ML20034G383

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Suppls 930127 Application for Amend to License SNM-1097, Providing Criticality Analysis to Demonstrates Safety for Addition of Tolerance Limit to U Oxide Powder Enrichments
ML20034G383
Person / Time
Site: 07109019
Issue date: 03/04/1993
From: Winslow T
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To: Macdonald C
NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
References
NUDOCS 9303090433
Download: ML20034G383 (19)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:.- 4/-908 1 i i ei -{ s GENuclearEnergy w w w :n:wnavn - ~m W MwIwbr C mpm 1 rp o p m, ;,s, o - n>unn l l March 4, 1993 [ .I Mr. Charles E. MacDonald, Chief i Transportation Certification Branch Division of Fuel Cycle & Material Safety U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555 .i

Dear Mr. MacDonald:

Subject:

Supplement to Consolidated Application dated 1/27/93

References:

(1) Certificate of Compliance USA /9019/AF, Model-BU-7 Shipping Package, Docket 71-9019 j (2) Consolidated Application, TP Winslow to l CE MacDonald, 1/27/93 i General Electric Company's Nuclear Fuel & Components _ Manufacturing (NF&CM) facility hereby submits a supplement to j the 1/27/93 application for the Model No. BU-7 shipping package. i This supplemental application provides a criticality analysis that demonstrates safety for the addition of a tolerance limit j to each of the uranium oxide powder enrichments. The i supporting criticality safety analysis and the maximum i enrichments proposed for the certificate are also provided as page changes to the consolidated application. l provides a description by section and page of the l requested changes to the existing consolidated' application dated 1/27/93. These requested changes do not reduce the j effectiveness of the package. ! contains the replacement pages for the consolidated application. Changes are indicated by an asterisk, in the right-hand column. l The following are proposed wording changes to the Certificate Conditions-that are affected by this submittal. All other proposed wording changes in the 1/27/93 letter remain the same.3 The' additional proposed wording is provided below in a bold type to facilitate' review. Wording that-has been removed is l indicated-by an asterisk in the right-hand column. Please note that the maximum enrichment of 5.00% does not change. 1 l 9303090433 930304 I N I PDR ADOCK-07109019 l C. PDR l

t v i Mr. C. E. MacDonald March 4, 1993 Page 2 Condition l

5. (b) (1)

Type and Form of Material

5. (b) (1) (i)

Uranium oxide powder enriched to greater than 4.10 w/o and not more than 5.00 w/o in the U-235 isotope. The maximum H/U atomic ratio shall not exceed 0.45. The mass of moderating materials within the inner container when added to the total mass of moderator within the fuel shall not exceed 1,000 grams or 3.6% of the weight of the uranium oxide, whichever is smaller.

5. 00) (1) (ii) Uranium oxide powder enriched to not more than i

4.10 w/o in the U-235 isotope. The maximum H/U atomic ratio shall not exceed 1.6. The mass l of moderating materials within the inner container when added to the total mass of moderator within i the fuel shall not exceed 1,750 grams.

5. (b) (2)

Maximum Quantity of Material Per Package-

5. (b) (2) (i)

For contents described in 5. (b) (1) (1), the maximum i contents per BU-7 package shall be limited in [ accordance with the following table: For Enrichments Greater Than 4.10 w/o U235 Maximum Uranium Maximum U-235 Oxide Powder Per Enrichment, BU-7 Package, w/o kgs i t 4.35 35.0 l 4.60 32.5 4.85 30.0 i 5.00 27.5 l k

