ML20035H615

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Ack Receipt of 930401 & 02 Ltrs Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-498/92-35 & 50-499/92-35.Root Cause Evaluation Re Cause of AFW Pump 24 Problems Inadequate.Understands Addl Info Will Be Provided
ML20035H615
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  
Issue date: 04/29/1993
From: Beach A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Cottle W
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 9305060086
Download: ML20035H615 (5)


See also: IR 05000498/1992035

Text

CEC

UNITED STATES

f[@. Q}q

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

.

)D

REGloN IV

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611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400

AR LINGTON, TE XAS 76011-8064

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APR 291993

Docket:

50-498

50-499

License: NPF-76

NPF-80

Houston Lighting & Power Company

ATTN: William T. Cottle, Group

Vice President, Nuclear

P.O. Box 1700

Houston, Texas 77251

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-498/92-35; 50-499/92-35 RESPONSE

Thank you for your letters of April 1 and 2,1993, in response to our letter

and Notice of Violation dated March 3,1993. We have reviewed your response

to Violation 9235-02, which cited four examples of your failure to take

appropriate corrective actions to ensure that conditions adverse to quality

are identified and that actions are taken to preclude recurrence.

In the

response, you state that you consider that the first example, although a

violation of requirements, was not a nonconforming condition.

The staff's

concern on this matter was that the foreign material in the fuel oil strainer

was considered a condition adverse to quality. A condition adverse to quality

would have necessitated your corrective action program to initiate a formal

root cause analysis.

Based on your response to Violation 9235-02, we understand that supplemental

information will be provided on the second example of Violation 9235-02 by

May 11, 1993.

Our review of your response to the third example of Violation 9235-02

determined that your root cause of the violation was inadequate.

Your

violation response identifies the cause of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 24

problems as being provided in Licensee Event Report (LER) 1-93-007.

Our

review of this LER indicates that the issues addressed in LER l-93-007 were

separate from the problems described in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/92-35;

50-499/92-35. This was discussed in a telephone conversation between Mr.

Wayne Harrison of your staff and Mr. Mark Satorius of this office on April 15,

1993.

Based on that conversation, we understand that additional information

concerning this example of this violation will be provided by May 11, 1993.

In your response to Violation 9235-02, you also indicate that, until full

compliance is achieved on December 15, 1993, the necessity for initiating

station problem reports to fully investigate apparent adverse trends in

equipment condition will be emphasized to station personnel.

In light of the

, poor performance that South Texas Project has exhibited in identifying and

addressing conditions adverse to quality, as evidenced by the recent escalated

/

9305060086 930429

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ADOCK 05000498

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Houston Lighting & Power Company

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enforcement issues, we would expect that, in addition to emphasizing the

importance of initiating station problem reports, a more proactive and

comprehensive program to address the weaknesses identified in your corrective

action program would be developed. We understand that this topic will be

specifically addressed in the public meeting which is not yet scheduled prior

to the Unit I startup following successful completion of your auxiliary

feedwater system testing program.

After further discussions with your staff, we agree with your position that

Violation 498;499/9235-03 should be modified to restrict its application to

l

Surveillances 1/2-PSP 02-SF-0001A, -18, -lC, -2A, -2B, and -2C performed prior

to September 1991.

In addition, we have reviewed your reply to Violations 9235-05 and -06 and

find them responsive to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation.

We

will review the implementation of your corrective actions to these two

violations during a future inspection to determine that full compliance has

been achieved and will be maintained.

Sincerely,

l

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&u

. Bill Beach, Director

Division of Reactor Projects

cc:

Houston Lighting & Power Company

ATTN: William J. Jump, Manager

Nuclear Licensing

P.O. Box 289

Wadsworth, Texas 77483

City of Austin

Electric Utility Department

ATTN:

J. C. Lanier/M. B. Lee

P.O. Box 1088

Austin, Texas 78767

City Public Service Board

ATTN:

R. J. Costello/M. T. Hardt

P.O. Box 1771

San Antonio, Texas 78296

Newman & Holtzinger, P. C.

, ATTN:

Jack R. Newman, Esq.

1615 L Street, NW

Washington, D.C.

