ML20038C512
| ML20038C512 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1981 |
| From: | Olmstead W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | CALIFORNIA, STATE OF, JOINT INTERVENORS - DIABLO CANYON |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8112110172 | |
| Download: ML20038C512 (17) | |
Text
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12/10/81 Of s
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N
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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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qi PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
Docket Nos. 50-275 OL N cp
)
50-323 OL (Diable Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Unit Nos. I and 2)
)
NRC STAFF SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO VRITTEN INTERROGATORIES Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.740(e) the NRC Staff is supplementing its response to written interrogatories received from Joint intervenors and Governor Brown.
In light of the information recently received from FEMA concerning its interim evaluation of offsite emergency preparedness at Diablo Canyon, the NRC Staff now expects to call Brian Grimes, Director of the Division of Emergency Preparedness, NRC as one of its witnesses on emergency planning matters. A copy of Mr. Grimes' professional qualifications is in Attachment A.
Mr. Grimes' testimony will concern the significance of deficiencies identified by FEMA in terms of the findings required by NRC for licensing pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47. A copy of similar testimony in the San Onofre proceeding is in Attachment B.
In response to interrogatory 15 from "NRC Response to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. 's First Set of Interroaatories and Second Request for Produc-tion of Documents" dated September 14, 1981, the NRC Staff indicated only one conversation between Drian Grimes, NRC and officials of the California State government concerning the complicating effects of an earthquake on emergency preparedness and/or response at Diablo Canyon.
Subsequently, O
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2-during a review of documents produced by the Governor in Sacramento, Staff Counsel discovered two meeting summaries which Indicated that Mr. Grimes had discussed earthquake planning at Diablo Canyon on at least two occasions when California State officials were present. Although Mr. Grimes has no specific recollection of the particular dates or meetings referenced, he has reviewed the documents and does not disagree with the remarks attributed to him.
A copy of tne two meeting summaries is in Attachment C.
Also attached is a copy of the Comission's December 8,1981 Memorandum and Order in the Matter of Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-33, 14 NRC
, which is relevant and material to the question of whether earthquakes should be considered as part of review of emergency plans pursuant to current Commission regulatfor's.
Respectfully submitted, bl
/
William J. Olmstead Deputy Chief Hearing Counsel Dated % t Bethesda, Maryland this 10th day of December, 1981
ATTACllMENT A BRIAN K. GRIMES PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS -
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT I am employed as Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D. C.
I am also the NRC Cochairman on the joint NRC/ Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Steering Comittee for Emergency Preparedness.
Responsibilities under my current assignments include directing the activities of perstnnel in the review of emergency plans for operating power reactors, operating licenses and construction permits and coordinating NRC and FEMA efforts in the review of emergency preparedness at and around nuclear power plant sites; assuring that the NRC's Operations Center is staffed, trained, and ready to respond promptly and effectively to actual or simulated emergencies, directing the NRC's inspection program to ensure NRC licensees are maintaining in eff ect emergency plans that there is no degradation in their ability to respond to emergencies.
I attended the University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, and received a l
BS degree in Chemical Engineering in 1962 and a MS degree in Nuclear Engineering in 1964. While completing my graduate work, I was employed as a research ~
l assistant at the University of MLshington Ingineering ' Experiment Station-i my duties involved perfoming analytical and experimental work on the University of Washington research reactor.
i In 1963, I accepted employment with the Division of Reactor Licensing, USAEC.
My first assignment involved attendance at the International Institute for l
l I
Nuclear Science and Engineering at Argonne National Laboratory for four months.
Upon completion of this course, I was assigned as a Nuclear Engineer in the Division of Reactor Licensing. My initial duties included primary responsibility for the continuing review of the nuclear safety aspects of various research reactors.
I subsequently participated in the safety evaluation of a number of construction permit applications for both pressurized and boiling water' power reactors.
Later, as a Reactor Project Engineer in the Division of Reactor Licensing, I had primary responsibility for the safety review of the construction permi,t application for.the Commonwealth Edison Company's Quad-Cities Units 1 and 2, for the Duke Power Company's Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, Z and 3, for the Metropolitan Edison Company's Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1, and for the Indiana & Michigan Electric Company's Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2.
I was assigned to the position of Technical Coordinator for Reactor Projects in October,1968.
