ML20035B482
| ML20035B482 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/15/1992 |
| From: | Greenman E, Partlow J, Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035B477 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304020041 | |
| Download: ML20035B482 (29) | |
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- e INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM REPORT i
JAMES G. PARTLOW, TEAhi LEADER Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation LUIS A. REYES EDWARD G. GREEN 51AN L. J. CALLAN Deputy Administrator Director Director Region 11 Division of Reactor Projects DivisIlon of Radiation Safety Region III and Safeguards 1
Region IV l
i JOHN T. GREEVES MARYLEE M. SLOSSON ERIC J. LEEDS Deputy Director Acting Chief Technical Assistant -
Division of Industrial Advanced Reactors and Division of Reactor and Medical Nuclear Safety License Renewal Projects West Nuclear Materials Safety Office of Nuclear Office of Nuclear and Safeguards Reactor Regulation Reactor Regulation Decer.ber 15,1992 wew cmaese moe =a p r c
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.s INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary............................................................I Background..................................................................
2 IRT Evaluation Activities...................................................
2 C o n cl u s i o n s................................................................. 3 Recommendations.............................................................Je Appendix A - IRT Charter...................................................../
Appendi x B - Management Revi ew Pl an......................................... 9 Appendix C - Pilgrim Case..................................................
11 Appendix D - Seabrook Case.................................................
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Append ix E - Nucl ear Energy Se rvice s Ca se.................................. 15 Appendix F - NRC Policy, Procedures and Expectations with Regard to Independent Verification of Licensee Assertions...............17 Appendix G - Allegation Maragement and Training............................
22 Appendix H - Region I Personnel Interviewed by the IRT..................... 25 i
Appendix I - Documents Reviewed by the IRT................................. 26 i
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INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM REPORT l
Executive Summary In a July 29, 1992 report to the Chairman, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) noted that their review of three inspection activities by Region I personnel (the Pilgrim EP inspection, Seabrook welding program investigatic.n and the investigation of allegations made against Nuclear Energy Services) involved staff reliance on representations made by licensees that were inaccurate or untrue.
In addition, the OIG stated that these representations were not adequately examined or verified until external influences forced an independent review.
In response, on August 13, 1992, the Executive Director for Operations established a senior-level Independent Review Team (IRT) to evaluate the bases for the Inspector General's generic conclusions and make i
recommendations regarding appropriate corrective action, as warrante..
Based on the review of relevant documentation and extensive interviews with Region I management and staff, the IRT concluded that:
r In the Pilgrim case, Region I did rely upon some licensee assertions, without sufficient independent verification, which later proved inaccurate or untrue.
l In the Seabrook case, Region I relied primarily on their own evaluations, not licensee representations.
In the NES case, Region I may have relied on the licensee's assertion that their license was inactive. Ambiguities in the records reviewed prevent a more definitive conclusion. The IRT t
agrees with the OIG that the licensee's representations were not
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adequately examined or verified until external influences forced a i
second inspection.
Although the region relied on licensee assertions without sufficient i
j independent verification in the Pilgrim case and may have also J
relied on licensa assertions in the NES case, the IRT concluded l
that Region I procedures and philosophy regarding reliance on licensee representations do not vary from Agency expectations.
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The IRT's recommendations include providing additional guidance and emphasis on conducting independent verification of licensee assertions in inspector training programs, providing more explicit guidance concerning the use of independent verification during allegation followup, and reassessing the allocation of regional resources for allc-gation followup based on historical d
l data.
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o INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM REPORT Backcround In a July 29, 1992 report to the Chairman, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) concluded that Region I staff cid not fully and adequately examine certain allegations made by a former employee of Nuclear Energy Services (NES), an NRC licensee.
In forwarding the report of investigation, the Inspector General noted:
"Since my arrival at the NRC in late 1989, my office has conducted three inquiries involving the inspecticn activities of Region I personnel (the Pilgrim inspection, the Seabrook welding program investigation and this investigation involving the allegations of Mr. Gundersen). A common denominator among the three is that Region I personnel relied on representadons made by licensees that were inaccurate or untrue. The representations were not adequately examined or verified until external influences forced an independent review."
In order to evaluate the bases for the concern, the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) established a senior-level Independent Review Team (IRT) to conduct an assessment of the factors underlying the Inspector General's concern. On August 13, 1992, the EDO issued a Charter to the IRT to conduct an independent evaluation of the bases for the Inspector General's generic conclusions and make recommendations regarding appropriate corrective action, as warranted. A copy of the IRT Charter is included as Appendix A to this report.
IRT Evaluation Activities In accordance with the Charter, the IRT developed a Management Review Plan for approval by the EDO. A copy of the approved plan is appended to this report (Appendix B).
IRT evaluation activities included:
An initial team meeting with the Inspector General and senior OIG staff to ensure an understanding of the OIG concerns.
Review of three OIG reports; Case No. 90N-02, "NRC Staff's Review of Pilgrim Off-Site Emergency Preparedness."
Case No.90-31H, " Review of the NRC Staff's Responses to Congressional Inquiries Regarding Joseph Wampler and the Welding Program at Seabrook Nuclear Station."
Case No.91-07G, " Inadequate Inspections and Mishandling of Allegations by Region I."
Review of Agency and Region I documentation on policy, practices, and training programs regarding the NRC's independent verification of licensee information or assertions provided to NRC personnel.
