ML20037B597

Summary of 771003 & 04 Site Visit to Evaluate Extent of defense-in-depth Afforded by Reactor Protection Sys Engineered Safety Features & Auxiliary Sys Required for Potential Accidents & Transients

ML20037B597
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	11/02/1977
From:	Oconnor P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Desiree Davis Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8010220718
Download: ML20037B597 (43)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:.. a' i$..1.. si+. j#" %,O UNITED STATES p* NUCl. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s.,...,y i,g WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 November 2.1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Don K. Davis, Acting Chief, Operating Reactors Branch #2, D0R FROM: Paul O'Connor, Project Manager, Operating Reactors Branch f2, DOR

SUBJECT:

TRIP REPORT - DRESDEN UNIT NO.1 On October 3 and 4 an interdisci Dresden Station Unit No.1 (D-1)plinary team of staff reviewers visited to evaluate the extent of defense-in-depth afforded by the reactor protection system (RPS) the engineered safety features (ESF), and those auxiliary systems which are required to operate to mitigate the consequences of potential accidents and transients at D-1.. This evaluation ~ is-being carried out by the staff in support of our. review of Commonwealth Edison's ECCS Exemption and ~ IEEE-279 Order extension requests dated July 8,1977. The team consisted of Roy. Woods and Carl Berlinger from the Reactor Safety Branch, Ed Butcher from Plant Systems, Steve Hosford from the Engineering Branch and Paul O'Connor from Operating Reactors Branch #2. ~ A presentation by the Comonwealth Edison (CECO) staff identified certain modifications proposed by CECO to increase the reliability of the D-1 RPS, ESF and auxilliary systems essential' to safety. Following the presentation by the CECO Staff, the team toured those areas of the facility that contained systems or piping that was of specific interest to each of area of review. The following discussion summarizes the review of team's visit: ,A. Plant Systems Branch 1. Offsite Electrical power System To improve the reliability of the offsite electrical power system, the licensee has added a 345/138kV transfonner at the site to connect the 138kV system of Dresden, Unit 1 to the 345kV system of Dresden, Units 2 and 3. With this modification, there are now three different voltage level sources of primary offsite power, i.e.,138kV (with ifnes running both North and South), 345kV, and the 34kV local distribution circuits. The 34kV distribution circuits are tied to the 138kV system onsite. In an emergency situation, electrical power to the plant is provided through two indepen-dent paths via 138/4kV and 34/4kV auxiliary transformers. 8 010224 76f [

'.i T G g 's s e a. Automatic transfers between offsite. sources.are provided at the 4kV level to maintain a continuous source of offsite power to the 480V ESF buses. The recent installa-tion of the 345/138kV tie at the site will provide sub-stantial additional reliability for the offsite power system during the extention period the licensee has reques ted. 2. Reactor Protection System . The RPS is. susceptible to single shorts and hot shorts which can disable individual trip functions or prevent a complete scram of all the control rods. The only single mechanism identified which could prevent a scram of all of the control rods is the hot short of a 125V ac power source to one side-of the scram solenoid bus. ~ Such a short is possible at the terminal blocks on.the back. of RPS Panel AP-5 in the control room and in the cable trays between the control room and the scram solenoid fuse cabinet in the containment. The two points that are susceptible to hot shorts at Panel AP-5 are within 4.25 inches of each other. but are separated by a wiring grill. The termimal blocks are located on opposite sides of the wiring grill and ars-covered by insulating shields. With the shields in place, no mechanism for a hot short fran equipment in the immediate vacinity of the panel was observed. The sensors for all individual trip functions are not separated and protected from common mode failures; but the sensors for different. trip functions are protected by separation from common mode failures. 3. Electrical Power and Controls for Essential BOP and ESF Systems ~ - In order-to-satisfy the performance requirements of 10 CFR 50.46, Appendix K,.certain. balance _of plant and ESF systems which were not designed-to satisfy our present requirements for new plants with regard to the single failure criterion, must be relied upon. These systems are the Feedwater, Emergency Condenser, Core Spray, Post Indicent and Fire Protection Systems. Based on the 'dicussions with the licensee and on the results of our plant inspection, we were able to determine that emergency core cooling can be provided in the event of a random single failure (with the exception of a failure of the plant's 125V de battery) and in may cases in the event of multiple, random single failures. Equipment necessary for emergency core cooling is initiated by t redundant instrumentation and controls or the controlled com-ponents (e.g., valves) can be bypassed or manually operated. i,

(= (h-l In the case of the feedwater system the control valves. remain as is (i.e.. open position during normal operation) when' the control function is lost. We were only able to make a pre-liminary assessment for the Fire Protection System due'to a lack of complete drawings. However, there appears to ~be several different ways to pressurize the yard loop and isolate breaks in the system. The drawings necessary to complete the review were requested from the licensee. In the case of cocynon mode failures such as those that may be caused by missiles or the loss of D. C. control power, the plant is virtually without protection. For example, all three of the core spray pumps and their control equipment are located in the same room with no barrier protection and all of the plant systems are provided control power from one 125V de battery. Redundant control cables are'not routed in separated cable trays and analysis by the licensee has shown that in the event of an earthquake of a magnitude equivalent to the Operating Basis Eqrthquake later' chosen for Dresden Station Unit'Nos; 2 and 3 (0.1g), certain caole tray supports will exceed yield by 70%. To improve the reliability of the onsite a.c. electrical. power system, the licensee is installing a skid mounted 2500 kW, 4160V diesel generator for temporary use during the requested extention period. This diesel generator will provide a single onsite power supply for the feedwater system and a second onsite-power supply for the other essential systems. The feedwater system is necessary to provide a high pressure source of emergency cooling water in the event of a pipe break too small to depressurize the reactor coolant system. The feedwater system could not pre-viously be provided on' site emergency power because the existing diesel generator capacity was only 500 kW. The new diesel generator will be manually started and connected to the plant's power distri-bution system from the control room. The licensee is currently evalu. ting the time available to perform this operation and to start the feedwater pumps in the event of a LOCA. ~ t 4. Gener&1 Plant Desian and Maintenance-It is clear from the discussions with the licensee and the plant inspection that little or no consideration was given to protect-ing vital equipment from common mode failures, when the plant originally designed. Vital ~ plant equipment such as the single source of d.c. power was not designed with any specific considera-tion for seismic loads, t I ~.ene ,,nn.. ,w,, .e, ,n n., ,..m.,, ,.,n, ,e---, .g

