ML20039D663
| ML20039D663 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/16/1981 |
| From: | Myers H NRC |
| To: | Dircks W, Haller N NRC, NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039D660 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8201050402 | |
| Download: ML20039D663 (4) | |
Text
t.
l D:cocher 16, 1981 To:
Bill Dircks/ Norman Haller From: Henry Myers The following questions concern findings of the NRC Inquiry into reporting of information during the accident at Three Mile Island. Background for these questions is contained in ay memos dated 11/9/81, 11/16/81, 11/30/81 and 12/1/81.
I.
Did know at approximately 8: 00 A.M. on March 28, 1979 that the PORV had been open Trom -
approrimately 4:00 A.M.
to approximately 6:20 A.M?
.s Foregoing should be asked with respect to:
Ken Bryan Mike Ross Bill Zewe
~
Brian Mehler George Kunder Gary Miller (See House Interior Committee Staff Report, p. 6 - 11.)
II. Did know at approximately 8: 00 A.M.
on March 28, 1979 that the HPI had been throttled during the time the PORV had been leaking?
Foregoing should be asked with respect to:
Ken Bryan Mike Ross Bill Zewe Brian Mehler George Kunder Gary Miller (See House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.
11 -14.)
III.
Did know at approximately 8: 00 A.M.
on March 28, 1979 that hot leg _ temperatures in excess of 700 degrees F.
did exist or had existed that day?
Foregoing should be asked with respect to:
Mike Ross Bill Zewe Brian Mehler George Kunder 8201050402 811219-Gary Miller John Flint DR ADOCK 05000 James Seelinger p
Foregoing question applies with respect to same person's as to their awareness of temperatures at 9: 00 A.M., noon,
~
and 2:00 P.M.
(See House Interior Committee Staff Report, p. 14'-33.)
IV.
Did
.knsw on M2rch,28,-1979'thnt t mparcturoc in Cxc300 of ths coturation temperatura indicated the the core was or had been in a condition where it was being cooled by steam rather than water?
Foregoing should be asked with respect to:
Ken Bryan Mike Ross Bill Zewe Brian Mehler George Kunder Gary Miller John Flint James Seelinger Did the foregoing know on March 28, 1979 that temperatures
- in excess of 700 degrees F. were temperatures in excess of the saturation temperature?
V.
Did know on March' 28, 1979 that the TMI reactor was in a condition not covered by emergency procedures?
Foregoing should be asked with respect to:
Ken Bry3n Mike Ross Bill Zewe Brian Mehler George Kunder Gary Miller John Flint James Seelinger (See House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.45 -53.)
VI. Was uncertain prior to noon on March 28, 1979 as to whether the TMI-2 core was being adequately cooled?
~
Foregoing should be asked with respect to:
Ken Bryan Mike Ross Bill Zewe Brian Mehler George Kunder Gary Miller" s
John Flint James Seelinger (See House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.
35 -45.)
m
VII.
Did rcport to Gary Millor prior to 9:00 A.M. on March 28, 1979 his awarensco of ths PORV b3ing opsn from approximately 4:00 A.M.
to approximately 6:20 A.M.?
If such information was not reported, what was the reason for the reporting failure?
Foregoing should be asked with respect to:
Ken Bryan Mike Ross Bill Zewe '
Brian Mehler George Kunder Note: Both interviewers and intelviewees use8 word "open'"
in discussing the status of the PORV between 4:00 A.M. and 6:00 A.M.
See House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.
6 - 11. Also Ibid, p.
4 -5 re emergency command team.
VII'I.
What is basis' for dismissing Miller's statements re ho t leg (see House Interior Committee Staff Report, p. 19) and incores (see House Interior Committee Staff Report,
- p. 23 and 30)?
IX.
What is basis for believing Miller's picture of the situation on March 28, 1979 was different than that subsequently recounted; e.g.
see House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.
42 - 44 and p.
52 - 547 (This is significant because the picture Miller conveyed in his retrospective statements was much more pessimistic than that which he conveyed in his statement to Dornsife at approximately 9:00 A.M.
and that apparently conveyed to Lt.
Gov. Scrantou at approximately 2:30 - 3:30 P.M.)
X.
What is the basis for accepting Miller's testimony to the effect that on March 28 he had been unaware of the pressure pulse and actuation of the safeguards system vis-a-vis statements to the effect that Miller was aware of pressure pulse (see House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.
- 63) and that it was hard to believe that anyone in the control room at the time of.the pressure pulse would have missed-this event (see House Interior Committee Staff l
Report, p. 65.')? [See also my memorandum of November 16, particular Rogovin conclusion on bottom of page 3.]
XI.
What is the basic for Lejecting the statements of Chwastyk and Mehler (which were, their best recollections) l with regard to whether an instruction was issued on March 28 to the effect that out of concern for igniting another detonation, equipment should not be started in the reactor building?
(See House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.
80 - 81, 84.)
XII.
Who issued the instruction to close the pressurizer block valve at approximately 3:08 P.M. on March 28?
(This is significant because if the order was issued by Miller (prior to his leaving for the Lt. Governor's office or by.
telephone from that office) then this fact substantiates Chwastyk's recollection of events. If Miller did not is. sue such an order, Chwastyk made a major change in strategy without authority from the Emergency Director and counter to
.his recollection that he. did nothing without approval from
r e
~,
XIII.
Wra ths NRC informed on March 28 of the following and, if so, at what hour:
. - That there was reason to believe the PORV had been opened (leaking) from approximately 4: 00 A.M.
to approximately 6:20 A.M?
-That HPI had been throttled during the time the PORV had been opened (leaking)?
-That temperatures in excess of 700 degrees F.
had been measured in the hot legs?
-That temperatures in excess of 700 degpees F.
had been measured on the incore thermocouples?
-That temperatures in e.xcess of 2000 degrees F.
had been measured on the incore thermocouples?
-That the plant was in a condition not provided for in the emergency procedures?
.-That there was uncertainty as to whether the core was in a condition where it was adequately cooled?
-That radioactivity measurements oi a reactor coolant sample indicated failure of a substantial portion of the fuel rods?
-That a pressure pulse had been recorded on reactor building pressure measuring instrumentation?
XIV.
Was the State of Pennsylvania informed on-M'rch 28 of a
the foreg,oing and, if so, at what hour?
XV:
Is there any reason to doubt recollections of Thomas Gerusky, Director of'the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiological Protection, as made to I&E on October 1, 1980 with respect to the meeting held in Lt. Governor Scranton's office on the afternoon of_ March 28, 1979 to the effect that the Met-Ed employees had conveyed the impression that the situation was under control, that there was no need to give the Pennsylvania officials "every little detail" as to what was happening at ?.he' plant, that the Met Ed employees' attitude was one indicating that they did not want the State officials to " bug" them, that the accident was over, that the Met Ed officials did not understand the States' interest in what was going on,,that there was minor (not severe) core damage in the sense of "some" cladding failures, that the pressure spike was not discussed, that it was "a' typical utility trying to play down a nuclear power plant problem,"
... that everybody;was trying to make a big deal out of nothing..", that it was none of your (the State's) business, that the-Met Ed employees had " talked down" to the State officials,,that the State officials had the feeling that the Met Ed employees-had more information than was passed on to the State, and that Met Ed supervisors's concerns over the potential for deterioration of the situation had not been passed on to State officials?
(House Interior Committee Staff Report, p.lld-ll6.)