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i INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM REPORT Review of selected Region I files documenting the manner in which i
allegations are addressed and resolved.
t Interviews with 34 members of the Region I staff regarding their understanding of Agency expectations for independent verification activities.
i Team meetings to discuss individual findings and impressions and to focus on overall IRT conclusions.
The above activities were aimed at answering several questions implicit in the IRT Charter:
Is there a common link between the deficiencies identified in the OIG reports concerning Pilgrim, Seabrook, and NES? In other words, is the OIG concern correct in that, in each of these cases, Region I personnel relied on representations made by licensees that were inaccurate or untrue? Is it correct that these licensee representations were not adequately examined or verified until external influences forced an independent review?
Do inspection practices and philosophy in Region I regarding excess reliance on licensee representations vary from Agency expectations?
Based upon the IRT evaluation activities, are any changes in Region I philosophy or practices, or are any changes in NRC-w:de practices warranted regarding reliance on licensee representations?
a.
Conclusions The IRT did not find a common link between the deficiencies identified in the Pilgrim, Seabrook, and NES OIG reports. The IRT does agree with OIG in the i
Pilgrim case:
Region I did rely upon some licensee assertions, without sufficient independent verification, which later proved to be inaccurate or untrue. However, in the Seabrook case, the IRT concludes that Region I relied primarily upon their own evaluations, not licensee representations, in reaching a position on whether a settlement agreement entered into by an l
alleger was restrictive in terms of the individual's ability to bring safety concerns to the NRC.
In the NES case, the IRT concludes that Region I may have relied on the licensee's assertion that their license was inactive.
Ambiguities in the records reviewed prevent a more definitive conclusion. The IRT agrees with the OIG that the licensee's representations were not adequately examined or verified by the region until external influences forced a second inspection.
The IRT's evaluation of each of the three cases is discussed in detail in Appendix C - Pilgrim, Appendix D - Seabrook and Appendix E - Nuclear Energy Services.
Although the region relied on licensee assertions without sufficient independent verification in the Pilgrim case and may have also relied on i
licensee assertions in the NES case, the IRT concluded that Region I procedures and philosophy regarding reliance on licensee representations do 3
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1 INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM REPORT i
t not vary from Agency expectations.
It appears to the IRT that it is Region I management policy that, consistent with available resources and an appreciation for safety significance, selective independent verification of licensee-provided information is a basic component of the Region's inspection philosophy.
Interviews with Region I staff indicate that they understand, endorse, and seek to put into practice the concepts of independence and independent verification in their evaluations of nuclear safety.
I The IRT conclusion regarding Region I inspection philosophy and practices was also based on a review of files maintained for each allegation processed by the staff. While Agency policy allows most allegations (with some exceptions) to be first referred to licensees for investigation, Region I, when resources are available, consistently prefers to independently resolve the concern if at all possible.
In this regard, the IRT took note of a June 1991 OIG audit report (OIG 90A-IB/90A-21) concerning NRC's handling of the Employees Legal Project (ELP) allegations regarding the Seabrook Station. The report indicated that:
- 0lG could find no instance when NRC staff either displayed an unprofessional attitude or showed a lack of interest toward ELP or the ELP allegations. NRC Staff often went beyond their requirements in trying to resolve the ELP allegations. According to the Agency's policy and procedures for handling of allegations, NRC staff could have dismissed many of the allegations when originally presented as too vague or too general.
Instead, NRC staff tried to resolve all the ELP allegations and sought j
additional information on vague or general allegation,s."
A review of Agency and Region I written guidance, including training programs, on verifying licensee assertions, indicates that the documentation is adequate.
Nevertheless, improvements could be made in the emphasis which is placed upon independence as the Commission's first principle of good regulation.
In this regard, the IRT concurs in the conclusions of the October 26, 1992 OIG report 'NRC's Policies for Deferring Materifis Inspections and Verifying Licensee Assertions":
'Although NRC's policies, procedures, and guidance indicate the necessity of relying on licensee assertions, they also recognize the need for verification. While inspector training programs clearly demonstrate this need, it does not appear that these programs emphasize the potential for a licensee to mislead the NRC.
Inspectors must be alert to situations where licensees attempt to mislead them, and there is no substitute for good judgment and intuitive decision making.
It is through formal and on-the-job training that new inspectors acquire the knowledge and experience needed to make these judgments and decisions.
Therefore, it is the inspector training programs that should emphasize the susceptibility of being misled, and provide instruction on handling such situations."
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INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM REPORT I
The IRT also noted that the Agency policy for Management of Allegations, I
Management Directive 8.8 (formerly Manual Chapter 0517) does not provide-l specific guidance with respect to when a licensee's response should be t
independently verified or the extent to which independent verification is necessary, y
i In addition to the above conclusions, the IRT found, based on interviews with Reoion I personnel, that there is a perceived oressure to reduce the
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allegation backlog and at the same time complete the assigned (core) inspection program despite a limited budget allocation for the resolution of allegations.
The particular regulatory environment in which the Region operates causes a greater potential for Region I personnel to have to respond to a large number of contentious allegations that require substantial,-
unbudgeted resources for resolution. The IRT recognizes this situation as unique to Region I and that the other Regions have experienced a declining i
trend in allegations received.
First line supervisors and middle managers 1
were knowledgeable of the Operating Plan Budget allocation for the resolution of allegations and were also aware that expenditures in the followup of allegations has historically exceeded budget allocations (almost doubled the
'i budgeted FTE for FY-92).