20036

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Houston Lighting & Power Company

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Central Power and Light Company

ATTN:

D. E. Ward /T. M. Puckett

P.O. Box 2121

Corpus Christi, Texas 78403

1NPO

Records Center

1100 Circle 75 Parkway

Atlanta, Georgia 30339-3064

Mr. Joseph M. Hendrie

50 Bellport Lane

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Bellport, New York 11713

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Bureau of Radiation Control

State of Texas

1101 West 49th Street

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Austin, Texas 78756

Judge, Matagorda County

Matagorda County Courthouse

1700 Seventh Street

Bay City, Texas 77414

Licensing Representative

Houston Lighting & Power Company

Suite 610

Three Metro Center

Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Houston Lighting & Power Company

ATTN:

Rufus S. Scott, Associate

General Counsel

P.O. Box 61867

Houston,-Texas 77208

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APR 291933

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J. L. Milhoan

Resident Inspector

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Project Engineer (DRP/A)

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ation

P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483

Houston Lighting & Power

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April 2,

1993

ST-HL-AE-4388

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File No.:

G02.04

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10CFR2.201

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U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Attention:

Document Control Desk

Washington, DC

20555

South Texas Project

Unit 1 and 2

Docket Nos. STN 50-498; STN 50-499

Reply to Notice of Violation 9235-02

Regarding Failure to Promptly Identify

and Correct Conditions Adverse to Ouality

Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) has reviewed Notice of

Violation 9235-02 dated March 3,

1993, and submits the attached

reply.

HL&P will provide a supplemental report on this Notice of

Violation by May 11, 1993.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr.

A.

W. Harrison

at (512) 972-7298 or me at (512) 972-7921.

.

hihi

W. H. Kinse), Jr.

Vice President

Nuclear Generation

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Attachment:

Reply to Notice of Violation 9235-02

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1R\\93-085.001

Project Manager on Behalf of the Participants in the South Texas Project

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ST-HL-AE-4388

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Houston Lighting & Power Company

File No.: G02.04

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South Texas Project Electric Generating Station

Page 2

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Regional Administrator, Region IV

Rufus S.

Scott

Huclear Regulatory Commission

Associate General Counsel

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400

Houston Lighti'.sg & Power Company

Arlington, TX

76011

P. O.

Box 61867

)

Houston, TX

77208

Project Manager

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Institute of Nuclear Power

Washington, DC

20555

Operations - Records Center

j

1100 Circle 75 Parkway, #1500

J.

I. Tapia

Atlanta, GA

30339-3064

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Senior Resident Inspector

c/o U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory

Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie

Commission

50 Bellport Lane

P.

O.

Box 910

Bellport, NY

11713

Bay City, TX

77414

D.

K.

Lacker

I

J.

R. Newman, Esquire

Bureau of Radiation Control

Newman & Holtzinger,

P.C.,

STE 1000

Texas Department of Health

1615 L Street,

N.W.

1100 West 49th Street

Washington, DC

20036

Austin, TX

78756-3189

D. E. Ward /T. M.

Puckett

U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

Central Power and Light Company

Attn:

Document Control Desk

P.

O.

Box 2121

Washington,

D.C.

20555

Corpus Christi, TX

78403

J.

C. Lanier/M.

B.

Lee

City of Austin

.

Electric Utility Department

721 Barton Springs Road

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Austin, TX

78704

K.

J. Fiedler/M. T. Hardt

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City Public Service

P.

O.

Box 1771

San Antonio, TX

78296

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Attachment 1

ST-HL-AE-4388

Page 1 of 3

REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION 9235-02

I.

Statement of Violation:

Criterion XVI to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, requires that measures

shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to

quality,

such

as

failures,

malfunctions,

deficiencies,

deviations,

defective

material,

and

nonconformances

are

promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant

conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that

the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action

taken

to

preclude

repetition.

Procedure

OPGP03-ZX-0002,

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Revision 0, " Corrective Action Program," Section 4.1, Station

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Problem Report Instruction, requires that., "any person at

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STPEGS who identifies or becomes aware of a Condition Adverse

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to Quality (CAQ) or Significant Condition Adverse to Quality

(SCAQ) SHALL promptly document the occurrence using an SPR

Form." Four examples of violating these requirements are

stated below:

1. Contrary to the above, a station problem report was not

promptly initiated to document the foreign material (rust

like particles) found on the Emergency Diesel Generator 23

fuel oil strainers on December 4, 1992. This nonconforming

condition was identified during the performance of Service

Request DO-186915 to replace the strainers.

2. Contrary to the above, prompt corrective actions were not

initiated to correct equipment deficiencies with Essential

Chiller

21A.

Plant

Equivalency

Change

CH-178119

was

initiated in June 1992 to correct a condition which

permitted the upper oil reservoir to migrate to the lower

reservoir, requiring the essential chiller to be declared

inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.14. On December 9,1992, the Essential Chiller 21A was

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declared inoperable because the essential chiller did not

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have sufficient indicated oil level showing in the upper

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reservoir. Plant Equivalency Change CH-178119 had not been

initiated

and

no

date

had

been

established

for

implementing the plant equivalency change.

3.

Contrary to the above,

as of December

17,

1992,

the

licensee had not identified the cause for the repetitive

problems with Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine 24 overspeed

trip mechanism and had taken no corrective actions to

preclude the recurrence of the problem.

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IR\\93-035.001

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Attachment 1

ST-HL-AE-4388

Page 2 of 3

I.

