ML20036A005
| ML20036A005 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1993 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20036A004 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-92-212, NUDOCS 9305070189 | |
| Download: ML20036A005 (7) | |
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l NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Docket No.
50-423 Berlin, Connecticut License No.
NPF-49 1
EA 92-212 Based on an NRC investigation conducted from December 18, 1989, to August 31, 1992, the NRC has determined that a violation of its regulations occurred.
In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C.
2282, and 10 CFR 2.205.
The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below:
I.
Violation Assessed a Civil Penalty 10 CFR 50.7, Employee Protection, subsection (a), prohibits discrimination by a Commission licensee against an employee for engaging in certain protected activities. Discrimination includes discharge and other actions that relate to compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
Protected activities include, but are not limited to, providing information to the NRC on potential violations or other matters within the NRC's regulatory responsibilities.
Contrary to the above, the licensee discriminated against an employee for engaging in protected activities.
The employee, Paul Blanch, Supervisor, Instrument and Controls Special Projects Section, was engaged in a protected activity in that he raised safety concerns related to an undetectable failure mechanism in certain Rosemount transmitter models with his management and the NRC.
Beginning on April 3, 1989, the licensee subjected Mr.
Blanch to a hostile work environment, as evidenced by the following:
1.
In April, 1989, Mr. Johnson wrote a memorandum to Mr. Roby in which he stated that Mr. Blanch had acted in an unprofessional manner during a meeting with the NRC on March 30, 1989, that concerned the Rosemount issues.
Mr. Roby had not attended the meeting but, based in part on this information from Mr. Johnson, he held a counseling session with Mr. Blanch on April 3, 1989, during which he accused Mr. Blanch of unprofessional conduct during the March 30th meeting.
Mr. Johnson subsequently sent a memorandum to file, dated April 12, 1989, noting that the NRC Senior Resident Inspector felt that all attendees at the 9305070189 930504 PDR ADOCK OponO423 0
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March 30th meeting had acted in a professional manner and that he (Mr. Johnson) agreed.
- However, he never retracted the accusation nor did he notify Mr. Roby that he had apparently changed his position regarding Mr. Blanch's conduct, so that this admonition was never rectified.
The failure to retract this accusation contributed to a hostile work environment directed toward Mr.
Blanch, because he viewed the April 3rd meeting as an attempt to get him to back off the Rosemount issue.
This failure to retract also had a chilling effect on the raising of safety concerns by other employees in the GEE section, since other employees were aware that Mr. Blanch had raised a safety issue and subsequently was criticized for unprofessional conduct at the NRC meeting.
2.
In June, 1989, Mr. Johnson attempted to preclude Mr. Blanch from serving as chairman of the Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group (BWROG) committee concerning the Rosemount issue by recommending in a memorandum to Mr. Mroczka that Mr. Blanch not be allowed to serve as chairman of that group.
Mr.
Johnson based his recommendation in large part on negative input about Mr. Blanch from Rosemount, the company whose product was under scrutiny, which raises an inference that Mr. Johnson's actions were a result of Mr. Blanch's attempting to raise safety issues, and were discriminatory.
3.
Messrs. Roby, Johnson, and Werner improperly attempted to influence an audit report being prepared by NU's Internal Audit Department (IAD) between September and November, 1989, of an audit that was conducted of time and expense reporting in Mr. Blanch's group.
Specifically, Messrs.
Roby, Johnson, and Werner reviewed the first draft of the report, dated October 27, 1989, and attempted to have negative comments concerning Mr.
Blanch's supervisory performance, which was not the subject of the audit, inserted into the audit report.
This is significant because: (1) Messrs.
Roby, Johnson and Werner had not been interviewed as part of the audit, (2) senior corporate management intended the audit to be independent of Mr. Blanch's line management, and (3) Messrs.
Roby, Johnson and Werner had earlier received letters of reprimand from Mr. Mroczka on October 16, 1989, concerning their dealings with Mr.
Blanch.
The timing of these attempts (i.e.,
during the period when Mr. Blanch had been raising
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i the Rosemount safety issue) supports an inference
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that the attempts were the result of Mr. Blanch's attempting to raise the Rosemount issue.
Furthermore, the IAD audit contributed to the creation of a hostile work environment.
The audit (the conduct of which was known to other people in the work group) was biased by its reliance on data which should have been known to be unreliable.
The data consisted of unofficial signout logs which were not required or controlled documents, were not required to be accurately maintained, and which had known errors.
In addition, the key card records for the Berlin office did not accurately reflect all entrances to the building in that the card readers were not reliable or always used.
The report was further biased because IAD investigators did not appropriately review or follow up on all of the explanations offered by those audited in Mr. Blanch's group.
IAD applied a lower level of inquiry to those individuals who were selected by the auditors for a comparison sample but were not in Mr. Blanch's group.
Further, the licensee did not initiate an audit into allegations of other similar potential abuses of time and expense reporting in the Instrument and Controls Engineering Department (such as long lunches, as well as drinking and golfing on company time).
Mr. Blanch testified to OI that he viewed the audit as a vehicle to discredit him.
These actions constitute an environment which Mr.
Blanch personally believed, as described above, stifled his ability to raise safety concerns or work effectively.
