ML20034F149
| ML20034F149 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1993 |
| From: | Greer L MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FRN-58FR5427 OLA, NUDOCS 9303020331 | |
| Download: ML20034F149 (3) | |
Text
~
snum Vm/tz s
G33 FEB 2& PH 12: 00 f
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)-
)
i Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Dkt. No. 50-271-OLA f
Power Corporation
)
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
)
MASSACHUSE'ITS ATTORNEY GENERAL
- S REQUEST FOR HEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO VERMONT YANKEE OPERATING LICENSE For the reasons set forth in the New England. Coalition on Nuclea: Pollution's ("NECNP") Comments In Opposition.to Proposed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration, its supporting.
affidavit, and NECNP's Request for Hearing on Proposed Amendment to Vermont Yankee Operating License, attached hereto as exhibit:,. and incorporated herein by reference, the Massachusetts Attorney General requests that a hearing be held on the license amendment requested by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
(" Yankee").
A signed copy of the supporting affidavit is being filed this date by NECNP.
Notice of the proposed license amendment is found at Fed. Reg. Vol. 58, No. 12, page 5435.
The Massachusetts Attorney General is an elected-representative of the citizens of Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
A significant portion of Yankee's emergency planning zone is within the Commonwealth's borders'..
The l
~
~
9303020331 930222 DR ADOCK 05000271 PDR u
,i
.o.
Commission should hold a hearing on.whether the proposed amendment poses an undue risk to public safety.-
If such a-hearing is held, the Massachusetts Attorney General requests the opportunity to participate in the hearing.
Respectfully submitted, SCOTT HARSHBARGER ATTORNEY GENERAL t.e Leslie B.
Greer Public Protection Bureau One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, MA 02108.
(617) 727-2200
=4 'l 1
E. '
r L.
y
~
('-. ~ k.i *
.s' 1
i UNITED STATES.0F AMERICA j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD-
)
In the Matter of
)-
)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Dkt. No. 50-271-OLA Power Corporation
)
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
)
Notice of Anoearance Notice is hereby given of the appearance of the undersigned for the Massachusetts Attorney General.
Respectfully submitted, SCOTT HARSHBARGER ATTORNEY GENERAL
.Y.
Leslie B. Greer-Public Protection Bureau One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, MA 02108 2 /Sk /13 (617) 727-2200 t
Dated:
i
+
f i -
~
i'# N FEB 22 '93 03:29PM' P.2_.
UNITED STATES OF' AMERICA BEFORE-THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
)
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA Power Corporation
)
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
a NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NU MRaR POLLUTION COMMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED FINDING O NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Introduction the duelear Regulatory Commission on January 21, 1993, issued public notice of an operat!ing. li-("NRC" or " Commission")
Cor-conse amendment request by the vermont Yankee Nuclear power which would permit Vermont Yankee to poration (" Vermont Yankee"),
perform extersive maintenance on the Vermont Yankee Nuclear '
"B" diesel generator for fourteen days dur-Station's ("VYNPS's")
I ing the current operating cycle, while the. reactor is. operating The NRC proposes to make'a-at power.1 58 Fed. Reg. 5,435.
determination of no significant hazards consideration regarding 4
the proposed license amendment.
The New England Coalition on Nuclear. Pollution ("NECNP")'op-
]
poses the proposed finding of no significant hazards considera-NECNP's opposition is supported by~the affidavit of Robert tion..
As; dis-a nuclear safety engineer.
D. Pollard, i
i
'l i
- l NECNP has requested a hearing on the proposed license amendl New. England Coalition's Request for Hearing.on Proposed 1
(February 22, 1993).
ment.
Operating License Amendment ecHilb IT
- A-007 T 9%9
"0
.FEB II '93 03i 30Pt1 t Yanken cussed below, the intentional disabling of one of Vor=on two diesel generators would Nuclear Power Station's ("VYNPS's")
violate General Design criterion ("GDC") 17, the ITRC's fundamen-tal requirement that onsite electric power supplies must "have redundancy, and testability to perform sufficient independence, 10 C.F.R.
their safety functions assuming a single failure."
Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
In addition, the proposed amendment which contain no violates the technical specifications for VYNPS, provision for deliberate removal of the diesel generators from On its face, ty, 2-2 service during power operation.
in the intentional disabling of an essential safety system, l tory violation of the NBC's General Design Criteria, NRC regu a technical specifications, raises significant guidance, and VYNPS Accordingly, pursuant to Section hazards considerations.