+ Mr. C. E. MacDonald March 4, 1993 Page 3

5. 03) (2) (ii) For contents described in 5. (b) (1) (ii), the maximum contents of uranium oxide powder per BU-7 package shall be limited in accordance with the following F

table: For Enrichments Not Greater Than 4.10 w/o U235 i Maximum Uranium Maximum U-235 Oxide Powder Per Enrichment, BU-7 Package, w/o kgs 2.91 70.0 3.06 62.5 3.60 47.5 4.10 37.5 6. Powder or pellets may contain any quantity of gadolinium oxide, provided the total mass of uranium oxide plus gadolinium oxides does not exceed the uranium oxide mass limits in 5 (b) (2). The wording "...or uranium oxide scrap..." has been removed from i the proposed wording in Condition 6 that appeared in our 1/27/93 9 - cover letter. It is not required because Section 5. 00) (1) (iv) allows for compounds of uranium to be mixed with other non-fissile (i.e., gadolinium) materials. { Ten (10) copies of this submittal application are provided for i your use. NF&CM personnel would be pleased to discuss this matter with you and your staff as you deem necessary. Sincerely, GE NUCLEAR ENERGY \\ / T. Preston Winslow, Manager Licensing & Nuclear Materials Management j /sbm l cc: TPW-93-021 ) l I i

~ i l Mr.

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E. MacDonald Maren 4, 1993 Page 1 of 1 P ? ATTACHMENT 1 SUPPLEMENTAL CHANGES TO THE 1/27/93 CONSOLIDATED APPLICATION SUBMITTAL Section/Page Description of Change Appendices Added Appendix G, titled " Criticality Page iii Safety Analysis: BU-7 Shipping Container With U0 Powder Enrichment 2 Tolerances", February 22, 1993 { Sections 2.7.1 (1) Changed the enrichment of 4.0 w/o to and 2.7.1 (2) 4.10 w/o in order to be consistent with Page 4 this application. Also, to make reference to Appendix G. j r Section 2.7.2 (1) and Changed tne enrichments to be 2.7.2. (2) consistent with this applicat'on Pages 5 and 6 i i a P I i l ~ {

i Mr. C. E. MacDonald March 4, 1993 Page 1 of 1 i i ) ATTACHMENT 2 L t REPIACEMENT PAGES FOR THE ? CONSOLIDATED APPLICATION, 1/2"//93 i t 'I ? 's i E 4 't l 4 ? e t

O APPENDICES A Drawing 112D1592, " Shipping Container - Model BU-7" B " Test Report for Model BU-7 Bulk Uranium Shipping Container", April 25, 1980 C " Criticality Safety Analyses for BU-7 Shipping Containers for 4.0% to 5.0% Enriched UO Powder with 2 Failure of Containment and Moderation Control", June 1, 1992 D " Criticality Safety Analysis for BU-7 Shipping Container for Below 4.0% Enriched UO Powder with 2 Failure of Containment and Moderation Control", December 11, 1992 and Addendum, January 25, 1993 E " Criticality Safety Analysis for BU-7 Shipping Container for Enrichments Below 4.0% UO Pellets / 2 Powder with Failure of Containment and Moderation ([]) Control", January 25, 1993 F " Criticality Safety Analysis for BU-7 Shipping Container for UO2 Scrap at 4.025% Enrichment". July 7, 1992 G " Criticality Safety Analysis: BU-7 Shipping Container With UO Powder Enrichment Tolerances", February 22, 2 1993 9 LICENSE SNM-1097 DATE 03/04/93 PAGE DOCKET 71-9019 REVISION 1 -iii-

inside dimensions of the inner containment drum are () 13 3/4" diameter by 26 3/4" high. 2.5 BU-7 Outer Container A nominal 55-gallon DOT Specification 17H steel drum (with three rolling hoops) or Uniform Freight Classification Rule 40 steel drum (with two rolling hoops). Drum is 18-gauge steel with an outer dimension height without the cover of approximately 35" and an inner diameter dimension of approximately 22 1/2". 2.6 Insulating Material The inner containment drum is centrally held within the outer container by, and the space between the () inner and the outer containers is completely filled with, solid insulating media composed of 4 fire-retardant phenolic foam as specified in Drawing ll2D1592. Four 1/4" diameter vent holes i equally spaced near the top of the outer container, covered with waterproof tape, would permit steam to escape in the event free moisture in the insulating material were exposed to the heat from an accidental fire during transport. i t q LICENSE SNM-1097 DATE 01/27/93 PAGE (]} DOCKET 71-9019 REVISION O I l