I=H (gr .g 3 The general appearance of the plant.sugges'ts.a:lacklof attention. ~ to detail in the maintenance of equipment and housekeeping. Electrical equipment covers were.left: laying.in the bottoms of ESF and RPS cabinets while the equipment was collecting dust. The insulating shields on the teminal' blocks of the RPS equip-ment vulnerable to hot-. shorts were lose.. A connection wa.s found lose and dangling from an RPS panel. Trash and miscellaneous-teminal connectors and cover plates were laying in the bottoms of safety related equipment cabinets. Whil.e none of these conditions represent a hazard, they are inconsistent with good maintenance and housekeeping practices and should be corrected. B. Reactor Safety Branch ~ ~ Based on our preliminary review of the material presented before and during the trip,.significant equipment is available in support of the D-1 exemption extension request from an ECCS standpoint. Areas. that need resolution include the credit that can be given-for availa-- bility of offsite power (so that credit can be taken for the feedwater system's availability), the core spray system, one-half of th~e emergency condenser, the post-incident system, and certain other balance-of-plant systems necessary for the above named systems to function (for example, availability of the fire system to supply the necessary-suction pressure for the core spray pumps). C. Eroineering Branch Several areas under EB review were identified to be concerns which could affect the safe shutdown of the plant during'or after a seismic accident. It was evident that the bulk of the-plant had not been designed using any seismic, analysis technicues, The lack of such consideration results in little or no restraint on piping and other equipment. Engineering Branch concerns are listed as follows.

1. 155tiaT}ip.i.ng.Sfstemi-curreh'tly nine 'of the essentlal~ p'ijin_g' " ~~~

~ ~ ~ systems are designed or ristrained for seismi'c~ loads, except ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ that portion of the core spray system installed after 1971. 2. Cable Trays - A simple analysis (by the license) identified at least one cable tray support which would see stress values 70". greater than the yeild stress for an OBE ' event. A statement was made, by the licensee, that a more refined analysis would demonstrate adequacy, but this was not evident by our inspection - of the support and the complexity of the loading geometry. t

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====: 5- ~ - Cf ?! My ~~ kh 3. Emergency D. C. Pcwer Source - the emergency d.c. power batt'eries ... 1 were not restrained for seismic loads. .l.'.T 4. Electrical Cabinates - the fire protection system power ~ center EI +e in the intake bui~1 ding was not restrained for seismic loads. = A survey of electrical control cabinates in the unit one. =EE control center revealed a number of relay covers to be off the ..f.7 relays and laying loose on the bottom of the cabinates. ~ F=1 A list of meeting attendees is attached, t+.E := The following drawings were provided to the team for the purpose of h 's= -illustrating points made by CECO during the meeting. These drawings p:: T are too bulky to be attached to this summary but may be examined by 'E.M the contacting Paul O'Connor at extension 27403. g ~~_ l. Single Line Diagram of Electrical System E. Basic Diagram of AC Auxiliary Power System ,F - 3. One Line 34kV to 138kV Bus Diagram 4. One Line Bus Diagram for 345kV System 5. Schenatic Diagram Safety System (2 sheets) 6. Front views of Instrument Racks in sphere il _Z 7. Sphere Electrical Penetration Arrangement to Details ~ 8. Reactor Envlosure Conduit Layout (8 sheets) 9. Elevation and Sections of Switchboard Panels (4 sheets) b ui= i The Plant Systems Branch concern reflected in section A.4 of this summary L + have been transmitted orally to the licensee (Mike Turbak) and prompt [= corrective measure are expected. The Office of Inspection and Enforecemnt will be requested to follow upon the licensee's corrective action. Original signed by Paul O'Connor, Project Manager f.! E0perating F(eactors Branch #2 ji ~ Division of Operating Reactors ).i

Enclosure:

l. Meeting Attendees 2. Meeting Handouts D** cc: See next page ?: o r,ec

• ORB #2: DOR ORB #2:00 L.0.'Connor_:m.J1 Davis cu~~
• 1]LLl77

.111 V l.7I

(._ . ', l { , ; X, ATTAClffENT.1 '.~ .s -OCTOBER 3, 1977.-

• UNIT l' EXEMPTION REQUEST MEETING Ad:ninistrative Assistant - Dresden Brent Shelton H. W. Wood (Roy)

NRC - DOR NRC - DOR / ORB #2-Paul V. O'Connor Steve B. Hosford NRC - DOR - EB Edward J.' Butcher NRC - DOR - PSB NRC - DOR - RSB ' Carl H. Berlinger Station Nuclear Engi'neering Department -- J. S. Abel-Cor:monwealth Edison NSLD - Sargent & Lundy. 4! James S. Dukelow_ Station Nuclear Engineering Department - J. E. Hauscan Commonwealth Edison Electrical Engineer - Sargent & Lundy G. E. Setka Electrical Engineer - Sargent & Lundy F. W. Fischer Project Manager - Fluor Pioneer G. C. Vellender Station Nuclear Engineering Department - J. S. Graves Commonwealth Edison Dresden Station - Com=otivealth Edison J. F. Phelan Dresden Station - Cormonwealth Edison J. D. Brunner Nuclear Licensing - Cornonwealth Edison M. S. Turbak MPMD - Sargent & Lundy P. M. Donnelly Operating - Dresden - Commonwealth Edison E. Budzichowski Station Nuclear Engineering Department - R. C. Lenke Commonwealth Edison I e 4