Statement of Violation: (cont'd)

4. Contrary to the above, the corrective action taken to a

violation documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/91-

11; 50-499/91-11 involving individuals working more than

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any 7-day period, was not adequate to preclude

repetition. During the inspection, four individuals-were

identified to have exceeded 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> worked in a 7-day

period without plant manager approval.

One occurrence

involved an instrumentation and controls technician, with

three

additional

occurrences

involving

electrical

maintenance personnel.

These

four

examples

constitute

one

Severity

Level

IV

'

violation. (Supplement I) (498;499/9235-02)

II.

Houston Lichtina & Power Position:

HL&P concurs that the cited violation occurred, but does not

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agree that the fuel oil strainer example represents a non-

conforming condition.

III.

Reason for Violation:

The

cause

for

the

second

example,

essential

chiller

modifications, is still being evaluated.

HL&P will provide a

supplemental report describing both the cause and corrective

actions by May 11, 1993.

The cause of the third example, Auxiliary Feedwatier Pump 24

overspeed trips, was reported to the NRC via LER l-93-007.

The fourth example, the adverse trend involving overtime

exceedance, was caused by a lack of training on the detailed

requirements of the Administrative Technical Specification

governing overtime. Most of the exceedances occurred because

personnel assumed that the requirement was based on a fixed

seven-day schedule instead of a rolling seven-day time period.

IV.

Corrective Actions:

The corrective actions involved with the third example,

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Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 24, have been reported to the NRC via

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LER 1-93-007.

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ST-HL-AE-4388

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Page 3 of 3

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IV.

Corrective Actions:

(cont'd)

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To

correct

the

fourth

example,

a

memo

was

issued

to

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Maintenance Department Personnel to reemphasize the STPEGS

Overtime Policy.

The Overtime Exceedance Policy (OPGP02-ZA-

,

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0060) will be replaced by OPGP03-ZA-0116 to clearly define

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management

expectations

regarding.

compliance

with

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Administrative Technical Specification requirements. . Training

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will be conducted on the new procedure.

(Completion Date:

{

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June 10, 1993.)

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The generic implications of this violation have also been

considered.

.The program to analyze and- trend equipment-

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history to identify repetitive component degradations and

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failures will be upgraded ' to provide for more prompt and

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effective action to prevent recurrence.

(Corrective action

will commence by April 15,

1993 and will be completed by

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December 15, 1993.)

Additionally, training-will be conducted

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to increase personnel awareness of the definition. of non-

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conforming conditions and the necessity of prompt corrective

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action.

Appropriate

plant procedures will be revised to

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include specific examples of non-conforming conditions. and

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specific instructions for dealing with non-conforming Service -

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Requests. The Service Request Form will be revised to ensure

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the

clear

indication

of

a

non-conforming

condition.

,

(Completion Date: June 30, 1993).

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V.

Date of Full Compliance:

.

HL&P will be in full compliance on December 15, 1993.

In the

.

interim,

the

necessity

for

initiating an

SPR to

fully

investigate apparent adverse trends in-equipment condition

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will be emphasized to station personnel.

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04/12/93

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P.O.B. zep Wad -val. T.u.a77483

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i!ouuon I.ighting & Power

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April 2,

1993

ST-HL-AE-4401

File No.:G02.04

10CFR2.201

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commincion

Attention:

Document Control Desk

Washington, DC

20555

South Texas Project

Unit 1 and 2

Docket Nos. STN 50-498; STN 5-499

ReplytoNoticeofViolatioh235j

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Regarding a Failure to Fu1If T..u

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Essential Chiller ESF Loadina Timiner Sequence

Houston Lighting & Power company (IIL&P) has reviewed Notice of

Violation 9235-03 dated March

3, 1993, and submits the attached

reply.

While preparing the response to the Notice of Violation, it

became

necessary

to

contact

the

responsible

Inspector,

for

clarification.

Because of the need to contact the inspector and

the complexity of this issue, should you have objections to this

reply, I suggest that a meeting of appropriato personnel from STP

and the NRC be Convened to discuuu the issues and insure all

parties understand them.

,

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. c.

A.

Ayala at

(512) 972-8620 or me at (512) 972-7921.

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H. Ki

y, Jr.

Vice Pres dent

Nuclear Generation

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Attachment:

Reply-i.to1 Notice of Violation'9235-03

1R\\93-091.001

Project Manage, on Itchalf of clic Participunu ies the Suoth ^!imes Pmject

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ST-HL-AE-4401

Fila No.: G02.04

Houston Lighting & Power Company

South Texas Propct Electric Generating Station

page 2

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Regional Administrator, Region IV

Rufus S. Scott

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Associate General Counsel

Houston Lighting & Power Company

Gil Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400

Arlington, TX

76011

P. O. Box 61867

Houston, TX

7/208

Project Manager

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Institute of Nuclear Power

Operations - Records Center

Wauhington, DC

20555

'

1100 Circle 75 Parkway, #1500

Atlanta, GA

30339-3064

J.