t t I t 2.7 Package Description - Contents .h. 2.7.1 Type & Form of Material j f (1)- Uranium oxide powder enriched to greater than j 4.10 w/o and not more than 5.00 w/o in the j U-235 isotope. The maximum H/U atomic ratio l shall not exceed'0.45..The mass of moderating 'l t materials within the inner container when added to the total mass.of moderator within l the fuel shall not exceed 1,000 grams or 3.6% F of the weight of the uranium oxide, whichever i is smaller. (See Appendi~ces C and G). i 1 i (2) _ Uranium oxide _ powder enriched to not more than i 4.10 w/o in the U-235 isotope. The maximum i H/U atomic ratio shall not exceed 1.6. The i k mass of moderating materials.within the inner container when added to the total mass of. l moderator within the fuel shall not exceed i i 1,750 grams. (See Appendices D and G). i i (3) Uranium oxide as pellets or a mixture of powder and pellets enriched to not more than 4.0 w/o in the U-235 isotope. The maximum H/U-i atomic ratio shall not' exceed 0.45. .The' mass 1 of moderating materials within the inner j container when added to the total mass of moderator within the fuel shall not exceed I 1,000 grams or 3.6% of the UO, whichever is-2 1 smaller. (See Appendix E) ) jj ll)- l LICENSE SNM-1097 DATE 03/04/93 PAGE . DOCKET ,71-9019 REVISICN 1 i 1

(4) Uranium-bearing materials in the form of {) solids, or solidified or dewatered materials. Uranium may be enriched to not more than 4.025 w/o U-235. Uranium-bearing materials may include oxides, carbides, silicates, or other compounds of uranium. Compounds of uranium may be mixed with other non-fissile materials. Any degree of moderation may be present. (See Appendix F) 2.7.2 Maximum Quantity of Material Per Package (1) For contents described in 2.7.1 (1), the maximum contents per BU-7 package shall be limited in accordance with the following table: ) For Enrichments Greater Than 4.10 w/o: Maximum U-235 Maximum Uranium Enrichment, Oxide Powder Per r w/o BU-7 Package, kgs 4.35 35.0 4.60 32.5 4.85 30.0 5.00 27.5 (2) For contents described in 2.7.l(2), the maximum contents of uranium oxide powder per BU-7 package shall be limited in accordance with the following table: l (]) LICENSE SNM-1097 DATE 03/04/93 PAGE DOCKET 71-9019 REVISION 1 ) 1

.~. a a t r ~ l t For Enrichments Not Greater:Than 4.10 w/o h. 02M : .i' Maximum U-235 Maximum Uranium Enrichment, Oxide Powder Per w/o BU-7 Package, kas Li 2.91 70.0 .3.06 62.5 -i 3.60 47.5 l 4.10 37.5 (3) For contents described in 2.7.1 (3), ' the maximum contents per BU-7 package shall be limited in accordance with-the following table: Maximum U-235 Maximum UO2 Enrichment, Per'BU-7 ~ w/o Package, kgs 3.0 50.0 -- l 4.0 30.0 j (4) For the contents described in 2.7.1 (4) : 'j Maximum 17.63 kg uranium per BU-7 package. Total mass of contents not to exceed 89 kg. i l f .i i ll) 'l LICENSE SNM-1097' DATE 03/04/93 PAGE DOCKET 71-9019-REVISION 1 6.- ~ J

4 i O i t i 'i + APPENDIX G I t s 4 CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSIS: BU-7 SHIPPING CONTAINER WITH UO2 POWDER ENRICHMENT TOLERANCES j ti FEBRUARY 22, 1993 ) ,O i 4 l l ..e ' h. LICENSE. SNM-1097. DATE 03/04/93. PAGE -DOCKET 71-9019 REVISION O G I

