ML20039C653
| ML20039C653 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/02/1981 |
| From: | Gilinsky V NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | SENATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112300007 | |
| Download: ML20039C653 (7) | |
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l TESTIMONY OF VICTOR GILINSKY, COMMISSIONER ON BEHALF OF THE i
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE i
l COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE DECEMBER 2, 1981 i
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i 8112300007 811202 i
o I am pleased to be here this morning to testify on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to safeguard peaceful nuclear activities.
As you know, the Commission's interest in this subject arises out of our responsibility for licensing the export of nuclear materials, facilities, and components.
The Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), conditions the export of nuclear materials and facilities upon the Commission finding, among other things, that IAEA safeguards will be applied with respect tc any such exports.
In addition, the Commission must find that the export is not inimical to the common defense and security of the United States.
While the Commissioners are not of one mind on the legal basis for inquiring into the adequacy of IAEA safeguards -- two Commissioners have asked Congress to clarify the NNPA on this matter -- they are unanimous that available information bearing on the adequacy of such safeguards in specific export cases must be taken into account.
In practice, the Commission obtains very little information about the details of the application of IAEA safeguards.
In a February, 1978 letter to this Committee, at the time of its consideration of the NNPA, Chairman Hendrie noted that the U.S. Government, including NRC, did not have direct access to country-specific information on IAEA safeguards effectiveness.
This is still true.
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o The reasons for this stem from the origin of the IAEA.
In order to ease the acceptance of international safeguards, the IAEA. Statute provides that no " industrial secret or other confidential information" should be divulgeC to third parties by the IAEA.
In practice, this prohibition has been interpreted in the broadest manner to withhold information e
about the details of the safeguards system.
Thus, for example, the " subsidiary arrangements" and other documents related to the application of safeguards in a particular country or at a particular facility are not available to other member nations of the IAEA.
The Commission does receive some information, both unclassified and classified, on the application of IAEA safeguards from the Executive Branch and the IAEA.
The IAEA publishes an annual report and provides its annual Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) to each member of the Board of Governors.
NRC obtains this document on a classified basis.
The preparation of these reports is a step in the right direction.
- However, the Commission believes that more information should be reported to the Board by the IAEA Secretariat.
We also believe that the U.S.
should make every reasonable effort to gain better and more timely information on overall international safeguards effectiveness and on any significant safeguards problems in countries receiving U.S. exports.
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o In'your letter inviting Commission testimony at this hearing, Mr. Chairman, you asked us to address the strengths and weaknesses of the IAEA safeguards system.
The question is a vital one.
Working to achieve effective international safeguards has been a central element of U.S. nonproliferation policy.
The Commission supports the President's commitment to work with other nations to help the IAEA improve the international safeguards regime.
As increasing numbers of large and sophisticated nuclear facilities come into operation around the world, the IAEA safeguards system will have to increase in size and capability.
An effective international safeguards system is an essential element of our national security, and warrants serious attention and commitment along with our other defense objectives.
The question of the IAEA's strengths and weaknesses is also a difficult one for the Commission to answer.
As I have indicated, we receive relatively little information on the subject, and much of what we do receive is classified.
As a general observation, the IAEA possesses the strengths and weaknesses characteristic of international organizations.
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Its strength lies in its ability to serve as a forum in l
which the member nations can work cooperatively toward international standards governing the use of nuclear energy.
It has served to highlight the necessity for international safeguards to protect against civilian nuclear materials
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being diverted to explosive purposes.
As an international institution, the IAEA is unique in providing for on-site i
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inspection in member countries.
Its weakness is that, in practice, it cannot enforce the standards agreed upon by its members.
It is hesitant to act against a member state, it accepts many constraints imposed by member states on inspections, and'its senior officials tend to be overly cautious about facing important issues.
All in all, because of these weaknesses, it appears that the IAEA safeguards system may no longer be adequate in some instances.
The Commission's concern regarding the weaknesses in IAEA safeguards is reflected in the Chairman's letter of November 27, 1981, to you, which I would like to submit for the record.
This letter also notes that the Commission is reviewing its statutory responsibilities for licensing U.S. nuclear exports in light of these concerns.
You also requested the Commission's suggestions for improving IAEA safeguards.
The following are some specific suggestions:
Delays in reporting nuclear material inventories and transfers should be reduced or eliminated.
Many states have routinely been tardy in reporting transfers and inventories of nuclear material, and the IAEA has s
experienced problems with matching records of supplier and recipient states, particularly when one is a nuclear weapons state.
In November 1980, the IAEA requested states' cooperation in revising reporting procedures.
The NRC is working with other U.S. government agencies
1 to assist the IAEA in developing workable procedures for more accurate and prompt accounting for material in international transfers.
Use of updated safeguards techniques should be agreed to by member countries.
The IAEA has had difficulties obtaining the agreement of states to revise the safeguards procedures at their facilities to incorporate recent advances in equipment and procedures.
We believe that a more determined effort should be made to secure the agree-ment of states to renegotiate " subsidiary arrangements",
and the Board of Governors should provide more guidance and direction on this matter.
Safeguards technology, equipment, and procedures for
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safeguarding many types of facilities need to be more fully developed.
In particular, the types of facilities of greatest proliferation concern (for example, reprocessing plants, enrichment plants, and large materials test reactors) present unique safeguards problems.
The U.S.
Program of Assistance to International Safeguards LPOTAS )., and other technical assistance programs by I
other countries, are designed to resolve these issues.
We believe that continued U.S. activities in this area are important to the improvement of. IAEA safeguards.
. c IAEA internal management procedures need improvement.
The IAEA recently had an international management consulting firm examine IAEA management and personnel practices and recommend improvements.
This study was paid-for with U.S.
funds provided under the POTAS program.
We have not examined this study, and so cannot
~ comment on the recommendations, but we consider the fact that it was done to be a step in the right direction.
In, closing, we would emphasize that, while progress has been i
made in improving the technical aspects of international safeguards, the more difficult problem remains the political pressures-on the IAEA.
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