ML20035C278
| ML20035C278 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200001 |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1993 |
| From: | Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304060431 | |
| Download: ML20035C278 (23) | |
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m cuar av,a se se cas1:5 } April 2,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Subject:
Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule - DFSER Confirmatory Item 9.5.1.2.2-1 and COL Action Items 9.5.1.4.6-1 and 203.1-1
Dear Chet:
Enclosed is a SSAR markup addressing DFFSER Confirmatory Item 9.5.1.2.2-1 and COL I Action Items 9.5.1.4.6-1 and 203.1-1. Please provide a copy of this transmittal to Butch Burton. Sincerely, W ack Fox Advanced Reactor Programs cc: Norman Fletcher (DOE) 1 Mohsen Nik-Ahd (GE) Chandra Oza (GE) p ' I. 060047 0 I mus / 1 9304060431 930402 I '! -PDR ADOCK 05200001 I A PDR
.: ' s CI 9. s'. 1. 2.'t t ABWR 234u=&n n-n Standard Plant s SECTION 9A.4 CONTENTS (Continued) - Section Title P. age 9A.4.1.6.10 - D/G Fuel DayTank C Room (Rm No.630) 9A.4-171 9A.4.1.6.11 Hatch and Corridor B/C Room (Rm No. 634) 9A.4-172 9A.4.1.6.12 Corridor B SLC Area (Rm No.622) 9A.4-173 9A.4.1.6.13 D/G FuelDayTank Room B (Rm No.620) 9A.4-174 9A.4.1.6.14 D/G (B) Equipment Room (Rm No. 625) 9A 4-176 9A.4.1.6.15 D/G (B)/Z HVAC Room (Rm No. 624) 9A.4-177 9A.4.1.6.16 ISI Inspection (Rm No. 639) 9A.4-178 9A.4.1.6.17 Deleted 9A.4-179 9A.4.1.6.18 Deleted 9A.4-180 9A.4.1.6.19 Corridor D (Rm No. 643) 9A.4-180 ,-B Div.M o. z. 9A.4.1.6.20 SGTSQRoom (Rm No.641) 9A.4-181 g (; Dwisie 3 9A.4.1.6.21 SGTSTilter TrairfRoom (Rm No. 642) 9A.4-182 9A.4.1.6.22 Deleted . 9A.4-183 9A.4.1.6.23 Deleted 9A.4-185 - 9A.4.1.6.24 Upper D/G A HVAC Room (Rm No.653) 9A.4-186 9A.4.1.6.25 FMCRD A/C Panel Room (Rm No.654) 9A.4-187 9A.4.1.6.26 Deleted 9A.4-188 - 9A.4.1.6.27 Deleted 9A.4-189 9A.4.1.6.28 Deleted 9A.4190 - 9A.4.1.6.29 Deleted 9A.4-190 9A.4.1.6.30 Upper D/G C HVAC Room (Rm No.673) 9A.4-191 9A.4-ri Amendment 20
ABWR uxemia Standard Plant wa SECTION 9A.4 CONTENTS (Continued) 1 Section Ii. tic Pace 9A.4.1.631 Deleted 9A.4-192 9A.4.1.632 Upper D/G B HVAC Rocas (Rm No. 663) 9A.4-193 9A.4.1.633 Upper Corridor B (Rm No. 626) 9A.4-194 9A.4.1.634 Deleted 9A.4-195 9A.4.1.635 FMCRD D/B Panel Room (Rm No. 681) 9A.4-1% 9A.4.1.636 Deleted 7A.4-197 9A.4.1.637 Deleted 9A.4-198 9A.4.1.638 MS Tunnel HVH Room (Rm No.685) 9A.4-199 9A.4.1.639 Pits and Pools 9A.4-200 9A.4.1.6.40 PVC Purge Exhaust Fan Room (Rm No. 623) 9A.4-200.1 9A.4.1.6.41 D/G (C) Corridor Room (Rm No. 635) 9A.4-200.2 9A.4.1.6.42 RIP Power Supply Room (Rm No. 638) 9A.4-200.2 9A.4.1.6.43 HWH Pump & Heat Exchanger Room (Rm No. 640) 9A.4-2003 l 9A.4.1.6.44 leak Detection Dust Radiadon Room (Rm No. 657) 9A.4-200.4 9A.4.1.6.45 Q RadiationMoom @No. 658[ 9A.4-200.5 Coham.h-vcssd Abenker tfo ni/o < 9A.4.1.6.46 C.AMS]AgRoom (Rm No. 659) ' R. c k 9A.4-200.6 9A.4.1.6.47 Upper HWH Heat Exchanger and Fan Room (Rm No. 680) 9A.4-200.7 l U 9A.4.1.6.48 (Dust Radiation Sampler Room B (Rm No. tm)) 9A.4-200.8 i 9A.4.1.6.49 (Containment essel Atmosph CAM) dioniioDRack Rm No.683) 9A.4-200.9 d 9A.4.1.6.50 Room 684 9A.4 200.10 1 9AA-mi Amendment 20
ABWR m^nman .s --Standard Plant P" B (3) Radioactive Material Present - None (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire assumes the loss of the function. Loss of the (4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls SGTS by an exposure fire is acceptable. comsnon with the HWH pump and heat exchanger room (Rm 640), the SBGTS filter Smoke from a fire will be removed by the train room (Rm 642), corridor room (Rm 614), normal HVAC system operating in its smoke the floor above the steam tunnel and the ceiling
- moval mode.