Prior to March,1970, I served as Technical Coordinator for both pressurized and boiling water reactors. After March, 1970, as Technical Coordinator for Boiling Water Reactors, my responsibilities included coordinating the technical aspects of all safety reviews in the Boiling Water Reactor group, providing liaison with the pressurized water reactor group and serving as administrative assistant ~ to the Assistant Director for Boiling Water Reactors.
I was assigned to the position of Chief of the Radiological Safety Branch, Division of Reactor Licensing in July,1971, in which position I was responsible for the review of systems necessary for the control and treatment of radioactivity e
6
under normal and accident conditions.
In January,1972, the functions of this branch were divided and I was appointed Chief of the Accident Analysis Branch. My responsibilities as Chief of the Accident Analysis Branch included reviewing calculational models, procedures and methods developed by members of the Branch for both conservative assessment and a realistic assessment of the consequences of a spectrum of accidents for all nuclear power plants and reviewing analyses of all nuclear power reactor sites perfomed by members of the Branch with regard to site related hazards and compliance with the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100.
In January,1976 I was assigned to the.
position of Chief of the Environmental Evaluation Branch in the newly fonned Division of ' Operating Reactors In this position my responsibilities included supervising the review of radiological and non-radiological impacts of operating nuclear power plants from both a safety and environmental standpoint.
Branch review areas included accident ana' lyses, site-related hazards, effluent treatment l
l systems, off-site radiological effects, and thennal and chemical effluents.
1 On ApriT 1,1978 I was appointed Assistant Director for Engineering and Projects in the Division of Operating Reactors.
In this position my ' responsibilities,
included managing the activities of the Engineering Branch, the Environmental Evaluation Branch, Operating Reactors Project Branch No. 3, Operating Reactors Project Branch No. 4 and the Standard Technical Specification Group.
On June 25, 1979, I was assigned Acting Assistant Director for Systems Engineering in the Division of Operating Reactors, and managed the Plant Systems Branch l
and the Reactor Safety Branch. On October 25, 1979, I was designated Director l
of the Emergency Preparedness Task Group reporting to the Director of the l
l
_4-Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
In November.1980, all reactor emergency preparedness review activities were combined with NRC response activities in the new Division of Emergency Preparedness in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement and I was appointed Director of that Division.
In this positicn, I supervise. the Emergency Preparedness Licensing Branch, Eccrgency Preparedness Development Branch and the Incident Response Branch.
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ATTACl! MENT B 11 have some level of conta'mination on their clothes or perso,008 1
ns, 2
that it would be desirable to minimize their exposure, and 3
prevent the spread of radioactivity to other areas by checking 4
them at relocation centers, and we have a provision that says 5
there should be a capability to bring in over some time period, 6
I think it is a 12-hour time period, monitoring equipment to 7
be able to check the number of people that one mightnexpect 3
at a relocation center, if you told people there was a chance 9
they were contaminated and that they should be sure to report 10 to that center.
11 Normally, people would not use the center for the 12 most party because most people in an evacuation would travel 13 elsewhere, but -- to relatives or other locations, but in the
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14 event that there us a problem of contamination, we believe 15 that they would very likely follow directions and go to be 16 checked and given a clean bill of health, for the nost part, 17 with respect to any levels of contamination.
13 Q
Now, Mr. Grimes, I would like to -- do you have 19 a copy of the Staff's Supplement number 3 to the SER with you?
20 A
Yes.
21 0
I would like you to turn to page 13-4, the 22 conclusion section, particularly the final sentence, which 23 reads, further,provided Ithat the corrective actions discussed 24 in Section 13.3.4 ab'ove are carried out prior to full power 25 operation, we conclude that the state of onsite and offsite
7 1
emergency preparedness at San Onofre 2 and 3 providea 2
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and 3
will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
4 Have you been present portions of yesterday and 5
today when Mr. Nauman presented his testimony?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
And have you seen the written testimony that has been entered in this 'ase and5 sponsored by FEMA?
8 c
9 A
Yes.
I don't have it before me right now.
10 Q
Let me provide you with that.
11 So you are f amiliar with the evaluations that the 12 Federal Emergency Management Agency has done, and the current 13 posture of the state of offsite emergency preparedness?
k' 14 A
Yes.