Also a reasonable nuclear power plant employee would believe that these actions stifled his or her ability to raise safety concerns or work effectively.
With regard to the belief of a reasonable nuclear power plant employee, several employees within the GEE section testified to OI that Mr. Blanch was retaliated against for raising a safety issue and that this resulted in a chilling effect on the raising of safety concerns. A Licensee consultant also observed similar indications of a hostile' work environment.
This is a Severity Level II Violation (Supplement VII).
Civil Penalty - $100,000.
II.
Violation Not Assessed a Civil Penalty 10 CFR 21.21 (a) requires that each individual, corporation, partnership or other entity subject to the regulations'in i
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this part shall adopt procedures to provide for the evaluation of deviations, and to assure that a director or responsible officer is informed if a basic component supplied for such facility fails to comply with any particular rule, regulation, order, or license of the Commission relating to a substantial safety hazard.
Nuclear Engineering and Operations (NEO) Procedure NEO 2.01, Revision 2, dated July 24, 1987, entitled " Implementation of 10 CFR 21: Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," defines, in Section 4.2, a Substantial Safety Hazard (SSH) as a loss or potential loss of a safety function due to a defect or noncompliance to the extent that there is a major reduction in the degree of protection provided to the public h%elth and safety of the facility or activity.
U Section 6.1.1.1 of NEO 2.01 requires that an SSH evaluat' ion shall be initiated when any employee has knowledge of a suspected defect or demonstrated deviation or defect.
l Section 6.5 of NEO 2.01 requires that the evaluation be pursued in a timely manner, in accordance with the suggested processing time on the SSH Evaluation Form of ten working days for the technical evaluation, or for the Manager, Generation Facility Licensing (GFL), to be notified if the suggested processing time cannot be met.
Contrary to the above, between December 8, 1987 and February 11, 1988, Mr. Thomas Shaffer, Manager, Instrument and Controls Engineering, violated the requirement for identification, evaluation and processing of a SSH in a timely manner, in that the suggested processing time of 10 days was exceeded by approximately 35 days, and the Manager, GFL was not notified.
The specific SSH involved the potential for a generic problem with the operation of the Rosemount transmitters used in safety related systems at the facility due to undetectable failure of the transmitters as a result of slow fill-oil loss.
This is a Severity Level III Violation (Supplement VII).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice).
This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each_ alleged violation:
(1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the correctivo steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken
to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compli-ance will be achieved.
If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.
Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part,'by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued.
Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may:
(1) deny the violation listed in this Notice in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed.
In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the civil penalty.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, should be addressed.
Any written answer in accordance-with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g.,
citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition.
The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282(c).
The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to:
Director, Office of
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t llotice of Violation 6
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Millstone facility.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland thisg tA day of May 1993
SYNOPSIS l
On December 18,1989, the Regional Administrator (RA), Region I, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), requested that an investigation be initiated concerning allegations of harlssment, intimidation, and discrimination (HI&D) of a corporate level supervisor employed by Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCo) of Northeast Utilities (NU), Berlin, Connecticut. The HI&D was allegedly carried out with the knowledge of senior line management of the licensee, the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECo), in order to restrict the free flow of information related to the technical resolution of a significant nuclear safety issue involving undetected failures of Rosemount transmitters. Furthermore, the RA requested that the Office of Investigations (OI) determine if the licensee failed to address legitimate safety concerns by modifying documents and/or destroying original evaluations to conceal those concerns. One set of the documents in question pertained to the Rosemount transmitter issue.
The OI investigation substantiated that an instrumentation & controls (I&C) engineering manager (since reorganization, the manager of Component Test Services) deliberately caused the processing of the Rosemount significant/ substantial safety hazard (SSH) form, which determines reportability to the NRC, to be delayed for approximately six weeks.
This delay resulted in NU's " suggested maximum processing time" for the SSH form being exceeded. OI determined, as did an independent consultant retained by the licensee, that the manager successfully pressured a supervisory subordinate into changing the original finding of "is" a SSH, to "is not" a SSH. OI concluded that, although the licensee was not in violation of 10 CFR 21 reporting requirements, the manager deliberately violated the intent of the NU internal procedure for the SSH evaluation, as well ks measures established in 10 CFR 50, Appendix B designed to assure the prompt identification and correction of deficiencies adverse to quality. The investigation disclosed that the SSH form and corresponding technical evaluation were not destroyed; however, the SSH form had been modified.
The OI investigation also substantiated that the I&C Special Studies and programs supervisor who raised the Rosemount transmitter safety concern, but was not involved in the original SSH evaluation, was the victim of various incidents of HI&D and attempted HI&D as a result of his stand on the issue. OI identified those responsible in Nuclear Engineering and Operations (NE&O), either directly or indirectly, as the supervisor's manager (the systems manager of Electrical Engineering; since reorganization, the manager of Engineering and I&C); the director of the supervisor's department (the director of Engineering; since reorganization, the manager of Field Services); the vice president of that department (Generation Engineering & Construction; since retired), the vice president of Nuclear and Environmental Engineering (since reorganization, the vice president of Environmental Engineering), and the then senior vice president of NE&O (since resigned).
Case No. 1-90-001 1
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