ML20036C054
| ML20036C054 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1993 |
| From: | Hull J NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20036C055 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#293-13999 OLA, NUDOCS 9306090176 | |
| Download: ML20036C054 (22) | |
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fay 28,1993 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
J' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY
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COMPANY, et. al.
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Docket No. 50-336 OLA (Millstone Nuclear Power
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(Spent Fuel Pool Design)
Station, Unit 2)
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NRC STAFF RESPONSE SUPPORTING NNECO'S
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION MOTION INTRODUCTION On May 7,1993, licensee Northeast Nuclear Energy Company ("NNECO") filed a motion for summary disposition in this proceeding,' which concerns the adequacy of the spent fuel pool ("SFP") criticality calculations performed for Millstone Unit No. 2's -
license amendment 158. See LBP-92-28,36 NRC 202,215-16 (1992). The NRC Staff has reviewed NNECO's Motion, its statement of material facts,2 and the supporting affidavits of John R. Guerci, George N. Betancourt, and Dr. Stanley E. Turner..The Staff files this Response, including affidavits of Dr. Laurence Kopp and George Bidinger,
" Northeast Nuclear Energy Company's Motion For Summary Dispositior. Of Contention 1" ("NNECO's Motion").
2 " Statement Of Material Facts As To Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Heard" ("NNECO's Statement of Facts").
DESIGNATED ORIGINAL hoch$36 J.
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in support of NNECO's Motion. Because "there is no genuine issue as to any material ~
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fact," NNECO's Motion should be granted, as it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 6 2.749(d).
BACKGROUND On April 28, 1992, a notice of opportunity for hearing was published in the Federal Register regarding the April 16, 1992 application by NNECO seeking authorization to change the design of the spent fuel pool at Millstone Unit 2 from a two-region to a three-region configuration. 57 Fed. Reg.17934. On June 4,1992, the Staff 1
granted NNECO's request and issued Amendment No.158 to the Millstone 2 operating license, notwithstanding the petition filed on behalf of the Cooperative Citizen's Monitoring Network ("CCMN") re-questing the Staff to deny NNECO's amendment request.
This Licensing Board was established to consider intervention petitions filed by CCMN and others and, based on CCMN's August 24,1992 filing, one ofits contentions was accepted for litigation and CCMN was admitted as a party. See LBP-92-28, supra.
CCMN's admission was based solely upon portions of Dr. Michio Kaku's August 23, 1992 Declaration. See LBP-92-28, 36 NRC at 215-18. Dr. Kaku's discussion of
" Maximum Credible Accidents" at pages 8-13 of his August 23,1992 Declaration was rejected by the Board, as were other CCMN contentions regarding neutron flux monitors and steam generators. See LBP-92-28, 36 NRC at 218-19. The adequacy of the criticality study performed for Amendment No.158 and Dr. Kaku's questions in this regard concerning (1) "the actual state of the Boroflex [ sic] box degradation," (2) the use j
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of benchmarking data, (3) the use of Monte Carlo calculations, and (4) the use of a vertical buckling term, were identified by this Board as the only issues to be litigated in this proceeding.' See id. at 217. The Board reiterated at the April 7,1993 pre-hearing conference that it would allow no testimony at a hearing on subjects not related to Contention 1. See Transcript at 141.d DISCUSSION I. APPLICABLE LEG AL STANDARDS -
The summary disposition process, governed by 10 C.F.R. 5 2.749, serves to screen out contentions that do not involve real factual controversies. See Wisconsin 3 The Staff does not regard NNECO's recent decision (see NNECO letter to Board dated May 6,1993) to file a license amendment application to change Region C of the Millstone Unit No.,2's SFP as enlarging the scope of this proceeding. Other than changing its designation from " Region II" to " Region C," the SFP changes authorized by Amendment No.158 did not affect Region C. See, e.g., NNECO's April 16,1992 letter to Staff, at 2; and Staff's June 4,1992 Safety Evaluation, at 2. Thus, any substantive changes to Region C which may now be contemplated cannot properly be viewed as within the scope of Amendment No.158 or this proceeding.
4 Many of the statements made by Dr. Kaku in his March 31, 1993 Declaration clearly concern issues not within the scope of this proceeding, such as:
(1) Fuel consolidation and lack of a permanent nuclear waste repository; (2) Beyond design basis and " catastrophic" accidents; (3) General inadequacy of the.95 keff Criterion; and (4) Inadequacy of the KENO Codes.