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l A more comprehensive discussion of Agency and Region I policies, procedures, l
guidance and training with regard to conducting independent verification of
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licensee assertions is included in Appendix F.
Allegation management, including Agency guidance as well as Region I allegation process implementation and training, is discussed in detail in Appendix G.
l Recomendations j
The IRT's recommendations are as follows*
(1)
The IRT concurs and supports recommendations #3 and #4 contained in the above-cited OIG report on verifying licensee assertions:
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Recommendation 3 l
The Executive Director for Operations (EDO) should direct that NRC i
training programs for new and experienced inspectors emphasize the topic of verification of licensee assertions.
1 Recommendation 4 i
The EDO should consider providing additional guidance and training on handling situations when inspectors believe that licensee data is-suspect, or when inspectors believe they are being misinformed by i
licensee officials.
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l INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM REPORT-I (2)
The IRT recommends that an allocation of resources for all allegation i
followup based on historical it. formation be considered to provide first line supervisors and managers a clear message that the need for thorough review of allegations is recognized and supported by management through adequate assignment of resources. Resources allocated to allegation followup could be redistributed from existing regional inspection programs with the approval of the respective Program Office.
(3)
The IRT recommends that Management Directive 8.8, "Hanagement of Allegations", be revised to provide more explicit guidance concerning the use of independent verification during the followup of allegations.
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APPENDIX A i
JRT Charter On August 13, 1992, the EDO issued the following IRT Charter:
CHARTER INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM
Purpose:
Conduct an independent evaluation of the bases for the Inspector General's generic conclusions and make recommendations regarding appropriate corrective action, as warranted.
Team Composition:
Jim Partlow, Associate Director for Projects, NRR, Team Leader Louis Reyes, Deputy Regional Administrator, RII Ed Greenman, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, RIII Joe Callan, Director, Division of Radiation Safety & Safeguards, RIV Marylee Slosson, Sec. Chief, Reactt,r Const. & Tech. Support Section, NRR John Greeves, Deputy Director, IMNS, NMSS Eric Leeds, Technical Assistant, NRR
Background:
The Inspector General has raised the following concern; "Since my arrival at the NRC in late 1989, my office has conducted three inquiries involving the inspection activities of Region I personnel (the Pilgrim inspection, the Seabrook welding program investigation and this investigation involving the allegations of Mr. Gundersen). A common denominator among the three is that Region I personnel relied on representations made by licensees that were inaccurate or untrue. The representations were not adequately examined or verified until external influences forced an independent review."
Team Activities:
I.
a.
Review the OIG Pilgrim Report and the staff response to the report.
b.
Review the OIG Seabrook Report and the staff response to the report.
I c.
Review the OIG NES Report and the staff independent review of the report (refer to memorandum from Thompson to Bernero, et al., dated i
August 12,1992). Copy attached.
d.
Review other written materials as deemed necessary.
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APPENDIX A (Continued)
I 2.
Determine if there is a common link between the deficiencies identified by the OIG in the reports specified in item 1.
3.
Conduct a Management Review of the Region inspection practices and philosophy to determine whether they vary from the Agency expectations regarding excess reliance on licensee representations. The Management Review Plan should be submitted to DEDR for approval.
4.
Determine whether changes in the Region I philosophy or practices are warranted.
5.
Determine whether changes in NRC-wfde practices are warranted.
6.
Based on items 1 through 5 submit a report, including recommendations, to the EDO. The DEDR should receive periodic status briefings.
DEDR will arrange for appropriate briefings of the IG.
Timing: Tasks 1-6 should be completed by November 15, 1992.
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APPENDIX B i
INDEPENDtNT REVIEW TEAM - MANAGEMENT REVIEW PLAN
Purpose:
Conduct a management review of the Region I inspection practices and i
philosophy to determine whether they vary from the Agency expectations regarding excess reliance on licensee representatives.
Outline:
I.
Conduct Team meeting with IG to ensure that the IG concerns are understood - completed September 25, 1992.
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Determine Agency expectations / guidance regarding reliance on licensee representations (both generally and in the face of allegations).
A.
Examine existing written program office procedures / policy.
B.
Examine inspection training programs-r I.
Fundamentals of Inspection.
2.
Inspecting for Performance.
3.
Other HQ training.
III. Examine written Region I inspection practices and philosophy regarding reliance on licensee representations.
A.
Examine existing Region I procedures / policy.
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Examine Region I inspection training:
I.
Region I resident inspector qualification books / procedures.
2.
Region-based inspector qualification books / procedures.
3.
Region-based inspection training.
IV.
Examine Region I personnel philosophies towards reliance on licensee representations with regard to the inspection process (Note: standard questions will be developed for consistency and direction).
A.
Interview selected personnel involved in the three inspection activities in question (Pilgrim, Seabrook and NES).
i I.
Inspectors involved in the three cases.
I 2.
Management personnel in the reports' review chain.
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APPENDIX B (Continued) 8.
Interview a random vertical slice of Region I personnel.
1.
Management - their expectations and their perspective, in hindsight, on the three cases.
2.
Region and site-based inspectors (residents at'three sites).
V.
Select and examine a sample of Region I closed allegation files over the past three years. Focus on inspector performance with regard to reliance on licensee representations in order to determine the magnitude of the issue.
A.
Samples should include issues of low and high safety significance.
