ML20034F473
| ML20034F473 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/17/1993 |
| From: | Larkins J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034F461 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 9303030272 | |
| Download: ML20034F473 (1) | |
Text
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.t-Io, UNITED STATES
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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE o,
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WASHINGTON. D C. 20565
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February 17, 1993 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Samuel S.
Chilk, Secretary ATTN:
William Hill, SECY FROM:
John T. Larkins, Acting Executive Director, ACRS/ACIN
SUBJECT:
ACNW MEETING WITH NRC COMMISSIONERS -
FEBRUARY 26, 1993 The next meeting between the Commissioners and the ACNW is scheduled for Friday, February 26, 1993 from 9:00 a.m. until 10:30 a.m.
It is our understanding that the Committee has been requested to discuss two of its recent reports which are attached.
These reports are:
1.
"Significant Issues in the High-Level Waste Repository Program," ACNW Report dated December 1,
1992 (Martin J.
Steindler will lead the Committee's discussion) 2.
" Issues Raised in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Section 801,"
ACIN Report dated February 5, 1993 (Dade W. Moeller will lead the Committee's discussion)
Any guidance you can provide regarding specific questions the Commissioners may have regarding these topics would be helpful.
It would also be helpful if you would inform us of any additional issues the Commissioners would like the ACNW members to address.
!A[
John T.
Larkins, Acting Executive Director, ACRS/ACNW Attachments:
As stated cc:
ACNW Members ACIN Staff 9303030272 930226 PDR 10CFR PT9.7 PDR
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UNITED STATES
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s ADV:SORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE t
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December 1, 1992 t
t The Honorable Ivan Selin l
Chairman i
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Chairman Selin:
SUBJECT:
SIGNIFICANT ISSUES IN THE HIGH-LEVEL WASTE REPOSITORY-PROGRAM j
The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACIM) was asked.at a meeting with the Commissioners to continue to identify significant issues that have the potential for delaying or otherwise i
interfering with the timely development of a repository.for high-level nuclear waste (HLW).
The ACNW focused on items of large scope that could hinder the development of an HLW repository, severely impact the schedule set by the Department of Energy (DOE),
or disrupt.the orderly licensing process by. extensive delays or untimely polemics.
In addition, the ACIN was asked to provide an outline of the process of developing an HLW repository.
The l
following is in response to these requests.
l The issues that appear to qualify for-inclusion in this communication constitute a fluid assembly because various parties to the HLW repository program are engaged in ongoing analytical I
studies, research, development, demonstration, full-scale tests' and l
the like.
Further, many studies, and other activities are not j
clearly visible or the outcome of. these efforts is not predictable.
Therefore, we provide this communication with the caveat'that the issues believed to be important today.may7not be so in'the near future.
In addition, the Committee provides a summary in which the i
issues cited in this communication are ordered by the Committee according to their impact on the. outcome of the repository:
.i development process.
Finally, the impact,of the recently passed-legislation under the Energy Policy Act' of 1992 is likely to result -
in further uncertainties about the relevance of some of the issues raised in this communication.
l 1.
A number of issues have been identified under the heading of.
j regulatory considerations pertinent to site characterization y
and licensing of a repository.
l l
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The Honorable Ivan Selin 2
December 1, 1992 i
a.
The NRC staff should develop positions that can serve as a basis for recommendations to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) relative to the Academy's role, mandated by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, of providing findings and recommendations on reasonable standards for the protection of public health and safety for the proposed HLW repository at Yucca Mountain.
b.
It is likely that regulations, issued by the NRC and other
- agencies, will not be wholly compatible or L
consistent.
It is not clear what constitutes resolution of the issue of compatibility and the stage at which this should be accomplished.
The Commission should request the NRC staff to clarify this issue and, if appropriate, initiate rulemaking.
c.
The DOE has promulgated 10 CFR Part 960 but its l
relationship to 10 CFR Part 60 as far as the licensing i
process is concerned is not clear.
