ML20035C506
| ML20035C506 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/06/1993 |
| From: | Curtiss J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304080047 | |
| Download: ML20035C506 (3) | |
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RELEASED TO THE PDR' NOTATION V0TEg
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RESPONSE SHEET T0:
SAf4UEL J. CHILK, SECRETARY OF THE C0!44ISSION FROM:
C0144ISSIONER CURTISS
SUBJECT:
SECY-92-413 - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION OPTIONS REPORTING TO THE C0144ISSION x
x APPROVED in part DISAPPROVED in part ABSTAIN NOT PARTICIPATING REQUEST DISCUSSION C0l44ENTS:
See attached comments.
Now 7. $
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SIGNA;URE CORRESPONDENCE PDR January 6,1993 RELEASE VOTE
/X /
DATE o
WITHHOLD VOTE
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/
ENTERED ON "AS" YES x'
NO t(\\
l Commissioner Curtiss' comments on SECY-92-413:-
l I-support the option in SECY-92-413 to set up a framework for the establishment of high-level Incident Investigation Groups (IIG),
reporting to and supervised by the Commission, on events of extraordinary safety significance.
I do not, however,, support the recommendation for development of a framework to establish an outside body -- an Incident Investigation Board'(IIB) -- to i
provide direction to, and recommendations on, NRC's incident investigation work.
My reasons in this latter regard are as follows:
J As the staff acknowledges in this SECY paper --
1)
As currently approved and implemented, the Incident Investigation Program describes and
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provides the NRC investigation process for significant operational events, including in principle, those of extraordinary safety significance [which would be the subject of the additional " proposed framework"),
2)
IITs (and AITs) [under the existing framework that was established in 1985] have been highly
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effective in identifying both the technical and i
the regulatory lessons to be learned from significant operational events
[and]
3) the objectivity of activities and specific
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technical findings and conclusions [of IITs and AITs] have not been questioned by the public, the media, or the Congress.
All of this cuggests, quite convincingly in my view, that the current Incident Investigation Program is fully adequate.
Indeed, it is not clear to me where the " perceptions" are coming 1
from that staff alindes to regarding the credibility of the
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current process.
cm tainly not from Congress.
When the issue of establishing an independent investigative function for nuclear events was most recently considered, the Senate rejected the proposal to establish an NTSB-type board for such events by i
nearly a 2-to-1 margin, citing at numcrous points the exemplary
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incident investigation program already established and in place at the NRC.
Consequently, I am at a loss to understand where these " perceptions" are coming from, what the " problem" is for i
which the establishment of this new organization would be the
" solution," or why we would want to reopen and rehash this issue at this time.1 Rather than repeating all of the compelling
' If the concern here is with the independence or objectivity of the investigative process in the event of a major nuclear accident, I would submit that should such an accident occur, Congress or the President (or both) will, in all I
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reasonsLwhy~the' establishment of such an organization is a bad-idea,fI would simply refer to.the position that the commission took on this matter in.the attached letter.
S'Iffice it'to say that, in my view, the position' reflected in this letter, and particularly the comments about the adequacy of'our' existing
. investigative process (see paragraphs 3-6), are equally-
}" l compelling today.
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likelihood, formally constitute an-inquiry to investigate such'an event, tailored-to the specifics of the accident and completely independent of the NRC.
Indeed, this is exactly what. happened-after TMI.
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h UNITED STATES f j ;
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i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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W ASHINGTC,N. D. C. 20555
%;=~3PC,f Februa ry 13, 1992 CHAIRMAN The Honorable J.
Bennett Johnston, Chairman I
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources United States Senate Washington, D.
C.
20510
Dear Senator Johnston:
I am responding to your oral request for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) comments on a proposal to create an independent Nuclear Safety Investigations Board within the Commission.
We understand that the proposal may shortly be offered by Senator Biden as an amendment to S.
2166,.the National Energy Security Act.
For the reasons discussed below and summarized in the penultimate paragraph, previous Commissions have opposed similar amendments in the past, and we see no basis to change our strong opposition to the enactment of the proposed amendment.
As we understand it, the Board in question would be headed by three Presidential appointees, who would be supported by a staff of up to 55 full-time employees and intermittent or_ temporary employees equivalent to up to 12 full-time consultants.
The primary functions of the Board would be to investigate significant safety events arising out of activities at production or utilization f acilities licensed by the commission under section 103 or 104 of the Atomic Energy Act, and to issue a written report providing the Board's findings and recommendations regarding each event investigated.
For eachtfiscal year of the Board's existence, six million dollars would0be authorized to be appropriated to support the work of the Boar $(i It is not clear to us what current commission regulatory problem is intended to be resolved by the creation of the proposed Nuclear Safety Investigations Board.
The NRC's Incident Investigation Program already provides for investigation of operational events and accidents in the nuclear industry.
The Commission's Office of Inspector General has found this program "to be a useful regulatory tool enabling the NRC to objectively investigate significant operational events at operating nuclear power plants."
OIG Review of NRC's Incident Investication Procram, OIG 88A-11, August 1989.
NRC's sensitivity to conflict of interest considerations is reflected in the operation of this program.