B.
Allegations should involve reactors (approximately 70% of cases for review) and materials licensees (30%).
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APPENDIX C Pilarim Case The OIG received allegations concerning the NRC Staff's testimony on the status of offsite emergency preparedness during October 14 and December 9, 1988, Commission rieetings. These meetings were conducted to consider the restart of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The IG conducted an investigation and, on July 23, 1990, the OIG issued his Inspection Report.
The OIG report concluded that "the staff's assessment of Pilgrim offsite emergency preparedness was neither balanced nor thorough. They did not contact responsible emergency planning officials in a timely manner, they did not reconcile differences in credible information they received from various sources, and in some cases they did not validate information they accepted.
The NRC staff was responsible for providing an accurate presentation of the status of Pilgrim offsite emergency preparedness for the Commission's consideration. However, portions of the staff's presentations during the October 14 and December 9, 1988 Commission Meetings were inaccurate. This inaccurate information includes the extent of the staff's interaction with local emergency planning officials and the situation on the beaches located in the EPZ."
On June 27, 1990, NRR responded to the IG findings. On August 3, 1990, the EDO directed that NRR conduct a " Lessons Learned" review. On October 1, 1990 NRR submitted their Lessons Learned Task Force Report.
The Lessons Learned Task Force developed a comprehensive action plan and provided recommendations in the areas of communication between the Commission and the staff, communication between the Commission and others with differing opinions regarding emergency preparedness, and applicability of the lessons learned guidance for generic use. The Lessons Learned Task Force also evaluated the staff omissions or errors during the Commission Meetings of October 19, 1988 and December 1988.
The IRT reviewed the OIG report, the Pilgt.n Emergency Preparedness Lessons Learned Task Force Report, and some of the transcripts supporting these reports. During the week of October 19, 1992, the IRT interviewed Region I staff familiar with the details of the Pilgrim case.
The IRT determined that Region I inspection activities for the Pilgrim offsite emergency preparedness included some activities to independently verify the status of Pilgrim offsite emergency activities.
It included visits to EPZ communities to meet with local emergency planning officials in the EPZ.
It also included a visit to Saquish Beach.
The effort expended in these activities was not complete or performed with rigor.
For example, because local officials verbally acknowledged that implementing procedures were available and will be used by them, Region I viewed this effort to be sufficient to conclude that implementing procedures were in place even though they were not approved through all levels of local government and Commonwealth officials. Conflicting information was not well APPENDIX C (Continued) 11
r APPENDIX C (Continued) articulated in Commission and Senior Management oral briefings. The omission 3
of this information and the lack of independent verification of some of the Boston Edison Company (BECO)-supplied information resulted in an inaccurate representation of the state of offsite emergency preparedness at Pilgrim.
The Region I staff activities were unique and conducted for the first time by NRC in many areas, in that the effort was conducted in lieu of activities normally conducted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This led to the Region I's staff obtaining the information and conducting 1
activities from sources located offsite and without the benefit of prior experience conducting such reviews.
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APPENDIX D Seabrook Case The IRT review of the Seabrook case focused on the degree to which Region I relied upon licensee contractor irformation during the Region's review of a settlement agreement between an alleger and the contractor.
The settlement agreement dates from 1984, when the alleger was briefly employed by a contractor at the Seabrook station. The question before the Region was whether the settlement agreement pertaining to health physics issues raised by the alleger was restrictive in the sense that it would restrict the alleger from raising safety concerns (specifically regarding welding issues) to the NRC. Region I reached the conclusion that the settlement agreement was not restrictive. This conclusion was communicated to Senator Kennedy in a letter from the Chairman of the NRC dated March 15, 1990. The subsequent OIG investigation into this and related matters raised the concerns that the region reached its conclusion using as a primary basis unverified information from the licensee contractor and that the region did not first obtain an independent legal review of the matter from NRC counsel.
The IRT agreed with the OIG concern that Region I reached a conclusion regarding the restrictiveness of the settlement agreement without first obtaining an independent analysis from NRC counsel. However, the IRT did not substantiate the concern that the primary basis for the Region I conclusion concerning the restrictiveness of the settlement agreement was from information supplied by a licensee contractor.
Through interviews, the IRT concluded that the settlement agreement and supporting documentation were personally reviewed by the then Deputy Regional Administrator (who was the current Regional Administrator at the time of the IRT review), and a judgement was made regarding the restric,tiveness of the agreement based upon that personal review. Although the Deputy Regional Administrator was aware at the time of his review that the licensee contractor agreed with his position on this matter, he stated that his conclusion was based on his personal reading of the settlement agreement and supporting documents. The Regional Counsel was not available during the short review time afforded to review the settlement and respond to the Senator's request.
The IRT concluded that the fact that agreement existed between the Region I position and the licensee contractor position concerning the restrictiveness of the settlement agreement did not indicate that Region I relied on licensee contractor supplied information as a basis for its decision.
In a related matter, the OIG identified a concern that the March 15, 1992, NRC letter to Senator Kennedy and a March 14, 1990, NRC letter to the alleger were inconsistent regarding statements portraying the NRC position on the i
restrictiveness of the settlement agreement. The IRT did not substantiate this concern, in that the IRT concluded that both letters convey the same message: the settlement agreement pertaining to health physics issues raised by the alleger is not considered by the NRC to restrict the alleger from raising safety concerns (particularly regarding welding issues) to the NRC.