-i O ~ .j I Criticality Safety Analysis:IlU ~i

i Shipping Container with UO2 Powder Enrichment Tolerances l

f 'I i 1 r i i r i r ~O i February 22,1993 oi k 't s'f l t .O i

February 22,1993 page 1 of 6 " Criticality Safety Analysis: ilU-7 Shipping Container with UO Powder Enrichment Tolerances" 2 1. INTRODUCTION in this analysis, for powder enrichments below 5.0%, the B U-7 container is demonstrated to comply with Fissile Class I requirements when tolerances on the various enrichments as determined by measurement are included. It is considered in this analysis that the five or three gallon pails lose their integrity and that the UO powder in each drum is mixed with the water in the BU-7's inner 2 containment vessel. Each container was shown to be restricted to UO mass limits by previous 2 analyses [Ref. I and 2] as follows: 27.5 kg UO for enrichments greaterthan 4.75% but no more than 2 5.00%,30 kg 00 for enrichments greater than 4.5% but no more than 4.75%,32.5 kg UO for 2 2 enrichments greater than 4.25% but no more than 4.5%,35 kg UO for enrichments greater than 2 4.0% but no more than 4.25%,37.5 kg UO for enrichments greater than 3.5% but no more than 2 4.0%,47.5 kg UO2 for enrichments greater than 3.0% but no more than 3.5%,62.5 kg UO for 2 enrichments greater than 2.85% but no more than 3.0%, and 70.0 kg UO for enrichments at or below 2 2.85%. The normal case restrictions of the fuel contents still apply: for enrichments no greaterthan 4.0% the maximum H/U atomic ratio is 1.6 with the contents limited so that the total mass of hydrogenous r, oderator in the inner containment vessel is no grea* r than I,750 grams; and for enrichments no greater than 5.0% the maximum H/U atomic ratio is 0.45 with the contents limited so that the total mass of hydrogenous moderator in the inner containment vessel is no greater than 1,000 grams or 3.6% of the weight of the uranium oxide, whichever is smaller. Consideration had not been given in these previous analyses to the tolerance limits on the h enrichment measurement which detemiines to which enrichment band a particular powder blend must be held. That is, when the enrichment is measured as 3.0% enrichment, fo; instance, the maximum amount of U-235 in the powder is not considered. To provide consistent terms between the production / pack.ing operation and the shipping certificate, the nominal bands used by t e h production operation are correlated to an upper bound on the maximum possible U235 enrichment. Applied to the shipping cenificate, this gives rise to new maximum U235 enrichment bands wH-h deviate from the above mentioned values by a measurement and manufacturing tolerance limit. The present analysis will demonstrate that BU-7 container complies with Fissile Class I requirements with the maximum possible U235 enrichments in each enrichment band at the corresponding mass loading. O a

February 22.1993 page 2 of 6 The bounds for the three sigma enrichment limits are preser.ted below along with the O corresponding nominal enrichments which were previously analyzed. Nominal Enrichment Maximum Possible Enrich-Maximum UO2 Mass Loading (%) ment No) (kg) 2.85 2.91 70.0 3.00 3.06 62.5 3.50 3.60 47.5 4.00 4.10 37.5 4.25 4.35 35.0 4.50 4.60 32.5 4.75 4.85 30.0 5.00 5.00 27.5 II. ANALYSIS The analysis in this report covers the criticality safety of increased maximum U235 enrichment bands corresponding to the upper tolerance limit of a measured nominal enrichment for powders packed in the BU-7 as a Fissile Class I shipping container. This will be done by including an addition of a tolerance limit to the enrichment used in the most reactive cases already shown subcritical and demonstrating that any increase in neutron multiplication results in the container (s) still remaining subcritical. A. General Requirements for Fissile Class I hhipping Lwtainers As specified in Parts 71.55 and 71.57 of Reference 3,the criticality sfety requirements for a Fissile Class I shipping container are that subcriticality be maintained for the following: 1. Sincle Contamers -with the most reactive credible configuration of the package and contents, including moderation by water, and assuming close reflection by water on all sides. 2. Infinite Arrays of Containers - undamaged, in any arrangement with optimum interspersed hydrogenous moderation. i 3. Arrays of Damaged Containers - two hundred and fifty " damaged" contsners stacked together in any arrangement, closely reflected on all sides by water and with optimum interspersed hydrogenous moderation. " Damaged" means in the condition resulting from being subjected to the " Hypothetical Accident Conditions" specified in Part 71.73 of the Rules and Regulations. B. Analytical Methad Neutron multiplication factor calculations in this criticality analysis have been performed with the GEMER Monte Carlo code. GEMER's bias has been determined in an extensive validation