serve as fire barriers between adajacent fire areas and are of 3 br fire-resistive concrete construction. A 3 hr fire rated door provides (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppres-access from the AC filter / fan area (Rm 615). sion extinguishes the fire. Water pools on the Room 643 connects directly into room 622. floor. Protection against floodingis provided by supporting equipment on steel framing or raised (5) Combustibles Present: pads and providing floor drainage through the sump system. Fire leading TotalHeat of Combuston (Blu) (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Cable Tray NCLL (64,000 Brus per sq Rupture of the Suppression System: ft maximum average) applies. (a) provision of raised supports for the equipment; (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull stations at (b) provision of floor drainage; 2.7-C.0 & 2.8-F.L (c) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture (7) Suppression Available: unlikely); and Type Location / Actuation (d) provision of curbs for the doorways. Modified Class Col. 2.7-C.0, (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Em-III, Seismic 2.8-F.1/ ployed: Category I Manual standpipe and (a) The functions are located in a separate hose reel fire-resistive enclosure. ABC hand extin-Col. 2.7-C.0, (b) The means of fire detection, suppression guishers 2.8-F.1/ and alarming are provided and accessible. Manual (13) Remarks - None (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: 9A.4.1.6.20 SGTS Fans Room (Rm No. 641) l c e t^. A c. c (a) The function is located in a separate fire mg resistive enclosure. j(1) Fire Area - F4201 3 = $ c c,. (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is I(2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 j g' provided and accessible. i j Safety-Provides (c) Fire stops are provided for cable' ray and j Related Core Cooling l l piping penetrations through rated fire barriers. Yes, D1, Yes, D1 D2 D2 i 9A 4-181 Amendment 22 t 0 y-W-- f
MkN 23A6100AH Standard Plant wa !(3) Radioactive Material Present - None, normally. (9) Consequences of Fire -The postulated fire ^O* Variable following and incident. assumes loss of the function. The complete loss of the SGTS as a consequence of a single fire is .n '(4) Qualifications of Fire Barriers - The walls acceptable. wA { common with the HWH pump and heat exchanger room (Rm 640), the SBGTS filter Smoke from a fire will be removed by the N train room (Rm 642) and a section of the floor normal HVAC system operating in its smoke common to fire area F3400 (Rm 543) below removal mode. u '~~~7 serve as fire barriers between adjacent fire areas and are of 3 hr fire-resistive concrete (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppres-construction. The remainder of the fbor (not sion extinguishes the fire. Water pools on the common to F3400) is common with the con-floor. Protection against flooding is provided by tainment and exceeds a 3 hr fire rating. The supporting equipment on steel framing or raised ceiling is internal to fire area F4201 and is not pads and providing floor drainage through the fire rated. A non fire rated door provides sump system. access from room 643. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against I (5) Combustibles Present: Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression System: 1 Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Btu) (a) location of the manual suppression system in the corridor, external to the rooms Cable Tray NCLL (64,000 Btus per sq containing the main safety related I i ft maximum average) equipment; applies. I (b) provision of raised supports for the l l(6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC equipment; j l m the room and manual alarm pull stations at i Col. 2.7-C.0 & 2.8.F.1. (c) provision of floor drainage; i J7) Suppression Available: (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture ? unlikely); and l I ) Type Location / Actuation (c) provision of doorway curbs. Modified Class Col. 2.7-C.0 Ill, Seismic & 2.8-F.1/ (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Em-Category 1, Manual ployed: standpipe and i hose reel (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive enclosure. l ABC: i in-Col. 2.7-C.0 guishe, & 2.8-F.2/ (b) The means of fire detection, suppression l Manual and alarming are provided and accessible. i