I. Tapia

Senior Resident Inspector

c/o U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory

Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie

Commission

50 De11 port Lane

P.

O.

Box 910

Be11 port, NY

11713

Bay City, TX

77414

D. K. Lacker

Bureau of Radiation Control

J.

R. Newman,' Esquire

Newman & Holtzinger,

P.C.,

STE 1000

Texas Department of Health

1100 West 49th Street

1615 L Street,

N.W.

Washington, DC

20036

Austin, TX

7H756-3189

D.

E.

Ward /T, M.

Puckett

U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

Central Power and Light Company

Attn:

Document control Desk

l

P.

O.

Box 2121

Washington,

D.C.

20555

,

Corpus Christi, TX

78403

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J.

C. Lanier/M.

B.

Lee

City of Austin

Electric Utility Department

721 Barton .9prings Road

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Austin, TX

78704

K.

J.

Fiedlcr/M.

T.

Hardt

City Public Service

P.

O.

Box 1771

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San Antonio, TX

78296

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Attachment 1

ST-HL-AE-4401

Page 1 of 4

Statement of Violation *

1.

Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.e.11 requires that "Each

standby diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE . . . at

nonths, during shutdown, by ... verifying

least onoo per 18

that the automatic load sequence timer is OPERABLE with the

first sequenced load verified to be loaded within 1.0 second

and all'other load blocks within +/- 10% of

and 1.6 seconds,

its design interval ..."

Surveillance Procedures 1/2-PSP 02-SF-

Contrary to the above,

0001A/1B/1C/2A/2B/2C, "ESF Diesel Sequencer 1A/1B/1C/2A/2B/2C

Timing

Test,"

did

not verify

the

entire

time

sequence

These

corresponding to the loading of the essential chillers.

procedures only verify the time sequence to the point at which

the chiller units receive a

start signal and the unit

(a fraction of the chiller

compressor oil pumps are loadedThe time delay introduced by the timers which

unit load).

were internal to the chillers wac not tested.

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This is a Severity Level IV violation.

(Supplement

I)

(498/499/9235-03)

II.

Houston Lichtinct & Power Pocition:

For Surveillances 1/2-PSP 02-SF-0001A/18/1C/2A/2B/2c performod

to September 1991, IIL&P agrees that; a violation of

prior

HL&P does

testing requirements stated in the UFSAR occurred.

not

concur

that

there

was

a

violation

of. Technical

'

Specifications in 1991 ut in 1992.

.

However, because of some confusion regarding the basis for the

It is

violation, the responsible NRC Inspector was contacted.

our understanding, after these discussions, the issue was that

the procedures are still less than adeguate in'that they d_o

not have sufficient acceptance critEfis Fo ident1ry a ra_11ure

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'aTd 3RitfEte an appropriate operability review as alsenssed in

Section 3.3.5 of Inspection Report 50-498/92-35; 50-499/92-35,

dated March 3,

1993.

IIL&P's position'is that the procedures

and the actions'taken at the time were adequate.

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The cited procedures have the following acceptance criteria

associated with the Essential Chillerc:

35 sec

K-237

Start signal - Standby Essential Chiller

K-238

Start. signal - Running Essential. Chiller

150 sec

K-239

Start signal - Running Essential Chiller

240 sec

65-70 sec

Compressor Motor Start

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04/12/93

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ST-HL-AE-4401

Page 2 of 4

II.

Houston Liahtino Er Power Position (Continuedi:

f

internal chillor timer is verified

The acceptability of the

when both the acceptance criteria for the K-237 relay add the

This is accomplished

Compressor Motor Start are satisfied.The internal chiller timer

once in each test for all trains.

the test because it is a

-

is not testod in each sequence of

mechanical timer and is not subject to significant drift.

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Additional testing would result in undue wear on the Essential

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The combination

Chillero due to unnecessary chiller starts.

or

these

acceptance

criteria

fully

verify

the

proper

sequencing of the Essential Chillers at the times specified as

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design intervals in Table 8.3-3 of the UFSAR.

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Dackaround

In November 1991, during a review of information gathered

during' the performance of the Standby Diesel 22 LOOP-ESF

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Actuation Test and the Standby Diesel 22 LOOP Test, procedures

2 PSP 03-DG-0014

and

2 PSP 03-DG-0008

respectively,

it

was

identified that Essential Chiller 21B did not start - at

anticipated time intervals. Because these procedures were not

validate the timing of load sequencing and all

written to

other aspects of the test were satisfactory, the surveillances

However, this situation initiated a review of

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were approved.

