ML20039B530
| ML20039B530 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1981 |
| From: | Bradley Jones NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20039B531 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8112230199 | |
| Download: ML20039B530 (13) | |
Text
f*
12/21/81
. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
=
In the Matter of fl.p#
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY Oc:ket hos. 50-275 0 50-323 J
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant )
N/
he f
UnitNos.Iand2)
)
{
C///4)
%.E L # M " 2 JggA $
~
r--
NRC STAFF MOTION h'R
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION Td OF CONTEhTILNS 10 AND 12 4
ds.,'
bh
_., s V,
I.
INTRODUCTION The NRC Staff hereby moves for summary disposition of Joint Inter-venors' Contentions 10 and 12 which were included in this proceeding pursuant to the Commission's September 21, 1981 Memorandum and Order.
Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) CLI-81-22, 14 NRC (1981).
The Staff submits that the attached Staff affidavits, supporting documents and the Safety Evaluation Report on the areas involved demonstrate that there are no factual issues requiring adjudication and that dismissal of the Joint Intervenors' Contentions 10 and 12 is warranted as a matter of law.
A discussion of the operative legal principles underlying summary disposition follows.
II.
ARGUMENT A.
Summary Disposition Procedures The Commission's regulations provide that summary disposition of a matter _at issue can be obtained on the pleadings if the moving papers demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the h
moyant is entitled to a favorable decision a a matter of law.
10 C.F.R.
/ /
DESIGNATED ORIGINAL N
Certified By<
8112230199 811221 PDR ADOCK 05000275 G
PDR TScn
[. =
92.749(d).
The summary disposition procedures set forth in 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749 'are analogous to the summary judgment procedures contained in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alabama Power Company (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-182, 7 AEC 210, 217 (1974). A hearing on the questions raised by an intervenor is not inevitable.
See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-654, NRC
, Slip op. at 4 (Septem-ber 11, 1981). The use of summary disposition has been encouraged by the Commission and the Appeal Board to eliminate litigation over conten-tentions for which an intervenor has failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue. See, e.g., Northern States Pcwer Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-73-12, 6 AEC 241 (1973),
aff'd sub nom BPI v. Atomic Energy Commission, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590,11 NRC 542, 550-51 (1980). The Commission has recently issued a policy statement concerning the conduct of adjudicatory proceedings.
In that statement the Commission advised its adjudicatory boards as follows:
"In exercising its authority to regulate the course of a hearing, the boards should encourage the parties to invoke the summary disposition procedure on issues where there is no genuine issue of material fact so that evidentiary hear-ing time is not unnecessarily devoted to such issues."
Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings,Section II.G.,
46 Fed. Reg. 28533 (1981).
Allthough the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of fact is upon the moving party, and the record will be viewed in the light y.4-
-- ~-. _
e--
most favorable to the party opposing the motion,M "a party opposing the motion...must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
~
genuine issue of fact." 10 C.F.R. I 2.749(b); Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451, 453 (1980). Mere allegations or denials will not suffice.
Id.; ALAB-443, supra, 6 NRC at 754; Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-75-10, 1 NRC 246, 248 (1975).
In addition:
"All material facts set forth in the statement required to" be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party."
- 10 C.F.R.9 2.749(a); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit No. 1), LBP-77-45, 6 NRC 159, 163 (1977).
Finally, to draw on federal practice, the Supreme Court has pointed out that Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not permit plaintiffs to get to a jury on the basis of the allegations in the complaints coupled with the hope that something can be developed at trial in the way of evidence to support the allegations.
First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289-90 (1968). Similarly, a plaintiff may not defeat a motion for summary judgment on the hope that on cross-examination the defendants will contradict their respective affidavits.
To permit trial on such a basis would nullify the purpose of Rule 56 which permits the elimination of unnecessary and costly litigation where no genuine issues of material fact exist.
See Orvis v. Brick. nan,
_1f. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753-54 (1977).
i
95 F. Supp. 605,' 607 (1951), aff'd 196 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.1952), cited with approval in River Bend, supra,1 f4RC at 248.
In light of these principles, and for the reasons set forth below, the Staff urges the Board to grant summary disposition of Joint Inter-venors' Contentions 10 and 12.
If the Board is unable to grant summary disposition of these contentions in their entirety, summary disposition should be granted on any portions of such contentions as to which there is no genuine issue of material fact.E B.