Under the NRC program, Incident Investigation Teams (IITs) are established by
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the Commission's Executive Director for Operations to investigate significant operational events from two perspectives.
The first lic-is to fully understand the implications of the event for pub health and safety, of equal'importance is the need to fully evaluate and understand any NRC shortcoming that contributed co the incident.
(Augmented Inspection Teams are established b)
Regional Administrators to inspect those events whose implications for public health and safety are of a lesser safety or safeguards significance, and these teams do not necessarily focus on NRC shortcomings.)
IITs are staffed with NRC employees who have had no significant involvement with licensing and inspection activities associated with the event or the affected facility.
A special NRC office that is independent of the j
program staff, the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of operational Data,* provides management and administrative support to each IIT.
Current protocol provides that at least one member of the nuclear industry or an outside consultant with unique expertise in an area significant to an incident is asked to serve on an IIT, and that individual is also screened to avoid a conflict of interest situation.
IITs issue reports on their findings to the Executive Director for Operations and to the Commission.
The reports are available to the public and excerpts are included in the NRC's quarterly report to Congress on abnormal occurrences.
Directed action by the Executive Director for Operations to the NRC staff in response to the report is also available to the public and is referenced in the quarterly report to the Congress.
In addition, the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data issues an annual report to the Commission that includes a compilation of all IIT actions (resolution, status, and disposition) during the l
past year.
The Commission therefore believes that the goals of Senator Biden's proposed amendment to S.
2166 are already being accomplished by the NRC.
Under the aegis of an office that is independent of the program staff, IITs provide a timely, structured, objective, and in-depth investigation of significant operational events for the purpose of providing a complete technical and regulatory understanding of each such event.
IIT team members are specifically selected to avoid _ conflict of interest problems.
IIT findings and recommendations are made public, they are reviewed by the NRC, and the status and 4
disposition of directed action resulting from such review are tracked and reported.
- This of fice was established pursuant to Three Mile Island
" lessons learned" to provide independence within the NRC for reviewing operational experience and events and to feed back important lessons both to industry and other NRC offices.
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Further, experience with the frequency of significant safety events in recent years indicates that the establishment of a Nuclear Safety Investigations Board, along with its support structure, would also be an extremely inefficient use of limited Federal resources.
In the last two years, two events at operating reactors, one event relating to a materials licensee, and one event at a fuel fabrication facility were of sufficient significance to warrant an IIT investigation.
Augmented i
Inspection Teams, which investigate events of lesser safety significance, averaged only 14 events per year.
In virtually all cases, these lesser events would not warrant an investigation by l
the newly created Board.
Thus, recent experience indicates that the workload would not be sufficient to fill the time of three i
Presidential appointees and the full-time staff envisioned by the proposed amendment.
In addition, the creation of an additional Board within the NRC would have significant resource implications that go beyond the six million dollar authorization of appropriations that is i
included in the proposed amendment.
The only sure way to avoid charges that the Board's activities may be undermined by dual loyalties (to the Board and to the Commission) would be to build up a staff and facilities devoted only to its activities.
The amendment seems to acknowledge this by mandating transfer to the Board of such offices of the Commission as are " properly related to the functions of the Board" (proposed section 9203(n)), and authorizing the Commission (or any other Federal agency) to detail personnel to the Board and to provide facilities, l
equipment, and other administrative support services to assist the Board in carrying out its duties (proposed section 9203(h)).
Even though there is a provision for reimbursement, inevitably i
this will entail a loss of services and facilities for other NRC functions, which will have to be made up by additional NRC expenditures.
Finally, contrary to the " findings" of the proposed amendment in section 9201(a)(2) and (3) of what we understand to be the proposed amendment, the NRC believes that the creation of such a j
Board would not inspire greater public confidence or ensure timely consideration and implementation of the recommendations of such an organization.
Rather, it will further diffuse Government responsibility for ensuring that commercial nuclear activities are carried out in this country in such a way as to ensure the health and safety of the public and industry workers.
In addition, the Board's activities would hinder the Commission from acting during the pendency of the Board's investigation since the Board would be the only fact-finding body.
Thus, instead of reassuring the public, the difficulties inherent in the approach visualized by the proposed amendment would create a loss of confidence in the ability of the Government to handle the issues under consideration promptly.
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. In summary, we do not support the creation of the proposed Nuclear Safety Investigation Board.
There is.no current NRC regulatory problem that would.be solved by creation of a Nuclear Safety Investigations Board.
The-NRC, which, itself,_is an-independent regulatory agency,already has an Incident-Investigation Program that meets the goals intended:to be achieved by creation of this new Board.
Moreover, creation of a-separate organization devoted to investigation of significant safety events would be an inefficient use of Federal resources.
It would inevitably lead to an increase in NRC expenditures.. In addition, the introduction of the proposed Board into the investigative process would actually undermine the ability of the NRC to respond promptly to significant operational events.
Please let us know if we can be of any further assistance in your-consideration of the proposed amendment.
l Sincerely, OmlWMLsmay M W StiL M Ivan selin ec:
Senator Malcolm Wallop i
a i
Originating Office:
OGC l
Ref:- CR-92-034 (Commission Correspondence) omer>...,T.E..C.Y.,.........
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