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recently performed surveillance procedure 2 PSP 02-SF-OOOlB, ESF

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Diesel Sequencer 2B Timing Test, and discussions between the

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system engineers

for the

Standby Diesel

Generator,

ESF

Sequencer, and Chilled Water systems.

.

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The review of 2 PSP 02-SF-0001B indicated that the sequencer was

operating normally with the sequencer timing relays for the

Essential Chiller all functioning well within acceptance

criteria.

At this point, the system engineers. reviewed the

,

circumstances and determined that there were no operability

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questions;

based

in part,

on

the previously determined

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oversized load capacity of the diesel generators.

This

resulted in a Service Request being generated with a low

priority.

Inspection Report 92-35 states that there were inadequacies in

the procedure scope and acceptance criteria, and questioned

the' actions taken by personnel.

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Attachment 1

ST-HL-AE-4401

Page 3 of 4

II.

Houston Lichtina 6 Power Position (Continuedt:

In retrospect,

it would have been better if the system

engineers had formally documented the basis for concluding

that there were no operability concerns. .

Had this same

situation occurred under current program requirements, there

would have been no question regarding the need for a Station

Problem Report, including a documented operability review.

llovever, the engineering judgement used was sound and the

actiona taken prudent.

III.

jlyason for the violation:

Hurveillance Procedures Prior to September 1991

Why the surveillance procedures for the ESF Diesel Sequencers

did not. originally include a requirement to demonstrate proper

operation of the internal chiller timer cannot be stated with

certainty because of the length of time and personnel changes

that have occurred since the procedures were

initially

developed.

appears that the original scope of the proceduros was

It

solely the demonstration of proper operation of the sequencer.

Decause of this, the acceptance criteria were developed from

the timing requirements to initiate action to controlled

equipment instead of the design loading intervals specified in

the UFSAR.

It should be noted that for all equipment other

than the Essential Chillers these loading intervaAs are the

Either consideration did not appear to have been given

same.

to the timer internal to the Essential chiller, or the writer

believed that its operation was to be verified in other

procedures.

IV.

Corrective Action:

Survnillance Propedures Prior to Scotember 1991

Upon identification that loading times for the Essential

chillers

were

not

fully

verified

an

operability

and

reportability determination was performed.

Procedures 1/2-PSP 02-SF-0001A/1B/1C/2A/2B/2C, were changed to

incorporate additional requirements to demonstrate. proper

operation of the internal chiller timer.

This action was

completed September 27, 1991.

Tests, incorporating the new requirements, were natisfactorily

and

performed in Unit 2 during October and November of 1991;

in Un.1t i during october and November of 1992.

IR\\93 091.001

J

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13:07

5129728298

012

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Attachment 1

ST-ML-AE-4401

Page 4 of 4

.

t

,

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Date of Full Compliance:

V.

1991,

full compliance since September 27,

,'

The chiller

IIL&P has been in

when the survei31ance procedures were modified.

i

1991.-

timer adequacy was verified by August,

!

,

.

,

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l'

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f

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iR\\93 091.001

I

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. . . . .

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.

c o mp a ny S uth Texas Project Electric Generating Station

'

P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483

l

Houston Lighting & Power

'

._.._~~.1

.

April 1,

1993

,

ST-HL-AE-4378

File No.:

G02.04

10CFR2.201

\\

-

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

!

Attention:

Document Control Desk

Washington, DC

20555

South Texas Project

Unit 1 and 2

Docket Nos. STN 50-498; STN 50-499

Reply to Notice of Violation 9235-05

l

Regarding Failure to Follow

Radiolocical Procedures and Postinas

Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) has reviewed Notice of

Violation 9235-05 dated March

3,

1993, and submits the attached

reply.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. C.

A. Ayala at

(512) 972-8628 or me at (512) 972-7921.

b.b

W. H. Kinsey, Jr.

Vice President

'

Nuclear Generation

RAD /pla

f

Attachment:

Reply to Notice of Violation 9235-05

o 'l 9{s'

a

loy-p

cx : J A * o 3

y 0975

1

-081.003

Project Manager on Behalf of the Participants in the South Texas Project

i

.

.

.

ST-HL-AE-4378

Houston Lighting & Power Company

File No.: G02.04

i

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station

Page 2

c:

l

i

Regional Administrator, Region IV

Rufus S.

Scott

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Associate General Counsel

l

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400

Houston Lighting & Power company

Arlington, TX

76011

P.

O.

Box 61867

Houston, TX

77208

Project Mar.ager

,

'

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Institute of Nuclear Power

Washington, DC

20555

Operations - Records Center

1100 Circle 75 Parkway, #1500

J.

I.

Tapia

Atlanta, GA

30339-3064

Senior Resident Inspector

c/o U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory

Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie

Commission

50 Bellport Lane

P.

O.