Joint Intervenors' Contention 10 is Appropriate for Sumary Disposition and Should Be Dismissed Contention 10 (as admitted by the Board in the September 30, 1981 Memorandum and Order)
The Staff recognizes that pressurizer heaters and associated controls are necessary to maintain natural circulation at hot stand-by conditions.
Therefore, this equipment should be classi-fied as " components important to safety" and required to meet all applicable safety-grade design criteria, including but not limited to diversity (GDC 22), Jeismic and environmental qualification (GDC 2 and 4), automatic initiation (GDC 20), separation and independence (GDC 3 and 22), quality assurance (GDC 1), adequate, reliable on-site power supplies (GDC 17) and the single failure criterion. The Applicant's proposal to connect two out of four of the heater groups to the present on-site emergency power supplies does not provide an equivalent or acceptable level of protection.
The above Contention focuses on whether the pressurizer heaters should be classified as " components important to safety" and required to meet all applicable safety-grade criteria.
The pressurizer heaters
_2]
Section 2.749(c) authorizes a " decision by the presiding officer in that party's [movant's] favor as to all or any part of the matters involved in the proceeding." See Public Service Company of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-77-46, 7 f4RC 167 (1977);
Toledo Edison Company (Davis-Besse N" clear Power Station), LBP-73-30, 6 AEC 691, 699'(1973). To the extent that the Appeal Board's Order of December 11, 1981 might ce interpreted as expanding the conten-tions to include the adequacy of the EPRI testing program, the Staff doss not address the expanded scope of the contentions in this motion.
at Diablo Canyon are designated as " components important to safety."
(Jensen Affidavit at 4).
However, the operation of the pressurizer heaters at Diablo Canyon is not a critical safety function and, therefore, the heaters are not required to be designed to safety-grade criteria.
The critical functions which must be provided by safety grade systems are identified in Section III.C of Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 100.
The pressurizer heaters are not relied on, nor is credit taken for them, in performing any of the critical functions in that Appendix.
(I_d. at 5).
Operation of the pressurizer heaters is not relied upon in the safety analyses of the design basis accidents for Diablo Canyon.
(Id. at 2).
Although operation of the pressurizer heaters is required to maintain system pressure for power operation and hot standby, operation of the pressurizer heaters is not normally required to bring the plant to cold shutdown, which is a safe and stable condition.
(Governor Brown's and Joint Intervenors' Admissions A-3).
Tests at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2
have demonstrated that the effect of de-energizing the pressurizer heaters would be a gradual depressurization of the primary system (100 psig/ hour) with no loss of natural circulation.
Failure of the pressurizer heaters to operate would allow the reactor system to gradually depressurize which, in the absence of any corrective action, would eventually cause automatic actuation of the ECCS.
(Jensen Affidavit at 2).
The emergency procedures which provide guidance to the operator on the use of the pressurizer heaters during an emergency do not raise the pressurizer heaters status to that of ufety grade components.
It should be noted that although the pressurizer heaters would be expected to be normally available in a number of anticipated transients and accidents
a 6-(as they are during routine' daily operations), they are not required to protect the reactor.
As discussed in Chapter 15 of the FSAR, reliance is placed on the Reactor Protection System and the Engineered Safety Features which are designed to safety grade criteria.
It must be recognized that emergency procedures are written to present guidance on all options available to the operator for coping with a transient or accident. To do otherwise would be an unwise limitation of design and operator capability during each event. The licensing arena in which conservative assumptions on the unavailability of non-safety grade components are typically imposed, should not be confused with an actual transient or accident during which the operator would be expected to make maximum use of ALL available systems, whether they are safety grade or not. (Id. at 4).E Although the pressurizer heaters are considered " components import-ant to safety" with respect to their pressure-control function, this does not mean it is necessary for the pressurizer heaters to meet safety-grade criteria. The term "important to safety" applies generally to the broad class of structures, systems and components addressed in the General Design Criteria.