15 0
could you then, given the context that we have, 16 expand on this statement in the SER, and relate it, if you 17 can, to the circumstances that we have presently?
18 A
Yec.
The last statement on:page 13-4 of the --
19 of supplement three is our conclusion, and given FEMA's 20 conclusion in its June 26 letter, that there were agreed and 21 defined positions concerning what FEMA's major concerns were 22 and the course of action that was being undertaken to correct 23 those, and also then as now supplemented by the FEMA 24 headquarters' judgment as relayed by Mr.Nauman in the September 25 24, 1981 testimony, that there is reasonable assurance
8 1
adequate protectiva measurco can and will be taken.
11,010 2
We therefore can make the overall finding that 3
there is reasonable assurance for both onsite and of fsite 4
preparedness, and that this is adequate, and to -- also, we -
5 believe, for the Board to do that, and perhaps I could go 6
through what our position would be in a noncontested case, and 7
then compare that to a contested case, to illustrate our 3
thinking in the matter.
9 In a noncontested case, we would identify our 10 own and FEMA's major deficiencies with respect to the planning 11 standards after a review of the onsite plans in our case and 12 the offsite plans in the case of FEMA.
13 Any deficiencies which were identified would be V
14 reflected in our safety evaluation reports and would have to 15 be corrected prior to issuance of a full power license.
Any 16 major deficiencies.
17 The exercise would normally be considered part of 13 our pre-operational inspection process, and here I would 19 relate that to any other part of the review process the Staf f i
20 goes through on other parts of the plant, that we review those i
l 21 portions of the FSAR provided to us by the licensce, make our 22 findings in the SER based on reasonable assurance, and then on l
23 an audit basis in the plant, during our pre-op inspection 24 process, verify that those things, appropriate procedures are 25 put in place, and that the equipment is in place, as was
11,011
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1 specified in the FSAR.
2 However, this latter part is generally not part of 3
the Board consideration.
4 Of course, the exercise must be held before a 5
full power license is granted, or at least before power levels 6
of above about five percent are exceeded, and any major 7
deficiencies identified in that exercise must also be 8
corrected.
9 In a contested case --
10 JUDGE KELLEY:
Excuse me.
Do you get a FEMA 11 review in an uncontested case?
12 WITNESS GRIMES:
Yes, and we would have a FEMA 13 review ordinarily on the plans, and when available, also on
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14 the exercise, before we issued our final safety evaluation 15 report supplement, and then we would have a finding on the 16 exercise prior to actually granting the license.
17 In a contested case, of course, there needs to be 18 a finding made of reasonable assurance on the areas that are 19 under contention, and the other areas would be treated by the 20 staff as in a noncentested case, and I have already made the 1
21 analogy of the SER evaluation versus the preoperational 22 inspection in other areas, and I think that.would apply here l
23 by -- in a. contested case, rather, by saying that the plan 24 review should be the major focus of the proceeding.
25 The -- if deficiencies are identified in the plan, r
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f0 then we believe that tho identification of clear courses bk' 1
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2 action to remedy those deficiencies, if they are straightfor-3 ward, and are likely to result in fixing the deficiencies, can 4
result in a finding of reasonable assurance on the overall 5
state of energency preparedness, conditioned on fixing those 6
things before an: actual license is granted.
7 Now, the exercise, I believe, in the general 8
contested case, can be treated as part of the preoperational 9
inspection process, which the Board does not necessarily have 10 to look at.
11 In this case, since we have an exere:.se held, and 12 we have identified specific deficiencies already, because of --
13 partly because of the exercise, I think it is reasonable that fs 14 the reasonable assurance finding should also address those 15 known deficiencies, and the courses of action that have been 16 laid out for those major deficiencies.
In this case, both 17 the planned deficiencies, and the exercise deficiencies are 18 addressed in the action plan dated June 26 from the licensee 19 to the NRC, and as discussed in Mr. Jaske's July 14 memorandum 20 to me, as being acceptable to FEMA as identifying the major 21 issues, and providing an adequate plan for fixing them.
22 So, we come to the Staff bottom line on page 13 13-4 of the SER, in supplement 3 of the SER, that given these 24 corrective actions, there is reasonable assurance at this 15 time that adequate protective measures can and will be taken
11,013 19 1
in the event of radiological emergency af ter issuance of the 4
2 license, and we believe that the Board should also be able to 3
reach the same conclusions with respect to those action plan 4
items which relate to the contentions.