Box 910

Bellport, NY

11713

Bay City, TX

77414

D.

K.

Lacker

J.

R. Newman, Esquire

Bureau of Radiation Control

Newman & Holtzinger,

P.C.,

STE 1000

Texas Department of Health

1615 L Street,

N.W.

1100 West 49th Street

Washington, DC

20036

Austin, TX

78756-3189

D. E. Ward /T. M.

Puckett

U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

Central Power and Light Company

Attn:

Document Control Desk

P.

O.

Box 2121

Washington,

D.C.

20555

Corpus Christi, TX

78403

J.

C. Lanier/M.

B.

Lee

City of Austin

-

Electric Utility Department

721 Barton Springs Road

Austin, TX

78704

K. J. Fiedler/M. T.

Hardt

City Public Service

P.

O.

Box 1771

San Antonio, TX

78296

i

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Attachment 1

ST-HL-AE-4378

Page 1 of 4

I.

Statement of Violation:

Technical Specification 6.11.1 states that procedures for

personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent

with the requirements of 10CFR20 and shall be approved,

maintained,

and adhered to for all operations involving

personnel radiation exposure.

Two examples of violating this

requirement are stated below:

,

1.

Procedure

OPGP03-ZR-0002,

Revision

9,

" Radiological

)

Controlled Area Access and Work Control,"

Step

5.5,

l

states, in part, that, when exiting the radiologically

restricted

area,

personnel

will

use

a

personnel

contamination monitor and, if not available, will perform

a whole-body frisk as directed by Health Physics.

Contrary to the above, on December 7,

1992, a licensee

worker exited the Unit 1 radiologically restricted area

'

without utilizing a personnel contamination monitor or-

performing a whole-body frisk.

2.

Procedure

OPRP02-ZX-0007,

Revision

5,

" Radiological

Posting and Warning Devices," Paragraph 4.2.2,

requires,

in part, that, the radiological posting signs be hung from

barriers such that the posting is clearly visible when

approaching the area.

Paragraph 4.3 establishes areas as

,

requiring radiological postings as any area where access

is

controlled

by HP

for purposes

of

protection

of

individuals from exposure to radiation and/or radioactive

materials.

Areas

outside

the

main

Units

1

and

2

radiologically controlled area (RCA) should be identified

as an RCA if the dose rates at 18 inches exceed 0.5 mr/hr.

,

Contrary

to

the

above,

on

December

4,

1992,

the

,

radiological

posting

was

not

adequate

to

restrict

personnel access from an area outside the main Units 1 and

2 RCA where dose rates exceeded 0.5 mr/hr at 18 inches.

j

During a radiation monitor calibration, while the source

l

was exposed, a licensee employee entered into the Unit 2

control room through the south door and violated the

radiological posting in place for the surveillance.

The

radiological posting sign had been hung from the door and

not from barriers such that the posting was not clearly

visible when approaching the door.

This is a Severity Level IV violation.

(Supplement I)

(498;499/9235-05)

,

IR\\93-081.003

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Attachment 1

ST-HL-AE-4378

Page 2 of 4

II.

Houston Liahtina & Power Position:

HL&P concurs that this violation occurred.

III.

Reason for Violation:

1.

The cause of this event was failure of the worker to

follow standard radiological work practices, as described

in, OPGP03-ZR-0002, Revision 9,

" Radiological Controlled

Area Access and Work Control," Step 5.5.

The individual

exited the radiological controlled area

(RCA) without

performing a whole body frisk.

Contributing to the event was that the equipment was being

loaded through the Mechanical Auxiliary Building (MAB),

331 door, which is located on a platform on the 60'

elevation, approximately 30 feet above the ground.

The

area in which the work was being performed (60' MAB and

loading platform) is a radiological " clean" area;

i.e.,

not contaminated.

The workers could not permenently exit

the RCA without traversing the MAB and exiting through the

normal RCA egress and through the personnel contamination

monitors.

In addition, a positive barrier was not established to

remind workers where the RCA boundary was located.

2.

The cause of this event was a failure of an employee to

identify and follow a radiological posting.

Contributing

to the event was that the radiation area was outside the

main Unit 1 and 2 RCA.

In addition, the posting was not

hung on a barrier other than the door used for normal

control room access. Health Physics technicians providing

job coverage for the radiation monitor calibration stopped

the individual prior to his actual entry into the Unit 2

control room.

The dose rates in the area of the door

threshold were $ 0.2 mR/hr.

IR\\93-081.003

.

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.

.

Attachment 1

ST-HL-AE-4378

Page 3 of 4

IV.

Corrective Actions:

la.

Health Physics personnel verified that the workers

involved were free of contamination.

No contamination

was found on personnel.

Ib.