42 U.S.C.
S 2239 (a) (2) (A),
of the Atomic Energy Act, 189a ( 2) ( A) t the NRC must provide a hearing on the proposed license amendmen before it can be issued.
STATsaENT OF PACTS I.
VYNPS has two standby diesel generators which constitute the onsite electrical power supply for the plant's structures, sys-GDC 17 requires that tems, and components inportant to safety.
i d
each of the diesel generators must be safety grade and des gne i
l t
to ",rovide sufficient capacity and capability" to mainta n p an i
safety during design basis accidents, assuming a loss of offs te power.
and the plant's Limiting Conditions for Pursuant to GDC 17 VYNPS cannot be operated at power unless Operation ("LCO's"),
F4
/
FEB 21 '93 03: 30 Pit
' As provided by Technical both diesel generators are functional.
3.10.A.1, specification ("TSa) ble and Both emergency diesel generators shall be operac quency in not more than 13 seconds.
ided in TS A limited exception to this requirement is prov 3.5.H.1:
During any period when one of the standby diesel gener-continued reactor operation is ators i; inoperable, pro-permissible only during the succeeding seven day Containment Cooling Subsystems connecting to the operablo diesel generator shall be operable.
states that "If this requirement cannot However, TS 3.5.H.1 alsr an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor be met, shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
on three previous occasions, Vermont Yankee has invoked TS t power.
3.5.H.1 for the purpose of repairing diesel generators a inten-the NRC granted Vermont Yankee permission to In 1990, s while tionally disable and overhaul one of its diesel generator on the ground that a local hydroelectric sta-operating at power, 2
Ene Memorandum from tion was available to provide backup power.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to Thomas Thomas E. Murley, (May 18, 1990) and T. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region I.
enclosures, the practice of intentionally disabling diesel generators while at power in order to make routineor the tec As discussed below, 2
repairs is not permitted by either GDC 17Thus, NECNP believes that the N specifications for VYNPS. erred when it granted permission for th repairs.
P.
~
FEB 22 '93 03: 3cpn
-4 Vermont Last year, on two separate occasions a month apart, fter "ab-Yankee declared its "A" diesel generator inoperable a jacket cooling system."
were encountered with the norr alities to United States Murphy, Vermont Yankee, Letter from Warren P.
166, One-Proposed Change No.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission re:
LCO Period to Sup-Time Extended Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2 (December 15, 1992) (hereinafter port Maintenance Activities at Attacnment 3.
On May 28, 1992, and again on
" Murphy Letter"),
Yankee began diesel generator repairs June 23, 1992, Vermont 5.H.1 for while the reactor was at power, as permitted by TS 3.
When Vermont Yankee found that
" inoperable" diesel generators.
be completed within 7 days, as required these repairs could not applied for and received temporary waivers it by TS 3.5.H.1, begun in May, which allowed a one-day extension for the repairs 222 BVY and a two-day extension for the repairs begun in June. to United Letter from Warren P. Murphy, Vermont Yankee,92-068, 1992);
BVY 92-074, States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (June 3, Letter from Warren P. Murphy, Vermont Yankee, to United States 1992), Attachments 4 and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (June 29, 5, respectively.
surveillance of the "B" diesel According to Vermont Yankee, hich generator "has not revealed any indication" of the problems w Murphy Letter at 2.
rendered "A" diesel generator inoperable.
to make the same Yankee deemed it " prudent" Nevertheless, Vermont it had made to the "A" diesel generator that repairs to the "B"
the earliest opportunity."
Id.
Rather than diesel generator "at
P.6 rcs II
- 03
- 31g; l
refueling outage or scheduling an outags waiting until the next letter to !!RC re-to make the repairs, Vermont Yankee submitted a i
to TS 3.5.H.1 which would allow a "one-t me ex-questing a change days to 14 days in which to make those tension" f rom the LCO of 7 the routine 18-month overhaul of repairs, as well as to conduct On January Mitrphy Letter, Attachment 3.
the diesel generator.
h the RRC published a Federal Register notice of t e pro-21, 1993, along with a proposed finding that no posed license amendment, is required because it poses no prior hearing on the amendment significant hazards consideration.
DS THE PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT POSES SI II.