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I
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ATTACilMENT C
./
Offica of Emergency Services CORRESPONDENCE COORDINATION SHEET Phil GreenbcI9 October 27, 19C0 K
D:p Dir Asst i
Di' I ary Frances Reed, Chief 7mdear Paer Plant Plann2ng Dir M c fieetings on Off-site E crgen:f Planning i
at San Onofre and Diablo Canyon pg
=
As I nuntioned in our telephone conversation last Wednesday, the 130 held actings on October 20 and 21 with FDm, OES, the cryunties and utilities r
to discuss the California, local and utility erurgency plans for areas gg mTounding the sites, the e;qected cx:cpletion dates for the plans, obstacles pg m ccmpletion and related matters. The agendas are attached. OES was represented bf Jack Kearns, Don Maestretti, Jim Alexander (Pegion I) and nn.
2 am straurizing here urf understanding of what was said by key lEC and FDR vffim nl4 on several significant issues.
Chief Emerg The San Onofre nneting was attended only by repre,sentatives of organizations Asst involved in the planning process. Drian Grires, Director for Dicrgenc"f
?ruparedness Program, IUC, stated that there is no Irquircrnnt that 13C eceive findings frcrn ma based on a form 1 subnittal of plans by a state Chief toFD%. Nw reactors will not be licensed for full power operation until Plons TB sends their finiirsjs on the status of off-site plans to IGC and IUC mkes a final deternination of their adeqtricy.
M: cording to John McCcnnnell, Assistart Director for Population Preparedness,
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M Chief for:ral subnittal and review process includes suhnission of plans by the state.
Cemm In nFAition, MG is to be aware of the status of planning throughout the Chief entire process. At NIC's request, they will issue findings based on the currunt Rodef status. The final FB R rule, due out November 1, is expected to include this second rethod.
In sumary, there will be no formal requireannts on who rust subnit plans to whcIn and it will not be necessary for the state to do the subnission in ordar Chief Fire for ma to issue findings and for 130 to determine the plans are adoquate and license a new reactor.
Iater in the meeting, !t:Connell said EG will not review any plan unless it carries the endorsement of local goverrrent and that EG's findings will be
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based on the entire state of energency preparedness. ':5is will have to incittle FCG's review of state and local plans and proceduros and the viedng of an earcise. lie believes scre criteria kould have to be ret by the state and could not be ret by artfone else.
Chief Util Prap by M Typed by bd
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Omce of Emergency Services CORRESPONDENCE COORDINATION SHEET Phil Greenberg Decenber 17, 1980 Of fica of the Governor Dir D:rp Dir wry Frances Reed, Ph.D., Chief Asst thclear Pcwor Plant Planning Dr Asst Dir Consideration of Earthquakes in Emergency Response PLO lanning for Nuclear Power Plant Accidents P
On Decenber 11, 1980, Don Maestretti and I attended a meeting to discuss requirenents for the Dv_rgency Operations Facility (IDF) for the Rancho Seco Chisi ndclear power plant. 'Ihis neeting was chaired by Brian Grinns, Director for F/A Erergency Preparedness Programs, NRC, and was also attended by representatives Of Film, SSUD, Sacranento County and Joe Ward of the State Departnent of Health Services.
Chist In addition to the EF, a recent letter frcxn the IEC to their licensees Emstg regarding the necessity for considering earthquakes in the offsite emergency
^ $ 5' n'ans for nuclear power plants was discussed. Brian Grires was asked to c:.arify this new requirement. He stated that two situations were to be considered:
Chisf 1.
A strong earthquake (dasign basis earthquake) leading to a degraded Plons situation at the plant; e.g., at the alert or Wite area emergency level. Plans nust consider the need to get key people to the IDF and to the site. Ecy overpasses nust have altarnate routes, back-up cxrmunications nust be available, etc.
l Chist l
Csmm' 2.
A noderate earthquake offsite that does not affect the plant but cbes lead to degradation of emergency preparedness in the surrounding Chisi area. One possibility for handling this situation would be to close Redef the plant until the offsite energency response capability was restored.
