ML20035C276

Forwards SSAR Markup Addressing Dffser COL Action Item 14.1.3.3.7.3-1.Requests That Copy of Transmittal Be Provided to Hou & J Brammer

ML20035C276
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	04/02/1993
From:	Fox J GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Poslusny C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9304060429
Download: ML20035C276 (4)

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. GENuclearEnergy -

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GenefDicx Comum

' I75 Cwmei Avev SrJose, CA 95725 '

.l April 2,1993

' Docket No. STN 52-001

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Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced Reactors

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and License Renewal -

Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

Subject:

Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule - COL Action Items 1

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14.133.73-1 t

Dear Chet:

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Enclosed is a SSAR markup addressing DFFSER COL Action Item 14.133.73-1.'

Please provide a copy of this transmittal to Shou Hou and Jim Brammer.

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Sincerely,

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t 1tek Fox j

Advanced Reactor Programs cc: Norman Fletcher (DOE)

Maryann Herzog(GE) i i!

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JF93-74.

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ABWR cot Achor Jh 14.1.3.s.7.3-1 m6me Standard Plant Rn a s

requirement for redundant separation is protected against the effects of these m e t.

Other redundant divisions are postulated pipe failures will be provided by the available for safe shutdown of the plant and applicant referencing the ABWR design (see no further evaluation is performed.

Subsection 3.6.4.1, item 4 and 6).

(4) If damage could occur to more than one Barriers or shields that are identified as division of a redundant essential system necessary by the HELSA evaluation (i.e., based within 30 ft of any high energy piping, on no specific break locations), are designed other protection in the form of barriers, for worst-case loads. The closest high. energy shields, or enclosures is used. These pipe location and resultant loads are used to methods of protection are discussed in Sub-size the barriers.

section 3.6.1.3.2.3. Pipe whip restraints as discussed in Subsection 3.6.1.3.2.4 are 3.6.13.2.4 P1pe Whip Restraints used if protection from whipping pipe is not possible by barriers and shields.

Pipe whip restraints are used where pipe (See %5ec.th u,S.lfite4)kcot licewse break protection requirements could not be 3.6.1.3.23 Barriers, Shicids, and Enclosures satisfied using spatial separation, barriers, hfow%w yqthemen'lD shields, or enclosures alone. Restraints are Protection requirements are met through the located based on the specific break locations protection afforded by the walls, floors, determined in accordance with Subsections columns, a'outments, and foundations in many 3.6.2.1.4.3 a n d 3.6.2.1.4.4 After the cases. Where adequate protection is not already restraints are located, the piping and essential present due to spatial separation or existing systems are evaluated for jet impingement and plant features, additional barriers, deflectors, pipe whip. For those cases where jet or shields are identified as necessary to meet impingement damage could still occur, barriers, the functional protection requirements.

shields, or enclosures are utilized.

Barriers or shields that are identified as The design criteria for restraints is given in necessity by the use of specific break locations Subsection 3.6.23.3.

in the drywell are designed for the specific loads associated with the particular break 3.6.133 Specific Protection Measures location.

(1) Nonessential systems and system components The steam tunnel is made of reinforced are not required for the safe shutdown of concrete 2m thick. A steam tunnel subcompartment the reactor, nor are they required for the analysis was performed for the postulated rupture lircitation of the offsite release in the of a mainsteam line and for a feedwater line (see event of a pipe rupture. However, while Subsection 6.233.1). The peak pressure from a none of this equipment is needed during or mainsteam line break was found to be 11 psig.

following a pipe break event, pipe whip The peak pressure from a feedwater line break was protection is considered where a resulting found to be 3.9 psig. The steam tunnel is failure of a nonessential system or designed for the effects of an SSE coincident component could initiate or escalate the with high energy line break inside the steam pipe break event in an essential system or tunne1. Under this eonservative 1oad component, or in another nonessential system combination, no failure in any portion of the whose failure could affect an essential steam tunnel was found to occur; therefore, a system.

high energy line break inside the steam tunnel will not effect control room habitability.

(2) For high energy piping systems penetrating through the containment, isolation valves The MSIVs and the feedwater isolation and check are located as close to the containment as valves located inside the tunnel shall be possible.

designed for the effects of a line break. The details of how the MSIV and feedwater isolation (3) The pressure, water level, and flow sensor and check valves functional capabilities are instrumentation for those essential systems.

3M Amendment 17

F ABWR iot A c. tion

. Item 14.1.3.3.'13-l

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Standard Plant nry 3

'x (1) A summary of the dynamic analyses N

applicable to h'igh-energy piping gg*q g

g4ggN systems in accordance with Subsection.

3.6.2.5 of Regulatory Guide 1.70. This shall include:

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(a) Sketches of applicable piping i

systems showing the location, size -

and orientation of postulated pipe breaks and the location of pipe whip-restraints and. jet impingement barriers.

(b) A summary of the data developed to select postulated break locations including ~ calculated stress intensities, cumulative usage; i

factors and stress ranges as

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deline.ated in BTP MEB 3

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J (2) for failure in the moderate-ene

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piping systems listed in Table 5.6-6, v

yg}jon descriptions showing how safety-related dS) Nigh-Mtf@ [ jug gg systems are protected from the.

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resulting jets, flooding and other adverse environmental effects.

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}{canh-h dt.M UE (3) Identification of protective measures g

jings provided against the effects of-Wh5C gdg gb postulated pipe failures for protection OW of each of the systems listed in Tables mtth kbt SfAk'iA!I"lDMA 36

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rey @,<e%ts ed whicA lin82 feg (E ddkhty pVOYfchon.

(4) The details'of how the MSIV functional:

capability is protected against the g

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effects of postulated p,ipe failures.

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(5) Typical examples, if any, where protection for safety-related system's 9

and components against the dynamic effects of pipe failures include their enclosure in suitably designed i

structures or compartments (including.

any addi.tional drainage system or.

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equipment environmental qualification 3.6.[ COL License Information needs).

r 5%aW 3.6.

1 ' Detairs of Pipe Break Analysis Results

.(6) The details of how the feedwater line and Protection Methods check and feedwater isolation valves:

functional capabilities are protected

'l The following shall be provided by the COL against the effects of postulated pipe l

fum applicant (See Subsection 3.6.2.5):

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Amenomem 23 1

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3.6.4 As-Built Inspection of High Energy Pipe Break Mitigation Features An as-built inspection of the high energy pipe break i

mitigation features shall be performed. The as-built inspection shall confirm that systems, structures and components, that are required to be functional during and following an SSE, are protected against the dynamic effects associated with high energy pipe breaks. An as-built inspection of pipe whip restraints, jet shields, structural barriers and physical separation distances shall be performed.

For pipe whip restraints and jet shields, the location, orientation, size and clearances to allow for thermal expansion shall be inspected. The locations of structures, identified as a pipe break mitigation feature, shall be inspected. Where physical separation is considered to be a pipe break mitigation feature, the assumed separation distance shall be confirmed during the inspection.

3.6.5 COL License Information 3.6.5.1 Details of Pipe Break Analysis Results and Protection Methods (7)

An inspection of the as-built high energy pipe break mitigation features shall be performed. The pipe break analysis report or leak-before-break report shall document the results of the as-built inspection of the high energy pipe break mitigation features. (See Subsection 3.6.4, for a summary of the as-built inspection requirements.)

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