Although the March 14, 1990, NRC letter to the alleger acknowledges that it is possible for the settlement agreement to be interpreted otherwise, this does 13 I
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l APPENDIX D (Continued) not detract from the letter's central point that it is clearly NRC policy that no settlement agreement is to be considered to restrict the ab_ility of the affected party to bring safety concerns to the NRC.-
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APPENDIX E NES Case i
The NES case involves a question of whether regional personnel involved in an inspection and follow-up report relied on representations made by the licensee that were inaccurate or untrue. Also, there is a question of whether these representations were not adequately examined or verified until external influences forced an independent review.
The case was initiated in June,1990, when an allegation was received that NES was not in compliance with its license. Region I sent a senior inspector accompanied by a new inspector to perform an inspection on July 24, 1990 as follow-up on the allegation. No violations were identified during the inspection and the report concluded that the licensee had not used it's license. Subsequent to this finding, the alleger raised questions about the conclusions of the inspection and sought help from Senator Joseph Lieberman.
As a result of these questions, Region I performed an additional inspection which identified 7 violations and confirmed some of the allegations. As a result of these actions, the OIG conducted an investigation which concluded that Region I personnel relied on licensee representations that were inaccurate or untrue, and were not adequately examined until external requests forced further review.
The IRT reviewed the OIG report on NES, another independent review team report on the NES case conducted by a team led by NMSS, and selected transcripts of interviews supporting these reports. During the week of October 19, 1992, the IRT interviewed Region I staff familiar with the details of the NES case.
However, the IRT relied most heavily on the conclusions reached by the NMSS independent review team report because of its indepth review and scope.
Basedontheseactivitiesitappearsthatanumberofmistalesweremade associated with the first NES inspection. For example, the new inspector had knowledge that the NES license had been active prior to conducting the inspection and yet still signed the inspection report indicating that the licensee had not performed any services nor had it possessed any licensable radioactive material under this license. We cannot explain how this mistake occurred. The docket file shows that the license had been active, however neither the senior inspector nor the Section Chief who signed the first inspection report appeared to be aware of this information.
A number of information sources indicated that the licensee apparently 1
asserted during the first inspection that the license had not bean activated.
The senior inspector's interviews clearly indicate that the licensee asserted that he only worked under his customers' license.
This information (inactive license) appears to have been provided to the Section Chief, and he j
subsequently advised the inspectors that no violations or further inspection i
activities were appropriate. Although there is a degree of uncertainty regarding the sources of information available to the Section Chief at the i
time this decision was made, the IRT concluded that the Section Chief may have relied primarily on the aforementioned licensee assertions as a primary basis for his decision.
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P APPENDIX F NRC POLICY, PROCEDURES, TRAINING AND EXPECTATIONS WITH REGARD TO INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF LICENSEE ASSERTIONS NRC Reculations NRC regulations require licensees and license applicants to provide complete and accurate information to the Agency upon request. NRC regulations in 10 CFR 30.9, entitled " Completeness and Accuracy of Information" require information provided to the Comission by a licensee or license applicant to be complete and accurate in_ all material respects. A similar provision is contained in 10 CFR 40, 50, 60 and 70.
In addition, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions contains the assertion that the Comission must also be able to rely on oral communications from licensee officials concerning significant information.
These Regulations and the Enforcement Policy, therefore, provide the framework for the NRC staff's expectations for complete and accurate information from licensees and applicants.
Inspector Performance Excectations On September 17, 1991, the NRC Executive Director for Operations promulgated performance expectations to all NRC technical staff, which included principles for regulation and specific performance expectations related to job function.
i The expectations for NRC inspectors include the following:
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" Inspectors apply an appropriate mix of document review, personnel j
interviews and observation of work to ensure inspection results are truly indicative of licensee performance."
i This expectation of inspector performance, to review multiple information sources to ensure accuracy and objectivity, is indicative of the overall agency policy of independent verification of licensee performance.
Manacerent Excectations The IRT interviewed 34 members of the Region I technical, supervisory and managerial staff (Appendix I). All levels of the organization clearly articulated and understood the regional philosophy to validate and independently verify information provided by the licensee.
Interviews of the technical divisions resulted in a consistent theme of utilizing a balanced i
inspection technique to verify the adequacy of licensed activities without undue reliance on licensee assertions. A large number of interviews indicated j
that Regional Management has and continues to clearly articulate the need to independently verify licensee assertions and not accept statements on fac, value. This is reinforced through the Regional Administrator's office, i
through routine division meetings and counterpart meetings. Based on the interviews conducted, the IRT believes that Region I has an inspection i
philosophy embracing independent verification through field observations, 17 i
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APPENDIX F (Continued) records review and interviers as appropriate. The following major themes support this view:
i 1.
Most interviewees knew that the subject of healthy skepticism and undue reliance on licensee assertions was addressed in the NRC's Fundamentals of Inspection and Inspecting for Performance courses.
2.
Interviewees consistently indicated the regional expectation and practices to independently verify though a combination of records review, interviews and field observations the validity of licensee 4
provided information.
3.
Senior management has clearly articulated the need to independently verify licensee assertions.
The IRT concluded that Region I inspection practices and philosophy do not vary from Agency expectations regarding excessive reliance on licensee representations.
Procram Office Inspection Manual and Procedures A review of the NRC Inspection Manual program was conducted to determine the extent of instruction to inspectors on the independent verification of licensee assertions.