The Health Physics Operations General Supervisor issued

night

orders

to

Health

Physics

personnel

which

emphasized the procedural requirement to perform a

whole-body frisk prior to exiting the RCA and provided

guidance on the transfer of material through the MAB,

331 doors.

ic.

A TechnicaA Services Training Bulletin was issued to

Health Physics personnel describing the event and

explaining

performance

expectations

for

job

coverage / work control

of

the

loading / unloading

of

material through the MAB, 331 doors.

Id.

General Employee Radiation Worker Training (GET II)

will be enhanced to provide' training on controls for

alternate access points to.the RCA, such as, the MAB

331 doors,

Reactor Containment

Building equipment

hatch, Fuel Handling Building truckbay, and radioactive

waste yards.

The enhanced training will be in effect

by June 30, 1993.

le.

A

review

of

RCA

monitoring

and

access

control

requirements will be performed.

Additionsl guidance

will be provided based on the results of the review.

i

This will be completed by November 19, 1993.

2a.

Access to the control room through the south door was

suspended by the Shift Supervisor and a radiological

barrier (magenta and yellow rope) was suspended across

the door's threshold with the posting attached to the

barrier.

Also, the card reader allowing door access

was disabled to preclude possible breaches of the

posting.

2b.

Health

Physics

personnel

initiated

Radiological

Occurrence

Report

2-92-0131

and

suspended

the

individual's RCA access pending counseling of the

individual by a Health Physics Supervisor and the

individual's Supervisor.

IR\\93-081.003

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Attachment 1

ST-HL-AE-4378

Page 4 of 4

IV.

Corrective Actions:

(con't)

2c.

The Training Bulletin described in action lc above

included a description of this event and explained

performance

expectations

for radiological postings

outside

the main Units

1

and

2

RCA boundaries,

including the construction of a positive barrier, such

as magenta and yellow rope, which is different from

normal

access

barriers.

The

Training

Bulletin

described in actions ic and 2c will be discussed at

biweekly crew meetings.

This will be completed by

April 30, 1993.

OPRP02-ZX-0007, Revision 5, " Radiological Posting and Warning

Devices," will be revised to clarify the use of positive

barriers for radiological postings outside the main Units 1

and 2 RCA and for movement of RCA boundaries to allow transfer

of material.

The procedure will be revised and effective by

May 31, 1993.

The lessons learned from these events will be discussed in

General Employee Training GET I and GET II requalification

training.

The lesson plans will be revised by June 30, 1993.

V.

Date of Full Compliance:

HL&P is in full compliance at this time..

.

l

I

1R\\93-081.003

- . - - -

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j

.

The Light

c o m p a ny South Texas Project Electric Generating Station

P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483

Houston Lighting & Power

,

April 2,

1993

1

32bN

ST-HL-AE-4402

'

'

,

4

File No.:

GO2.04

^

-

r

,

10CFR2.201

'

-

~- -

~ __,!

'

U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Attention:

Document Control Desk

Washington, DC

20555

South Texas Project

Unit 1 and 2

Docket Nos. STN 50-498; STN 50-499

Reply to Notice of Violation 9236-06

Recardina Failure to Reauest Relief from ASME Reauirements

Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) has reviewed Notice of

Violation 9236-06 dated March

5,

1993, and submits the attached

reply.

HL&P will provide a supplemental report on this Notice of

Violation by May 11, 1993.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr.

C. A. Ayala at

(512) 972-8628 or me at (512) 972-7921.

.

S.

Rosen

.

Vice President

Nuclear Engineering

'

GLM/ag

Attachment:

Reply to Notice of Violation 9236-06

l

1

,

W " % 93-pi0

l

IR\\93-076.001

Project Manager oti Behalf of the Participants in the South Texas Project

i

?

.

.

ST-HL-AE-4402

Houston Lighting & Power Company

Fi

1 o. : G02.04

l

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station

c:

Regional Administrator, Region IV

Rufus S. Scott

i

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Associate General Counsel

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400

Houston Lighting & Power Company

4

I

Arlington, TX

76011

P.

O.

Box 61867

Houston, TX

77208

Project Manager

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Institute of Nuclear Power

Washington, DC

20555

Operations - Records Center

1100 Circle 75 Parkway, #1500

J.

I. Tapia

Atlanta, GA

30339-3064

Senior Resident Inspector

c/o U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory

Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie

Commission

50 Bellport Lane

P.

O.

Box 910

Bellport, NY

11713

Bay City, TX

77414

D.

K.

Lacker

J.

R.

Newman, Esquire

Bureau of Radiation Control

Newman & Holtzinger,

P.C.,

STE 1000

Texas Department of Health

i

1615 L Street,

N.W.

1100 West 49th Street

'

l

Washington, DC

20036

Austin, TX

78756-3189

1

D.

E. Ward /T. M.

Puckett

U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

I

Central Power and Light company

Attn:

Document Control Desk

l

P.