February 22,1993 page 3 of 6 against critical experiments to vary from +0.006 to -0.012 over the range of moderation in the fuel mixtures considered in this analysis, including mixtures with carbon compounds. Since the bias is h positive for H/U ratios less than 5, it can be ignored for the array calculations involving undamaged containers. For the calculations involving the array of damaged containers, a value of-0.012 is conservative. C. N1odelling of Geometry The geometry model used in this analysis of the BU-7 container is the same as for the previous cases. Models constituting the most reactive conditions for each case were re-mn using the I upper tolerance ;imit on the maximum enrichment allowed. In all cases, the accident array of l containers is most limiting, so it is necessary only to examine the effect of enrichment tolerances on l those arrays. The models with no interspersed moderator were found to be the mast reactive cases for the finite array of damaged containers, so these will serve as the bases for the present cases. The most reactive arrays had moderator content which varied with mass loading. 'Ihe weight fraction water in the fuel region sets the height of the fuel region in the container and is independent of the enrichment. Thus, the models of the most reactive cases at each enrichment and mass loading will be unchanged in terms of the actual geometry used. Only the enrichment of the fuel in the fuel region will change, and this only slightly. D. UO Powder and Water Niistures 2 The contents of the container is taken to be the inner containment vessel with uranium oxide 235.The fuel is modelled as UO and water and therefore applies to h powder enriched up to 5.0% in U 2 3 all uranium oxide powdets having theoretical densities no greater than 10.96 g/cm l Mixtures of fuel and water have been analyzed by considering mixtures occupying the l mmunum volume possible and having the maximum densities. In this case, the densities of the l mtxtures are given by I Omix = (WFuo:/10.96 + WF co) i VF o2 + WFH2O = 1.00. where quo 2 = Omix

  • WF o2, 9H2O = Vnux
  • WF no, an/

U U i For example, the maximum density mixture nonnally corresponding to 5% water (i.e. 3 3 3 This l WFH20 = 0.05)is that with gmix = 7.316 g/cm,0Uo2 = 6.951 g/cm, andQH20 = 0.369 g/cm mixture has an H/U atone ratio of 1.579. The weight fraction water which previously resulted in the most reactive configuration for each enrichment band analyzed is also used here for the cases with nominal enrichments increased by their tolerance limits. This results in no change in hydrogen or oxygen panial density for the respective cases, only a change in the ratio of U-235 to U-238. The number densities of U-235 and U-238 may be found by multiplying the number densities of the previous case (at nominal enrichment ) by the ratios e/p and ( 1-e)/( 1-p), respectively. Here, e is the fractional enrichment value for the present case and p is the fractional enrichment value for the previous case. The resulting number densities are given in Table A. g i