In terms of general guidance, Inspection Manual Chapter 0215, "NRC Inspector Objectivity" specifically addresses independent verification in section 05.01 a:
1.
Indeoendent Verification (a)
Positive Pattern. Demonstrates through reports and other i
activities that the inspector independently attempts, to an appropriate degree, to verify information received from the 4
licensee.
(b)
Neoative Pattern. Unless otherwise warranted, demonstrates that little or no verification was done to substantiate information received from the licensee.
Shows reliance on unsubstantiated licensee information with no independent followup regarding plant activities and events.
Overall, there are numerous examples in the NRC Inspection Manuals where inspectors are instructed to verify licensee information. The following is a short list of examples of Manual Chapters instructing inspectors to independently verify licensee information:
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Hanual Chapter 1010, " Independent Assessment and Analysis" i
Manual Chapter 37051, " Verification of As-Builts" Manual Chapter 61715, " Verification of Containment Integrity" Manual Chapter 92719, "SER Review and Follow-up" 18
APPENDIX F (Continued)
In conclusion, independent verification of licensee assertions is adequately discussed in the inspection program and instructions to inspectors to i
independently verify licensee information is provided.
Recional Instructions and Procedures The general expectations with regard to resident inspector performance of their duties is contained in Regional Instruction 1060.I, " Resident-Inspector i
Guidance". Verification on licensee activities is discussed in Section I.0, i
Resident Inspector Principle Duties".
It states:
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In keeping with the reactor inspection program objectives, many of the procedures comprising the core program are developed to reflect a i
performance based orientation.
Performance based inspections adopt a.
direct observation philosophy, coupled with a. requirement for inspectors to draw overall conclusions on the adequacy of a licensee's performance.
'l The resident inspectors provide the major on-site presence for direct-observation, verification and assessment of licensee activities.- It is i
expected that resident inspectors will' perform those inspections that emphasize observations of plant activities in progress and field verification of licensee activities.
None of the other Regional Instructions reviewed (see Appendix H) contained instructions or expectations with regard to independent verification of q
licensee assertions.
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Inspector Trainino Procrams
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h During interviews, most individuals acknowledged that the subject'of independent verification was addressed to some extent in the. Fundamentals of Inspection course and through the Inspecting for Performance course. However.
cost all personnel indicated that proper inspection techniques, blending interviews with record reviews and field observation, was learned through the qualification process of on-the-job training, pairing junior with senior inspectors and through mentoring of resident inspectors by senior resident inspectors. The IRT concluded that proper inspection techniques was largely a.
l function of on-the-job training by senior inspectors and staff.. The following.
is a brief discussion of inspector training programs.
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!N APPENDIX F (Continued)
Fundamentals of Inspection A number of Region I personnel indicated that they received training to independently verify licensee assertions in the Fundamentals of Inspection This course provides inspectors with basic information on inspection course.
preparation, inspector conduct, performance and documentation of inspections.
The course includes information on inspector conduct including encouraging a questioning attitude regarding written records and verbal statements by the licensee staff. The instruction encourages inspectors to perform a mix of
(
observation of work in progress, interviews of workers focussing on the performance of work in progress, review of documents and discussions with l
licensee staff.
There is currently an interoffice group tasked with updating and revising the Fundamentals of Inspection course. Although the individual chapters have not been written at the time of this report, the group has developed an outline 1
j for each chapter. The topic of independent verification is directly discussed 4
in the outline of several chapters.
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i Although the Fundamentals of Inspection course discusses the topic of I
independent verification of licensee assertions, the IRT concluded that added erphasis, including lessons learned involving instances of inadequate independent verification, is warranted.
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Insrectina for Performance
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i The Inspecting for Performance Course was also mentioned by a number of Region I personnel with regard to verifying information through direct observation of work activities. The course was developed to provide instr,uction in the concepts of performance-oriented inspections. The course emphasizes actual 1,
observation of ongoing activities as a primary resource for inspection, complementing document review and personnel interviews. The course also directs inspectors to focus their efforts in the areas that have the greatest safety benefit.
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The Inspecting for Performance course instructs inspectors to get out into the l
field, or into the plant, and witness ongoing activities for verification of performance. The course teaches concepts congruent with the Agency's policy l
with regard to independent verification of licensee assertions.
Qualification Procram The majority of Region I personnel interviewed indicated that their understanding of the methods for inspection was learned through on-the-job training.
Inspectors learned to independently verify licensee assertions through a combination of inspection techniques, through the process of pairing junior with senior inspectors, resident inspectors tutored by senior residents, and to some extent, through expectations expressed by their management during inspection report review. Many inspectors felt strongly 1
20 J
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i APPENDIX F (Continued) that on-the-job training had the most significant impact on their understanding for the need to independently verify licensee assertions.
Based on these interviews, the IRT concluded that independent verification of licensee assertions was greatly learned through on-the-job training.
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i APPENDIX G ALLEGATION MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING i
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A11ecation Manacement The IRT reviewed the NRC's allegations review process as promulgated through I
Agency guidance and as implemented in Region I.
In conducting this review,.
the team reviewed written guidance in the form of management directives and procedures, reviewed training, discussed the allegations process during staff 4
interviews, attended an Allegation Review Panel Meeting, and reviewed a sample of closed allegation files. The IRT also reviewed Allegation Management System (AMS) program reviews and audits, OIG audits concerning the allegations process and.the NMSS Independent Review Team report on the NES case. The IRT's review concentrated on examining the need for independent verification during the review of allegations.
