ML20038A716
| ML20038A716 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  |
| Issue date: | 11/12/1981 |
| From: | Wolfe S Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | Cowna B, Sohinki S ECKERT, SEAMANS, CHERIN & MELLOTT, NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-MP, NUDOCS 8111160210 | |
| Download: ML20038A716 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES
[,k7 i.S NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION r_
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- by j ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL
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~81 NDY 12 P3:18 November 12, 1981 LQ,,,,
T SECRETAFY
, mG & SERVICE Barton Z. Cowan, Esq.
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Eckert, Seaman, Cherin & Mellott 600 Grant Street, 42nd Floor Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 w, Lq-Stephen M. Schinki, Esq.
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Counsel for NRC Staff T
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~,u In the Matter of e,, Q,7ar c
0FFSHORE POWER SYSTEMS A
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Docket No. STN 50-437 MP Gentlemen:
Pursuant to the Board's Order of November 3, 1981, Applicant and/or the NRC Staff are requested to submit written direct testimony by November 27, 1981, in response to thq f,cilowing Board questions:
1.
Since Gulf States Utilitie: Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760 (1977), involved a construction permit applica-tion rather than a manufacturing license application and since River Bend cites the " reasonable assurance" provision of s 50.35(a) which Appendix M to Part 50 states is inapplicable, why did Staff specifically include Appendix C to Supplement 4 to the SER to respond to the River Bend decision?
(See p. C-3 of Appendix C).
(Since this is a legal question, Staff's counsel may respond orally at the correncement of the hearing.)
2.
Wi respect to unresolved generic issues in Appendix C to Supple-mern 4 to the SER, the Staff concluded that (a) as to some issues there is reasonable assurance that the CNPs car be manufactured before these generic issues have been resolvM without endangering the heclth and safety of the public, (b) as to some issues that FNPs can be manuf actured before these generic issues have been resol without endangering the health and safety of the public, (c) as a some issues that the FNPs can be manufactured and operated before these generic issues have been resolved, without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, and (d) as to some issues that a satisfactory solution will be incorporated in the FNPs before they are placed in operation, and, therefore, there is reasonable assurance DQ that FNPs can be manufactured and operated, without undue risk to J
the health and safety of the public? What were the reasons for wording
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these conclusions differently?
f/O 8111160210 811112 PDR ADOCK 05000437 G
. November 12, 1981 3.
In light of the information required to be furnished by Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 775 (1977), with regard to the Staff's discussion of unresolved safety issues, Task Numbers A-12 and A-47, in Supple-ment a to SER, what alternative courses of action might be available should the programs for each not produce the envisaged rcsults?
4 What changes in the magnesium oxide core iadle would be necessary to provide complete containment of a molte, core?
Is such a design feasible for the proposed floating nuclear plants?
5.
Explain in greater detail the differences between the density driven case and the Kulacki-Goldstein case for heat transfer in the molten pool.
Describe qualitatively the behavior at the interface between the magnesium oxide and the molten uranium oxide in the core ladle, particularly at the bottom of the pool.
Discuss the possibility that pits will form in the pool bottom and grow preferentially.
Is the range of measurements described in the Kulacki-Goldstein paper appropriate to the situation in the molten core ladle? Table 5 of SER Supplement 3 reflects that two of the analyzed sixteen cases show that the pool freezes.
Explain in qualitative terms why that happens.
6.
Expliin why convective heat transfer by air was not considered by the Staff in its thernal analysis of the molten pool.
Following a core m-t scenario, wcs'd there be any air exchange between the chamber of the core iadie and the balarce of the containment?
7.
What changes would be required in the UPS design to meet the require-ments of the proposed final rule on hydrogen control which, as modified by the Staff at the Commission's request, is now being considered by the Coami sion?
Very truly yours, SheldonJ.Qolfe,E3 quire Chairman cc:
Service List
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