There may be a need i
to clarify this relationship, especially in light of the l
emphasis of the DOE on 10 CFR Part 9GO in its Early Site Suitability Evaluation to the exclusion of inferences from 10 CFR Part 60.
The Commission should request the NRC staff to identify the role, if any, of 10 CFR Part 960 in the licensing process.
d.
Considerable data that are useful or necessary for a
]
licensing application and are anticipated to be involved in the licensing process will be or have been obtained without use of the rigorous quality assurance (QA) procedures now being implemented.
The Licensing Support i
System (LSS) has been established to encompass pertinent data but has not yet been inaugurated.
Further, the LSS i
may contain data or results that have similar deficien-cies.
Also, the guidance for the application of QA procedures to development and validation of models, and to decision-making among competing conclusions is at present substantially absent.
The inclusion of QA-deficient data or protocols in selection, validation and evaluation of uncertainties in models could pose signif-icant difficulties in the licensing process.
The Commission should request the NRC staff to initiate a comprehensive review of the guidance to the DOE that is necessary to define the quality requirements for the use of all important data obtained prior to promulgation of the QA requirements and for relevant models developed for the licensing-related repository description.
l The Honorable Ivan Selin 3
December 1, 1992 I
e.
Expert judgment will be a necessary and important part of the licensing process.
Acceptance of expert judgment, 4
its methodologies and its results in the waste management arena continues to be controversial and could disrupt a licensing process. The Commission should request the NRC staff to proceed with rulemaking to delineate the processes and standards for application of expert judgment to ensure that this technique can make a useful contribution to the licensing process and that its application will be accepted in an adversarial setting.
f.
The NRC staff has apparently taken the position that performance enhancement of the engineered barrier system (EBS) cannot be used to offset the potential deficiencies likely to be encountered in the geologic media.
This position has caused significant concept and design difficulties, appears to be without technical justi-fication and also appears to be without bases in regulations.1 owing to the inability to predict for any i
site if all of the attributes will meet all regulatory requirements, the Commission may wish to examine this position to ensure that the DOE is not burdened with a i
requirement that is neither necessary nor feasible to implement, and with one that contributes little i
additional assurance of protection of the health and i
safety of the public. The Commission should instruct the staff to devise means to ensure that major improvements in the EBS can and should be used to offset inadequate retention / confinement properties of the geologic i
environment of the waste.
The NRC staff should identify functional criteria for such trade-offs.
1 i
1As specifically stated in 10 CFR 60.112, it is the total system that must be judged in terms of meeting the regulatory requirements, i.e., "... The geologic setting shall be selected and the engineered barrier system... shall be designed to assure that releases of radioactive materials to the accessible environment following permanent closure conform to such generally applicable environmental standards for radioactivity as may have been established by the Environmental Protection Agency In addition, 60 CFR 102(e)2 indicates that "
special emphasis is l
placed upon the ability to achieve isolation by virtue of the characteristics of the geologic repository. The engineered barrier system works to control the release of radioactive material to the geologic setting and the geologic setting works to control the release of radioactive material to the accessible environment."
i
The Honorable Ivan Selin 4
December 1, 1992 1
1 g.
The properties of HLW that was previously stored in pools or dry storage and is assumed to constitute a waste form i
suitable for disposal in a repository are uncertain. The Commission may wish to require the NRC staff to identify those properties of the stored spent fuel that are of importance to the repository and those tests that are considered necessary for qualification of_this waste as the interim storage time lengthens.
Similar consider-ations should also be given to HLW glass that may have been stored for some time under various conditions.
h.
A significant part of the licensing process for an HLW repository involves the selection and analysis of scenarios of postulated events in the repository, coupled with the application of a variety of models of the physical system.
The processes by which 'models are designed, tested and, where appropriate, validated to be representative of the present and future behavior of parts of the repository system are not included in regulations or guidance to DOE.
Particularly, the protocols for obtaining agreement that a specific model adequately describes the future state of a system have not been defined.