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NRC Guidance l
1 Management Directive 8.8 (formerly MC 0517)
- Management of Allegations," dated j
April 30, 1992 defines responsibilities for allegations management and provides policy and procedural guidance regarding receipt and handling, followup and closeout of allegations. The Directive outlines three possible courses for NRC allegation followup:
I.
Inspection by NRC Inspector j
2.
Investigation by NRC 01 Investigator
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3.
Referral to licensee for investigation with NRC r,eview of evaluation ~
of results.
Section 510 of the Directive discusses referral to licensees and indicates j
that action offices are expected to refer as many allegations as possible to l
licensees, applicants or vendors with the exception.of l
I) those which referral would compromise the integrity of the alleger, l
- 2) those which referral would compromise an inspection or investigation.
i MD 8.8 provides additional guidance concerning when to' refer an allegation to a licensee.
The guidance includes evaluating the licensees past record in dealing with allegations; the possible effect that release of the information could have on the alleger; if the licensee would be the best source of I
information; if there are objections from the alleger or another Government-agency; and if the alleger has raised the issue with the licensee with
.j unsatisfactory results.
E 22 E
4 APPENDIX G (Continued) 1 l
In addition, MD 8.8 provides guidance concerning the evaluation of licensee responses to referrals. MD 8.8 directs the staff to evaluate the objectivity and competence of the individual or organization which prepared the response, the scope and depth of review, and whether root cause and generic implications were considered.
The Management Directive allows for allegation closeout without independent verification in those instances when the staff agrees with the licensee's response. The Management Directive also allows referral of allegations which are not within the NRC's regulatory base to be referred to the licensee with no response required. The Management Directive does not provide specific guidance with respect to when a licensee's response should be independently verified or the extent to which independent verification is necessary.
j Recion I implementino Guidance Region Instruction 1210.1 Revision 5, " Allegations and Complaints - General,"
implements MD B.8 in Region I.
RI 1210.1 models MD B.8 with respect to referral of allegations to licensees and evaluation of licensee responses.
RI 1210.1 establishes that each allegation received will be reviewed by an Allegations Review Panel (ARP) consisting of the appropriate Division Director or Deputy, the appropriate Branch Chief or Section Chief, the Senior Allegations Coordinator, the 01 Field Director, and appropriate technical support personnel.
The ARP determines the method of allegation followup. As with MD 8.8, RI 1210.1 does not provide specific guidance with respect to the need for independent verification during the followup of allegations.
Trainino Allegations training is provided to Region I and other NRC staff through i
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" Fundamentals of Inspection" training and through specific allegations refresher training. The IRT reviewed the " Fundamentals of Inspection" course manual that is used nationally by NRC and by Region I without modification.
In addition, the IRT reviewed the presentation slides used by Region I personnel during the conduct of " Fundamentals of Inspection" and Region I specific allegations training given over the last year.
i Chapter 10 of the " Fundamentals of Inspection" course manual discusses preparation and conduct of inspections supporting followup of allegations.
It instructs that a docket file review should be completed prior to inspection performance, records reviews should be checked for validity and discrepancies resolved through other records and interviews, and that independent i
measurements should be performed as appropriate.
It also instructs the inspectors to follow their intuition. The review of presentation slides indicated that the inspectors are instructed that they must strive to maintain their objectivity and that it is as impartant to gather evidence and information demonstrating an allegation is not true, as it is to substantiate an allegation.
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i APPENDIX G (Continued)
Staff Interviews The IRT discussed the allegations process with the Region I interviewees.
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Regional personnel were highly sensitive to allegations and most had an in-depth knowledge of the allegation process. Although most regional staff were 3
aware of NRC policy encouraging referral of allegations to liv ensees, most personnel indicated they prefer to followup an allegation wit i an inspection.
l An exception to this preference is the case of Millstone, in which the staff received so many allegations that a management decision was made to refer the allegations to the licensee and to perform independent verification on a l
sampling basis. Regional personnel indicated that referral to reactor j
licensees is more common than referral to materials licensees.
In many instances regional personnel indicated that they are more skeptical and less likely to rely on information from a licensee when following up on an allegation. The results of the IRT interviews are in direct cont'lict with the i
premise that Region I personnel may be likely to rely excessively on licensee information.
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Allegation Files The IRT reviewed 10 allegation files which had been closed over the last i
3 years. The IRT specifically selected allegation files which indicated that followup was referred to the licensee.
Seven of the files related to reactor l
licensees. The remaining three files concerned materials licensees. This l
4 distribution was selected because the majority of Region I allegations l
l concerned reactor licensees.
The IRT did not identify any instances in which i
regional personnel appeared to inappropriately rely on licensee information.
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Peview of Other Document s 1
l The IRT reviewed Headquarters' program reviews conducted in 1991, 1992 and i
regional audits conducted over the last 3 years of the Region I allegation i
process. The program reviews and audits indicated a lack of formality with respect to documentation of referral of allegations to licensees and NRC i
evaluation of licensee responses.
Regional performance with respect to these weaknesses appears to have improved.
The IRT also reviewed the April 3,1992 report of the Inspactor General's audit of the AMS which concluded that the NRC AMS was worklag satisfactorily and was meeting the intent of Commission's policy and objectives. The IRT also reviewed the OlG's 6/28/91 audit report of its " Review of NRC's Handling l
of the Employees Legal Project Allegations Regarding the Seabrook Nuclear Station."