I believe the consideration of an eartiguake actually damaging plant safety mster:s in the preparation of emergency response plans for nuclear pcxer plant Chist accidents has not been indicated to be necessary by IEC offit-inla prior to l
Fire this time. Considering the Governor's concern about earthquake ha w T3s to aclear ine_r plants in California, I thought I should report this discussion n
l to you.
Please contact me if I can provide further information.
Chisf am enclosing two copies of the revised version of IUREG-0654 which we have I
l Law j 2st received.
l M'GY FRTe m RECD, Ph.D., Chief N2 clear Pczer Plant Planning l
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m Diablo Canyon meeting was a public rneeting, with Pbthers for Peace',' # Y'
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hlone Alliance and several radio and '1V stations in attendance, in addition '.V '
gt.th,,, to individuals involved in the planning process.
County officials estimated
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=pletion of the entire planning process, including exercises and approval
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'Ihe Chainran y the Board of Supervisors, would take approximately two years.
,f the Board of Supervisors emphasized that they have made a uxnitment to.
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f ull public involvanent at all stages of the process.
U" rian Grires did say (although I'm not sure this is what he meant) that a PIO Ifull power operating license would not be issued until the plan and exercise nre ccrplete and that it is up to the cx>unty to schedule their planning.
A m paur testing license could be issued on the basis of old criteria, Nhan J sked by a ruter of the public if the plans will take eartlquakes and the
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esultant probicas of bridges.being out, etc., into account, Grines replied a
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d would require these ocuplicating features to be ad resse.
l Please note that we were unabl[to attend any reer.ings on the afterncon of h 21, so we weIn not a'aare of any findings or any actions which trans-Chief Emerg pired at those meetings.
,, g Asst s
'ary Frances Reed, Ph.D., Chief l
Nuclear PCMer Plant Planning Chief Plans Att.
Chief Comm Chef Redef Chief Fire l
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ATTACllMENT D UNITED STATES OF R4 ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONilSSION
. COW 4ISSIONERS:
Nunzlo J. Palladino, Chairman Victor Gilinsky Peter A. Bradford John F. Ahearne Thomas M. Roberts
)
.u In the Matter of
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-SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON
)
Docket Nos. 50-361 OL
. COMPANY g d.
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50-352 OL
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'7 (San' Onofre Nuclear
)
- ~ Generating Station, Units
)
.1 and 2)
)
)
MEtiORANDL11 AND ORDER (CLI-81-33)
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By order dated September 18, 1981, the Comission took up er its own motion the issue previously raised sua sponte by the Atom 1c Safety
. and Licensing Board -- whether emergency planning should be concerned with earthquakes approaching or beyond the safe shutdown earthquake
, occurring with a release of radiation offsite.M After consideration of this and related issues, the Comission has decided *.ht.t its current
. regulations do not require consideration of the impacts on emergency
'plarming of earthquakes which cause or occur during an accidential
. radiological release. Whether or not emergency planning requirements
'sh'ould be amended to include these considerations is a question to be Y
By definition, in the event of a safe shutdown carthquake, the plant is required to be designed to be capable of. safe shutdown or the prevention of the reinase of radiation in excess of levels specified in current regulations.
10 CFR Part 100, App. A, III(c).
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cddressed o.n a generic, as opposed to case-by-case, basis. Accordingly, It'he 1.icensing Board is hereby directed not to pursue this issue in thi:
pro'c'eeding.
A review of the ruler.akir.g file ossociated with the Corr.ission's er r;ency planning regulations (see 45 FR 55402; 44 FR 75167; 44 FR
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41483) reveals that the Comission did not address the question of hnw
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the consequences of a severe earthquake would influence er~3rgency pl ann'i ng. Three comenters suggested that the NRC specifically require
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,.the, occurrence of earthquakes or severe natural phenomena to be part of
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' 'f the basis for emergency response planning, but the coments were not accepted in the final rule.
(See NUREG-0628, NRC Staff Freliminary Analysis of Public Coments on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Eroergency Planning; NUREG-0684. Sumary of Public Comments and NRC Staff A.nalysis Relating to Rulemaking on Einergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants; and NUREG/CP-00ll, Proceedings of )dorkshops on Proposed
, 'Rulemaking on Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants.) The current regulations are designed with the flexibility to accomodate a range of onsite accidents, including accidents that may be caused by severe
., earthquakes.