February 22.1993 page 4 of 6 t Table A Atom I)ensilies for Maximum i)ensity Mixtures a u m o aad n2o O z Ennch. WF g;o Nu235 NO23s No Nn i ment (%) (atoms /bam-cm) (atoms /banum) (atoms / barn-cm) (atoms /banum) 2.91 0.40 8.67238 5-05 2.85693E4)3 3.53140E412 5.88560E4)2 i 2.95 0.40 8.79160E415 2.85575FA3 3.53140E412 5.8R560E412 3.06 0.35 1.0976l E4M 3.43328E-03 3.56930E412 5.721M)E412 3.1 0.35 1.lll30E4M 3,43186E-03 3.56930E4)2 5.721N)E-02 3.6 0.40 1.07287E4M 2.83660E4)3 3.53150E-02 5.88560E-02 j 4.1 0.45 1.01830E-04 2.35173E4)3 3.50050E412 6.01980E412 4.35 0.50 9.00380E415 1.95479E-03 3.47470E412 6.13170E412 4.6 0.45 1.14248EAM 2.33948E-03 3.50050E4)2 6.01980E4)2 4 85 0.50 1.00387E4M 1.94458E4)3 3.47470E4)2 6.13170E412 [ I Note ihat no values are given for the 5.00% enrichment hand. This values is still taken to be j the maximum possible U235 enrichment value to be used in the BU-7 since control of the I enrichment coming into the facility is currently restricted to not more than 5.00% maximum enrichment. De upper enrichment band is therefore assumed to remain the same as in the previous 2 analysis O III. CRITICALITY SAFETY ANAI YSIS RESUI,TS j Table B shows the results of the GEMER calculations perfonned with the fuel mixtures and i geometry models described in Section 11. The results from the prior analyses are also shown here for comparison. %e results are separated into " nominal" and " tolerance limit" categories. %e results are all subcritical with the most limiting case being the accident condition array with zero 4 interspersed water. i 3 f I ? ? l [ 4 4 4 O (

.l February 22.199.1 page 5 of 6 Table Il GEN 1Elt itesults* for IlU-7 Containers with 2 '<mder Enrichment Tolerances l UO Nommal Ennchment Tolerance Limit Ennchment WFmo Mass Ennch-(rr o Ennch-Nrr o UO2 ment rnent (Oc) t *c) 0.40 70.0 2.85 0.9216 0.0029 2.91 0.92742 0.00173 0.35 62.5 3.0 0.9252 0 0018 3.06 0.93316 0.00185 0.40 47.5 3.5 0.9212 0.0029 3.6 0.92991 0.00181 0 45 37.5 4.0 0.9178 0.0028 4.1 0.92671 0.00194 0.50 35.0 4.25 0.9265 0.0033 4.35 0.92460 0.00176 0 45 32.5 4.5 0.9247 0.0034 4.6 0.92321 0.00215 0.50 30.0 4 75 n.9293 0.0031 4.85 0.92623 0.00186

  • Neutron Multiplication Factors Based on Fission Particle Rut Method Since the maximum kerr + 20 value is less than 0.9370, the BU 7 with the assumptions of loss of containment and failure of moderation control with enrichments conforming to the above restrictions meets the applicable requirements for a Fissile Class I package.

O I V. SUN 1N1 AltY AND CONCI.USION This analysis has demonstrated that the BU-7 shipping container meets the requisements of 10CFR71.55 and 57 for a Fissile Class I package with contents specified as follows: Type and Form Uranium oxide powder enriched to not more than 5.0 w/o in the U-235 isotope with the maximum H/U atomic ratio not exceeding 0.45 and the mass of moderating materials when added to the total mass of moderator within the fuel shall not exceed 1,000 grams er 3.6% of the mass, whichever is smaller. Uranium oxide powder enriched to nor more than 4.0 w/o in the U-235 isotope with the maximum H/U atomic ratio not exceeding 1.6 and a C/U ratio of not more than 1.27 and the mass of moderating materials within the inner container when added to the total mass of moderator within the fuel shall not exceed 1,750 grams. N1asimum Quantity per l'ackage The maximum contents per package shall be as follows: O -- a

V February 22.1993 l ~* page 6 of 6 I Maximum Maximum UO Mass 2 p 'd Nominal Enrichment (kg) Enrichment (%) (%) 2.85 2.91 70.0 t 3.00 3.06 62.5 1 3.50 3.60 47.5 4.00 4.10 37.5 4.25 4.35 35.0 4.50 4.60 32.5 4.75 4.85 30.0 V. REFERENCES 1. " Criticality Safety Analysis for BU-7 Shipping Container for 4.0% to 5.0% Enriched UO2 Powder with Failure of Containment and Moderation Control",6/1/92. 2. " Criticality Safety Analysis for BU-7 Shipping Container for Below 4.0% Enriched UO2 Powder with Failure of Containment and Moderation Control", 12/11/92. O 3. " Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material", United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rules and Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations - En-ergy, Part 71. l I r I I i o r}}