Any " material facts" relied upon by CCMN in opposing summary disposition that are based on issues (1)-(4) above should be rejected by the Board as being outside the scope of this proceeding. Parties in general may not seek to litigate issues that are not within the scope of the Federal Register notice of opportunity for hearing. See Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-739, 18 NRC 335, 339 (1983); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-619,12 NRC 558, 565 (1980).
Additionally, in this proceeding, CCMN may not seek to litigate issues that are not within the scope of its Contention 1. See LBP-92-23,36 NRC at 215-18, supra.
Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-696,16 NRC 1245, 1258 (1982). The fact that a contention was admitted for litigation in a proceeding pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714 does not preclude summary disposition nor guarantee a party a hearing on its contention. See Point Beach, supra,16 NRC at 1258 n.15; Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-130,6 AEC 423,425 n.4 (1973). Licensing boards are to grant summary disposition if the filings in the proceeding, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the statements of the parties and the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law.
10 C.F.R S 2.749(d).
The provisions of 10 C.F.R. Q 2.749(a) specify, in part, that: (1) a concise statement is to be attached to the motion for summary disposition setting forth "the material facts as to which the moving party contends that there is no genuine issue to be heard";
(2) a similar statement is to be filed by the party opposing the motion, establishing that there are one or more issues of material fact to be heard; and (3) the moving party's facts are deemed admitted unless controverted by the opposing statement.
10 C.F.R. Q 2.749(b) requires in part that any supporting or opposing affidavits state facts that would be admissible in evidence, and that "a party opposing the motion may -
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials" made in answering the motion; rather, that party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact."
In applying these provisions, the Commission's adjudicatory boards have routinely affirmed grants of summary disposition where properly supported summary disposition
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motions were not rebutted by factual evidence.5 These decisions establish that rebuttals based only on bare assertions expressing differences of opinion do not defeat properly supported motions for summary disposition. For example, in a SFP case, Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451,459-63 (1980), the intervenor's bare assertions of SFP problems in other plants, contending that additional investigation was needed, were insufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material fact still existed. An intervcnor must properly cite, by affidavit or otherwise, evidentiary support for its position, and cannot rely on argument alone in opposing summary disposition. See, e.g., Cleveland Elecaric Illuminating Co.
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-841, 24 NRC 64, 93-4 (1986);
Houston Lighting and Power Co.
(Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit e
No.1), ALAB-629,13 NRC 75,78-81 (1981). Moreover, when material facts are not controverted by an intervenor opposing summary disposition, the mere difference of opinion between an intervenor's experts and the applicant's experts does not preclude summary disposition. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-932, 31 NRC 371, 422-23 (1990). Even when an intervenor opposing summary disposition files a statement of its expert which seemingly raises factual issues, the technical merits of the statement must be examined by the board to The burden of proof remains on the party moving for summary disposition, so that 5
unless the movant makes a primafacie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, an opposing party's failure to meet the 10 C.F.R. Q 2.749 requirements may be of no consequence. See Cleveland Electric 1/luminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443,6 NRC 741,752-54 (1977). The Staff believes that NNECO's Motion and supporting affidavits make the necessaryprimafacie showing.
determine if a dispute on a material issue of fact really exists. See Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), ALAB-950,33 NRC 492, 498-99 (1991).
The provisions of 10 C.F.R. f 2.749(c) state that if, based on one or more affidavits, it appears that the party opposing summary disposition "cannot, for reasons stated, present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition," the board may act so as to give the opposing party time to remedy the situation.' However, this rule is not applied to deny summary disposition if it is otherwise justified. In Point Beach, supra, 16 NRC at 1263, the adjudicatory board cited 10 C.F.R. 6 2.749(c) and stated that if a licensing board determines that there are no genuine issues of material fact, it may grant summary disposition even before discovery is otherwise completed if the opposing party cannot identify what specific information it seeks to obtain through further discovery.
6 On May 3,1993, CCMN filed a pleading titled "CCMN Motion For Leave To Compel And Motion To Compel NNECO And NRC To Fully Respond To CCMN's Discovery Requests [" Discovery Motion"] and CCMN Motion For Variance In Schedule For Filing Response To Liscenee's [ sic] Summary Disposition Motion,"_ in which CCMN claims that it was denied Holtec data. CCMN's Discovery Motion has no merit, as discussed in the Staff's May 21,1993 filing. CCMN's Motion For Variance In Schedule was granted by Order dated May 13,1993 (unpublished), and CCMN cannot credibly claim any prejudice in being required to oppose summary disposition by June 29,1993.