- (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed
(13) Remarks - None .J I l (a) Fire detection and suppression capabilityis 9A.4.1.6.21 SGTS Filter Train Room (Rm No. 642) - 4 1 'N% provided and accessible. l(1) Fire Area - F6201 j .x l j (b) Fire stops are provided for cable tray and .,, j piping penetrations through rated fire 3 t h__.d.u as f 9^ # Amendmeit 22 \\ l l
w ABWR 23xcowi Standard Plant ne s l(2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6 2 (b) Fire detection and suppression capability is provided and accessible. i Safety-Prmides N f,PC } Related Core Cooling (c) Fire stops are provided for cable tray and w,W. piping penetrations through rated fire j Yes, D1, No, barriers. i tA M j D2 (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire 3 (3) Radioactive Material Present - Filters within assumes loss of the function. The complete loss their housings may become contaminated with of the SGTS as a consequence of a single fire is S use. Releases up the stack could occur as a acceptable. resuh of fire. However, the system is capable to be isolated in case of any fire, and burn itself Smoke from a fire will be removed by the f out by cutting off the oxygen to the fire. normal HVAC system operating in its smoke removal mode. (4) Oualifications of Fire Barriers - The floor, ceiling and walls serve as fire barriers between (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppres-adjacent fire areas and are of 3 hr fire-resistive sion extinguishes the fire. Water pools or the .j j concrete construction. 3 hr fire-resistive doors floor. Protection against flooding is prosided by j provide access from the corridor (Rm 643) and supporting equipment on steel framing or raised the SBGT Room 641. pads and providing floor drainage through the sump system. l }(5) Combustibles Present: l (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against ' l Fire Loading Total Heat of inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or j Combustion (Bru) Rupture of the Suppression System: f Cable Tray NCLL (64,000 Brus per sq (a) location of the manual suppression system j f t maximum average) in the corridor, external to the rooms applies. containing the main safety related ) I equipment; '(6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and manual alarm pull station at (b) provision of raised supports for the I Col. 2.7-C.0. equipment; 1 l (7) Suppression Available: (c) provision of floor drainage; Type Location / Actuation (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely);and Modified Class Col. 2.7-C.0/ 111, Seismic Manual (c) prodsion of doorway curbs. Category 1.- l standpipe and (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Em-hose reel ployed: ABC hand enin-Col. 2.7-C.0/ (a) The functions are located in a separate guishers Manual fire-resistive enclosure. (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed: (b) The means of fire detection, suppression ! l and alarming are provided and accessible. (a) The function is located in a separate fire resistive enclosure. (13) Remarks - None i 1 1 9A.4.1.6.22 Deleted 1 9A.4183 Amendment 22
~ ABWR nistoosu 1 Standard Plant x,. n (3) Radioactive Material Present-None that can be (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppres-released as the result of a fire. sion eninguishes the fire. Water pools on the floor. Protection against flooding is provided by (4) Qualification of Fire Barriers - All four walls, supporting equipment on steel framing or raised the ceiling floor and door are internal to fire pads and providing floor drainage through the area F4301 and therefore are not fire rated. sump system. I Access to Rm 657 is provided via a stairwell from Rm 615 on the floor below. