ML20035D917
| ML20035D917 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/1993 |
| From: | Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035D912 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-93-05, 50-498-93-5, 50-499-93-05, 50-499-93-5, NUDOCS 9304140111 | |
| Download: ML20035D917 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1993005
Text
.
.
I
{
l
l
APPENDIX
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
498/93-05
499/93-05
l
Operating License: NPF-76
NPF-80
l
Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company
P.O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas 77251
l
l
Facility Name: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station,
!
Units 1 and 2
l
Inspection At: Matagorda County, Texas
!
l
Inspection Conducted: March
8-12, 1993
Inspectors:
M. A. Satorius, Project Engineer
L. J. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
R. M. Latta, Resident Inspector
--. -$ Wx
Approved:
/4 M
4dN3
T. F."Stetka, Chief, Project Section D
Dats
Inspection Summary
Areas Inspected: A special inspection was conducted to determine the events
surrounding the failure of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
pumps (TDAFWPs) to start on demand in both Units 1 and 2.
The inspection also
reviewed a previously identified unresolved item involving the failure to
satisfy Technical Specification (TS) requirements relative to Unit 1 emergency
diesel generator (EDG) availability and mode change restrictions.
Results:
l
Eight apparent violations were identified:
l
(1)
The first apparent violation involved a failure to follow
procedures in accordance with the requirements of TS 6.8.1.a.
The
failure to follow procedures and test EDG 13 following painting
the machine resulted in its inoperability from December 29, 1992,
to January 22, 1993 (Section 1.1).
l
(2)
The second apparent violation involved a failure to satisfy the
requirements of TS 3.8.1.1.b for having three separate and
9304140111 930408
ADOCK 05000498
G
l
-.
..
.
--
.
_
_ - _ - _ _
.
.
4
-2-
,
independent standby diesel generators operable in Modes 1-4
(Section 1.1).
(3)
The third apparent violation involved a failure to satisfy the
requirements of TS 3.8.1.1, Action f, for restoring at least two
oparable EDGs within the TS required outage time while in
Modes 1-4 (Section 1.1).
(4)
The fourth apparent violation involved a failure to follow
procedures in accordance with the requirements of TS 6.8.1.a.
Unauthorized maintenance was conducted by unqualified personnel on
the Unit 2 TDAFWP (Section 2.2.1).
(5)
The fifth apparent violation involved a failure to provide a test
program in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix
B, Criterion XI. Neither unit's TDAFWP had been consistently
tested under suitable environmental conditions to identify
deficient conditions that affected operability (Section 2.2.1).
(6)
The sixth apparent violation involved a failure to satisfy the
requirements of TS 3.7.1.2.b by failing to maintain the Unit 1
TDAFWP operable while in Modes 1-3 (Section 2.2.1).
(7)
The seventh apparent violation involved a failure to provide
i
adequate procedures in accordance with the requirements of
The failure to have adequate procedures for the
adjustment of the Unit I governor valve contributed to the Unit 1
TDAFWP overspeed trips (Section 2.2.2.2).
(8)
The eighth apparent violation involved a failure to follow
procedures in accordance with the requirements of TS 6.8.1.a.
Unauthorized valve positioning of Unit 2's Main Steam
Valve (MS) 517 resulted in an overspeed trip on demand of the
Unit 2 TDAFWP (Section 2.2.3).
The actions taken by plant management to resolve problems on Unit 1
.
Valves MS 148 and MS 218, following the identification of their
deficient condition (hard to operate); and to correct the excessive
leakage on Unit l's Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) 514 was not considered to
be proactive.
Summary of Inspection Findings:
-
Unresolved Item 498/9303-02 was closed (Section 3.1).
.
Apparent Violation 498/9305-01 was opened (Section 1.1).
.
Apparent Violation 498/9305-02 was opened (Section 1.1).
.
- -
_
. _ _ _ _
.
._ __
_ ,1
.
-3-
.
Apparent Violation 498/9305-03 was opened (Section 1.1).
Apparent Violation 498;499/9305-04 was opened (Section 2.2.1).
Apparent Violation 498;499/9305-05 was opened (Section 2.2.1).
Apparent Violation 498/9305-06 was opened (Section 2.2.1).
Apparent Violation 498/9305-07 was opened (Section 2.2.2.2).
Apparent Violation 499/9305-08 was opened (Section 2.2.3).
Attachments and/or Enclosures:
,
'
Attachment 1 - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
l
)
.
