ML20038A085
| ML20038A085 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1976 |
| From: | CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| RO-76-1, NUDOCS 8110060023 | |
| Download: ML20038A085 (4) | |
Text
FIRST OF '1NO SHELS LICENSEE EVENT. REPORT CowTaOc stocoi0 I I l41017 to I '
,.u.
o s
e i m easseen N
N l Mi il BI R l pill I of 01-101 o f ol ol 01-1 olo I ik 1111l-l11 lolli 01 7 ee 14 12 2S 29 30 31 32 oocat? MAseFA EWh? D.it ApoNT Dats gaver l_l_J S LIJ l o f s i ol-l o li l s i s i I o f il il 917161 lo li ta l81716 i 7 e se Se ao si se ce 74 7S so svinT uun, sun EG / During a reviu, of Appendix J testing iequiresents, e vacuum instru:nent was identified l 7 81 ao as having inadequate design presoure
- sting. No redundant device is operable. Event l
'7 i' 9 80 0
l sirilar to 1-75) revice valved out with procedurai controls to return to service l l
7 8
@9lvhen needed. Replae ent of devi te being investigated. JM l
00 7_8 e 7
80 8I i
~
7 ee m
so "cou"e U conspos.on coot arama Wmatos
@ lf.l D l y lI l N l S l Tl RI U)
[Nj lBl0lkl5l
[Nj 7 89 10 1.
12 17 43 44 47 46 CAUSE DESCRf7 TION E l Bailey Meter Co pressure transmitter model BD1117% contains a diaphngs.rtich r.ay l
7 89 80
@ l upture if exposed ',o pressures greater than 10 psig. D3A pressure is 23 psig.
l 7 89 80
[iB i I
,'O WJ s.
on sr.ruc o.co a., o..c-o.e 8
Ltl lol 61 of I NA I LzJ l
u^
l g
10 12 13 44 45 48 80 7 8 s%*"isl i
i.
tocano,e o, muoi
=u"J" o ou.a e,. cur, LzJ LzJ NA NA l
i2 7 8 9
10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEt EXPOSURES samaeca tree on::nricae DE lOl01cl Lz_J l NA
_]
7 89 11 12 13 60 PERSONNEL INJURES usaeta otscaserose l 0l Ol 0l l NA l
14 7 89 11 12 60 FROBABLE CONSEQUENCES l Failure of the device vg.uld result in a loss of containmant vacut:s indication (contd} l 13 7 89 OO LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACRJTY tvet otscswices n L:J l Ni I
7 89 10 00 PUOUC!TY DG Ms retort vill be distributed to the Michim media on t.ans=1ttal to the NRC.
l 7 89 80 ACOfT10NAL FACTORS h l PROBABLE CONSEQUENCIU (Contd) rua.d would ecuse a small breach of containment l
89 60
@ lintec*rity (1/h-i*ch rire nice) l 7 89 00 l
l pa esi....
l I
8110060023 760128
~
PDR ADGCK 05000155 S
UCENSEE EVENT REPORT
).qd O coNTax m.oCol i 11I I I' cuanan maanma.msmusse monisanoso 1
W s u.
t==
n rm E LsI rl 21919111 I ol 01-101 o f of ol o1-1 of ol I hl1 h 12 !11 lo 111 7 89 14 15 23 26 30 31 32 moi.sca ocotti asuusse eveget cart me*ont uats hCONT d
l 0l Sl 0!-l0 l1 1 5l Sl l 0 l1l 1l 9lT l 6l l0l1l2l8l7l6l 7 8 57 SS SS 80 61 68 69 74 75 00 EVENT DESCRfm0N
@ LDuring a revies of App J testing requirements, severcl containment pressure sensing l
7 89 80 l svitches were found to have inadequate design pressure ratings. No redundant pressurel o
7 89 80
@ lsvitches are installed. Event similar to Ao 1-75.
Corrective Action: Yalved out l
7 89 80 l svitches whose function vould be impaired during a Eht with procedural controls to l
o:
7 8
@9l valve in when needed (T-1-76).
80 l
7 89 80 E E couponeNr coot waamme
@ M [BJ (I l N l S l TI Rl Ul W
lMl2l3lSl W
7 89 10 11 12 17 43 44 47 de CAUSE DE*N E l Mercoid pressure switches - DAW 23-153(R-3A) ed DAW 533(R-2) are installed in the l
7 89
@ l contair=sent pressure sensing lines. The set points of these uvitches vill change l
80 7 89 E l if they should be exposed to pressures anticipated durir.g a DBA.
l 80
'sE g powen ofwon starus vtav ascovtm otsoerose y
l 0l 6l 0l l NA l J l
NA l
7 8 g
to 12 13 44 43 48 a0
[o os s
amount or actury Locaros or nar.as.