1 ATTACH 4ENT 2 (+ .c. [ Dresdtn 1 ECCS Ex;=ption Erttnsion NRC Site !.'.eeting BOP Outline' I Introduction 1 A. General Drection and Considerations -1. Analysis and perfor=ance basis

2. List of required equipment (short and long term)

3. Possible single failures

4. Probability of failure and consequences

5. Additional measures II Analysis Basis A. Appendix K " Plant As Is" analysis

1. Sent to }.'r.

Rusche on 7/31/75

2. !!APLEGR curves - meet performance requirements

3. Short ters

4. Feedwater, emergency condenser (i), core spray B. Core Spray Analysis

1. Supplement A to Proposed Change No. 17, 9-17-70 2.P34,39)

3. Less conservative - rore realistic - older

4. Feedwater adequate without e=ergency condenser 5'. GupncycincUn,M4 s 4tWtchl*/k4sst.&

C. P!EA . 1. Submitted 10/20/76 to Zie: ann in response to questions

2. With EPCI, but included core spray, fire rater, PI, etc.

3.1,ll-containment cooling does not need PI heat exchangers D. Core Spray Cooling Coefficient

1. Cycle 11 operation restricted to comply with current NRC criteria

,regarding core spray cooling

2. Answer to round 2 reload questions - submitted 9/S/77 III List of Required ECCS and BCP Systems and Backup Equip =ent A. Short Tem Cooling

1. Feedrater

2. E=ergency condenser

3. Core spray

-4. Fire system B. Iong Tem Cooling

1. Post Incident

2. Fire system l

( (. C.' Backup Cooling EquipmEHt Availabl9 If Needed .s,. 'i

1. Condensate storage tank

2. Makeup system pumps 1

3. "A" storage tank

4. Waste storage tank

5. Liquid waste return pump

6. Emergency primary feedriater pump

7. Others IV Feedwater System A. Deceription and Function

1. Performs HPCI function 2 3-50% pu=ps (Vert. eent, turb. )

3. Hotwell (40,000 gal. ), backed up by Cond. storage and A storage f

4. Review P&lD

5. Power supply to pumps - 4KV, non-essential, but "A" on new D.G.

6. Power supply to valves - control valve neumatic,10-50 on essential feed B. Seismic QmHfication and Abnormal Environment

1. Seismic code and activity of area-same for all BOP Syste=sexcept core spray.

The seiscographic classification ~of Dresden Unit 1 is zone 1 with no past histcr/ of destructive eathquakes. Accordingly, the unit was-designed and built in accordance with the zone 1 requirements-of the Uniform Building Code, Pacific Coast Building Officials Conference, 1955 edition. Although there is very little paper reork concerning' seismic qualifica-tion for a plant of this vintage, there is an 18 year histor/ of successft.1 operation giving us confidence in the equirment. Most of . g pi#1 the ecuicrent ras manufactured by the sa=e ec=panies providing the s .o #2 equipment for the newer units i.e. Limitorque motor operators, G.E. motors, Ingersoll-P.and pumps, etc. Because of the 20, years of good operatien, the low seismic. activity of the area, and.he short dura-tion of the extensics, the probability of a serious seismic event during the extension period is extremely low.

2. The location within the plants provides a lot of protection 'against

. missiles. p+

3. Environment outside containment include ' auto level control

--4. HELB SR #33 by NSC submitted 2/19/74 - OK, other mods by 12/31/77 C; Reliability

1. Excellent plant record

2. Mech, equip. single failure - control valve,10130 3c Control valve fails as is, second pump aut'o starts

4. Additional actions

a. Lock open valve LD 130

b. Procedure to bypass control valve

5. Valve operation - no need for compressed air

6. Tech. Spec. surveillance - offsite power to cne pump 7, cS 4Miytiew4M2fGMf Opew<er4/me ddif@dkMMMM cs.. hut.cytri&& to.Ls ei c(P&

.nw A l, muu pa.s& wx<G.: y pi y4"iw w.

( (" J t Emergmey Cond;n%r A. Description and Function 1.. Performs depressuri.,ation function along with feedwater

2. Two halfs

3. Auto initiated at 1050 psig, on. a LOCA signal, or manunily

4. Power supply to valves from DC battery

5. P&ID, location B. Seismic and Abnor=al Environment

\\

1. Seismic qualification - same as feedwr2ter 2.1D valves =oved outside of drum to improve reliability

~3.125v CC outside schere

4. Power and control cables are multiconductor and therefore qualified for the LOCA environment m.

C. Reliability

1. Reliability of AD valves is OK, ' 4 c^ _ _ r"

" m-L==L. ~ ~

2. Only need i per app. K, not needed at all per CS analysis

3. Tech. spec. surveillance

4. No need for co= pressed air VI Core Spray A. Descriptien and Function

1. Cools core during LOCA

2. Lcw pressure spray directly on to fuel 3 3-50% pungs

4. Redundant active co:ponents

5. Relies on fire water rystem

6. Powered hem two essential service 4807 buses

7. Installed in 1971 not 1958, ccets newer criteria ( ANSI-B 31.7, ASE, III-279)

8. Does not need co. pressed air,

9. Review P&ID

3. Seis=ic and Abnor:a1 Eniriron=ent

1. L'.eets D 2/3 seismic criteria

2. Equip. in sphere is qualified for LOCA environment

a. valves

b. controls

3. Initiatica equipment-is qualified - additional actions

a. EFA relays

b. plastic face recoved fro = drum level switches

c. reviewed sensors and cables C. Reliability

1. Tech, spec. surveillance 2.1: ewer cable with diverse routing for the two divisions

3. FE A - the system is well designed against single failures.

o N.,. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

( k..- .4. The system han two7nd; pendent and s2greg:ted elcetrical cystems .which can tolsrato a~cingla fcilure.