.
. - .
-.
.
.
.- - ___
.
l
-4-
DETAILS
1 UNIT 1 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABILITY
1.1 Event Description
In an effort to upgrade plant housekeeping and appearance, the licensee
started to repaint various areas and components within the plant.
On
December 29, 1992, contract painters started to repaint EDG 13 and finished
the job 2 days later. The recoating of the exterior of EDG 13 was performed
under Work Request XG-116382. The work request, which was originated on
February 2, 1991, included, in part, the following instructions in the work
statement:
(1) precautions shall be taken to protect moving parts that could
bind during operation of the diesel, if painted, and (2) an operability test
was required after coating of the equipment.
Before the painting of the EDG, a prejob briefing was held between the
contract painters and mechanical maintenance personnel . Maintenance
personnel, which included the system engineer, discussed and pointed out to
the painters the areas not to be painted.
These areas included moving parts,
stainless steel, and greased components.
A contract foreman was present at
the briefing and during the painting process.
On December 28, 1992, and prior to the start of the painting, the shift
supervisor reviewed the work request and noted that a postmaintenance
test (PMT) consisting of running the EDG in accordance with
Procedure IPSP03-DG-0003, " Standby Diesel 13 Operability Test," was required.
This requirement was a concern to the shift supervisor, because he understood
that the EDG would remain in service during the painting evolution, and the
IMT requirement implied that the EDG would be considered inoperable while
being painted. After discussions between the system engineer and the shift
supervisor, the PMT requirement was voided by the system engineer, with no
documented explanation given for the voidance as required by Procedure OPGP03-
ZM-0025, Revision 3. " Maintenance Testing Program." The voidance without
explanation of the EDG PMT requirement by the system engineer, after
discussion with the shift supervisor, was considered an apparent violation of
TS 6.8.1.a (498/9305-01). The painting was subsequently completed on December
1
31, 1992, without a PMT being performed.
On January 20, 1993, a regularly scheduled surveillance start of EDG 13 was
performed using Procedures OPSP03-DG-0003, Revision 0, " Standby Diesel
Generator 13(23) Operability Test," and IPSP03-DG-0015, Revision 0, " Standby
As part of the test process, the EDG was given an
emergency start signal at 6:27 a.m.
EDG 13 rolled to 100 rpm but failed to
start. The EDG was declared inoperable and actions were taken to satisfy the
requirements of TS 3.8.1.1.
Inspection and traubleshooting of EDG 13 were performed in accordance with
Service Request (SR) DG-170221. The fuel starting solenoids were initially
-
-
- ----
-
. .
-
- .
I
.
.
-5-
,
I
considered to be the source of the problem; however, further investigation
revealed that 11 of 20 injection pumps (seven on right bank, four on left
bank) had fuel metering racks that were stuck because of paint.
The paint
that was applied to the fuel injection pumps had dripped and entered the back
side of the fuel rack openings. This paint prevented the fuel racks from
traversing through the injection pumps, which prevented the injection of fuel
into the cylinders.
The areas were cleaned and maintenance personnel manually
cycled the fuel rack linkage to ensure the racks moved freely in both
directions.
EDG 13 was subsequently started in accordance with Surveillance
Procedure OPSP03-DG-0003. While unloading EDG 13, the engine experienced load
swings of about 1000 kilowatts, while the engine was operating at
4200 kilowatts. The engine was secured and SR DG 175439 was issued to
troubleshoot the problem.
The cause of the load swing problem was determined
to be a faulty motor-operated potentiometer located in the electrical
speed / load control circuitry. A load sensor was visually observed to have a
questionable solder connection and was also replaced. After replacement of
both parts, EDG 13 was satisfactorily tested in accordance with Surveillance
Procedures OPSP03-DG-0003 and IPSP03-DG-0015 and returned to service on
January 22, 1993.
EDG 13 repainting started on December 29, 1992, with the last engine
operability run, prior to January 20, 1993, being successfully performed on
December 24, 1992. As a result, the inspectors determined that EDG 13 was
inoperable for 24 days, from December 29, 1992, until January 22, 1993, which
was considered an apparent violation of the requirements of TS 3.8.1.1.b
(498/9305-02).
In addition to failing to meet the requirements of TS 3.8.1.1.b, the licensee
made three mode changes and failed to conduct operability checks on four
cross-train components during the period that EDG 13 was inoperable.