" Safety-grade structures, systems and components" are a sub-class of all those "important to safety." All structures, systems and components encompassed by 1.he term "important to safety" y
The principle that it is not necessary for all non safety-grade systems which might be used to mitigate the consequences of an accident to meet all safety-grade criteria has been accepted in NRC precedent. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1) lestart Proceeding; Licensing Board Decision of December 14, 1981, pages 208-216 of Slip opinion.
m
-7 (including' the " safety-grade" sub-class) are necessary to meet the broad safety goal articulated in Ap,endix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 of tne regu-lations l1.e., to provide reasonable assurance that a facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public). Only
" safety-grade structures, systems and components are required for the critical accident prevention, safe shutdown, and accident consequence mitigation safety functions identified in Section III.C of Appendix A
The pressurizer heaters do not perfom these functions (that is, no credit is taken for their performing those functions). There is, therefore, no basis for requiring pressurizer heaters to be classified as safety-grade.
(J d. ).O Contention 10 also alleges that there is a deficiency in the emergency power supply to the pressurizer heaters.
Two manual transfer switches with associated safety-grade protective devices have been added to connect the pressurizer heaters to onsite standby power sources.
The switches give the plant operator the added option of using onsite standby power to supply the pressurizer heaters when there is a loss of l
4j The classification system presented by the Staff does not present a question of first impression. The Licensing Board in the TMI l
restart proceeding has recently ruled that the Staff position on l
the classification system for components and systems is the correct approach. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three tiile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1) Restart Proceeding; Licensing Board Decision of December 14,1981, pages 199 thru 205 of Slip opinion.
- Also, although the factual situations differ between TMI and Diablo Canyon, the Licensing Board at TMI did rule that neither the PORV's Mr the pressurizer heaters needed to be classified as " safety-gr ade" for TMI. This, at least, demonstrates that the functions these components and systems perform do not automatically require their classification as " safety-grade."
Id., 81-86,97-106.
offsite power.
The Staff finds this emergency power supply system adequate.
(Knox Affidavit, attachment B, p. 2-28).
The contention in general deals with the ability of the pressurizer heaters to maintain natural circulation in the coolant systems.
For plants with U-tube steam generators, such as Diablo Canyon, the high points of the coolant loops are the U-bends of the steam generator tubes which are continually covered with secondary coolant supplied by the main or auxiliary feedwater systems.
Steam formed in the coolant loops of a plant of the Diablo Canyon design would be condensed.by the steam generators with no loss of natural circulation.
If sufficient steam were present, the mode of natural circulation would change from single-phase natural convection to two-phase boiling condensation. Tests at the LOFT and Semiscale. facilities have demonstrated that loss of natural circulation will not occur at plants equipped with U-tube steam generators in the presence of steam ii..ne coolant loops as long as steam generator cooling remains available.
(Jensen Affidavit at 3).
Semiscale results are documented in Report No. EGG-SEMI-5507, " Quick Look Report for Semiscale Mo-2A Test S-NC-2," July 1981. (Attached as Appendix A).
LOFT results are documented in Report No. NUREG/CR-1570 " Experimental Data Report for LOFT Nuclear Small Break Experiments L3-7," August 1980.
(Attached as Appendix B).
In sum, based on the discussion above and attached supporting affidavits and documents, there are no material facts on which an evidentiary hearing is necessary.
Further, as a matter of law, the Staff is entitled to a favorable ruling on their motion to dismiss this con-tention. The discussion above shows that the pressurizer heaters do r
-g-e comply with the regulatory requirements. The Staff, therefore, urges the Licensing Board to grant summary disposition on Contention 10 and dismiss the contention from this proceeding.
C.
Joint Intervenors' Contention 12 is Appropriate for Summary Disposition and Should Be Dismissed Contention 12 (as admitted by the Board in the September 30, 1981 flemorandum and Order) -
Proper operation of power operated relief valves, associated block valves and the instruments and controls for these valves is essential to mitigate the consequences of accidents.
In addition, their failure can cause or aggravate a LOCA.
Therefore, these valves must be classified as components important to safety and required to meet all safety-grade design criteria.
The above contention argues that Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV's) should be classified as compontnts important to safety and required to meet all safety-grade standards.
Proper operation of the PORV's and the associated block valves is not a critical safety function and, therefore, the PORV's and block valves are not required to be desigr.ed to safety grade criteria. The critical safety functions which must be provided by safety grade systems, none of which the PORV's or block valves are meant to perform, are identified in Section III.C of Appendix A ta 10 C.F.R. Part 100.
(Jensen Affidavit at 9).
The function of the PORV is to prevent unnecessary opening of the pressurizer safety valves and to provide a backup means of depressuri-zation and overpressure protection. The function of the block valves is to permit isolation of a leaking or failed open PORV.