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or (5) Combustibles Present - No significant amount Rupture of the Suppression System: of exposed combustibles. NCLL (64,000 Brus per sq ft maximum average) applies. (a) location of the manual hose suppression system external to the room; j (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC detection system in the room and alarm pull (b) provision of raised supports for the l station at 5.2-D.8 & 5.2-B.6, clevation equipment; 23500mm. (c) provision of floor drainage; (7) Suppression A.vailable: (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture Type 1.ocation/ Actuation unlikely); and Modified Class 5.2-D.8 & (c) provision of doorway curbs. 111, Seismic 5.2-B.6 Category 1, E123500/ (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Em-standpipe and Manual ployed: hose reel (a) The functions are located in a separate ABC hand 5.2-D.S & fire-resistive enclosure. extinguisbers 5.2-B.6 E113500/ (b) The meane of fire detectiv -noor Mon Manual and alarmig are provided and a:c 6soie. (8) Fire Pictection Design Criteria Employed: (13) Remarks-None v (a) Fire detection and suppression capability is 9A.4.1.6.45fhst. Radiation Sa3pler (A))Roocn 6 provided and accessible. No.658F (b) Fire stops are provided for cable tray and (1) Fire Area-F4301 piping penetration through rated fire barriers. (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 i (9) Consequences of Fire - The postulated fire Safety-Provides assumes the loss of the function. Related Core Cooling Smoke from a fire will be removed by the No No normal HVAC system operating in its smoke removal n ode. (3) Radioactive Material Present - N e q f (4) Qualification of Fire Barriers - Three walls, the ceiling, floor and door are internal to fire area F4301 and therefore are not fire rated. A fourth wall is common to room 659 and is of 3 hr fire-9A.4-200.5 Amendmen; 22
23A6100AH Standard Plant ne. s resistive concrete construction. Accm to room (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against 653 is via a stairway from room 616 on the floor Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or below. Rupture of the Suppression System: (5) Combustibles Present: (a) location of the manual hose suppression. system external to the room; Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (Bru) (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; Cable Tray NCLL (64,000 Btus per sq ft maximum average) (c) provision of floor draiuge; applies. (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rapture (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC unlikely);and detection sy-*.em in the room and alarm pull simion at 5.2-D.8 & 5.2-B.6, El 23500. (e) provision of doorway curbs. (7) Suppression Available: (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting Methods Em-ployed: Type Location / Actuation (a) The functions are located in a separate Modified Class 5.2-D.8 & 5.2-B.6 fire-resistive enclosure. III, Sei:mic El 23503/ Category 1, Manual (b) The means of fire detection, suppression standpipe and and alarming are provided and accessible. hose reel (13) Remarks-None ABC hand 5.2-D.8 & 5.2-B.6 C ee b ; - e.?r Vq n tection features at this elevation. See the discussion for the operating floor for applicable fire protection feature. No further comments will be made in the analysis for this elevation. 1 l l 9^ 4-201 Amenament 22 ._=.
1
- s. -
'T.htech'. fh-m,. 9A.4.1.6.2d SGTS B Division 2. Room (Rm (7). Suppression Available: i No.641) Location / Actuation Type (1) _ Fire Area - F42Ol l Modified Col. 2.7-C.0 (2). Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Class III, & 2.8-F.1/ -seismic Manual Safety Provides Category I, Related Core Cooling standpip and l hose reel Yes, D2 NO I ABC hand exti-Col. 2.7-C.0 (3) Radioactive Material Present - nguishers &-2.8-F.2/ Filters within their housing may Manual become contaminated with use. Releases up the stack could occur (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria as a result of fire.
