ML20037D219
| ML20037D219 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105220300 | |
| Download: ML20037D219 (2) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II May 15, 1981
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Director of Nuclear Peactor Regulation ro' Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief
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Licensing Branch No. 2
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Dear Mr. Schwencer:
In the Matter of the Application of
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Docket No. 50-328 Tennessee Valley Authority
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We have determined, during our review of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant unit 2 technical specifications, that the reactor coolant systs boundary valves for the boron injection system (63-586, -587, -588, -589, and -581) do not form an interface between the high pressure reactor coolant ard low pressure systems and should be excluded frgm the leak testing program. %e 2
piping is high pressure piping (2580 lb/in g at 6500F and 2800 lb/in g at 2000 ) and the valves in these lines are designed to withstand reactor F
coolant system design pressure. ASMS Section XI,1974 Edition Sumer 1975 Addenda requires this piping to be hydrostatic pressure tested (refer to 1HB-5222 for Class I piping and INC-5220 and INC-2510 for Class II piping). Since there are other normally closed motor operated valves in the piping, it is 'IVA's position that no testirn should be required to verify closure of these check valves.
It is '1VA's position that the Residual Heat Removal (RRR) suction pressure isolation valves (EUV-74-1 and 2) should be tested accordits to the draft unit 2 technical specifications except at each 61sturbance due to valve actuation. W e following justifications provide a basis for this exemption.
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Full closure of these valves is verified in the control room by direct monitoring traition indicator.
7, Inadvev. tent opening of these valves is prevented through interlocks which require the plant to be below RHR operating pressure before opening.
I 8105220SCO An Equal Opportunity Employer
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4-1 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation-May 15, 1981 Gross leaka9 s due to valve failure would be detected by increasing -
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0 levels in the pressurizer relief! tank.
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'Iherefore, full closure.of the RHR valves is verified after opening, inadvertent opening is prevented, and gross leakage can be readily detected.
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If you have any questions, please get 'in touch with'M. A. McDurnett at -
FIS-857-2581.
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Very truly yours, TREESSEE VALLEY AUIHORITY L. M. Mills, Mdnager Nuclear Regulation and Safety to and subscri;ed before m Sworn [IELdayof8)W8261981 this
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