5. The only possible single failures appear to be:

si. A failure of a passive. mechanical conponent - this is highly unlikely for this newer system,-used in the short term, and.can , be tolerated if it is'the rupture. .b. Reliance on the fire system - to be discussed later

c. Failure of the 125v de battery or bus - highly.unlikely in one year co-incident with a 10CA, and represents a very mall.part of the total amount of equipment.

6. 0dy cu DG, ntM DG fuzcWAlvdcy,22tmt dsekaf.

VII Fire System A. Description and Function

1. Supplies water to the Core Spray and Post Incident systems

2. l'ultiple pu=ps

3. 't.*orks with or without nor=al aux power

4. Review P&ID

5. Yard loop alternate paths

6. Does not need compressed air-

3. Seis=ic and Abnormal Emiren=ent

.1. Seismic qualification sa e as for feedwater

2. Susceptibility of yard loop to seismic rupture

3. Alternate paths, isolation valves

4. Hose addition

5. Yard loop is missile protected

6. Equipment is outsice the sphere C. Eeliability

1. FL'5.A

a. The piping system has redundant and interconnected loops which together with the sizable and dependable punping capacity should deliver rated flow to the core spray suction even.in the presence of some disruption of the piping.

. b. 'i'ne fire protection system has no single electrical failure which can prevent successful. system operation.

2. Hose addition VIII Fest Incident A. Description and Function

1. Recycles water to the core for long term cooling

2. Heat exchangers cool water.and transfer-the heat to the fire system water.

3. Two 505 systems

4. Each half fed from different 480v essential service bEse

5. P&ID, locatien, use of cs line

6. Does not need compressed air

7. ?unps are vertical turbines

8. Required suction - 505' el. - 200,000 gal.

9. Use clean demin. water for bearing lub.

L 6:.u B. Seismic and Abnor=al Environ =ent

l. Sa=e seismic qualification as feedwater

, a. affects only long tem cooling leaving time for corrections.

b. would need two pipe ruptures to cause a problem

2. Outside of contain=ent C. Reliability

1. MEA - several failures are possible but none are serious

a. Valve or electrical interlock failure will either reduce or stop flow but this can b'e corrected frem outside the contain-cent or by using core spray or e=ergency feed pu=p.

b. Passive failures are extre= elf unlikely and the emergency feed-water pu=p can be used to provide some flow,

c. Failure of a pu=p can be =ade up by,using a core spray pump.

d. Ioss of fire water prevents heat re= oval from the contain=ent via PI heat exchangers. Asseemmunnerseseus analysis (see response to question A.11) indicates that the conta' ment will cool without PI.

g g g X Backup Cooling Yethods and Equip =ent A. Procedure

1. Submittal (long tem cooling if -the core spray line is ruptured)

2. Also covers loss of Pest Incident (i) or locs of long term fire water

3. Discuss route and method of backup long term cooling

4. P&ID

5. Station procedure B. Backup Equip =ent

1. Condensate. storage taab

a. Function - to supply additional water to feed %gfeed pu=ps g

b. Iccated on turbine ficor

c. 50,000 galfdid tech. spec. level =aintwnee

d. auto filled by ~*eup pu=ps

2. Makeup s/ stem pu=ps

a. supply cendensate tanks

b. Two 250 gpm pu=ps plus 50 gp= jockey pump

,c. Each pu=p fed from a different essential bus

d. Pu=ps tnke suction form "A" storage tank

3. "A" storage tank a supplies water to =akeup pu=p and condenser (by gravity)

b. 200,000 gal, outside

4. Waste storage tank a, receives water frc= sphere thru PI drain

b. 250,000 gal located at radwaste

5. Liquid waste return pu p

a. pu=ps water from the waste storage tank to the "A" storage tank

b. 200 gp=, located at radwaste

c. Powered by non essential bus, but could be fed by new D.G.

e

- [=" . 6. E= erg:ncy primarf Eard pu=p

a. pu=ps water from th9 condinstto storaga tank to tha vaml..

b. 100 gp=, vert. centrif. turbine

c. Powered from essential service bus, i.e. D.G.

7.'Mda.tmbwncy.ccnhy.ss(f.yAu), Probability and Consequence a%y S m v of Pos,sible#Sif.gle Failures, Their XI A. Feedwater System

1. Seismic

a. very unlikely during one yea.

b. multiple active cocponent,s

'^

c. rupture would aid depressurization

2. Valve closure

a. control valve fails as is and bypass valve available -

b. MO 130 locked open 5 dJWQf22$i fa,.$62.2 d C((AE22 l10%%

B. E=ergency Condenser 4pg M, h) int w D Lv y roblem in 18 years N

b. very unlikely during one year

c. app. k analysis assu=es i failure

d. CS analysis says its not needed at all

e. rupture would aid depressurization

2. Outlet LD valver z*

rw 4ti2ub Zo c72p 7

a. moved outside drumy-to improve reliability

b. app. K analysis as 'es i failure

c. CS analysis says it not needed at all C. Core Spray

1. passive mech failure (pipe rupture)

a. highly unlikely for system designed to 1970 standards

b. need not be considered for a short tern system

c. rupture would aid dep_essurization and allow reflooding

d. alternate long term cooling means available

2. Reliance on fire protection system a, to be discussed later

3. failure of 125v de battery or bus i

a. highlf unlikely co-incident with a LOCA during only one year of ope-ration

b. m-M part of total system

,c. equipment outside sphere - manual correction possible IL O. cat (p4-(ksL41.4stco Alc22.' 3%Jn almZW. D. Fire P tection System 44M/M MMAt M dd/0 /e4 ob gade/ / l>)/M W % 4 M f - k u~icr L t h w.