During a 61-hour period on January 12-14,1993, EDG 12 was declared inoperable
in order to conduct routine Engineering Safety Features Train B maintenance.
EDG 12 being inoperable for these 61 hours7.060185e-4 days <br />0.0169 hours <br />1.008598e-4 weeks <br />2.32105e-5 months <br />, concurrent with EDG 13 being
considered inoperable, was an apparent violation of the requirements of
TS 3.8.1.1, Action f (498/9305-03).
EDG 13 was the first of the plant's six EDGs to be painted. The licensee
plans to paint the remaining EDGs in the future. The licensee has stated that
adequate precautions to prevent EDG operability concerns will be implemented
prior to initiating this work.
.
.
-6-
,
2 TURBINE-DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP FOLLOWUP
2.1 Background
On February 1, 1993, at 9:49 a.m., with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, the
Unit 1 TDAFWP was tested using Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-AF-0007,
Revision 7, " Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 14 Inservice," in order to satisfy the
monthly requirements of TS 4.7.1.2.1.a.2.
When called upon to start, the pump
tripped on overspeed and was declared inoperable at 10 a.m.
The licensee
began troubleshooting activities to return the pump to an operable condition.
On February 3, 1993, Unit 2 was operating at 100 percent power. At
approximately 3:23 p.m., the operators initiated a manual reactor trip,
because of the loss of a steam generator feedwater pump.
Following the plant
trip, the TDAFWP was automatically called on to feed the steam generators.
The pump started but immediately tripped on an overspeed condition.
Control
room operators were able to maintain adequate feed flow to the slaam
generators using the remaining three motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.
On February 4, 1993, at 9:38 a.m.,
the licensee had not been successful in
restoring the Unit 1 TDAFWP to an operable condition.
Subsequently, Unit I
commenced shutting down to place the reactor in the mode required by TS.
Region IV formed an augmented inspection team (AIT) on February 4, 1993. The
AIT was sent to the station to gather information regarding licensee actions
and to review plant response to the repeated failures of both unit's TDAFWP
l
overspeed trip problems.
2.2
AIT Inspection Findings and Followup
i
NRC Inspection Report 50-498/93-07; 50-499/93-07 contains a detailed sequence
of events and documents the findings of the AIT; however, selected
descriptions and root and contributing causes of both unit's TDAFWP overspeed
trips will be discussed in this report.
2.2.1
Event Description
On December 27, 1992, the Unit 1 TDAFWP was tested in accordance with
Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-AF-0007, Revision 7, " Auxiliary feedwater
Pump 14/24 Inservice Testing," the monthly surveillance that demonstrates
operability in accordance with TS 4.7.1.2.1.a.2.
After receiving a start
signal, the pump immediately tripped on an overspeed condition. After a local
manual start and a second remote start from the control room, the surveillance
procedure was repeated. On this attempt the pump successfully started and the
licensee subsequently considered the pump operable.
On January 23, 1993, a reactor trip occurred on Unit 2, following a turbine
trip when a main turbine and steam generator feedwater pump turbine
electrohydraulic control (EHC) system pipe, which was common to both turbines,
failed.
(For a complete description of this event, refer to NRC Inspection
.__
--
-.
-
,
-
.
.
-7-
Report 50-498/93-04; 50-499/93-04.) The Unit 2 TDAFWP started, on demand, and
was later secured when no longer required.
After the pump was secured,
problems occurred when operators attempted to relatch the TDAFWP's trip and
throttle valve, MOV 514 from the control room. The pump was declared
inoperable, while the unit was shut down for repair of the EHC pipe. On
January 25, 1993, the EHC pipe failure was repaired. A significant amount of
troubleshooting and testing was conducted on the TDAFWP to resolve the MOV 514
relatch problem and another speed control problem that was identified during
the testing. After successfully completing the operability surveillance test
in accordance with Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-AF-0007, the TDAFWP was
declared operable and the unit restarted.
'
On January 28, 1993, the Unit 1 TDAFWP was again tested in accordance with
Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-AF-0007 as part of a routine monthly
surveillance.
When started, the TDAFWP immediately trippcd on overspeed and
was subsequently declared inoperable.
During the period of January 28-30,
1993, an extensive testing and troubleshooting effort was conducted by the
licensee to determine the problem with the TDAFWP. Numerous pump starts were
completed.
Several problems with overspeed tripping, speed control and
oscillations, and the ability to maintain rated, full-load, steady-state speed
were identified. Vendor support was retained to assist in troubleshooting and
problem resolution.