CONSIDERATIONS, Statutory and Regulatory Pramework A.
of the Atomic Energy Act and Pursuant to Section 189a(2) ( A) the NRC may not issue an operating license 10 C.F.R. 50.92(c),
determines amendment before granting a public hearing unless it poses "no significant hazards consid-that the proposed amendment the amendment Eeuld Dol:
eration,"
i.e.,
that increase in the probability (1) Involve a significant d;
or consequences of an accident previously evaluate from any accident previously evaluated; or (2) a significant reduction in the margin of of accident (3) Involve safety.
i In passing the enabling legislation for this regulatory prov -
sion, Congress recognized that issuing the order in advance of a hearing would as afore the licensing board practical matter, In addition, its views considered.
would often be unable to order any substantial relief of an after-the-fact hearing.
as a result
- FEB 22 '93 03
- MP!1 '
. 2d Sess., at 37-38.(1982).
97th Cong.,
Conf.' Rep. No.97-884, Thus, the conferees noted their intent that.
in-in determining whether a proposed license amendment the com-
-volves no significant hazards consideration, mission should be especially sensitive to the issues posed by license amendments that have irreversible con-amount of effluents or radiation emitted from a sequences to coerate for a ceriod of ity or allowino a facility time without full safety crotections.)
Id. (emphasis added)
In response to Congress' expression of concern, the Commis sion "made clear" in the preamble to S 50.92 that an amendment which allows a plant to operate at full power during which one or more safety systems are notin the sa operable would be treatedamples considered.likely to' involve hazards consideration.
id-Final Procedures and Standards on No Significant Hazards Cons orations, 51 Fed. Reg. 7,744, 7,750, Col. 3 (March 6, 1986).
In' the NRC staff to assure that the Commission " charge [d]
- addition, doubtful or borderline cases are not found to involve no sig-51 Fed. Reg. at 7,753, Cols.
2-nificant hazards consideration."
3.
The Proposed Licence Amendment Raises Significant
~
D.
Hazards Considerations involving the disabling of a The circumstances of this case, major safety component in violation of NRC General Design raise significant Critoria and VYNPS technical specifications, Even were these hazards considerations in the starkest terms.
[51 Fed. Reg. at 7,753, violations more " doubtful or borderline" the serious safety questions raised by the proposed Cols. 2-3),
.~
p,g-7' 1
FEB 22 *93 ' 03:32Fil
.i
)
-7
'I i
amendment would dictate against the issuance-of-a co"significant hazards consideration-finding, and require'the granting of'a Yankee's proposed license' amendment.
prior; hearing on Vermont The Proposed Amendment Involves the Intentional i
In Violation of GDC 1.
Disabling of A' Safety System, 17.
Under the Commission's standards'for finding no significant j
i hazards considerations, see 51 Fed. Reg. at 7,750, Col.
3, there j
the proposed amendment raises?"sig-can be no question that y
nificant hazards" considerations, because it would allowLthe full' power during which one or more safety VYNPS to operate "at systems (i.e., the "B" diesel generator] are not operable," in The importance of compliance with direct violation of GDC 17.
GDC 17 cannot be gainsaid.
GDC 17 is one of the NRC's " minimum establishes the " principal design criteria" requirements".that and components.that provide reasonable for " structures, syntoms, assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to-Introduction to 10 C.F.R.
the health and safety of~the public."
t 7
In evaluating the sufficiency of-the onsite Part 50, Appendix A.
assumes that offsite power supply to power safety systems, GDC 17 power systems are unavailable, and requires the provision of l
onsite power supplies "with sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a I
in evaluating whether Vermont Yankee's.
single failure."
- Thus, it must be assumed' that (a) diesel generators comply with GDC 17, no offsite power is available and (b) one of the two diesel gen-r l
If the remaining diesel generator were in-erators has failed.
[
.h
P.?