1. yard loop susceptible to seis=ic disruption h %ume A46.

a. rated flow still likely even with some disruption

@ UM7

b. alternate paths

c. isolation valves

d. hose addition

e. alternate long term cooling method available

f. analysis shows its not needed for containment coolirg s*

7, r-

m-17 5

= >

E. Post Incident System .1.. valve or electrical interlock failure could reduce or'stop flow ~

a. ' core spray pump can substitute.

b. emergency feed pump can be used

c. problem can be corrected since it is outside the sphere and is j

a long term system. ' 2. passive failures (including seismic) ~ 'a. extremely unlikely b, emergency feed pt".::p can provide some flow-

c. would need two pipe ruptures to cause a real problem i

d. long tezu allows some ti=e for correction 3

lure of a pu=p

a. can be made up by'using a core spray pump-4.Caly-ou DG nuw DG Jaelwf' 3

III Conclusion The' existing ECCS and BOP systens can provide reliable means for adequately cooling the core under accident conditions during the one year extension. ~ e O e D e = e num + RCL/ayp 9/30/77 e

(-::...9R.L f 3 lt-O- B - Safety Evaluation The primary design o'bjective' of an ECCS is to minimize the radiological ha:ard of a LOCA. This section 'shnmari:es the capability cf proposed Dresden Unit 1 ECCS to meet tho' ~ - above design obj ective.. The' major arcas ; analyzed were as ~ follows: l' 1 - Fuel Rod Integrity An essential aspect of controlling the radiological effects of a LOCA is maintaining the integrity of the Zirconium f6el cla'ading. ~ Gross, fuel clad fai1urc Etould release ~ to the co' tainnent sphere volatile Eission products.and n ~ would allow I:olten-fuct and.c1 adding to drop.to the e-) bottom of the reactor vessel. If the. molten core material penetrates,the reactor, pressure vessel, the ~ eventual termination of the accident, is indetermin;tte. To assure that radioactive materials do not escape to ' the environs, the p'roposed Dresden Unit 1 ECCS is ~ designed to iaintain core geo etry during any ~ /. postulateds LOCA. The. performance.of the proposed core spray systc=. 'in conjunction with the energency condenser was analy:cd ~ -by General El'octric Conpany using the TACT V computer ~ code model of core heatup. The, results of this analysis are presented graphically on Figure 4 and indicate the . ECCS'.s ability to contrni peak clad temperature to s 2375'F for the worst case I.0CA. mm m D s o. = oa

5 W -- ..q. t ;3 n-B - Safety Evaluation The primary design. o'bjective' of an ECCS is to minimi:e the radiological hazard of a LOCA. - This section' summari:cs the capability of proposed Dresden Unit 1 ECCS to meet tho' above design objective..' The major areas,analy:cd were as follows: 1 - Fuci Rod Integrity 4 An essential aspect of controlling the radiolo~gical eff'cets of a LOCA is maintaining the integrity of the Zirconium fuel cla'dding. Gross, fuel clad failure would release ~ to the containnent sphere volatile fission products and-would allow colten fuel and c'1 adding to drop.to the q bottom of the reactor vessel. If the molten core material penetrates,the reactor, pressure vessel, the ~ eventual termination of the accident is indeterminate. To assure that radioactive materials do not escape to the environs, the p'roposed Dresden Unit 1 ECCS is designed to maintain core geometry during any / postulated LOCA. The perf,ormance.of the proposed core spray system in co,njunction with the energency condensor was analy:cd by General EI'cctric Conpany using the TACT V computer code model of core heatup. ' The, results of this analysis are presented graphically on Figure 4 and indicate the . ECCS's ability to control peak clad temperature to 2375'F for the worst case LOCK. ~ p 9

.) C, ',.. \\ (;' ',' .) ..FIGVDE -1 1 \\ FEED)iATER ALONE 1 g I COBE SPHAY WIT 110UT 1 .l AUXILIAltY DEPREGSURI2ATION l -l i l g 2-e I l o 8, \\ '8 l CORE SPHAY VITH 5'M l EMERGENCY CONDENSER CAPAOITY ,l ~. I-I i i CORE SPRAY WITH 107p' r EMP.RGENCY CONDENSER CAPACITY j [ 1 l i i .I I g l ] ] l 'l l l l I I I I t t 0.0 .o1 .02 .ols -.o6 .08 .1 .2 5 l'.o 3,0 S'o BREAK AREA,.(sq. f t.).

