commented that consideration should be given

to developing a trend analysis procedure to work in conjunction with

Procedure IX-6.

An overview procedure in accordance with the IEB 79-14 requirements should be in place prior to system turnover for

pre-operational and startup tests.

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b.

Review of Gould Pumps, Inc. (GPI) Reports

The inspector reviewed the following Seismic. Analysis Reports

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provided by GPI for the vertical pumps installed in the emergency

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service water pump house at-Perry site. These reports were pre-

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pared by Mcdonald Engineering Analysis Company, Inc.

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ME-452 for flodel VIT Size 6x8 JLC Three Stage Screen Wash Pumps,

September 12, 1977.

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ME-453 for Model VIT 8x12 JMC-5 stage small service water pumps,

September 16, 1977.

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ME-454 for Model VIT 20x30 BLC-2 stage large service water pumps,

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September 20, 1977.

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In review of ME-454 and in discussion with GAI's Mechanical

Engineer - Seismic Qualification Specialist, the following

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questionable areas were identified:

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In comparison with GPI drawing D2324, dated December 7, 1978,

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where punp weight of 16,875 lbs.

flooded and 12,720 lbs. dry

were stated, the computer input pump wieght model showed

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18,683 lbs., and the output showed pump weight of 14,221 lbs.

The centerline of masses on the pumps and on the motor were

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not shown on the'GPI drawing.

The GAI developed building structural response spectra were

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not attached to the report.

The GPI report showed no documentation on review, verification,

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approval and acceptance of the stress analysis.

Because of the identification of these questionable areas and the

previously discussed problems (in Paragraph 1 of this report) the

inspector requested the following materials for his review:

(1) GAI Specification SP-750-4549-00, Revision 1, dated March 11,

1974, and SP-501-4549-00, Revision 2, Sections 2 and 3, dated

November 11, 1976,which provided the design and acceptance

criteria.

(2) Documentation on GPI review of the Mcdonald reports, and GAI's

acceptance of the report in representation of the licensee.

(3) GAI program procedures, from 1977 to present, established for

the review of vendor equipment seismic analysis reports.

This is considered to be an unresolved item.

(440/81-16-04;

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441/81-16-04)

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c.

Site QA Audit of Nonconformance Report (NR) Closeouts

During site inspection conducted on November 17-20, 1981, it was

brought to the inspector's attention by the Construction Quality

Engineer that some of the Pullman NRs were closed without verifi-

cation that rework or repair had been completed. The problem was

discussed in the site Audit Report No. 543, dated June 18, 1981.

Subsequent to the inspector's visit, site QA organization performed

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another audit from November 30, 1981 to December 3, 1981. Thirty

closed Pullman NRs were chosen for review to determine whether or

not there was documentation and evidence to support the closeouts.

Six Action Requests (ARs) were issued as a result of the audit.

Pullman QA was instructed to review all the previoi+,1y closed NRs

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before January 1, 1982. Followup on lice nsee resolution of the

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subject matter is planned. This is considered to be an unresolved

item.

(440/81-16-05; 441/81-16-05).

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4.

Management Meeting on Decmeber 15, 1981 at the NRJ-Region III Office.

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A meeting was held to discuss the upgrading of the licensee's piping

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suspension systems installation and QC inspection program, and the

licensee's planned actions relative to the resolution of problem areas

identified during this inspection. The agenda for the licensee pre-

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sentation and discussion was as follows:

a.

Plans to upgrade the existing piping support program to include

modified checklists, establish periodic assessment program to

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reverse adverse trends, and provide for prompt action to identify

nonconforming conditions and initiate immediate corrective action.

b.

Plans to improve the QA program as it relates to small bore piping

systems including issuance, review and approval of instructions,

and design basis and acceptance criteria.

Increase technical audits

in this area to assure compliance.

c.

Plans and schedules to:

(1) Reinspect or inspect, as applicable, all safety-related

supports to the upgraded procedures (new checklists, etc.).

(2) Review for design acceptability all previously completed

small bore piping systems that were installed without approved

engineering procedures.

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(3) Perform a joint QA/ Engineering audit of Gould Pumps, Inc. for

design control and stress analysis in February 1982. NRC will

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be in attendance.

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d.

Audit of contractor verification and closeout-of nonconformance

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reports.

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Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order

to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or-

deviations. 'Two unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed

in Paragraphs 3.b. and 3.c.

Exit Interview

The inspector met'with licensee representative.o at the conclusion of the

inspection. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.

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The licensee acknowledged the findings reported herein.

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