(Id_.at6).
Proper operation of the PORV and the block valves is not-required to mitigate the consequences of any design basis accident.
(I d_. ) Failure of a PORV and block valve.to function can cause the equivalent of a
~
small-break LOCA, but if the failure occurred in conjunction with a LOCA, the consequences would not be significantly altered. An unisolated stuck-open PORV would not result in core damage.
(I.d. at 7).
Joint Intervenors are apparently under the impression that the PORV's and block valves are not classified as " components important to safety".
In fact, the PORV's and block valves are considered " components important~
to safety" with respect to their pressure control function.
(Id at 8).
They are not required to meet safety-grade criteria. The term "important to safety" applies generally to a broad class of structures, systems and components addressed in the General Design Criteria (GDC's).
" Safety Grade" structures, systems and components are a subclass of all those "important to safety". All structures, systems, and components encompassed by the term "important to safety" (including the " safety-grade" sub-class) are necessary to meet the broad safety goal articulated in Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 of the regulations (i.e., to provide reasonable assurance that a facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
(Id.) Only " safety-grade" structures, systems, and components are required for critical accident prevention, safe shutdown, and accident consequences mitigation safety functions identified in Section III.C of Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 100.
The PORV's and block valves are not used to perform those functions.
(Id.
at 9).
The Joint Intervenors' Contention 12 also implias that the operation of the relief and safety valves is essential to mitigate the consequences of accidents. The facts do not support such an assertion.
The function of the PORV's at Diablo Canyon is to open at the set pressure of 2350 psig
. o
-and relieve pressurizer steam so as to preclude the necessity of the safety valves being opened for mild transients. The set pressure for the safety valves is 2485 psig.
(M. at 6). The PORV's may also be manually opened by the operator at any pressure below their setpoint to provide a backup means of pressure control in accordance with the operating pro-cedures, flanual opening of the PORV's would cause them to relieve steam at the pressure of the reactor.
Reliance is placed on the Engineered Safety Features to mitigate design basis events rather than on the PORV's.
(Id.).
The function of the block valve is to isolate a leaking or failed open PORV. The PORV might leak or fail open during operating conditions.
The operator might close _the block valve at any time to isolate the leak.
(Gov. Brown /J.I. Admissions B-1).
The analyses in WCAP-9600 (attached as Appendix C) demonstrated that adequate core cooling occurred without operator action.
(Gov. Brown /J.I. Admissions B-7).
Reliance is placed on the Emergency Core Cooling System to mitigate the event, rather than manual closure of the block valve.
(Jensen Affidavit at 7). The PORV's and block valves, therefore, are not essential to mitigate the consequences of accidents. The functions of these compo-nents are not required for the critical accident prevention, safe shut-down, and accident consequence mitigation safety functions identified in Section III.C.of Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 100. (M. at 9). The PORV's and block valves are, therefore, properly classified as non safety-grade.5f 5/
See n.4.
The use of the PORV's and block valves in some emergency procedures does not change the conclusion as to the classification of those components. Although the operation of the PORV's and block valves woul'd be expected to be normally available during a number of transients and accidents, these components are not required to protect the reactor. As discussed in Chapter 15 of the FSAR, reliance is placed on the Reactor Protection System and the Engineered Safety Features, which are designed to safety-grade criteria.
It must be recognized that emergency procedures are written to present guidance on all options available to the operator for coping with a plant transient or accident. To do otherwise would be an unwise limitation of design and operator capability during such events.
The licensing arena in which conservative assumptions on the unavailability of non-safety grade components are typically imposed should not be con-fused with an actual accident or transient during which the operator would be expected to make maximum use of ALL available systems, whether they are safety-grade or not.
(Id. at 8).O In sum, based on the above discussion and attached supporting affidavits and documents, there are no material facts on which an evidentiary hearing is necessary.
Further, on the legal question of whether under the above facts the PORV's and block valves should be classified as safety-grade under the regulations, the Staff is entitled to a favorable ruling confirming that the present classification of 6/ - See n.3.
those components is correct., The Staff, therefore, also urges the Licensing Board to grant surnary disposition of Contention 12 and I
dismiss the contention from this proceeding.
Respectfully su itted, h
Bradley W.
es Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 21st day of December,1981.
4 f
_ _ _. _