- However, Employed:
the system is capable to be isolated in case of any fire, and (a) The function is located in a burn itaelf out by cutting the smparate fire resistive oxygen to the fire. enclosure. (4) Qualification of Fire Barriers - (b) Fire detection and The walls common with the HWH suppression capability.is i pump and heat exchanger room (Rm provided and accessible. 640), the SGTS A division 3 room (Rm 642), the ceiling, and a (c) Fire stops are provided for i section of the floor common to cable tray and piping i fire area F3400 (Rm 543) below penetration through rated serve as fire barriers between fire barriers adjacent fire areas and are of 3 lur fire resistive concrete (9) Consequences of Fire - The-construction. The remainder of postulated fire assumes loss of the floor (not common with fire function. The' complete loss of area F3400), the wall common with the SGTS B as a' consequence of a SLC Area and corridor B room 622 single fire is acceptable. are not rated as they are Functional backup is provided by internal to fire area F4201. A SGTS A (div.III) non fire rated curbed door provides access from corridor D Smoke from a fire will be removed (Rm 643). by the normal HVAC system operating in its smoke removal 5 (5) Combustible Present: mode. (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression Fire Loading Total Heat of - Suppression extinguishes the Combustion (BTU) fire. Water pools on the floor. i Protection against flooding is Cable Tray NCLL (64,000 Btus provided by supporting equipment per sq ft maximum on stect ---4ng or raised pads average) applies. and pre floor drainage i through., sump system. (6) Detection Provided - Class A supervised POC in the room and l manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.7-C.0 & 2.8-F.1. t
s 1 (11) Design Criteria Used for (4) Qualification of Fire Barriers - Protection Against Inadvertent The walls, and floor serve as Operation, Careless Operation or fire barriers between adjacent Rupture of the Suppression fire areas and are of 3 hr System: fire-resistive concrete construction. The ceiling is (a) location of the manual common with the fire area above suppression system in the (F4301), therefore is not require ~ corridor, external to the to be of a 3 hr fire barrier. A rooms containing the main 3 hr fire resistive curbed door safety related equipment; provides access from corridor D (Rm 643). (b) provision of raised supports for the equipment; (5) Combustible Present: (c) provision of floor drainage; Fire Loading Total Heat of Combustion (BTU) (d) Seismic Category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and Cable Tray NCLL (64.000 Btus per sq tc maximum (e) provision of doorway curbs. average) applies. (6) Detect. ion Provided - Class A (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting supervised POC in the room and Methods Employed: manual alarm pull station at Col. 2.7-C.0 & 2.8-F.1. (a) The functions are located >q a separate fire-resistive (7) Suppression Available: enclosure. Type Location / Actuation (b) The means of fire detection, suppression and alarming are Modified Col. 2.7-C.0 provided and accessible. Class III, & 2.8-F.1/ seismic Manual (13) Remarks - None. Category I, L ^ 5 " p D standpip Jpd hose reel 9A.4.1.6.21 SGTS A Division 3 Room (Rm ABC hand exti-Col. 2.7-C.0 No.642) nguishers & 2.8-F.2/ Manual (1) Fire Area - F4301 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria (2) Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 Employed: Safety Provides Related Core Cooling (a) The function is located in a separate fire resistive Yes, 03 NO enclosure. (3) Radioactive Material Present - (b) Fire detection and Filters within their housing may suppression capability is become contaminated with use. provided and accessible. Releases up the stack could occur as a result of fire.
- However, (c) Fire stops are provided for the system is capable to be cable tray.and piping isolated in case of any fire, and
.enetration through rated burn itself out by cutting the aire barriers. Oxygen to the fire.