FEB Ir '93 M03: 3IFTI q
-8 nt Yankee's license tentionally disabled, as proposed in Vermo tion against a amendment application, VYNPS would have no protec
~
in direct violation of GDC.
failure of a diesel generator, f
single could 17.
is clear that such a violation of GDC 17 Moreover, it i
~
t by increase accident risk at VYNPS in all three of the aspec s i
10 C.F.R. S which NRC judges "nignificant hazards" under i
With respect to the first_ criterion, the inten-50.92 (c) (1)-(3).
t r would significantly tional disabling of the "B" diesel genera o i t d with.a-compound the " probability or consequences" assoc a e the unavailability of i.e.,
"previously evaluated" accident generators during a loss of offsite power, as one of the diesel If the "B" diesel generator is inten--
contemplated by GDC 17.
be assumed'to-tionally disabled and the "A" diesel' generator must this would-leave VYNPS without be disabled as required by GDC 17, l
Under such circumstances, a design _
any source of onsite power.
d design basis ac-basis accident would be transformed to'a beyon hic con--
with the potential for meltdown and catastrop
- cident, Thus, the proposed amendment raises significant sequences.
- 50. 92 (c)_.
hazards considerations under the second criterion equences Finally, the significantly increased probability and cons i
ificant of a serious accident would obviously involve a "s gn thus establish-reduction in the margin of safety" at the plant, ing a significant hazard under S 50.92(c) (3).
f 1
'~-
~
'~
P ' 10
.FEB ZZ '93 03: ?? Pit
._g-The Intentional Disabling of a Diesel. Generator for Repairs at Power Violates Vermont Yankee's 2.
.l Technical Specifications and NRC Regulatory Guid-3
)
ance.
application is Vermont Yankee's operating license amendment through its based on the assumption that it is already entitled, to disable and repair the "B" diesel' technical specifications, all it requires is an extension of and that generator at power, Egg Mur-the seven-day period for repairs' allowed by TS 3.5.H.1.
However, Vermont Yankee's position is based on phy letter at 1.
i interpretation of VYNPS's technical specifications.
an incorrect the intentional disabling of a diesel generator for In fact, could otherwise be postponed until a planned outage repairs that violates the VYNPS technical specifications.
the principal VYNPS technical specifi-Pursuant to GDC 17, requires cation governing standby diesel generators, TS 3.10. A.1, ble of t
that both diesel generators must be " operable and capa reaching rated voltage and frequency in not more than 13 sec-upon which Vermont Yankee relies, creates a onds "
TS 3.5.H.1, "During any period limited exception to this rule, providing that i
when one of the standby diesel generators is inoperable, con-f d
tinued reactor operation is permissible only during the succee -
ing seven days Vermont Yankee apparently interprets the term " inoperable",
to include the intentional disabling of as used in TS 3.5.H.1,
- Thus, the diesel generators for routine or non-urgent repairs.
TS 3.5.H.1 permits it to intentionally j
as read by Vermont Yankee, I
disable one of its diesel generators for repairs at any time, as
F.11 rES 22 '93 03:33pn
. 10 -
How-long as the duration of the repairs does not exceed 7 days.
in TS 3.S.H.1 ever, such a broad interpretation of the exception d TS would swallow the general rule established by GDC.17 an operate unless both diesel generators 3.10.A.1, that VYNPS cannot under Vermont Yankee's In effect, are operable and available.
a diesel genera-interpretation of the technical specifications, long as the tor could be disabled for repairs every two weeks, as repairs could be finished in seven days.
Yankee's interpretation of its technical specifica-Vermont in Reg.
tions is also inconsistent with the guidance set forth after the which contemplates at power repairs only Guide 1.93, reactor have been balanced aaainst the ricks of shuttina down the with only one diesel cenerator:
risks of continuino to coerate it may be safer to continue Under certain conditions, operation at full or reduced power for a limited time an immediate shutdown on the loss of Such de-than to effect some of the required electric power sources.
cisions should be based on an evaluation that balances the risks associated with immediate shutdown against If, on those associated with continued operation.
the immediate shutdown is the safer course, unit should be brought promptly to an orderly shutdown,
- balance, For exam-and to a cold shutdown as soon as possible.
ple, the risks associated with an immediate shutdown on power supply during a period of the loss of ensite a.c.
light system load would tend to be less than those dur-ing a peak load period because the stability of theIf, offsite power system would be relatively higher, continued power operation is the safer the period of continued operation should be on balance, source and to prepare for an
- course, used to restore the lost that these ac-orderly shutdown, provided, of course, risk further degradation of the e tivities do not tric power system or in any way jeopardize plant safety.