The Commission should request the staff to define a methodology for obtaining agreement on this issue in advance of the licensing process.
We recommend that this topic be included in early rule-making, in order to provide guidance to DOE for the performance assessment process.
i.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations have not been codified and considerable uncertainty remains about the existing standards for 14 C and other gaseous radionuclides.
In addition, the NRC has not developed specific and comprehensive guidance to DOE on its requirements for the confinement of such radioactive material.
This uncertainty could strongly influence the entire EBS design, testing and analysis.
The Commission may wich to instruct the NRC staff to begin development of such guidance in the near future, recognizing that the new environmental standards will influence the details of such guidance.
i j.
Protocols for testing of the EBS and its components under repository-relevant conditions have been difficult to-l define and apparently such testing has not been conducted in a manner agreed to be satisfactory.
The DOE, as well as the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses j
(CNWRA), has initiated tests that are believed to be i
repository-relevant.
Owing to the extensive time requirements for tests whose results are to be
The Honorable Ivan Selin 5
December 1, 1992 i
t extrapolated over the expected life of the EBS, the Commission should initiate development of guidance, perhaps in the form of staff technical positions, on the l
criteria for determining when test conditions are j
repository-relevant.
k.
The DOE has indicated that the overall performance assessment of the repository system may not include an allocation from the performance of the waste form.
This approach apparently does not agree with the view of the NRC staff and has resulted in exchanges that appear to be at an impasse.
Since the waste form (spent fuel, glass) is now either prepared or in the process of being prepared in facilities that are substantially completed, i
the Commission should request the NRC staff to clarify the details of this disagreement and adjudicate, at an early stage, the position it wishes to take in this matter.
l 2.
The Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) Facility has received i
attention by the Congress, DOE, various Indian Tribes, cities, counties, and States, but has not developed into an accepted project with a currently valid starting point or a schedule for its completion, licensing and operation.
Owing to the pivotal position of the MRS in the disposal of spent fuel, several issues are pertinent.
a.
The required life of the MRS needs to be defined and the specifications, criteria for siting and construction, the content of licensing documents, and the anticipated i
licensing process need to be established, published and approved. The Commission should request the NRC staff to develop the details of regulations related to the licensing of an MRS.
b.
There has been no substantial development of a backup I
concept to the MRS in the event that it is not feasible to locate, site, license, or operate such_a facility.
While the reasons for such a failure will be non-technical, their effect could be-profound.
There has been little planning for this eventuality, and the i
Commission should request the NRC staff to initiate such studies in cooperation with the DOE and the Of fice of the Nuclear Wastc Negotiator.
1 3.
The scientific / technical investigations for the repository i
program being conducted by DOE are aimed at a comprehensive licensing document for NRC review. The studies that have been completed and those that are in progress are likely to produce results of variable quality or applicability.
Further, there 1
i
l The Honorable Ivan Selin 6
December 1, 1992 i
will certainly not be enough time and resources devoted to these studies to provide full insight into all scientific /
l technical questions.
The NRC staff has commented on the Site Characterization Plan (SCP) prepared by the DOE and has provided DOE with a significant list of issues to be resolved.
This list is in the form of the Site Characterization Analysis (SCA) issued by the NRC.
The Commission should initiate inquiry about the importance to the function of NRC of having all of the issues and questions raised in the SCA resolved to the satisfaction of the NRC staff on a time schedule commen-surate with licensing needs.
Similar questions should be answered regarding the importance of having all study plans which are based on the contents of the SCP completed and submitted to the NRC staff before work on the associated topics is initiated.
4.
The post-emplacement process for a repository involves a period during which the repository is to be monitored and for which retrieval of the waste is to be planned.
a.
There are no criteria for the thermal and other measure-ments that are to be made during this period.
The Commission may want to explore the need for such criteria and, if found necessary, request the NRC staff to develop and promulgate them in order to ensure that technologies for data acquisition and interpretation can be provided in a timely f ashion for the design of the EBS and the repository.
b.