[9) Consequences of Fire - The (a) location of the manual postulated fire assumes loss of suppression system in the function. The complete loss of corridor, external to the the SGTS A as a consequence of a rooms containing the main single fire is acceptable. safety related equipment; Functional backup is provided by SGTS B (div.II) (b) provision of raised supports for tha equipment; Smoke from a fire will be removed 1 by the normal HVAC system (c) provision of floor drainage; operating in its smoke removal mode. (d) Seismic category I standpipe (rupture unlikely); and (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression - Suppression extinguishes the (e) provision of doorway curbs. fire. Water pools on the floor Protection against flooding is (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting provided by supporting equipment Methods Employed: on steel framing or raised pads and providing floor drainage (a) The functions are located in through the sump system. a separate fire-resistive enclosure. (11) Design Criteria Used for Protecti on Against Inadvertent Operation, Careless Operation or (b) The means of fire detection, Rupture of the Suppression suppression and alarming are System: provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - None.
In$ ed ' c" 2* EA.4.1,6.49~ Containment Vessel ABC hand exti-Col. 2.7-C.0
- Atmospher (CAM) monitor Rack B Room nguishers'
& 2.8-F.2/ (Rm No.621; Manual- ' t l(1) Fire Area - F4201 (8) Fire Protection Design Criteria Employed * (2)- Equipment: See Table 9A.6-2 3 Safety .Provides (a).The function is located in-a Related Core Cooling separate fire resistive-enclosure. Yes, D2 NO ) (b) Fire detection and (3) Radioactive Material Present - suppression capability is -t None provided and' accessible. -i -(4)1 Qualification of Fire Barriers - -(c) Fire stops 'are previded fcr The exterir wall and the wall cable tray and piping common with the elevator serve as penetration through rated 1 fire barriers and are of 3 hr fire barriers. fire-resistive concrete I construction. _The remaining. (9) Consequences of Fire - The walls, ceiling and floor are postulated fire assumes loss of internal to fire area F4201 and function. The complete loss of ~ therefore are not fire' rated. the CAM Monitoring Rack B as a Acess to the room 621 is provided consequence of a single fire is through a.non fire rated curbed acceptable. Functional backup is door from corridor B (Rm 622), provided by CAM Monitoring Rack A-div.I (Rm 659). (5) Combustible Present:. Smoke from a fire will be removed Fire Loading Total Heat of by the normal HVAC system Combustion (BTU) operating in its smoke' removal mode. Cable Tray NCLL (64,000 Btus per sq ft maximum (10) Consequences of Fire Suppression. average) applies. - Suppression extinguishes ti26 fire.. Water pools on the floor. '(6) Detection Provided - Class A Protection against flooding is supervised POC in the room and provided by supporting equipment-manual alarm pull station at Col. on steel framing or raised pads 2.7-C.0 & 2.8-F.1. and providing floor drainage through the sump' system. (7) Suppression Available: (11) Design Criteria Used for Protection Against Inadvertent Type Location / Actuation Operation, Careless Operation or Rupture of the Suppression Modified Col. 2.7-C.0 System: Class III, & 2.8-F.1/ seismic Manual Category I, (a) location of the manual-standpip and suppression system in the . hose reel corridor, external to the j rooms containing the main ~ ( safety related equipment'; I i j 'i
(b) provision of raised supports (12) Fire Containment or Inhibiting for the equipment; Methods Employed: (c) provision of ficor drainage; (a) The functions are located in a separate fire-resistive (d) Seismic Category I standpipe enclosure. 1 (rupture unlikely); and (b) The means of fire detection, (e) provision of doorway curbs. suppression and alarming are provided and accessible. (13) Remarks - None. I-E i