Since January,1993, CCMN and Dr. Kaku have had Holtec Report HI-92777, FuelRack Analyses For Millstone Unit 2 (With Gaps in Tha Boraflex) (April 1992) and Holtec Report HI-91737, Blackness Testing of Boraflex in Selected Region-1 Cells of the Millstone-2 Spent Fuel Storage Racks) (January 1992), the latter of which includes information marked proprietary.
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(Footnote and citations omitted). In Perry, supra, the intervenor argued on appeal that the licensing board, in granting summary disposition against the intervenor, misapplied 10 C.F.R. Q 2.749(c)in refusing to delay the proceeding. This argument was rejected.7 i
CCMN must now present evidentiary support for Contention 1, and must address NNECO's updated analysis upon which Amendment No.158 rests, rather than the earlier Combustion Engineering ("CE") criticality analysis. In North Anna, supra, an NRC adjudicatory board affirmed summary disposition in part because the intervenor did not rebut corrective analyses contained in licensee and staff affidavits filed in support of summary disposition. Here, CCMN and Dr. Kaku have seized upon the threat of a criticality event as reported on by NNECO in Licensee Event Report 92-003 dated March 13, 1992,8 but they have asserted no facts casting doubt on the validity of NNECO's subsequent safety analyses submitted with its April 16, 1992 license amendment application. Cf. North Anna,11 NRC at 459-61.
Statements of opinion and argument similar to Dr. Kaku's declarations to date should not prevent summary disposition. The statements made by Dr. Kaku in his two l
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The intervenor had stated in its affidavit opposing summary disposition that it l
7 needed more time to analyze documents which it had recently received through discovery -
against the applicant and NRC Staff. See Perry, 24 NRC at 94. The licensing board's grant of summary disposition was affirmed. See Id., at 95. Similarly, CCMN's recent request for additional information should not preclude summary disposition here.
Contrary to CCMN's representations that Dr. Kaku has had almost no time to review material produced during discovery, he has in fact had such material in his possession
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since January 1993.
8 A copy of this report was sent to CCMN by Staff's letter to the Board dated July 1,1992.
declarations are not supported by citations to specific portions of any documents. Only a few documents are even referenced generally.' CCMN must now show that there are factual matters in dispute, not just that differences of opinion exist.
II. NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST CCMN has not established that there is a genuine factual issue material to this proceeding regarding the actual state of the Boraflex degradation in the Millstone 2 SFP, or whether the.95 k,y requirement is met.
A. Bora0ex Degradation in the Millstone 2 SFP The first matter set out by the Board for inquiry is:
- 1. What is the actual state of the BoroDex [ sic] box degradation, and what is the corresponding disposition of the water gaps? According to Dr. Kaku, the licensee examined only 16% of the Boroflex [ sic] boxes.
If the samplesis not representative, the gaps may be larger than expected, or locally concentrated.
A concentration of gaps would cause local enhancement of the neutron distribution with an effect of increasing k n.
i LBP-92-28, supra, 36 NRC at 217 (footnote and citations omitted).
CCMN and Dr. Kaku recognize that substantially more than 16 % of the Boraflex boxes in the Millstone 2 SFP were examined for degradation. Dr. Kaku admits that the 16% figure he used in his August 1992 Declaration to describe the percentage of Boraflex boxes examined by NNECO for degradation was "in error."
March 31,1993
' The March 31, 1993 Declaration's sole reference to any documentary materials appears on page 1, where Dr. Kaku lists: " amendment 158" (but not NNECO's April 16,1992 amendment application); an August 11,1987 NNECO letter to the NRC, which concerns the fuel consolidation program at Millstone; a February 28,1992 CE letter to NRC, describing CE's initial evaluation of its criticality calculation errors; and the NRC's March 24,1992 information notice describing CE's initial evaluation (which was superseded by the criticality calculations at issue here).
9 Declaration, at 1.3 In fact, Holtec's January 1992 report, Blackness Testing ofBoraflex in Selected Region-1 Cells of the Millstone-2 Spent Fuel Storage Racks), at 3 and Figure 3, establishes that 176 out of 384, or 46%, of the cells were tested for the presence of gaps." See Exhibit L of Dr. Kopp's affidavit.