The need to retrieve the waste after emplacement and f
backfilling influences the design of the repository and the EBS.
The staff has not defined what type of l'
retrieval will be required, the extent to which retrieval is likely to be needed, under what conditions retrieval is to be practiced, or the standards and criteria that would govern the retrieval.
Owing to the importance of these issues to the design of the repository, the Commission should encourage the NRC staff to define more closely, prior to licensing, criteria for the various l
parts of the emplacement and retrieval process, the monitoring protocols that are expected to be applied by DOE, and the regulations that are needed for this part of i
the HLW disposal system.
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k The Honorable Ivan Selin 7
December 1, 1992 t
SUMMAItY:
A review of the HLW disposal system, its development by DOE, and the regulatory structure emplaced by the NRC and the EPA resulted in identification of issues that can be arranged under several major headings and subheadings.
These are listed below in general order of decreasing impact on the successful and timely development of a functional repository.
i A.
Regulations and Guidance Reoort Section 1.
NRC Recommendations to the NAS (la) i 2.
EBS Performance and Natural Barriers (if) 3.
Protocols for Use of Expert Judgment (le) 4.
Model Selection and Qualification (1h) 5.
QA Applied to Models and Data (1d) 6.
Condition of Aged HLW (1g) 7.
Relevance of Waste Form Performance (1k) 8.
Repository-Relevant EBS Testing (1j) 9.
Regulations for Gaseous Radionuclides (ii) 10.
Regulatory Consistency (1b) 11.
Role of 10 CFR Part 960 (Ic)
B.
Completion of SCP Comments and Study Plans (3)
C.
Post-Emplacement Regulations 1.
Retrieval of HLW (4 b) i 2.
Thermal and Other Measurements (4a)
D.
Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility 1.
Definition of Licensing Process (2a) i 2.
Back-Up to MRS (2b)
The importance of rulemaking as a process that can remove from contention selected aspects of the licensing proce.ss appears to be l
rising.
This is particularly true as the development of experi-r mental methods, scenarios, and experimental results is proving to be a much slower process than originally envisioned. The following j
topics for potential rulemaking have been identified in this communication.
j 1.
Consistency between EPA Standards and NRC Regulations (1b) 2.
Protocols for Use of Expert Judgment (le) 3.
Model Selection and Qualification (1h)
The Commission should initiate a more aggressive rulemaking process l
and seek to complete, at an early date, those rulemaking items that l
i
The Honorable Ivan Selin 8
December 1, 1992 impact the repository design and the development of experimental data.
In addition, we provide this response with the recognition that additional considerations could be added.
Further, we plan to review and continue monitoring the results of systems analyses being conducted by DOE and its contractors.
The schedule of these efforts may allow a report on their status before the end of this fiscal year.
Sincerely, Dade W.
Moeller Chairman
Enclosure:
HLW Relational Diagram
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE o,
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WASHINGTON. D C. 20566 l
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February 5, 1993 i
The Honorable Ivan Selin Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Chairman Selin:
SUBJECT:
ISSUES RAISED IN THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 1992, SECTION 801 During its 50th meeting, January 27 and 28, 1993, the Advisory I
Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW) met with representatives from the U.K.
National Radiological Protection Board, the U.S.
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, and the NRC Staff to discuss the three principal' issues that the National Academy of Sciences will be addressing in response to the assignment outlined l
by the U.S.
Congress in the Energy Policy Act of 1992.
)
The Committee did not have an opportunity to _ review SECY-93-13, l
which presents the NRC staff analysis of these ' issues.
The comments that follow are primarily based on discussions held during l
our meeting.
In considering Section 801 of the Energy Policy Act, it is important to note that the charge to the National Academy of Sciences involves the development of standards that are intended to be site specific for the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain.
As we interpret it, these standards, to be developed by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), will be used to guide the
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design and to define compliance of this repository.
In this regard, we offer the following observations.
a.