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• FIRE ??OTECTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION-e 9-t e

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Tho following b.rscription of tho Dronden._,..totion Firo s 3 Protection System is intended to demonstrato it:s adequacy as a 4 The sourco of water for the proposed Unit I core spray system.. proposed core. spray system, requires the fire p:-o teetion sy stem C be capable of providing 215,0 spm at 100 psig to the suction of This description demonsuratos the ability the core spray pumps. ^ of the' fire protection syst'em to provide the required flow with 'or without normal auxiliary power available. The station fire protection sys. em shown en Figure 1 is a t The se systems combination of the Unit 1 and Unit 2/3 systems the.' 8-inch, will be operated normally tied at two points iz: The operation of this cross-tied system underground fire main. will be described in the following paragraphs. If the fire system is considered cross-tie:d,.it will operate, n as follows when normal auxiliary power is available. 4 ~ 1. Unit 2 and 3 SE.VICE '4ATTE FED'PS The Unit 2 and 3 service water system operates tied, to the The service water system fire nain system as shown in Figure 1. There are five service will normally supply the fire system. ~ ' water pumps each rated at 1J,050 spm with a dipebarge pressure of During nomal operation, fcir pumps tcould be in service, ,,91 psis. The service water system normally operates at ' tiro pumps per unit. the fire n.aln pre ssure wculd-a pressure near 110 psig; therefore, not drop low enough to actuate the Unit 1 alarra or. screen wash pumps. 2. 'LO'd FRFSS M ALAFM If flou from the firo system is too lnrgo,.firc main pressure y ? At a fire main pressure of 80 psig, nn nlarm in the will drop. e 9 g 1_ =--..-,-r r --rw sy,#-g ,m.w

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w v 4 main control rootsis indicated. Ths alarm un=is ta of sounding o g,' - horn and 11 h' ting a nnnepinto which indientos " Fire' Gystem Water G g Pressure Low." ~ The oporator can either stirt' a sSrcen wash pump, ' '.or allow the pressure to continue dropping. This : alarm circuit is. .:.^. fed from the 120V DC Unit 1 battery system, and is initiated by a single-pres'sure switch on the fire main in the cribhouse. ,..3.. Unit 1 SCREEN WASH' NUMPS ~ ~ At a fire main. pressure of 75 psig, the two Unit 1, 2000 gpm/ 62 psig _ screen wash pumps are-s tarted automatica11y, an'd $h,e screen .. wash systen. motor-operated isolation valve is c1bsed automaticclly. ~ The tuo pumps are capable of delivering a total o'r 2200 spm at 110 ~ s 'he screen ~ - psig. The signal uhich ' starts the pumps and isol' ate' t . wash systen is from a single,120V ' A0 pressure. switch on the fire ~ nain in the cribhouse. Each screen wash pump is, driven by a 100MP, ,s (1 480V AC' notor, one fed from bus 27 and one fran tus 28. The notor.- ~ . controls are 120V A0 f_ed through individua1 transformers frc= the associa'ted motor power 'cus. - The motor operated screen kash isolstit-valve is fed from 480V A0 bus 28, and controlled by 120V A0 trans-former frc= bus 28. The individual screen vadh pumps can be startet . and the isolation valva closed manually,frer. - the main ~ control roon. Operation of either 125V ro screen wash pump "run-off" switch in thocontrol room st' arts the respe'etive pump and enuses the isol.a tion valve to close. ' ~ Euses 27,nd 28 ore tied to the emergency diesel generator. ' buses 15 and 16, but the screen wash pump brecker.s spe automatical locked out when tho _ emergency dios.ol conerator is.in service. This . ' }) lock out can only bc p;c-er:pted by operntion of the manual pur.P q ;/ control switches in the main control room. e 0 e a S. /

h 8(' . If norm'al aurgiary power woro lost to the Unit 1 cercen was =: pumps and tho Unit 2 and Unit 3 service woher punps,'tha firo' system .= ~ ~' ,Q. ?. ldi . ill, be supplied by two die sel-driven fire pumps.' The diese - r ven w pumps come into operation automntically at a fire mo'in" pressure o One 'diosel-drivcit. pump is located in the Unit l cribhohse ~ 70 psig.. The s'econd 'p~ mp is -in-u and has a capacity of 1000 gym at 100 psig. ) i the Unit 2/3 cribhouse s'nd hos a capacity of 2000 gpm 'at 125 psig. ~ i 1. Unit l' DIESEL FIPE Pm4P The. Unit 1 fire pump diesel engine is ' a 1.02 bhp, ltwo cycle,~ 3 The' engine is~ 1760 rpm. Fairb'anks Morse automotive' type unit,. ~ desidled to operate. efficiently under varying load' c6ndit1onsi is.. quipped with a constant speed governor. c 1 f.12V electric motor powered by. either of' two 12V batteries is ~The batteries arg used to. start the Unit i die sel-driven fire pc=p. ? . charged by the 120V AC station lighting syste:m thrdtish a rectifier ( or by an engine-mounted belt-driven generator. ~~ ~ The diesel-driven fire pump control systet: is fed 1from hhe Unit 1125V DC ' atteries. . Controls include a nanual'" start-stop" b switch in the main control roon and an " auto-aff-caual" s With the " start-stag" switch on " start" - the engine control pnnel. and the " auto-off-manual" switch in " auto", tha : dies'el will be - -/ sigial from the fire mein low pressure switch set at. started on a The diosol will continuo to run rega:: 515si Jf fire 7.2in ' ^' 70 Psig. pressure until the " start-stop" switch "is" noved manually to t A fire main pressure indicator, a dienol engine. "stop" position. located in the trouble :.Inrn, end all engine runn,ing lights are main control room. J v a. e g 3 3-

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Tho' tank' su'pplica' ~~ 75-gallon I' day" tonk located 'in the cribbous2. 'The -.) oil to the engine fLc1 pump through n ainglo 1/2-inch line. " day.'! tank contains curficient diosc1 oil for. oight hours of diesel operation. Oil is supplied to the " day" tank frca the 4000-gallon outdoor diesel oil transfer pump thruush a ^ diesel oil storage tank by the Maintenance of oil 1{ vel in the " day" 3/4-inch underground line. tank is accomplished by remote manual' operation -of the diesel' oil