This does not, however, mean that emergency plans should be tailored to accomodate specific accident sequences or that emergency plans must also take into account the disruption in implementation of Offsite emergency plans ceused by seveTT earthquakes.
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The tonunission will consider oc a generic basis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe
.eapthquake on emergency planning.
For the interirt, the proximate
'becurrence of an accidential radiological release and an earthquake that
'could disrupt nonnel emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely
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.that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic
,;. consideration of the matter is not warranted.
The Comission will consult with,the Federal Emergency Managenient Agency as it proceeds to
, determine a further course of action.
- It is so ORDERED.
[,
the Corm sion oLW i SAJ4UELJ.KHILK
'...J Secretary of th( Comission Dated at Washington, D.C.
'this 8th day of December, 1981.
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9
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER AHEARNE 7
The. San Onofre Licensing Board has identified two wea.kne's'ses in the NRC approach to emergency planning.
The Commfission should. address these weaknesses on a generic ba s'15..
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- The basic assumption in emergency planning is t. hat rad.ioactive m,a.terials are released into the area around the J
pla n.'t.' 1. e.. emergency planning assumes failure of reactor saf,ety
... s/ stems.
The board has suggested that we thould also examine our a'ssumptions about the impact of natural disasters occurring during a release on emergency planning capability.
Reactors are built in areas of differing natural hazards:
earthquakes in Califo.rnia; tornadoes in Alabama; hurricanes in Florida. Texas, North Carolina and. Connecticut; blizzards in Wiscons'in.
T.he NRC emergency p.lanning rule accommodates
. ' operation under the worst annual conditions.
The Board J
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.. suggests.that is correct for the basic plan, but that the p.lan.-s.hould also be examined to see how much flexibili ty it has to' provide some response capability for a once in a lifetime event.
(The Board actually discussed a once in thousands of years event.)
In de.termining whether this issue should be included in t'he. San Onofre operating license proceeding, several questions shou'Id be answered:
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(1)
Will specific reactor des"ign changes be required?
I do not believe so.
The types of changes that might be required to achieve flexibility relate to adequate prepara tion, i.e..
thinking in advance
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, about possible dif ficulties and developing procedures to assu.re the appropriate response.
Consequently, changes with respect to the reactor itself would not be necessary.
(2)
Will local governments be required to spend sizeable funds in order to implement these modifications?
I do not believe they will.
Because of the very low probability of the basic events being discussed, it is not appropria te to impose major Lew require-ments.
Rather, the goal is to provide for graceful degradation of the plan under worse than planned for condi tions.
The most likely result would be to require exami-nation of a plan to see what kind of flexibility
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or stretch it has, and then perhaps to incorporate some where there is none through advance planning.
(3)
To what extent will resolution of the issue turn on expert judgment?
Examina tion of plans for degradation will primarily be subjective, requiring expert knowledge.
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Why should this not b6 done"by FEMA?
The issues
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involved are ones that relate primarily to the
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offsite planning by State and local governments, This area is' reserved to FEMA in the emergency i
planning process.
.,. ( 5 )
Why should the requirements not be set generically rather than by an individua'l licensing board?
The issues raised by the board affect all emergency pla'nning and consequently are not unique to San Onofre.
. These. considerations provide additional support for the Congission's decision to address this issue generically ra,ther than in the San Onof re proceeding:
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.(1),(2)
My expectation that reactor design changes and large expenditures by the local governments
' will be unnecessary supports my belief that l
resolution of the issue can wait for a generic proceeding.
Otherwise it might be difficult
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to backfit any final decision concerning the need to incorpora te flexibili ty.
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.(3)
Input from a Licensing Board is less useful
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for areas which turn primarily on expert j udgment than for areas which can be resolved 1argely by using logic and general scientific principles.
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The structure of the hearing decision process is not consis tent with the need to have FEMA take the lead in resolution of this issue.
,(5)
The fundamental question is how to approach this area of emergency planning.
Issues of basic policy should be set by the Commission, 1~
not an individual Licensing Board.