Environmental standards are most useful when formulated j
without reference to a specific site.
We interpret Section 801 of the Energy Policy Act as calling for the development by l
EPA of " generally applicable standards" but for the proposed Yucca Mountain site.
This should provide EPA sufficient l
flexibility to avoid the development of standards that would be unnecessarily site specific.
In making corresponding j
changes to 10 CFR Part 60, the Commission should similarly avoid, wherever possible, developing regulations that are i
uniquely applicable to the Yucca Mountain site.
The regula-tions should be based on assumptions or conditions that have a sound foundation in the pertinent technical disciplines and l
methodologies.
_/%MN s e1-
[
t The Honorable Ivan Selin 2
February 5, 1993 r
b.
Regardless of the form of the standards, we believe that they should be geared to specific time periods in the future.
For example, such periods might include one during which it is reasonable to assume the presence of institutional. controls, a second during which it is assumed that the biosphere will be comparable to the present, and a third that extends so far i
into the future that the associated predictions have such unacceptably large uncertainties as to compromise their usefulness. The Commission may want to encourage this type of
- approach, c.
Fundamental to the standards should be a provision that individuals and populations in the future are accorded a level of protection at least equivalent to that which is accorded to individuals and populations alive now.
ISSUE ONE "Whether a health-based standard based upon doses to individual members of the public from releases to the accessible environment will provide a reasonable standard for protection of the health and safety of the general public"?
In response to this inquiry, our answer is "Yes."
In support of that view, we offer the following comments:
a.
We interpret a " health-based standard" as incorporating a
" risk-based standard."
In this sense, such an approach would-represent a major step forward in that risk is a more funda-mental criterion than dose for the protection of members of the public.
Although a risk-based standard could incorporate a limit on the dose, it should also reflect the possibility that the limit could be exceeded.
Setting the standards on the basis of risk would also avoid having to revise them as newer data on the health effects of radiation are developed.
In addition, application of a risk-based standard makes it possible to compare the risks of radionuclide releases from a high-level waste repository to the risks from other environ-mental contaminants.
i b.
Interestingly, this approach, if adopted, would place an annual, versus cumulative, limit on permissible doses to members of the public.
In incorporating this approach, however, it is important that the limit include application of the concept of the " critical group," rather than the concept of the " maximally exposed individual."
Benefits of the concept of the " critical group" are that it ensures not only that members of the public will not receive unacceptable j
exposures, but also that decisions on the acceptability of a i
practice will not be prejudiced by a very small number of individuals with unusual habits.
i
The Honorable Ivan Selin 3
February 5, 1993
[
t c.
A standard containing a radionuclide release limit avoids the necessity to estimate environmental radionuclide transport and associated human intake.
[However, determining co=pliance with such a standard through environmental monitoring would be very difficult, as would be comparing a release liinit to the impacts of other radiation sources (e.g.,
natural back-ground).]
An environmental standard should have broad application; one that incorporates radionuclide release limits is useful only as a guide for design.
d.
Limits on individual doses should not be used as a justifica-tion for selecting poor repository sites.
For certain proposed sites, it could theoretically be possible to exceed a dose limit for individual members of the public due to the
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j fact that there is very little water available.
A
" risk-based" standard would help to overcome this problem by making it necessary to take into consideration the probability i
that the individual dose limit might be exceeded.
At the same time, limitations on the quantities of water available would restrict the number of people who could be exposed, and the associated collective doses (or societal impacts) of the radionuclide releases.
In this regard, it should be noted
~,
that collective dose estimates beyond several generations are not very useful due to a lack of information on the number. or the living habits, of people who might live in a given area.
ISSUE TWO 3
"Whether it is reasonable to assume that a system for post-closure oversight of the repository can be developed, based upon active institutional controls, that will prevent an unreasonable risk of breaching the repository's engineered or geologic barriers or increasing the exposure of individual members of the public to radiation beyond allowable limits"?
j
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In response to this inquiry, our answer is "No."