• Remote control suitches are located in the main transfer pump.

control room, at th,e diesel generator local control panel', and in lo cations, the - th'e oil transfer pump house. At sny of the abov,e ! diesel oil transfer p==p is started by operatLng a nomentary contact ~ ~ The pump is then available t'o fill' start switch or push button. either or both the diesel generetor end the diesel fire pump " day - ~S (,, " Oil, flow to ecch ' tank is controlled by a solenoid-operated tanks. k le rsl switch 'on each " day" tank autonctically opens inlet valve. ~ the associated inlet valve to. maintain proper " day" tank oil 1evel x catisfied, the sesociated inlet As cach tank level switch is valvc is closed auto =stically. level sui tches in both dey tonks are satisfied, the When the T'he fire pump dicsol. oil' transfer pu_ap is tripped autor.ntically. 1 suitch dicsol oil dcy tank is n1so equippsd with high an4 low. lev: l roon which transmit the respective icyc1 alarns to the main contro The htn the nppropriote nameplate. Each alerm sounds a horn and liC diesel oil pump no' tor is fed frca I;8OY A.c bus 27, which in tici t All dienal oil transfer sy te: tho emergency diccc1 concrator bus. i 120y ne battery system. Y ind instrunnnta are fnd by the controls ~ e 1, -

2. Unit 2/3 DIESEd._.'TRE Pui4p {. ,ayn3 ond I?culor, pump with s ' The 'diesol fire pump is a tuo-staBe, & J6hnson model II? 200 right angle genr' drive which,is driven by a ..q The diesel is a six cylinder, four cycle Cummins diesel engine. The diesel engine i., supplied fuel from i 220 bhp,1800 rpm ens ne. a 250-sa11on day tank which' is located in the Unit' 2/3 cribhouse. 15,000-gallon The Unit 3 diesel generatoi' oil transfer pump and buried oil storage tank are the source of makeup oil for the diesel Low. oil level is alarmed in the Unit 3 control fire pump day tank. room. The punp is rated at 2000 gp= at a discharge pressure of 12 All necessary controls for remote nanuni operetion are - psig. located. in the Unit 3 co'ntrol room. 'ill' opei' ate from r'edundant better1G The diesel starting, system and sla:n systems will op'es ( 'The diesel and pump control, instrument, 011 transfer contro1c from the 1257 DC Unit 2.or 3 dattery systek.s. instru=ent and alare. systems' also operate on 125V' DC. 3 Unit 2 and 3 SE=VICE 'dA0ER PUMPS If " normal auxiliary pouer to all three units were lost and a Un'it 1 loss' of-coolant a ccident were assuned to occur, one Unit 2 and one Unit' 3 service water pump could be placed in service usin In such an event, it is credible thct UniQ emergency : diesel power. 2 and 3 will recaire only enough po::er for safo shutdown. s one ser water pump per unit is provided for 'in the safe shutdoun capacity In the event of a totel loss. the Unit 2 and 3 diesel generators. normn1 aux 111ary power, the Unit 2, 3, and 2/3 diesel concrotor Any one of the:c dicscis is capabic of carry J start cutomatically. ing the load of equip =ent required to provide safe shutd C ' c;

.. f.. ' roepsetivo single uQ. The Uniti 2/3 diosol' nn suing to oither Af ter the diesel genorstiors nrs running, one Unit 2 or Unit 3 servi.cc water pump per unit can be atnited'nanually from the main control room. S'ince these punps require manuni ctartings, they will not be availabic within 30 seconrls after the loss of auxilisry For the maximun credible Loss of-c.colant Accident (LdC

power, the Unit 1 core spray system requires fire systen water be favai1-able at 2150 gpm-100 ps15 within a maximum of 30 seconds; therefo i

the service uster pumps will only be considered ss long" term bac c to thd diesel-driven fir.e pumps. TESTIt'G ~ The proper op$ rating condition of the existing portions.,of the Dresden Station Fire protection system is verified by a weekly The attached tigare 2 is a copy of the data sheet test program. Ac# indicated by filled.out as part of these weekly system checks. this data sheet, 'all essential

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For first 11 minutes: The hotwell can provide 40,000 gallons of water supplied by the primary food pumps (minimum of 2 pumps). Each pump with a rated flow of 1650 gpm, ha9u a runout capacity of 1107. of rated flow. Before the hotwell becomes empty (between 7 and 11 minutos after 2. the accidant)? ,,;))jv.Rjufict(Y.24. !A'ydf A The operator must r,c uce the feedwater, flow to about 200 gpm and c..4.c ca' a in the l' ir.ch linc cupplying Mater from the condon-s;. At a flow rate of sate storage tank /to the primary feed pump $, vel 37,5.00 gallons) 200 gpm, this 50,000 gallon tank ' (mini =um will supply water for about 200 minutes. ,.g ggf,./ gjy,y '973l is'G Before the condensate storage. tank becomes empty -(200 minutes) :~ 3. . The-operator must start the makeup dembl 4~e-pumps (250 gpm) to transfer water frcm "A" storage tank (200,000 gallons) to the condensato storage tank which is supplying the feedwater pumps. The jockey pump will automatically transfer at 50 gym from NOTE: th e " A" storage tank to the condensate tank. IT When the water level in the $;phere reaches the high level (505' 4. clevation) : e The operator must reduce the primary feedwater flow to about 50 gym to the vessel. A post incident pump will be started and f.cm the sphere , lined up to transfer water (approximately 50 gp=) through the 3-inch line to radwaste. Water from radwaste will then be transferred to "M storage tank to provide a closed loop makeup supply.to the primary 'feeduater pumps. ~ 5. $dditional means of supplying water to the vessel are: Using the cmcrgency feed pump (100 gpm)' more at runout dondition a. to transfer water frca the condensate storage tank to the vessel This pump can be run using the dicscl generator. i I ~ b. Periodically run a feed pump after the hotwell has been made up from the "A: storage tank using the 8-inch lino. l O e '=~ve- ~.- -