y .~ U can 9 D.HJo*l 14 lof A AMM asisiooru Standard Plant nev n S considerable length of time will not prevent earthquake there will be two manual hose streams safe shutdown s available in any area containing equipment required for safe shutdown and that there will be In addition, fire protection systems are de-no uncontrolled release of fire suppression water C0 t-signed so that their inadvertent operation or the in the areas. 9,f./,y,4-/ occurrence of a single failure in any of these /N5E#T 9.E /./ systems will not prevent plant safe shutdown. The quality asr cance (OA) program,in accor-dance with CMEB 9.5.1 for the design of fire Possible fires that could affect safety re-protection systems, is presented in Chapter 17. lated systems and significant combustible load-ings are presented in Appendix 9A on a The consequences of inadvertent operation of room-by-room basis. Fire barriers and fire pro-a suppression system and of moderate energy line tection systems are discussed for each safety and cracks are discussed in Appendix 9A. non safety-related area. Each room is also anMyzed for its potential radioactive release due Except for fuel and lubricating oil located in the to a postulated fire. Noncombustible or diesel. generator rooms, there are no storage areas smoke-evoh>cd and fuel-contributed index of 25 or in the reactor or control buildings for flammable less are used wherever practicable. liquids, oxidizing agents, flammable compressed gases, corrisive material or explosive or highly SRP acceptance Criterion II.2.a of SRP Section flammable materials. Nonflammable compressed 9.5.1 requires adherence to BTP CMEB 9.5.1. gases (e.g., air, nitrogen) do not represent a fire Paragraph C.5.f of the SRP requires that the hazard. means by which smoke will be removed from the plant be established early in the plant design. The Small quantities of chemicals may be stored in ABWR meets this requirement,in that it is listed or approved cabinets and containers for planned that smoke will be removed by normal immediate use.The CRD maintenance area is an HVAC System. In the reactor building, the example where such storage is permitted. normal supply and exhaust fans are located identification of the type and location of these external to the building. Every room of the materials is a requirement of SRP Section 13.2.2 reactor building secondary containment receives which is the responsibility of the COL applicant. l supply air from and exhausts to the building normal HVAC. The emergency ventilation systems for the electrical equipment and diesel generator rooms provide additional smoke removal capability for those rooms. There is a containment vent and supply sys-tem. Neither the supply or exhaust ducts are equipped with fire dampers. The isolation vahrs on ther.e ducts are normally closed and would remain closed during plant operation so as to maintain the contain nent in an inerted condition, yff a fire occurred in containment during a plant outage, when the valves were open and the containmern not inerted, the drywell or wetwell spray would be initiated to protect the containment at a temperature well below the threshold of damage to the ventilation duct. For these reasons, the ABWR design for the containment ventilation is considered proper and adequate. The water suppression systems are designed on the basis that following a safe shutdown DSE# T f.S. /. / Uransformers located within fire areas containing safety-related equipmen" will be of the drytype only. For those 9.s-t.03 areas utilizing liquidgnsulated transformers, the COL applicant'shall provic'e features to prevent the-insulating liquid from pecoming an unacceptable health hazard to employees in the event of release 'ef the material to the building 9.5.t3. W 4 < Col.- h e 8 - b y
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.' i -[ ABWR. coa w.44 -/ 7 *Ob Sandard Plant PJiy_13 full-load following every no-load or low-load with plant monitoring equipment; (20% or less) operation lasting for a period of 30 minutes or more. (See Subsection 8.3.1.1.8). (c) Minimum isolation zone and protected area illumination capabilities cannot be 9.5.13.9 Applicant Fire Protection Program defeated by sabotage actions outside of the protected area; and, The following areas are out of the ABWR Standard Plant design scope for the fire (d) Electromagnetic interference from plant protection program, and shall be included in the equipment startups or power transfers will COL applicant's fire protection program, not create nuisance alarms or trip security access control systems. (1) Main transformer 9.5.13.12 Fire liazard Analysis Compilance (2) Equipment entry lock Review (3) Fire protection pumphouse The COL applicant will perform a compliance review of the as built design against the (4) Ultimate heat sink assumptions and requirements stated in the fire hazard analysis (Appendix 9A) shall be The COL applicant's fire protection program conducted. This includes comparision with Table shall comply w th the SRP Section 9.5.1, with 9A.6-1 data base. Any non compliance shall be ability to bring the plant to safe shutdown documented as being required and acceptable on condition following a complete fire burnout the basis of the Fire Hazard Analysis, Appendix without a need for recovery. (See Subsection 9A, and the Fire Hazard Probabilistic Risk 9.5.1) Assessment, Appendix 19M. (See Subsection 9.5.1.3). 