Since 1990, NNECO has kept the Staffinformed about the degree of Boraflex degradation in the Millstone 2 SFP. By letter dated October 1,1990, from NNECO to NRC, Millstone Unit No. 2 Spent Fuel Racks Boraflex Degradation, NNECO reported the results ofits first neutron blackness testing campaign of storage cells,28 which began on August 24,1990. NNECO's letter stated that from the 384 storage cells in Region 1 (now Regions A and B) of the SFP,420 Boraflex panels were tested and 45 panels were found to have one gap" and three panels had two gaps in their Boraflex material. The z
Dr. Kaku apparenny confused the observed Boraflex panel defect rate of 16 percent with the percentage of panels examined in the Millstone 2 SFP.
" Attachment 2 to NNECO's April 16,1992, amendment request, Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Safety Analyses, stated that "approximately half" of the Boraflex cells in Region 1 (now Regions A and B) of the SFP had been tested for the presence of gaps.
32 See Exhibit C of Dr. Kopp's affidavit. NNECO sent a copy of this letter to CCMN on September 10,1992, and NNECO's counsel sent a copy to Dr. Kaku by letter dated January 26,1993.
As stated in 17 of Dr. Kopp's affidavit (attached), blackness testing consists of using a neutron source and neutron detectors to measure the neutron attenuation through Boraflex panels.
Increases in neutron count rates indicate missing or significantly degraded BoraDex material while low count rates confirm that Boraflex material is present. Each storage cell or box contains four Boraflex panels.
The number of panels having one gap was subsequently corrected to 46. See Exhibit L of Dr. Kopp's affidavit, at 3 n.l.
largest single gap reported was 1.8 inches wide, and it was further reported that of the three panels having two - gaps, the largest combined gap measurements equalled 1.9 inches. See Exhibit C of Dr. Kopp's af6 davit, at 1.
By letter dated November 15, 1990, the Staff requested additional information from NNECO regarding the Boraflex degradation in the Millstone 2 SFP.35 In its response dated January 4,1991, NNECO reported that the gaps found in the Boraflex panels were randomly distributed.'6 On February 7,1991, the Staff sent to NNECO' an evaluation of the Boraflex degradation, concluding that the.95 km criterion would not be violated, but requesting results from any future blackness tests should those tests reveal increased gap sizes."
On October 15, 1991, NNECO began a second series of blackness tests at.
Millstone 2. The results were reported by NNECO's letter to the NRC dated November 21,1991, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, Boraflex Degradation in Spent Fuel Racks." NNECO reported that the Boraflex testing consisted of (1) all of_ the panels previously identified to have gap indications, (2) a large subset of panels where is See Exhibit D of Dr. Kopp's af6 davit. A copy of this letter was sent to Dr. Kaku as reflected in the Staff's letter to Ms. Marucci dated December 31,1992.
See Exhibit E of Dr. Kopp's affidavit, at 2. NNECO sent a copy of this letter to
'6 CCMN on September 10,1992, and NNECO's counsel sent a copy to Dr. Kaku by letter dated January 26,1993.
See Exhibit F of Dr. Kopp's af6 davit. A copy of this evaluation and its cover letter was sent to Dr. Kaku as reflected in the Staff's letter to Ms. Marucci dated December 31,1992.
" See Exhibit G of Dr. Kopp's affidavit. A copy of this letter was sent to Dr. Kaku as re6ected in the Staff's letter to Ms. Marucci dated December 31,1992.
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no gaps were encountered previously, and (3) testing of previously untested storage cells for expansion of the data base. The test results indicated that gap growth had occurred in the locations previously identified to have gaps. See Exhibit G, at 2. Additionally, new gaps were detected in panels where no gaps had been previously identified and new gaps were detected in the expanded cell population which had not been previously tested.
Id. One panel was found to have exceeded the 2.7 inch gap utilized in the previous Combustion Engineering criticality analysis. Id. That gap was initially determined to be between 3.0 and 3.5 inches. Id. A panel from a second cell was found to be borderline in exceeding the 2.7 inch gap criterion. Id. On October 21,1991, NNECO-began replacing the two Boraflex panels that exceeded the 2.7 inch criterion. Id.
As described in i 12 of Dr. Kopp's affidavit, Attachment 2 to NNECO's April
- 16. 1992, amendment request, Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Safety Analyses," reported that approximately half of the Boraflex cells in Region 1 (now Regions A and B) of the SFP had been tested for the presence of gaps. The test data identified a Boraflex panel defect rate of 16 percent. With the exception of the two panels cited above that were replaced, the testing did not identify any gaps exceeding the 2.7 inch criterion, which corresponds to a 2% shrinkage rate. To account for any further gap growth, NNECO's i
" NNECO's counsel, by letter dated July 1,1992, sent CCMN a copy of NNECO's April 16,1992 amendment application, with attachments. A copy of these documents was also sent to Dr. Kaku by letter from NNECO's counsel dated January 26,1993.