Under this standard, the only acceptable Reg. Guide 1.93 at 1.
ld justification for repairing the diesel generators at power wou
P.12 rEs II '?3 03: 3 :pn 11 -
is safer to do that than to shut the plant it be a showing that diesel genera-down -- an argument that could be made only if the or so unreliable as to be effectively cor was upable to function, Those circumstances do not exist here, where the "B"
and Vermont Yankee seeks permis-diesel generator is functional, duct routine sion simply to make non-urgent repairs-and to con the Thus, under the guidance of Reg. Guide 1.93, maintenance.
it the in-VYNPS technical specifications cannot be read to perm d
to perform tencional disabling of the diesel generators in or er routine repairs.
Yankee's proposal to intentionally disabla Because Vermont titutes a the "B" diesel generator during power operation cons important departure from its technical specifications governing necessarily raises "significant hazards. con-safety functions, it while the NRC staff concluded (erroneous-siderations."
In fact, that Vermont Yankee's 1990 bid to overhaul its ly, NECNP submits) by its diesel generator during power operation was sanctioned the staff noted its concern that "this technical specifications, Memorandum from maintenance practice poses a noteworthy risk."
Reactor Projects Branch No.
3, Region I, to R.
J. Johnson, Chief, Directorate I-3, NRR (April 6, 1990), Enclosure to At-
- Wessman, tachment 2.
p,33
- rcs 22 '93 03: 3sn -
'l
. The. Existence of the Vernon Tie-Line Would Not Compensate for the Disabled' Diesel Generator Under-3.
~
Yankee attempts to satisfy the no significant Vermont hazards standard by arguing that there will be no significant in the types of potential accidents at VYNPS or decrease change "because of the in the nargin of safety of the plant, including the-a availability of other plant electrical systems, i
from a local hydropower station.
Murphy letter.
Vernon tie line" However, this argument ignores GDC 17, which provides at 5.
quite clearly that offsite power sources, such as the-Vernon tie e
cannot be used as substitutes for onsite power sources in
- line, order to satisfy the requirements for backup power supply.
and the Vernon Moreover, even if GDC-17 could be ignored, tic line could be credited as a backup electricity supply, far a
too many questions exist about the capacity and. reliability of the Vernon tie line as a source of backup power.to safety sys-as Vermont Yankee has conceded, it is in-tems.
For instance, the Vernon tie-line under a full station black-
)
possible to test out load.
BVY 92-94, Letter from Leonard A. Tremblay, Jr., Ver-to United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, re:
mont Yankee, 10CFR50.63 Station Blackout (SBO) - Response to NRC Request for to DVY 92-94 at 3 (July 31, Additional Information, Attachment Moreover, Vermont Yankee admits that "[d]ue.
i 1992), Attachment 6.
voltage to the vintage of the hydro station generators' is unable to " analytically predict" what the regulators," it load to voltage levels will be upon application of the la1 gest the 4160-volt emergency bus.
Id. at 3.
Instead, Vermont Yankee V
~
~, g
/
/
REB 12-*93 63:3reti.
relics on the engineering judgment of hydro operators and. dis-who are not licensed by NRC patchers from outside Vermont Yankee, safety of VYNPS.
In sum, and who have no responsibility for the Vermont Yankee has neither empirical evidenco nor analytical results to demonstrato that the Vernon tio line has " sufficient Ac-capacity and capability" to meet the requirements of GDC 17.
the existence of the vornon tic-line provides no basis cordingly, for a no significant hazards finding in this case.
CONCLUSION Vermont Yankee has failed to demonstrate that the proposed involves no significant hazards considerations; license anendment it would significantly increase the risk to in fact, on its face, Accor-public health and safety posed by operation of the VYNPS.
dingly, the NRC chould reverse its proposed finding of no sig-and order a prior hearing on the nificant hazards considerations, proposed license amendment.
Respectfully submitted, m
hv%%, -^
Wano Curran HARMON, CURRAN, CALLAGHER &
SPIELBERG 2001 "S" Street N.W.
' Washington, D.C.
20009 (202) 328-3500 Counsel to NECNP February 22, 1993
muurTrumanusunuum).
/
FEB 22 '93 03: 35PM Attachmant 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
)
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Vermont Yankee t4uclear
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA Power Corporation
)
)
(Vermont Yankee tiuclear
)
Power Station)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. POLLARD I, Robert D. Pollard, do make oath and say:
1)
My name is Robert D. Pollard.
Since February 1976, I have been employed as a nucicar safety engineer by the Union of Concerned Scientists.
My business address is 1616 P Street, Previously, I was employed by the N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
20036.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Licensing Pro-joct Manager for commercial nucicar power plants.