,
On January 30, 1993, maintenance personnel discovered during a meeting that
maintenance had been conducted on the Unit 2 TDAFWP at approximately 12:10
a.m., on January 25, 1993, by unauthorized and unqualified personnel without
the use of appropriate procedures; as a result, the pump was again declared
inoperable. The unauthorized maintenance activities had consisted of
adjustments made to the overspeed trip linkage associated with MOV 514 and was
conducted by the on-shift Unit 2 unit supervisor, a licensed senior reactor
operator. The unauthorized maintenance was observed by the duty plant manager
and the general maintenance supervisor.
Neither of these individuals stopped
'
the work activity or generated a station problem report (SPR) to document this
A mechanical maintenance supervisor
subsequently generated SPR 930342 on February 1, 1993.
This SPR, which had
not been closed at the end of the inspection, had started the process of
conducting root cause analysis and investigating generic plant implications of
this event. The performance of maintenance on a safety-related component
without the use of appropriate procedures was considered an apparent violation
of TS 6.8.1.a (498;499/9305-04). The unauthorized maintenance was reworked
and the pump tested in accordance with Surveillance Procedure OPSP03-AF-0007,
and was declared operable later on January 30, 1993.
On January 30, 1993, the Unit 1 TDAFWP was declared operable following
extensive maintenance activities and the successful completion of Surveillance
Procedure OPSP03-AF-0007.
On February 1, 1993, the Unit 1 TDAFWP was tested again using Surveillance
Procedure OPSP03-AF-0007.
The pump was tested at the direction of the Unit 1
operations manager in order to ensure operability, following the numerous
--.
- - .
.
. .
- . . - - . -
- -
- . - - --.
.
.
-8-
,
problems encountered in the previous several days. When called upon to start,
the pump tripped on overspeed and was declared inoperable at 10 a.m.
On February 3,1993, at approximately 3:23 p.m., a Unit 2 reactor trip
occurred, and the TDAFWP started but immediately tripped on an overspeed
condition.
The inspectors reviewed the affect that the unauthorized
maintenance conducted on January 25, 1993, had on this overspeed trip.
On February 4,1993, at 9:38 a.m., Unit I commenced a shutdown to place the
reactor in the mode required by TS because the TDAFWP had not been restored to
an operable condition within the allowed TS outage time.
The inspectors' evaluation of both units' TDAFWP overspeed trip events
determined that the surveillance test program established to satisfy the
operability requirements of TS 4.7.1.2.1.a and b was not sufficiently rigorous
to assure that the testing was performed from normal standby conditions.
This determination was based upon a review of the circumstances during
surveillance testing on several test occurrences.
Specifically, in Unit 1 on
June 11, 1990, December 27, 1992, and January 30, 1993, and in Unit 2 on
December 11, 1991, following an overspeed trip, the pump was not returned to
its normal standby condition prior to retest.
Since these pumps are normally
idle, an on-demand start would normally occur from an ambient temperature
,
condition.
If testing was conducted from other than this condition, the
potential existed that degraded conditions affecting operability would be
masked.
It was evident, from the inspectors' review, that this masking
condition was occurring because, following several start attempts, the pumps
'
would perform their operability test satisfactorily; however, subsequent
i
testing at a later time with the pumps in their normal standby mode resulted
in a failed test.
The failure to ensure that system testing was performed
consistently under appropriate normal standby conditions was considered an
apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI
(498;499/9305-05).
Because the surveillance test program was determined to be deficient in
ensuring consistent testing was being conducted to determine the operability
of both unit's TDAFWPs, the inspectors considered that no valid operability
surveillance test had been conducted on Unit l's TDAFWP since Mode 3 had been
entered on December 26, 1992, at the end of the fourth refueling outage.
These surveillance tests included the operability tests completed on
December 27, 1992, and January 30, 1993. The inspectors considered that the
pump had remained in this inoperable condition from December 26, 1992, until
the plant was shut down on February 4,1993.
During this period of time, from
December 26, 1993, until February 4,1993, a period of 33 days, the reactor
operated in a mode in which the TDAFWP was required to be operable. The
failure to maintain the TDAFWP operable during these 33 days was considered an
apparent violation of the requirements of TS 3.7.1.2.b (498/9305-06).
In addition to the violation noted above, the licensee made five mode changes
during the period that the Unit 1 TDAFWP was inoperable.
. -
.
_
,_ _ _ .