9.5.13.10 HVAC Pressure Calculations 9.5.13.13 Diesel Fuel Refueling Procedures The COL applicant shall provide pressure calculations and confirm capability during The OL applicant shall establish procedures pre-operational testing of the smoke control mode to verify that the day tank is full prior ta of the HVAC systems as described in Subsection refilling the storage tank. This minimi~.es the 9.5.1.0.6. likelihood of sediment obstruction of fuel lines and any deleterious irnpacts on diesel generator 9.5.13.11 Plant Security Systems Criteria operation. The COL applicant's design of the security 9.5.13.14 Portable and Fixed Emergency system (see Subsection 9.5.2) shall include an Comr2unication Systems evaluation of its impact on plant operation, testing, and maintenance. This evaluation shall The COL applicants design of the portable assure that the security restrictions for access radio communication system and the fixed to equipment and plant regions is compatible with emergency communication system shall comply with required operator actions during all operating BTP CMEB 9.5-1, position C.S.g(3) and (4). The 'nd emergency modes cf rp--ation (i.e., loss of COL applicant will supplement Subsection 9.5.2.6 ofta power, accu, nor fire protection, health accordingly as applicable. physics, maintenance, testing and local operator). In addition, this evaluation shall 9.5.13.151dentification or Chemicals assure that: The COL applicant wil(identify the type and (a) There are no areas within the Nuclear Island ocation of chemicals as required by SRP Section where communication with central and 13.2.2. (See Subsection 9.5.1.1). secondary alarm stations is not possible; gj g /g fan (b) Portable security radios will not interfere //j'vId NJe*/a led TrWMorWr5 Md tw // 95-107 i Amendment 24
f A= [N cot A c.nco L Ttsu. '2. o. 3. I -- i ABWR 23A6100AC Standard Plant nev c ? IA3 COL LICENSE INFORMATION changes, proposed or implemented, deemed appropriate, to improve the availability of the emer-1A3.1 Emergency Procedures and gency core cooling equipment.'(See Subsection Emergency Procedures Training Program 1A.2.2.5) Emergency procedures, developed from the emergency procedures guidelines, shall be prosided and implemented prior to fuelloading. (See Subsec-tion 1A.2.1). IA.3.2 Review and Modify Procedures for Removing Saiety-Related Systems From Service t J ua-s J 2e sJeb 13_os, ,com p Procedures shall be reviewed and modified (as required) for removing safety.related systems from scrsice (and restoring to service) to assure operabil-l ity status is known. (See Subsections 1A.2.18 and 19). 1A33 In-Plant Radiation Monitoring Equipment and training procedures shall be provided for accurately determining the airborne io-dine concentration in areas within the facility where l plant personnel may be preacnt during the accident. (See Subsection 1A.2.35). IA3.4 Reporting Failures of Reactor System Relief Valves s Failures of reactor system relief valves shall be reported in the annual report to the NRC. (See Sub-section 1A.23.21.1). 1A.3.5 Report on ECCS Outages Starting from the date of commercial opera-tions, an annual report should be submitted which in-cludes instance of emergency core cooling system un. availability because of component failure, mainte-nance outage (both forced or planned), or testing, the following information shall be collected: 4 (1) Outage date (2) Duration of outage (3) Cause of outage (4) Emergency core cooling system or I component irwolved (5) Corrective action taken The above information shall be assembled into a l report, which will also include a discussion of any Amendment 23 1A.3-1 I h
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