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criticality analysis for Amendment No.158 assumed 5.65 inch gaps (4% shrinkage) at -
the observed test locations and 5.65 inch gaps randomly distributed in all of the other Boraflex panels. See Attachment 2 to NNECO's April 16, 1992 amendment request, at 1.
NNECO's analysis further demonstrated that even with an assumed concentration of 5.65 inch gaps in the central 50% of the rack height, as opposed to the random distribution of gaps actually observed, the maximum calculated km was 0.9212, well within the 0.95 criterion. See id, at 3, and Table 4 of NNECO's amendment application.
s in issuing Amendment No.158, the Statf not only had the above plant-specific data, it had more general information concerning Boraflex degradation. See 1113-14 of Dr. Kopp's af6 davit. Information concerning Boraflex degradation at the Quad Cities and Point Beach plants resulted in publication of NRC Information Notice 87-43, Gaps in Neutron-Absorbing Material in High-Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks, dated September 8, 1987.2 This notice discusses research programs on gap formation which were then being coordinated by the Boraflex supplier (" BISCO") and the Electric Power Research Institute ("EPRl"). See Exhibit A, at 2. The results of these studies were later reported in EPRI Report NP-6159, An Assessment of Boraflex Performance in Spent-Nuclear-Fuel Storage Racks, dated December 1988.2i The 1988 EPRI report reflects 2
See Exhibit A of Dr. Kopp's af6 davit. A copy of this information notice was sent to Dr. Kaku as reflected in the Staff's letter to Ms. Marucci dated December 31,1992.
2 See Exhibit B of Dr. Kopp's af6 davit. A copy of this 1988 EPRI report was sent to Dr. Kaku as reflected in the Staff's letter to Ms. Marucci dated December 31,1992.
This report's Ondings are summarized in Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-89-12, 29 NRC 441,448-52 (1989), afirmed, ALAB-921,
what the BISCO and EPRI-sponsored studies established regarding maximum Boraflex shrinkage, the levels of gamma exposure which produces maximum shrinkage, and the effect irradiation has on Boraflex ability to absorb neutrons. Data from the BISCO research shows that a maximum 3-4% shrinkage of Boranex occurs at a gamma radiation saturation point of approximately 1 x 10" rads.22 See Exhibit B, Figure 5-2 and pp. 5-9 to 5-12. No loss of Boranex ability to absorb neutrons could be detected after samples were irradiated in the Bisco test reactor. See id. at 4-18. The Bisco test irradiation environment was conservative, as the samples were subjected to gamma exposures greater thar *ose projected to occur over 40 years in a SFP. See id. at 5-27. The test data support EPRI's finding that "there are no indications that combined exposure to gamma -
radiation and the pool aqueous environment result.in the onset of rapid or gross degradation of the polymer matrix that would cause the loss of boron." Id. at 5-29.23 As stated above, NNECO's criticality analysis for Amendment No.158 assumed 5.65 inch gaps (4% shrinkage) at the observed test locations. The assumption of a 4%
30 NRC 177 (1989), another case involving the use of Borauex in a SFP.
The same maximum shrinkage of 3-4% was found in an EPRI-sponsored study 22 of shrinkage as a function of the length of time Boranex remains in a SFP. See Exhibit B at 3-16 to 3-21, and Figure 3-2.
in February 1993, EPRI published report TR-101986, Boraflex Test Results and 2)
Evaluation. See Exhibit N of Dr. Kopp's affidavit. Although this 1993 report was obviously not relied upon by the Staff in issuing Amendment No.158, it nonetheless confirms the 1988 report's findings. For example, Exhibit N confirms, at 6-1, that "the maximum total shrinkage of Borauex is limited to 3 to 4 %."
Exhibit N, at 6-9, confirms that " gap formation and growth represents no loss of boron from the system."
Copies of this '993 report were sent to CCMN and Dr. Kaku in the Staff's May 7,1993 supplemental response to CCMN's December 1992 discovery request.