I enlisted in the United States Navy and 2)
In May 1959, was selected to serve as an electronics technician in the nuclear After completing the required training, I became an instructor responsible for teaching naval personnel both the power program.
theoretical and practical aspects of operation, maintenance and From February 1964 to repair for nuclear propulsion plants.
I served as the senior reactor operator, supervising April 1965, the reactor control division aboard the U.S.S.'Sargo, a nuclear-In May 1965, I was honorably discharged from powered submarine. Navy and attended Syracuse University, where I received in electrical the U.S.
the degree of Bachelor of Science magna cum laude _
engineering in June 1969.
I was hired by the United States Atomic 3)
In July 1969, and continued as a technical expert with Energy Commission (AEC) the United States Ituclear Regulatory the AEC and its successor, After joining the AEC, I Commission (NRC) until February 1976.
completed a year of graduate studies in advanced electrical and nuclear engineering at the Graduate School of the University of I subsequently advanced to the posi-New Mexico in Albuquerque.
tions of Reactor Engineer (Instrunentation) and Project Manager with AEC/NRC.
As a Reactor Engineer, I was primarily responsible for performing detailed technical reviews analyzing and evaluat-ing the adequacy of the design reactor protection systems, con-trol systems and emergency electrical power systems in proposed nuclear facilities.
In September 1974, I was promoted to the Manager and became responsible for safety position of Projectreviews of applications for licenses to construct and operate several commercial power plants.
P.16 FEB II '93 03: 36FM
-2 In the course of my six and a half years with the AEC I performed technical reviews, analyses and evaluations 4) of designs of systems and components necessary for safe operation and NRC, abnormal and emergency condi-of reactor facilities under normal, for the purpose of determining whether such systems com-level of safety tions plied with NRC rules and provided an acceptable for the public.
5)
For the past fifteen years, I, along with other members of the Union of concerned Scientists' professional staff, have conducted numerous studies pertaining to the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants, both on a generic and plant-I have provided technical analysis for UCS's specific basis.
participation in rulemaking proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and for UCS's litigation against the NRCits for failure to fulfill I testified before the President's Commission on the at Three Mile Island which investigated that 1979 acci-ergy Act.
AccidentI participated as an expert witness in the NRC's ad-judicatory proceeding on matters pertaining to reactor safety be-dent.
fore numerous committees of the United States Congress and vari-legislative and administrative bodies.
ous other state and local Thus, my 23 years of professional experience on the technical and UCS have given me first-hand knoul-staffs of the AEC, NRC, administered, edge of NRC regulations and how they are developed, and interpreted.
reviewed all of the documents referenced in New 6)
I have England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Comments in Opposition to Proposed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration (Feb-I am also familiar with NRC regulations and ruary 22, 1993).
regulatory guidance governing the design and operability of diesel generators.
The factual statements made in the attached New England 7)
Cool _' ion on Nuclear Pollution's Comments in Opposition to Pro-posed linding of No Significant Hazards Consideration are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Robert D.
Pollard Subscribed and sworn to bef ore me this __ day of February, 1993.
Notary Public My Commisrion expires
FEB 22 f93 03:36Pt1-
'P.17 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMITSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
)
l In the Matter of
)
)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Docket No. 50-271-OLA
)
Power Corporation
)
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
NEW ENGLAND' COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION'S REQUEST FOR HEARING ON PROFOSED AMENDNENT TO VERMONT YANKEE OPERATING LIC Introduction the Nuclear Regulatory Commission On January 21, 1993, issued public notice of an operating 11-("NRC" or " Commission")
cense amendment request by the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Cor-poration (" Vermont Yankee"), which would permit Vermont Yankee to perform extensive maintenance on the Vermont Yankee Nuclear' Pow
~
"B" diesel generator for fourteen deys dur-Station's ("VYNPS's")
ing the current operating cycle, while the reactor is operating.
at power.
58 Fed. Reg. 5,435.1 Pursuant to Section 189a of the S 2239 (a), the New England ' Coalition.
Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.
on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP") hereby requests an adjudicatory hearing on the proposed license amendment.
i
.The NRC also proposed to make a deteriminatian of-no s g.
nificant hazards consideration regarding the' proposed license 1
In a separate pleading filed today,~NECNP seeks-New Eng-amendment.
reversal of the NRC staff!s proposed determination.
land Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Comments-in. Opposition to Proposed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration (February 22,~1993).
