ML20038A846

Responds to IE Bulletin 81-02 Suppl 1, Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure. Lists of Westinghouse Electro Mechanical Div Valve & Corrective Actions Encl.Approx 400 Manhours Expended

ML20038A846
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek, Callaway
Issue date:	11/16/1981
From:	Petrick N STANDARDIZED NUCLEAR UNIT POWER PLANT SYSTEM
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
REF-SSINS-6820 IEB-81-02, IEB-81-2, SLNRC-81-125, NUDOCS 8111240219
Download: ML20038A846 (6)

Text

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e SNUPPS Standardded Nuclear Unit Power Plant System 5 Choke Cherry Road Nicholas A. Petrick Rockville, Maryland 20850 Executive Director ta u 8smo flovember 16, 1981 SLilRC 81-125 FILE: 0278.10 SUBJ:

IE Bulletin 81-02 Supplement #1 Mr. James G. Keppler, Director Region III, Office of I&E U.S. Iluclear Regulatory Comission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

$\\\\NI/eq Mr. Karl Seyfrit, Director 7

Region IV, Office of I&E 1

N. l.;

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I U.S. Iluclear Regulatory Commission N OV ~o I93 b Suite 1000, Parkway Central Plaza "5Tfj7g(" R; v

H2 611 Ryan P1aza Arlington, Texas 76012 A

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s Docket llos: STN 50-482 and STN 50-483 Ref: SLflRC 81-59, dated July 22, 1981, IE Bulletin 81-02 Gentlemen:

This letter is submitted in response to the subject IE Bulletin for the SNUPPS Utilities, Kansas Gas and Electric Company and Union Electric Com-pany.

The referenced letter provided the SNUPPS response to IE Bulletin 81-02.

Reports on the potential failure to close of Westinghouse-EMD valves also were made by SHUPPS in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). Supplement 1 to Bulletin 81-02 noted that Westinghouse-EMD valves of sizes other than that reported in the original Bulletin also had the potential for failure to close.

The attached table provides the information requested by the Bulletin for the additional Westinghouse-EMD valves. The corrective action required for these valves and the schedule for the corrective action are the same as that given in the referenced letter.

Approximately 400 manhours have been expended investigating this matter and preparing this report. Manpower expenditures for the corrective action ' ave not been determined.

Ver truly yours, 3

8111240219 011116 DR ADOCK 05000

' %g C

Nicholas A. Petrick Attachment 9 i NOV 2 0 19@

cc: See Attached l

SLNRC 81-125 cc:

J. K. Bryan UE G. L. Kcester KGE D. T. McPhee KCPL W. Hansen NRC/ CAL T. E. Vandel NRC/WC R. DeYoung Office of I&E, Washington, D.C.

20555 J. Konklin NRC Region III

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ENCLOSURE A WESTINGHOUSE EMD VALVE INFORMATION j

MAXIMUM AP(psi) AS FLOW APPROACHES ZERO VALVE W EMD FINAL CONSEQUENCE VALVE LOCATION MODEL EQUIP.

FUNCTIONAL OF FAILURE FUNCTION NUMBER REFERENCE SPEC.

REQUIREMENT TO CLOSE*

VCT Outlet LCV 112B,C 4GM72FB 200 100 1

RWST to Suction of CCP's LCV 1. D,E 8CM72FB 200 200 1

RHR Suction 8701A B Isolation 8702A,B 12GM88SE 700 700 2

RHR Discharge Cross Connect 8716A,B 10CM74FE 700 300 1,4 RHR HX Discharge to CCP Suction 8804A 8CM74FE 700 300 4

RHR HX Discharge to' SI Pump Suction 8804B 8GM74FE 700 300 4

4

MAXIMUM AP(psi) AS FLOW APPROACHES ZERO i

VALVE W EMD FINAL CONSEQUENCE VALVE LOCATION MODEL EQUIP.

FUNCTIONAL OF FAILURE FUNCTION NUMBER REFERENCE SPEC.

REQUIREMENT TO CLOSE*

l RWST to SI Pump Suction 8806A,B 8GM72FB 206 200 1

1 CCP Suction l-to SI Pump Suction Crossover 8807A,B 6GM72FB 200 200 1

CCP Suction

.i to SI Pump Suction Crossover 8924 6CM72FB 200 200 1

Accumulator l

Discharge 8808A B.C,D 10GM78FN 2750-0 5

l RHR Pump CL Injection 8809A,B 10GM78FN 2750 200 4

RWST to RHR Pump Suction 8812A B 14GM74FE 700 100 1

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MAXIMUM AP(psi) AS FLOW APPROACHES ZERO VALVE W EMD TINAL CONSEQUENCE VALVE LOCATION MODEL EQUIP.

FUNCTIONAL OF FAILURE l'

FUNCTION NUMBER REFERENCE SPEC.

REQUIREMENT TO CLOSE*

}!

Sump Suction 8811A,B 14GM74FE 700 100 3

SI Pump I

Discharge Cross Connect 8821A,B 4GM77FN 1500 1500 4

SI Pump Suction Cross Connect 8923A,B 6CM72FB 200 200 1

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• NOTES 1.

Potential incomplete isolation of ECCS injection / recirculation trains.

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2.

Potential overpressurization of RHR system.

3.

Potential incomplete containment isolation.

4.

Potential incomplete RCS hot leg / cold leg recirculation train isolation.

5.

Potential RCS pressurization during cold shutdown operations.

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