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shrinkage rate is conservative as shown by the EPRI research discussed above. See T 14 of Dr. Kopp's affidavit. The assumption of 5.65 inch gaps randomly distributed in all of the other Boraflex panels is supported by NNECO's blackness test results discussed above. Even with an assumed concentration of 5.65 inch gaps in the central 50% of the rack height, the maximum calculated k,y was 0.9212, well within the 0.95 criterion. See to NNECO's April 16, 1992 amendment request, at 3, and Table 4 of NNECO's amendment application. These are material facts which CCMN has failed to rebut.24 NNECO's analysis of the Boraflex degradation found in its SFP, performed as part ofits application for Amendment No.158, assumed 4% shrinkage of Boraflex. This is a conservative assumption which supports the grant of Amendment No.158. See
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24 In his March 31, 1993 Declaration, Dr. Kaku states that his " knowledge of the degradation of the Boraflex boxes" comes from the following material: " amendment 158";
an August 11, 1987 NNECO letter to the NRC, which concerns the fuel consolidation program at Millstone; a February 28, 1992 Combustion Engineering
("CE") letter to NRC, describing CE's initial evaluation of its criticality calculation errors; and the NRC's March 24, 1992 information notice describing CE's first evaluation. See March 31, 1993 Declaration, at 1.
Neither of Dr. Kaku's declarations give any indication that he has considered NNECO's April 16, 1992 amendment application, or its attached safety analyses. For example, Dr. Kaku appears unaware of NNECO's concentration of gaps analysis discussed above. He states that NNECO's effort to model the Boraflex degradation "is questionable, since it omits the possibility of the concentration of gaps." March 31,1993 Declaration, at 1-2. See also August 23,1992 Declaration, at 3-4.
Dr. Kaku refers to Boraflex shrinkages of 3-4% at the Quad Cities and Point Beach plants, citing a 1987 " alert sent to nuclear power plants." Id. at 4. This " alert" is the NRC Information Notice 87-43, which generated the additional EPRI data on Boraflex degradation and which, as discussed above, shows that 3-4% shrinkage is the maximum amount that can be expected to occur over the life of any plant.
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1113-15 of Dr. Kopp's affidavit. The most recen: EPRI data on Boraflex also shows the validity of this shrinkage factor. Id. CCMN has not shown that any facts exist which cast doubt on NNECO's analysis. Accordingly, on the issue of.Boraflex degradation, NNECO should be granted summary disposition.
B. Eenchmark Data The second matter set out by the Board for inquiry is:
- 2. To what extent are the benchmark data used by the Licensee representative of the arrangement of Boroflex [ sic] boxes, fuel boxes, and water in the storage pool?
LBP-92-28, supra, 36 NRC at 217 (citation omitted).
t As discussed in Dr. Kopp's affidavit, 11 18-20, the Staff has reviewed Holtec reports produced by NNECO in response to CCMN discovery requests, showing that benchmarking data dxist which sufficiently represent the spent fuel rack configuration found in the Millstone 2 SFP. As discussed in the affidavit of George Bidinger, i 12, benchmarking compares calculational results with experimental results, resulting in code and cross-section library improvements, and in an understanding of biases in the codes.
As a further check on the reliability of NNECO's underlying data upon which its amendment application was based, the Staff had Oak Ridge National Laboratory
("ORNL") independently review NNECO's criticality calculations performed for Amendment No.158.25 For Amendment 158, NNECO used the KENO V.a code, a ORNL's review is set forth in its January 1993 report, Criticality Safety 25 Calculations For Region B ofthe Millstone Unit No. 2 Spent Fuel Pool, a copy of which is attached to Mr. Bidinger's affidavit as Exhibit A. Copies of this report and related materials were sent to Dr. Kaku as reflected in the Staff's January 12,1993 response to the intervenor's discovery request 9.
three dimensional neutron transport code which can calculate km for a reactor with rapidly changing neutron fluxes. See Mr. Bidinger's affidavit,17. This capability of the KENO V.a code allows for the proper three dimensional modeling of fuel assemblies in storage racks with Boraflex panels, with or without Boraflex gaps. Id.,18. KENO V.a is thus quite capable of analyzing fuel storage configurations such as poisoned fuel racks of the type found in the Millstone 2 SFP. Id. ORNL verified that NNECO had adjusted the calculated k,y values to allow for the bias in the benchmarking of the codes and cross-sections. Id., i 11.
Dr. Kaku states that realistically modeling the neutron distribution in the Millstone 2 SFP is difficult due to the " unusual" geometry of the fuel rack in' the Millstone 2 SFP. The type of KENO analysis used by NNECO and ORNL was developed to analyze these very types of arrays. Id., i 15. By carefully benchmarking the Boral experiments,26 by selecting enough generations of enough neutron histories, and by carefully examining the calculation edits, both NNECO and ORNL were able to calculate the km with due regard for the geometry of the array in the Millstone 2 SFP.