In this report the OlG indicated that the staff went beyond NRC requirements to resolve ELP allegation and concluded that the staff received, evaluated and resolved the ELP allegations in accordance with Agency policy and procedures. These reports do not support the premise that Region I staff rely extensively on licensee information without independent verification.
a l
The IRT also reviewed the NMSS independent review team report involving the NES case.
The NMSS report discussed several recommendatior.s in the area of Region l's implementation of the Allegation Management process. The IRT has i
no objections to recommendations contained in the NMSS report.
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t APPENDIX H REGION 1 PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED BY IRT f'
D. Holody, ORA, Enforcement Officer R. Fuhrmeister, ORA, Senior Allegation Coordinator J. Dwyer, Senior Health Physicist, Medical Inspection Section, DRSS W. Lanning, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety T. Shedlosky, Project Engineer, PB 4, Division of Reactor Projects J. Wiggins, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects E. Wenzinger, Chief, PB 2, Division of Reactor Projects E. Ullrich, Senior Health Physicist, Research, Development and Decommission, DRSS F. Costello, Chief, Industrial Applications DRSS D. White, Health Physicist, Industrial Applications, DRSS W. Kane, Deputy Regional Administrator J. Durr, Chief Engineering Branch, Division of Reactor Safety J. Whit-Chief, Reactor Projects 2A, PB2, DRP W. Laz,
,, Chief, Reactor Projects 3B, PB3, DRP E. McCabe, Chief. Emergency Preparedness Section, DRSS W. Ruland, Chief Electrical Section, DRS W. Hodges, Director, Division of Reactor Safety M. Evans, Resident Inspector, Peach Bottom J. Macdonald, Senior Resident Inspector, Pilgrim P. K. Eapen, Chief, Systems Section, Engineering Branch, DRS T. Oberg, Health Physicist, Research, Development and Decommissioning, DRSS C. Sisco, Operations Engineer, PWRS, DRS A. Della Groca, Senior Reactor Engineer, Electrical Section, DRSS L. Cheung, Senior Reactor Engineer, Electrical Section, DRS W. Pasciak, Chief, facilities Radiation Protection Section, DRSS T. Martin, Regional Administrator P. Wilson, Senior Resident Inspector, Calvert Cliffs J. Beall, Team Leader, Systems Section, DRS R. McBrearty, Reactor Engineer, Materials Section, DRS R. Coccer, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards R. Bellamy, Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety Branch, DRSS L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Operations Branch, DRS C. W. Hehl, Director, Division of Reactor Projects P. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone 25
=.,,
APPENDIX I DOCUMENTS REVIEWED BY IRT i
NRC Inspection Manual Chapters
+ O215 NRC Inspector Objectivity
- 1010 Independent Assessment and Analysis (deals with testing and analysis of materials samples)
+ 37051 Verification of As-built 61715 Verification of Containment Integrity i
- 92701 Follow up
- 92703 Follow up of CAls
- 92719 SER Review and Follow up r
Recion I Instructions l
- 1010.1 Resident Inspector Guidance
- 1010.3 Management Oversight of Inspection Activities
+ 1060.1 Resident Inspector Guidance
= 1020.5 Processing of Inspection Reports and Correspondence with Licensees
- 1020.3 Backshift Inspection /On-site NRC Coverage 0410.1 Inspector Training and Qualification Program
= 1020.1 Site-specific Inspection Program Management and Power Reactors 1020.4 Open Items Lists 1080.1 Safety Concern Identification and Evaluation
= 1330.1 Deviations 1320.1 Violations 1540.1 Processing of 10 CFR Part 21 and 50.55(e)
Defect Reports
- 1210.1 Allegations and Complaints - General IG Audit Report - OIG/91A-07 " Review of NRC's Allegation Management System,"
dated 4/3/92 IG Audit Report - DIG 90A-18/90A-21, " Review of NRC's Handling of the Employees Legal Project Allegations Regarding the Seabrook Nuclear Station," dated 6/28/91 NRC Management Directive 8.8 "Hanagement of Allegations," dated 4/3/90 NRC " Fundamentals of Inspection" course manual and instructors slides Region I 1992 Allegations Refresher Training Instructor Slides Memorandum to File - Richard C. Brady, " Review of Allegation Hansgement in Region I," dated 4/5/90 26 l
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I APPENDIX I (Continued)
Memorandum to file - Richard C. Brady, " Review of Allegation Management in Region I," dated 7/16/91 l
Memorandum, Holody to Martin, " Action Planned for Responding to the Findings i
of the Latest DRMA Audit of Allegation Files," dated 5/15/92 i
Memorandum, Kane to Hehl, " Audit of Allegation Files,:" dated 7/16/91 Region I Program Review (Enforcement / Allegations) dated 9/16/92 Memorandum, James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations, to NRC Technical Staff, September 17,1992, "NRC Technical Staff Performance Expectations."
" Independent Review Team Report of findings and Recommendations," dated 10/6/92.
Richard L. Bangert, Team Leader
" Final Independent Review Team Report of Findings and Recommendations," dated i
12/01/92. Richard L. Bangert, Team Leader IG Report, " Review of NRC's Policies for Deferring Materials Inspections and Verifying Licensee Assertions, dated 11/92 t
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