O.

Box 2121

Washington,

D.C.

20555

Corpus Christi, TX

78403

l

J.

C. Lanier/M.

B.

Lee

City of Austin

Electric Utility Department

721 Barton Springs Road

Austin, TX

78704

K.

J. Fiedler/M.

T.

Hardt

City Public Service

P.

O.

Box 1771

San Antonio, TX

78296

l

l

l

I

I

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..

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Attachment 1

ST-HL-AE-4402

Page 1 of 2

-

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I.

Statement of Violation:

4

Failure to Reauest Relief from ASME Code Reauirements

10 CFR 50.55a requires that ASME Code Class 3 pumps and valves

whose function is required for safety undergo IST which complies

with the requirements of ASME Section XI to verify operational

readiness, unless relief has been granted.

i

Article IWP-4110 of ASME Section XI, requires that instruments

used in IST be of a quality such that instrument accuracy is

within 2 percent of full scale.

I

Contrary to the above, the essential cooling water flow element

installation for the Units 1 and 2 component cooling water heat

exchanger had an error of 7 percent of full scale and no relief

from the provisions of Section XI was granted.

This

is

a

Severity Level

IV violation.

(Supplement

I)

(498;499/9236-06)

II.

Houston Lichtina & Power Position:

HL&P concurs that the cited violation occurred.

III.

Reason for Violation:

The cause of the event was inadequate management controls to

ensure that request for relief from the requirements of ASME

Section XI was submitted in a timely manner.

IV.

Corrective Actions:

l

1.

An investigation was performed to determine if instrument

'

inaccuracies similar to those discovered in the Essential

Cooling Water (EW) System existed in other systems.

Similar

instrument inaccuracies were discovered in the Essential

Chilled Water (CH) and Safety Injection (SI) systems.

2.

An evaluation of the data collected during previous ASME

Section XI pump testing was conducted and concluded that the

EW, CH, and SI instrumentation provided results capable of

detecting pump degradation and therefore met the intent of

ASME Section XI. ' System operability for EW, CH, and SI was

reviewed and was determined to not be a concern due to

sufficient margin existing

between the design and

the

,

required system flow rates.

'

IR\\93-076.001

.

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Attachment 1

ST-HL-AE-4402

Page 2 of 2

IV.

Corrective Actions:

(con't)

3.

For the CH and SI systems,

temporary flow measurement

devices capable of achieving the required ASME Section XI

accuracy will be used until the existing instrumentation is

precision calibrated to resolve the inaccuracies.

Use of

these devices requires revision to the reference value

procedures,

inservice test procedures,

and controlotron

calibration specification sheets for the CH and SI systems.

These revisions will be completed prior to their next

performance.

4. For the EW system, an analysis of the methodology required

to meet the ASME Section XI accuracy is continuing.

The

results of this analysis and the date of compliance with

ASME Section XI for the EW system will be provided in a

supplemental report scheduled for May 11, 1993.

5.

Procedures OPGP03-ZE-0021, " Inservice Testing Program for

Valves", and OPGP03-ZE-0022, " Inservice Testing Program for

Pumps"

will be revised to require that relief requests be

submitted to the NRC within six months of discovery of the

need for the requests.

This revision will also require that

compensatory actions be taken, as required, until the relief

request is granted by the NRC.

These procedures will be

revised by September 23, 1993.

6.

To

prevent

recurrence,

procedure

IP-3.04Q,

" Inservice

Inspection

Program",

was

revised to

require

that the

responsible engineer ensure that the instrumentation used to

collect data for inservice testing is accurate to within the

tolerances specified in ASME Section XI prior to inclusion

of the instrumentation in the testing plan.

In addition,

procedure OPGP03-ZE-0031, " Design Change Implementation",

was revised to require consideration of programmatic impact

to the ASME Section XI Pump and Valve Testing Program in the

event of a design change to the existing configuration.

Also,

the +/-

2%

instrument accuracy was specifically

identified as a potential impact to Section XI equipment on

the Design Change checklist.

V.

Date of Full Compliance:

The

CH

and

SI

systems

will

be

in

compliance

with

the

requirements of ASME Section XI prior to their next performance.

HL&P

will

provide

the

date

of

full

compliance

in

the

supplemental report scheduled for May 11, 1993.

IR\\93-076.001

t

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Houston Lighting & Power Company

-4-

ppR 29 i%

bec'to DMB (IE01)

bcc distrib. by RIV:

J. L. Milhoan

Resident Inspector

DRP

Section Chief (DRP/A)

Lisa Shea, RM/ALF, MS: MNBB 4503

MIS System

DRSS-FIPS

RIV File

Project Engineer (DRP/A)

R. Bachmann, 0GC, MS: 15-B-18

DRS

Section Chief (DRP/TSS)

040168

e