Id.
In granting Amendment No.158, adequate benchmarking data was provided for the application of the KENO V.a code to the Millstone 2 SFP.27 See ii 19-20 of 26 See Dr. Kopp's affidavit, i 19.
Dr. Kaku has not established that he has any experience working with KENO codes 27 in the context of performing SFP criticality calculations. The KENO Codes were developed specifically to handle criticality calculations, and publicly available benchmarking studies show that these codes are reliable and can correctly account for the thin layers of boron, and fuel rods, present in the Millstone SFP.
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Dr. Kopp's affidavit; 117-8,11-12, and 14-15 of Mr. Bidinger's affidavit. CCMN has provided no supported basis to question this conclusion. Accordingly, on the issue of benchmarking, NNECO should be granted sum nary disposition.
C. NNECO's Recalculation of k_g for Amendment No.158 The third matter set out by the Board for inquiry is:
3.
Have the Monte Carlo calculations incorporated enough iterations to provide a good estimate of the pool's reactivity?
LBP-92-28, supra, 36 NRC at 217 (citation omitted). The basic question here is whether NNECO's criticality calculations, on which issuance of Amendment No.158 was based, were performed correctly and conservatively.
As explained in Dr. Kopp's affidavit, criticality is a measure of the capability of the neutron field to sustain a nuclear chain reaction. This measurement is expressed by indicating the effective multiplication factor for neutrons (k,u), which is the ratio of the number of neutrons produced from fissions in each generation to the number of neutrons-lost by absorption and leakage. The k,n must equal 1.00 for there to be criticality. See Dr. Kopp's affidavit, j 16. See also Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant), ALAB-725,17 NRC 562,564 n.2 (1983). The k,yis determined by mathematical calculation, and the precise k,n level cannot be measured with exactitude, as discussed in the attached affidavit of Mr. Bidinger. The.95 k,n criterion, set forth in f 9.1.2 of benchmarking studies are cited in Appendix C of Holtec Report HI-92777, Fuel Rack Analyses For Millstone Unit 2 OVith Gaps In The Boraflex) (April 1992), which NNECO's counsel sent to Dr. Kaku by letter dated January 26,1993.
the Commission's Standard Review Plan,2 contains a number of built-in conservatisms such as: (1) the calculations are based on fully-filled racks of unirradiated fuel of the maximum allowed enrichment; (2) calculational uncertainties and mechanical tolerances are included in their most adverse (highest reactivity) direction; and (3) no aedit is taken for dissolved boron in the SFP water.2' See Dr. Kopp's af5 davit, j 16.
For the KENO Monte Carlo calculations performed for Amendment No.158, the 95/95 calculational uncertainty' was 0.0019 based on 1000 generations (iterations) of 500 neutrons each (500,000 histories) and 0.0012 based on 2500 generations (iterations) of 500 neutrons each (1.25 million histories). See Table 3 of NNECO's April 16,1992 license amendment application. This decrease in the calculational uncertainty with increasing generations indicates that a sufHcient number of generations was used to
=
provide a good estimate of the Millstone 2 SFP's reactivity for operation under Amendment No.158. See Mr. Bidinger's affidavit, 11 10-11, 15-16. In addition, The Commission's Standard Review Plan contains guidance for Staff review of 2:
license amendment applications, including those relating to spent fuel storage. See generally Big Rock, supra,17 NRC at 567-70, for a discussion of the relationship between the keff standard and the Commission's general design criteria for the storage and handling of nuclear fuel.
It is well known and generally accepted that the presence of soluble boron in the 2'
SFP water acts to substantially lower the maximum keff, even in the presence of fresh, unirradiated fuel. Not taking credit for this boron makes the keff calculation for SFPs very conservative, even in the absence of the other conservatisms. See Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-89-12,29 NRC 441,456 n.5 (1989).
The NRC requires that the methodology uncertainty for spent fuel criticality 5
calculations be quantified at a 95/95 one-sided tolerance level. This means that km will be below the computed value with 95% probability at a 95% con 6dence level. See Mr.