Thirefo re. I conclude. the Commission should (1) direct the Licensing Board not to take up this issue. (2) direct the
. staff to work with FEMA to develop an approach for checking th'e' flexibility of plans and develop guidelines as to what k
.s'heuld be included in those plans, (3) direct the staff to work with FEMA in examining existing plans for San Onofre
, and other appropriate reactors to determine whether adequate
. flexibility appears to be present, and finally (4) based on this work prepare and publish for public comment the necessary rev.isions to our emergency planning rule.
l.
l Having outlined my position as to why I recommend l
. support of the Commission order, I believe I must respond to h
. several points made by Commissioner Gilinsky.
l I do not see us going to greath lengths to avoid having
.a 11. censing board deal with a question.
I strongly disagree with the implication in Commissioner Gilinsky's remarks that 4
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. having a board examine and decide issues can be done sinply' and quickly.
In fact, experience shows that putting complex
.. issues, into the adjudicatory system without adequate guidance lead.s to.a long drawn out process and a poor decision.
What-Ka1TJtoo familiar,is the willingness of commissioners to
' - (. ;abdica~te their responsibility to develop policy for the agency.
~
The responsibility for long rulemakings resides with
-,', - the people who run the agency, namely, the Commissioners.
The Reorganization Act reserves formulation of basic policy
~
-,to; the Co'mmi.s s i o ne rs.
Let us do it.
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SEPARATE VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER GILINSKY
=.
REGARDING THE SAN ONOFRE $3 SPONTE ISSUE
. s.
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It appears the commission will go to any length to avoid hp.ving a Licensing Board deal with'a question the Board e -
its' elf has raised.
' The ~$an Onofre Board askoa, in ef fect, whether the applican't '
. :and NRC staff had considered the possib l ty that an earthqua e i i k
. hich damages the reactor might simultaneously disrupt w
evacuation routes and sever offsite communication.
Such an g
earthquako need not necessarily exceed the limiting earthquake
~ ' considered in the safety review process.
It seems a reasonable
. gu.estion to ask about a nuclear plant in an earthquake-prone area.
A common sense approach would let the Board examine and
. decide the issue in the particular circumstances of this
.~..
cape.
This could be done simply and quickly and the Commission would have a chance to review the result.
Instead, to take
... the matter outside the adjudicatory process, the Commission
' has decided that the question affects all plants and that it should therefore be handled "on a generic basis".
It will consult with the Federal Emergency Management Agency on the effects of earthquakes on emergency planning "as it proceeds to determine a further course of action".
.If past practice is a guide Interagency meetings will be held.
Memoranda will be written.
The Commission will be
. briefed.
Contracts to study the question will be awarded to national laboratories.
Increased budget requests will be received from our staff.
The Commission will be drawn into ponderous rulemaking.
But the most elementary steps to assure public protection will not be taken.
An all too
' familiar story.
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SEPARATE VIEWS OF COMMISS10MER BRADFORD
^
REGARDING THE SAN ON0FRE SUA_SPONTE ISSUE
)
. agree with the vic'ws of Comissioner Gilinsky.
In addition. I l"would note that the Comission has had a number of npportunities over 8
.th6 last thr.ee years to review on-soing proceedings to correct problems
^
arising.fr6m Licensing or Appeal Board decisions or from staff 2.206 i
When it has stepped into proceedings in progress, it has
. denials
' curtailed investigation of issues unfavorable to the app 1tcant; the
.Comission has stayed its hand when that action upholds Board or staff 8
conduct favorable to the applicant.y It has rarely required a Board or the staff to expand safety or environmental considerations.
~-.
7..This ~ case presents an especially unfortunate manifestetion of that te'ndehey.
Despite a recent demonstration of the value of sua sponte
~
_re' view,2) the Comission is telling a Board that h3s had the foresight
. -:.to' uncover a serious safety matter" within the meaning of 10 CFR 2.760a that it may not inquire into the matter further, even though the Board
'.. :.apparently doubts that it has " reasonable assurance that adequate protective
.. measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency The result of this action could easily be an inadequacy
.'(10 CfR 50.47)."
.in San Onofre emergency planning that goes unremedied for a long time.
. y See, eA, Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Islaad Nuclear
~
Station, Unit 1),11 NRC 674 (1980), restricting the manner of litigation of hydrogen control issues; Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1),12 NRC 607 (1980),
. foreclosing any consideration of psychological stress arising from
.the reopening of Three Mile Island; Northern Indiana _ Public Service
_ Company (Bailly Generating Station. Nuclear-1),10 NRC 733 (1979),
' refusing a ! earing on a change in plant foundations, reversed sub
. nom. People of the State of Illinois v. NRC No. 80-1163 (D.C.