LEL4181T
-B Og g g4 ~
v>
P.86 FEB Z2 *93 03: 37Pr1 I)
Description of Petitioner The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP),
nonprofit educational association based in founded in 1971, is a Its with members throughout the New England states.
- Vermont, purpose is to inform and educate the public concerning the hazards of nuclear power and the availability and benefits of NECNP has actively par-safer and more efficient energy sources.
ticipated in many NRC rulemakings and in licensing and enforce-ment proceedings rogarding the safety of nuclear power plents in The health and safety of NECNP's members, most of New England.
who reside in the New England states, would be affected by an ac-cident at the Vermont Yankee plant.
Nature of NECNP's Right Under the Act to be Made a Party to II.
the Proceeding Section In any licensing proceeding for a nuclear facility, 189a of the Atomic Energy Act guarantees a hearing "to any person 42 whose interents may be affected" by the licensing action.
The right to interveno under Section 189a is U.S.C. S 2239(a).
governed by " contemporaneous judicial concepts of standing,"
the action being challonged could cause injury-i.e., whether (1) such injury is arguably within in-fact to the petitioner, and (2) interest protected by the Atomic Energy Act or the the zone of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power National Environmental Policy Act.
LBP-90-6, 31 NRC Station (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station),
Portland General ElectJ c Co._ (Pebble i
85, 89 (1990), citing Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610, 613-14 (1976).
i
P.19 FEB 22 '93 03:3 Pf1 3-NECNP meets the Commission's requirements for asserting see Houston Lichtina and standing on behalf of its members, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-10, 9 NRC Power Co. (South Texas Project, 439, 447-48 (1979), aff.'d, ALAB-54 9, 9 NRC 644 (1979).
As
- Gorsuch, demonatrated in the attached affidavits of Charles R.
NECNP has members who live Jessie Haas, and David N.
- Pylos, who have authorized NECNP to inter-within 25 miles of the VYNPS, and whose safety would vene in this proceeding on their behalf, be adversely affected by the unsafe operation of the VYNPS under the proposed license amendment.
NECNP meets the Commission's special standing test
- Moreover, i.e.,
that the for operating license amendment proceedings, presumption of standing for organizational members who live within 50 miles of a nuclear facility applies only in those cases amendments involving " obvious potential involving "significant" for offsite consequences.
Elprida Power & Licht Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-99-21, 30 NRC 325, 329-As discussed in detail in New England Coalition on 30 (1989).
Nuclear Pollution's Comments in Opposition to Proposed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration, filed today and attached and incorporated by reference herein, the proposed license amend-ment raises a significant hazard to public health and safety be-cause it would involve the intentional disabling of an important in safety system, the "B" diesel generator, at power operation, violation of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 ("GDC 17"), NRC regulatory guidance, and the
FEB '22 '93 ' 03: 3hFH
~
~
'r :cu -
-~. -
- e. -
the proposed license
- Thus, plant's technical specifications.
i amendment would leave the VYNPS without a backup source of ons te in the event of a loss of offsite power and a single. fail-energy ure in the "A" diesel generator, with the potential-for a beyond design basis accident involving significant offsite consequences.
III. ASPECTS OF PROCEEDING ON WHICH NECNP WISHES NRC regulations at 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a)(2) require a petitioner to set forth "the specific aspect or aspects of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to A petitioner may satisfy this requirement by.
intervene."
" identifying general potential effects of the licensing action'or areas of concern that are within the scope of natters that.may be Yankee-Nuclear Power Cor-Vermont considered in the proceeding."
j giting Vircinia Electric and Power' noration, sunra, 31 NRC at 89, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-146, 6 AEC (North Anna Power Station, Coz 631, 633 (1973).
NECNP seeks to litigate the questions of whether the pro-l posed license amendment. violates GDC 17 and Regulatory Guide is beyond the scope of actions permitted by the plant's-1.93, t
and poses an undue risk to public technical specifications, health and safety.
t b
7 u
r
.,n
.~,
e-.m
^
P.21 rcs ;; 93 c3:33p4j
.g.
-:5:
Respectfully submitted, Dhna Curran HARMON, CURRAN, GALLAGHER &
SPIELBERG 2001 "S" Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20009 (202) 328-3500 Counsel to NECNP February 22, 1993 k