-
_ _ _
_
_
.___
.
.
d
.
-9-
,
2.2.2 Contributing Causes for Unit 1 Overspeed Trips
l
2.2.2.1
Trip and Throttle Valve Leakage
During the AIT inspection, it was determined that MOV 514 in both units leaked
excessively by their seats.
MOV 514 in Unit I had been identified and
documented as a deficiency by the system engineer since March 1992. This
created the potential for condensate collecting and not draining from the
i
casing. Although not considered by the turbine vendor.to be sufficient water
to consistently cause overspeed trips, the presence of this condensate and its
l
potential for becoming entrained and water slugging the turbine was considered
to reduce the margin to overspeed trips.
j
Late in Unit l's fourth refueling outage, the licercee disassembled MOV 514 in
an attempt to repair the leakage.
The licensee informed the inspectors that,
after the valve was disassembled, they were not able to procure repair parts
and decided to lap the seat of the valve to improve the valve's integrity.
M0V 514 was subsequently reassembled without any significant repairs being
accomplished.
Following the Unit I shutdown on February 4,1993, resulting from the TDAFWP
overspeed trip problems, the licensee removed MOV 514, shipped it to an off-
j
site vendor where the valve was reworked to design leakage specifications, and
J
re-installed the valve in the system. This evolution was completed in only
6 days. The inspectors questioned the licensee on their rationale for not
taking this action to repair the valve during the later portion of the
refueling outage.
Licensee management stated that time was the principle
factor for not removing MOV 514 and conducting an adequate repair during the
outage.
The inspectors considered the failure to take appropriate action to correct
the identified deficient condition in MOV 514 to be a non-proactive approach
in correcting identified problems.
2.2.2.2
Governor Adjustment
Review of the as-fnund condition of the governor valve indicated that its
closed position was misadjusted approximately 1/16-inch (10 percent) off the
closed seat during the last outage (mid-September to late December 1992).
This misadjustment had two impacts:
(1) When the governor valve closed to
slow the turbine, it was 10 percent behind, or further open than, the
governor's demanded position; and (2) with MOV 514 leaking-by, steam was being
admitted into the turbine and, although not sufficient to cause the turbine to
turn, did permit a faster rate of steam admission into the turbine once a
start signal was present. This second impact would also tend to challenge the
governor's ability to slow the turbine prior to an overspeed condition being
reached.
._
_
_
--.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
___
..
..
. .
.
..
..
.
-
\\
.
.
-10-
The adjustment of the governor valve was conducted during Unit l's
fourth refueling outage using Preventative Maintenance Work
Instruction MM-1-AF-89003576. The inspectors reviewed this instruction
and determined that it did not contain sufficient quantitative and
qualitative acceptance criteria to demonstrate that the governor valve on the
Unit 1 TDAFWP would perform satisfactorily in service.
The failure to provide
adequate instructions to adjust the governor linkage was considered an
apparent violation of TS 6.8.1.a (498/9305-07).
2.2.2.3
MS 148 and M; 218 Out of Position
During the AIT inspection, the TDAFWP Steam Admission Drain Line Valves MS 148
and MS 218 were determined to be partially closed rather than fully open as
specified on applicable system line-up Procedure IPOP0Z-AF-0001, Revision ll,
" Aux liary Feedwater." Valves MS 148 and MS 218 were series valves that
routed condensate from the TDAFWP steam admission piping to the main condenser
arj maintained the area upstream of MOV 514 free of water to preclude
entrained water from entering the TDAFWP.
Radiographic examination was
performed by the licensee and it was determined that Valve MS 148 was only
20 percent open and that Valve MS 218 was 80 percent open.
Followup of the operational impact of Valves MS 148 and MS 218 being less than
fully open was determined to have had a negligible impact on the operations of
the TDAFWP. This conclusion was based on the fact that the area available for
steam flow through Valve MS 148 was significantly greater than the area
afforded by a 1/8-inch flow orifice which was located immediately downstream
of the subject drain valves.
Although not considered a contributor of the Unit 1 TDAFWP overspeed trip
events, the inspectors noted that the cause of these valves being mistakenly
not fully open was due to seizing of the hand wheel bearings. This situation
caused the operators to incorrectly conclude that the valves were fully open.
This bearing seizure was caused by a lack of maintenance on these valves.
SR MS 1156957 was written in November 1992, which identified the deficient
condition of these valves; however, no action had been taken to correct the
problems prior the TDAFWP overspeed events.