Bidinger's af6 davit, i 9.
l j
i Table 3 of NNECO's April 16, 1992 license amendment application shows that statistically combining the calculational uncertainty with the bias uncertainty and the uncertainties in the manufacturing tolerances gave a total uncertainty cf 0.0115 (1000 generations) and 0.0114 (2500 generations) for Region B and a total uncertainty of 0.0154 (1000 generations) and 0.0153 (2500 generations) for Region A of the spent fuel pool. The small change in these two values for Regions A and B resulting from the large increase in neutron generations indicates that the fuel and storage racks were correctly modeled for KENO calculations. See Mr. Bidinger's affidavit, 1110-11. On this basis it is concluded that a sufficient number of iterations were performed to provide an adequate and conservative estimate of the Millstone 2 SFP's reactivity. See id. at 1111, 15-16.
On the issues of k,y and criticality in the Millstone 2 SFP as now licensed, CCMN has failed to establish the existence of material factual disputes between NNECO and CCMN.33 See i 17 of Dr. Kopp's affidavit; and 115,7,11, and 16 of Mr. Bidinger's affidavit. Accordingly, on this issue of NNECO's recalculation of k,n for Amendment No.158, NNECO should be granted summary disposition.
3' SFP operations to date have had no discernible effect on public health and safety.
Dr. Kaku's declarations fail to: (1) specify how the documented Boraflex degradation might cause the.95 keff criterion to be violated in the Millstone 2 SFP as presently configured under Amendment No.158; and (2) explain how a criticality event in the SFP would result in off-site consequences. Moreover, in neither of his declarations does Dr. Kaku identify any particular expertise he has in the area of physics relating to performing criticality calculations for spent fuel pools.
D. Use of a Vertical Buckline Term i
The fourth and final matter set out by the Board for inquiry is:
4.
If a vertical buckling term has been used, has it been used correctly?
LBP-92-28, supra, 36 NRC at 217 (citation omitted).
The criticality calculations performed in support of Amendment No.158 used the KENO V.a code, a three-dimensional Monte Carlo neutron transport code. See 17 of Mr. Bidinger's affidavit. The three-dimensional feature of the KENO V.a code does away with the necessity of using a vertical buckling term, and thus it was not used in the Amendment No.158 calculations. See j 21 of Dr. Kopp's affidavit. additionally, as explained in Dr. Kopp's affidavit, NNECO used a 27-group cross <,ection set in its criticality calculations, rather than the 4-group cross-section set prev'.ously used by CE, thus making use of a vertical buckling term unnecessary. See id. Consideration of this term was not germane to the criticality analysis performed for Amendment No.158.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, NNECO'c sur. mary disposition motion should be granted.
Respectfully submitted, v
/
J n T. Hull Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 28th day of May 1993
r UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'93
- 28 P 53 DEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD" In the Matter of
)
)
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR
)
Docket No. 50-336 OLA ENERGY COMPANY, et. al.
)
(Spent Fuel Pool Design)
)
(Millstone Nuclear Power
)
Station, Unit 2)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF RESPONSE SUPPORTING NNECO'S
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION MOTION,"
" SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT OF DR. LAURENCE I. KOPP," and " SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT OF DR. GEORGE H.
BIDINGER," in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or as indicated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 28th day of May 1993:
Ivan W. Smith, Chairman *'
Nicholas S. Reynolds Administrative Judge John A. MacEvoy Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Winston & Strawn Mail Stop: EW-439 1400 L St., N.W.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20005 Washington, DC 20555 Mary E. Marucci2 Dr. Jerry R. Kline*
104 Brownwell St.
Administrative Judge New Haven, CT 06511 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 2
Mail Stop: EW-439 Richard M. Kacich, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Licensing Northeast Washington, DC 20555 Utilities P.O. Box 270 Dr. Charles N. Kelber*
Hartford, CT 06101 Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Cooperative Citizen's Mail Stop: EW-439 Monitoring Network i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 1491 Washington, DC 20555 New Haven, CT 06506 Pursuant to tne Board's Order dated April 26,1993, (unpublished), the Staff is also sending Judge Smith a diskette containing this filing.
2 Copies of Exhibits not included.
t L I Professor Michio Kaku Atomic Safety and Licensing Department of Physics Board Panel
- City College of New York Mail Stop: EW-439 138th St. and Convent Ave.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory New York, NY 10031 Commission Washington, DC 20555 Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication
- Office of the Secretary * (2)
Mail Stop: 16/G16 OWFN Attn: Docketing and Service U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: 16/G16 OWFN Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Adjudicatory File * (2)
Washington, DC 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: EW-439 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 k/f?
J n T. Hull ounsel for NRC Staff