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7 1. Dresden Nnit #1 Auxiliary Power System (Electrical) I. System Normal 1. 4KV bus 11_(with or,without LOCA) A. Tr. 11, unit aux., 14.4-4.26KV, 10000KVA 2. 4KV bus 12 (with or without LOCA) A. Tr. 12, reserve aux., 138-4.16Kv, looooKVA 3 Essential 480V busses 15 & 16 (without LOCA) A. Tr.15 & 16, 4160-480V, 750KVA 4. Essential 480V busses 15 & 16 (LOCA) A. Tr. 15 & 16, 4160-480V, 750KVA B. Diesel generator 1-1, 480V, 500K'4 a. Automatic engine start from LOCA sensor circuit b. Automatic transfer if busses 15 & 16 have no voltage II. System Abnormal - Loss of Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (Tr.12) 1. 4KV bus 11 (with or without LOCA) A. Tr. 11 2. 4KV-bus 12 (with or without LOCA) ) A. Tr. 11 a. Autocatic transfer if bus 12 sustained. low voltage t l l

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480v s me as I-3 4. 480V same as I-4 III. System Abnormal - Loss of, Unit Auxiliary Transformer (Tr.11). ~ 1. 4tV bus 11 (with or without'LOCA) A.- Tr. 12 a. Automatic transfer if bus 11 sustained low voltage 2. 4KV bus 12 (with or without LOCA) A. Tr. 12 3 480v same as I-3 4. 480v same as I-3 IV. System Abnormal - Loss of Unit Auxiliary and Reserve A7x111ary Transformer (Tr.11 & 12) 1. 4KV bus 11 (with or without LOCA) A. Tr.13, 34.4-4.16KVA, 2500KVA a. Auto =atic transfer if bus 11 & 12 at 25% of rated voltage for 30 cycles 2. 4KV bus 12 (with or without LOCA) .A. Deenergized 3 Essential 480v busses 15 & 15 (without LOCA) A. Bus 16 energized from Tr. 16 B. Bus 15 energized from bus 14 a. Manual switching 6% -enW@v. 0+ O e Q y -e. s-M

?.'. -(= .L=- ,a 4. Essential 480V: busses 15 & 15 (LoCA) A. Tr. 15 and bus i4 B. Diesel generator,1-1 a. Automatic engine start from LOCA sensor circuit b. Automatic transfer if busses 15 & 15 have no voltage ~ V. System Abnormal - Loss of All Off-Site 34KV Transmission Lines 1. 4KV and 480V systems same as case I VI. System Abnormal - Loss of All Off-Site 345KV Transmission ~ Lines 1. 4KV and 480V systems same as case I VII. System Abnormal - Loss of All Off-Site 34KV and 345KV Transmission Lines 1. 4KV and 480V systems same as case I VIII. System Abnormal - Loss of All Off-Site 138KV Transmission , Lines (worst case situation assumed, generator off-line) 1. 4KV and 480V systems same as case III Note: For this case, new transformer 81 ~ (330/138-33KV, 300MVA) is utilized to energize the 138KV bus, allowing the primary of Tr. 12 to be energized. i.

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-4 IX. System Abnormal - Loss of All Off-Site 34KV and 138KV Transmission Lines (worst case situation assumed, generator off-line) 1. Same as case VI'II X. System Abnormal - Loss of All Off-Site 138KV and 345KV Transmission Lines (worst case situation assumed, generator off-line) l. 4KV and 480V systems same as case III Note: For this case Tr. 10 (132-35 5-13 2KV, 40MVA) is utilized to energize the 138KV bus, allowing the primary of Tr. 12 to be energized XI. System Abnormal - Loss of All Off-Site Power 1. 4KV bus 11 (with or without LOCA) A. Diesel generator 1-2, 4150V, 2500KW a. Manual engine start b. Manual loading as required 2. 4KV bus 12 (with or without LOCA) A. Deenergized '3 Essential 480V busses 15 & 16 (without LOCA) A. Diesel generator 1-1 a. Automatic engine start if busses 11 & 12 at 25% voltage for 30 cycles b. Automatic transfer if busses 15 & 15 have no voltage o

c ^ (... ( -= ~ \\ B. Diesel generator 1-2 Manual.switdhing of appropriate 4KV and 480V j a. circuit break,ers 4. Essential 480V busses 15 & 16 (LOCA) A. Diesel generator 1-1 \\- a. Aut'omatic engine start from LOCA sensor circuit b. Aut5matic transfer if busses 15 & 16 have no voltage. s 1 [ B. Diesel gen,e.raton 1-2 .x Manual / switching of appropriate 4KV and a. ( 480V circuit breakers i g' \\ ~ ( \\ 3 8 1 J \\ j I P O 4 k I h \\ ) P 5 I , -.,., +.,.. _.

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• 9 MEETING

SUMMARY

DISTRIBUTION - a Docket 50-10 NRC PDR 50-10 4 IXGXXPIE ~ ORB #2 Reading NRR Reading B. C. Rusche E. G. Case V. Stello K. R. Goller D. Eisenhut T. J. Carter A. Schwencer G. Lear R. Reid W. Butler B. Grimes R. Baer L. Shao Project Manager P. O'Connor/R.Bevan Attorney, OELD - OI&E (3) - R. Diggs NRC Participants (Major) R. Fraley, ACRS (16) T. B. Abernathy, DTIE J. B. Buchanan Licensee -}}