. fir. July l'~19BT); Houstin tighting anFTower Company (South
. Texas Project Units 1 and 2), CLI 81-28 (November 4.1981), declining
- 'to review an Appeal Board order reversing a Licensing Board decision td furnish names of witnesses interviewed during an NRC investigation; and an unmemorialized 2-2 decision in May 1981, not to review Perrors by a Diablo Canyon Licensing Board, see Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. Linits 1 and
'2), CLI B1-22 (September 21. 1981), Commissioner Gilinsky's Separate Opinion, Slip at 10.
Florida _ power and Light _ Company (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, y ~ Unit No. 2),12 NRC 30 (1980).
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSthG BOARD in the Matter of
)
)
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
Docket Nos. 50-275 0.L.
)
50-323 0.L.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Unit Nos. I and 2)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mall, first class or, as Indicated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Requiatory Commission's internal mail system, this 10th day of December, 1981:
John F. Wolf, Esq., Chairman
- Richard E. Blankenburg, Administrative Judne Co publisher Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Wayne A. Soroyan, News Reporter U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission South County Publishing Company Washington, DC 20555 P.O. Box 460 Arroyo Grande, CA 93420 Glenn O. Bright, Esq.*
Administrative Judge Mr. Gordon Silver Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mrs. Sandra A. Silver U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1760 Alisal Street Washington, DC 20555 San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Dr. Jerry Kline, Administrative Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Judge
- Snell & Wilmer Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 3100 Valley Center U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cnnmission Phoenix, AZ 95073 Washinqton, DC 20555 Paul C. Valentine, Esq.
Ms. Elizabeth Apfelberg 321 Lytton Avenue 1415 Cozadero Palo Alto, CA 94302 San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Bruce Norton, Esq.
Philip A. Crane, Jr., Esq.
3216 North 3rd Street Pacific Gas & Electric Company Suite 202 P.O. Box 74 4,2 Phoenix, AZ 85012 San Francisco, CA 94120 Andrew Baldwin, Esq.
Mr. Frederick Eissler 124 Spear Street Scenic Shoreline Preservation San Francisco, CA 94105 Conference, Inc."
4623 More Mesa Drive Santa Barbara, CA 93105
1 Mrs. Raye Fleming Harry M. Willis, Esq.
1920 Mattle Road Seymour & Willis Shell Beach, CA 93449 601 California St., Suite 2100 San Francisco, CA 94108 Joel R. Reynolds, Esq.
John R. Phillips, Esq.
Janice E. Kerr, Esq.
Center for Law in the Pubile Lawrence 0..
Carcia, Esq.
Interest 350 McAllister Street 10951 West Pico Boulevard San Francisco, CA 94102 Thir d Floor Los Angeles, CA 90064 Mr. James 0. Schuyler Nuclear Projects Engineer Byron S. Georgiou Pacific Gas & Electric Company Legal Affairs Secretary 77 Beale Street Governor's Office San Francisco, CA 94106 State Capitol Sacramento, CA 95814 Mr. Mark Gottlieb Californie Energy Commission David E. Fleischaker, Esq.
MS-18
'P.O. Box 1178 1111 Howe Avenue Oklahoma City, OK 73101 Sacramento, CA 95825 Richard B. Hubbard Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal MHB Technical Associates Panel (5)*
1723 Hamilton Avenue - Suite K U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission San Jose, CA 95125 Washington, Dr 20555 John Marrs, Managing Editor Atomic Safety and Licensing Board San Luis Obispo County Panel
- Teleoram-Tribune U.S. Nuclear Requiatory Commission 1321 Johnson Avenue Washington, DC 20555 P.O. Box 112 San Luis Obispo, CA 93406 Docketing and Service Section (i)*
Office of the Secretary l
Herbert H. Brown U.S. Nuclear Requiatory Commission Hill, Christopher & Phillips, P.C.
Washington, DC 20555 1900 M Street, N.V.
Washington, DC 20036 l
l
,.D ^
i William J. Olmsts'ad j
Deputy Chief Hearing Counsel i
l
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