2.2.3
Root Cause for Unit 2 Overspeed Trips
The root cause of the TDAFWP overspeed trip was determined to be an incorrent
valve lineup, in conjunction with an inoperable or, at a minimum, degraded
steam trap.
The inspectors determined that MOV 514's above seat drain system lineup was
changed to incorporate the requirements of Field Change Request 92-0220 on
April 15, 1992.
This field change request specified that Steam Trap Bypass
Valve MS 517 be opened and that the steam trap inlet and outlet Valves MS 515
and MS 516, respectively, be closed in order to isolate the degraded steam
trap.
Based on the review of the valve lineup which was performed on
April 14, 1992, for the auxiliary feedwater system in accordance with
.
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _
.
~
O
-11-
.
Procedure 2 POP 02-AF-0001, Revision 04, " Auxiliary Feedwater," it was
determined that the MOV 514 above seat drain lineup was properly performed.
However, during a subsequent maintenance activity performed April 28-29, 1992,
steam trap bypass Valve MS 517 was closed.
This incorrect system lineup
remained essentially unchanged, as indicated by the temperature trend data
obtained from the plant computer archives for Temperature Element T-7537,
until February 3, 1993, when Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip with an
associated auxiliary feedwater actuation.
During this trip (described in
paragraph 2.2.1 above), the TDAFWP experienced an overspeed trip upon startup
because of the presence of excessive condensate buildup in the steam supply
line above MOV 514.
The excessive condensate was due to MS 517 being
i
l
incorrectly positioned and the steam trap degrading to a condition where it
was no longer capable of passing condensate to the condenser.
Based on the review of the documentation associated with the overspeed trip of
the TDAFWP on February 3, 1993, it was determined that the licensee had failed
to follow procedures in that Valve MS 517 was incorrectly positioned. This
example of failure to follow procedures was considered an apparent violation
of TS 6.8.1.a (499/9305-08).
l
3 FOLLOWUP (92701)
l
3.1
(Closed) Unresolved Item 498/9303-02:
EDG Availability and Mode Changes
j
(Unit 1)
This item involved the failure of the EDG to start, resulting from less than
adequate review and oversight of work activities during EDG painting, which
had the potential to negatively af fect operability.
Specifically, the
activities to be performed did not appear to be well planned or implemented
and the licensee did not provide adequate oversight of the activities to
ensure that the paint was being applied in a careful and controlled manner.
This unresolved item concerning EDG operability is closed and is considered
apparent Violation 498/9305-02.
l
l
!
!
-.
.
.
_
_
.
,
.-
F
. _
_--_.
._
.
.
.
ATTACHMENT
,
,
!
!
1 PERSONS CONTACTED
11 Licensee Personnel
S. Bollinger, Consulting Engineering Specialist, Corrective Action Group
C. Bowman, Administrator, Corrective Action Group
J. Calloway, Supervisor, Planning and Assessment
M. Chakravorty, Executive Director, Nuclear Safety Review Board
M. Chambers, System Engineer, AFW System
K. Christian, Manager, Operations
M. Coughlin, Senior Engineer, Licensing
D. Denver, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance
D. Hall, Group Vice President, Nuclear
M. Hardt, Director, Nuclear Division, CPSB-San Antonio
S. Head, Deputy Manager, Licensing
H. Hesidence, Acting Director, ISEG
W. Kinsey, Vice President, Nuclear Generation
D. Leazar, Manager, Plant Engineering
F. Mallen, Manager, Planning & Assessments
P. Newsome, Lead Maintenance Specialist
G. Parkey, Plant Manager
R. Dally-Piggot, Engineering Specialist, Licensing
T. Pucket, Manager, Nuclear. Central Power and Light
R. Rehkugler, Quality Assurance Director
S. Rosen, Vice President, Engineering
G. Schinzel, Supervisor, Plant Engineering Department
<
D. Wohleber, Director, RMS/A
1.2
NRC Personnel
R. Latta, Resident Inspector, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station
M. Satorius, Project Engineer, Project Section D, Division of Reactor Projects
J. Tapia, Senior Resident Inspector, South Texas Project
The personnel listed above attended the exit meeting.
In addition to the
personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this
inspection period.
2 EXIT MEETING
)
An exit meeting was conducted on March 12, 1993.
During this meeting, the
inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did
not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the
inspectors.
l
,
, _ , . . . . _ , , - - . , - . . _
,_
, . . _ . _ ,