Supplementing this response, we offer the following comments:
a.
As a basic premise, we believe that the assumption of institu-tional control (or oversight) for extremely long periods of j
time is neither practicable nor workable.
It is imperative that the assumption of post-closure oversight not be used as a justification for lessening the stringency of the repository design.
a b.
Reliance on active controls also has the disadvantage of conceivably leading to acceptance of an otherwise unsatistac-tory disposal facility, because it could be assumed that i
unacceptable radionuclide releases would be detected and
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mitigated by active controls.
i v.
d The Honorable Ivan Selin 4
February 5, 1993 c.
The post-closure phase presents an opportunity to continue to monitor the performance of the repository and to gather data that could be useful in the siting and design of similar facilities in the future.
Although we share with the NRC staff the concerns that intrusive monitoring equipment is not 1
acceptable, we believe that technologies could be developed for collecting data through remote sensing operations or electrical connections that will not negate the integrity of the repository.
Key parameters on which data might be collected include thermal conditions, the presence of mois-ture, seismic events, and radionuclide releases.
I ISSUE THREE "Whether it is possible to make scientifically supportable predictions of the probability that the repository's engineered or geologic barriers will be breached as a result of human intrusion over a period of 10,000 years"?
In response to this inquiry, our answer is "No."
On the basis of our discussions, we offer the following comments:
a.
As a basic premise, we believe that the design, construction, and operation of an HLW repository should be conducted using the assumption that there will be no post-closure oversight.
That is to say, we believe that the design should be robust enough to ensure that such oversight is not necessary.
b.
In our opinion, inadvertent human intrusion into the proposed Yucca Mountain repository over the next 10,000 years is a reasonable likelihood; in fact, we believe it is reasonable to assume a probability of one for such an event.
This being the case, we concur with the Board on Radioactive Waste Management that it would be more appropriate for the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) to base its risk assessments of human intrusion on its potential consequences, rather than its probability.
Following this approach, the possibility of human intrusion should be a factor in the selection of a site and the design of a disposal facility.
c.
We believe that the risk-based standards for individual members of the public should generally apply to radionuclide releases that occur as a result of human intrusions that have a probability of bypassing a portion of the repository barrier system.
- However, the limits should not apply to public exposures that occur as a result of actions by intruders who bypass all the repository barriers.
Intruders who possess the capaL'.lity to intrude into a repository in such a manner would presumably possess sufficient technological capabilities to identify any radionuclide releases that accompany such actions.
The standards should include general guidance on
\\
i The Honorable Ivan Selin 5
February 5, 1993 design considerations that might compensate for the damage to f
a facility caused by human intrusion and mitigate any i
radionuclide releases to the environment.
d.
We believe that the probabilities and consequences of human intrusion should be considered outside the normal evaluation i
of the safety of a repository in the same manner as threats of l
sabotage are considered in terms of releases from a commercial nuclear power plant.
For this reason, we concur with the DOE position that radionuclide releases to the accessible environ-ment from human intrusion should be treated separately from potential radionuclide releases caused by natural processes and events.
e.
In addition to the specific requirements enumerated in the statement of this issue, the upcoming National Academy of Sciences study offers an excellent opportunity to investigate the possibility of making scientifically supportable predic-tions of the probability that various barriers within the repository will be breached as a result of natural events over a period of 10,000 years.
We strongly encourage such an effort.
We trust these comments will be helpful.
The Committee plans to continue to review the impacts of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 on the disposal of high-level radioactive' waste.
j i
Sincerely, l
Dade W. Moeller Chairman References 1.
SECY-93-13, dated January 25, 1993, for the Commissioners, from James M.
Taylor, EDO, " Analysis of Energy Policy Act of 1992 Issues Related to High-Level Waste Disposal Standards" 2.
National Radiological Protection Board (UK), " Board Statement l
on Radiological Protection Objectives for the Land-Based Disposal of Solid Radioactive Wastes," Volume 3, No.
3, 1992
.