13J LzJ l na l
I x^
l i2 7 8 9
10 11 44 45 PERSONNEL EXPOSI:AES eg numera free cascwtos
@ l 0l 0l d Wl HA l
7 89 11 12 13 80 PERSONNEL NJURIES NLweER otScMic4
@ l 0l 0l d l NA l
(
7 89 11 12 80 FRGBABLE C01 SEQUENCES
]E l Svitches (PS-6G thr t 667)(DAV21-lC3) vill still function to provide trip (contd) l 7 89 LDSS OR DAMAGE TC FACUTY 80 tvet erscWToN
@Ul NA l
7 89 10 80 FU3UCITY l S is report vill te distributed to the Michican med.a on transmittal to the NRC.
l 7 89 80 ACOITIONAL FACTORS ll l FOOBAELF CONSECUENCES (Contd) sigrals to reactor protection systen. Switches l
89 BC
@ l t)? 9051 ed 009 (mmi -sv. t rm-um ns esic-ad and, therefore, are valved out[
7 89 UO ve one.e,
i m...,.,
Ta
' 2BSewell, P21-107 9;
9 DEDeMoor, Big Rock /
GEPetitjean, Big Rock M
rm O
carc January 27, 1976 Sue. ace' ADDENDUM TG LICRNSEE EVENT REPCRT NUMBIE T-1-76 8a'taa n Connespomoemer DECEIVED cc N. B. Os v er AV- / r JAN 291976 NI' CLEAR UCENSING 1.
Analysis of Occurrence a.
Pressure switches PS-664 through PS-667 sense cortain=*nt pressure and operate at a pressure ci 1.5 pois to initiate reactor scram and conrafnment isolstion. In a post Design Basis Accident (DBA) situs-tion, these switches would experience'1oss of calibretion and a change of setpoint; however, this' deficiency would occur only after these switches had accomp11obed their cafety-related function. For these switches (MERCOID DAW 23-153, R3A) damage results from a per-manent deformation of the bourdon tube sensing element when exposed to sustained pressures greater than 20 psig. The contafmment pres-sure anticipated during a DBA is 23 psig.
b.
Pressure switch DPS 9051 opens the ventilation supply valve to provide a vent path when containment pressure falls into the vacuum region.
Pressure switch DPS 9052 provides an alarm indication when containment pressure falls into the vacuum region. In a post DBA situation, both of these switches would lose calibration and experience a change in setpoint, such that they could not be relied upon to carry out their function should the containment go into vacuum during quenching with l
the enclosure spray system. These switches (MERCOID DAW 533, R2) ex-perience damage identical to MERCOID DAW 23-153, R3A, except that
(
damage is expected to occur at pressures greater than 15 psig.
c.
Iressure Transmitter PT-173 provides only a display signal; however, this signal is needed to permit operator backup action in the event i
of a failur'e of DPS 9051 and DPS 9052.
i i
l l
l I
w
K F
" ', $.;:d....)..M,M. ;'e. ~,$
6
'.co
-. ; ; 7 _,
,.::;x~q:. ',1x2; ::g?f.MWTl-a Addendum to I.icensee Event Report Numbsr T-1-76.(contd)
'. : #ir 2'.E;' :f ? ' T Jac.uary 27, 1976
-N
- . Cf.1
~f.O q
Y y ; ::. ' ^G, ; L.,
u:.'. w; -
y L,h.,. y;,n. Hp;a.-..,
~
~
- :p/.ig f,;Cfd..
.7 i~
g L. '
W.q.;, g '
E W ;% -*-
s
., e.
n~~g m
- 6.. nTA.w.wi = % 4,Q,i' ' % $.
[
d.
Note that if DPS 9051 DPS 9052 and PT-173 were all rendered,' inoperable n.
m,.:....gf:.
no indication of containment pressure under vacuum conditions would be..17.+.,,
u. A u ~*n;w.
+-
g available,norwouldautomaticcontainmentvacuumrelief'capabilitybe?i'l.,'
,.~^ ~.'
=
.. e
~
~, v.i 7..'
2.
Inmediate Corrective Action
',.4
. l.
The Plant Review Ccanittee (PRC) concluded that since pressure swit'ches..
t.
.s PS-664 through 667 would still function to provide signals.to the. reactor...
h protection s stem, continued reactor operation with these switches.'in 7 ',,
,.., : x c n
,c..
P service would not adversely affect public safety or health..
After a safety reb.ev of applicable portions of the PSAk and Technical' p
Speciff, cations, the PRC concluded that isolation of PT-173,,DPS 905i and.
, j.
~
9052, with procsdural requirements to return these instruments to se'rvice.',,. "'.
e should they be needed (and when containnent pressure would be sufficientif; se" lov to prevent damage) was carranted, and would not adversely affect publie "-
^
safety or health. An Operations Meuo ves issued on 21 January 1976 to'put ?
E L.
these procedural controls int'o effect.
3.
Permanent Corcective Action 6
I kepir. cement of the instruments with instru:ner.ts having proper ~ pressure '
E ratings is being pursued.
v-r b E
DED/CEP 1/27/76 P
J
^
E
~
e m
2 E
' ~ -
m.
g
+
i
'_-4.
E EF lt
. j,, ca i,,_si
'l ? s m
[,
w b.
e O
M g
e e
[,
-. -.