ML20034D511
| ML20034D511 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/16/1992 |
| From: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-92-413, NUDOCS 9212290333 | |
| Download: ML20034D511 (7) | |
Text
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _
- - RELEASED TOTHE PDR
/" "%,
i 4hl9 s i; 1
~,,
M a
i r;
,,s -
................ (m
\\...../
POLICY ISSUE (Notation Vote)
December 16, 1992 SECY-92-413 For:
The Commissioners i
From:
James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations Subiect:
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION OPTIONS REPORTING TO THE COMMISSION
Purpose:
To inform the Commission of a proposed framework for incident investigation options that may be activated by the Commission when an event of extraordinary safety significance occurs. The Commission's approval is requested to develop the proposed framework as an added element of the current incident investigation process.
Issue:
To ensure the credibility, impartiality, and independence of investigations at agency licensed facilities for events of extraordinary safety significance.
Backaround:
In October 1985 the Commission approved e'stablishment of the Incident Investigation Program (IIP). The purpose of-the IIP is to ensure that significant operational events are investigated by the staff in a manner that is timely, objective, systematic and technically sound; that factual information pertaining to events is documented; and that probable cause(s) are ascertained.
In addition to plant-specific and industry-generic lessons, the IIP is also intended to improve regulatory oversight by uncovering facts that could show whether the regulatory process before the event contributed to the cause or the course of the event.
Contact:
NOTE:
TO BE MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE Stuart D. Rubin, AEOD WHEN THE FINAL SRM IS MADE 492-4147 AVAILABLE 050074 q
p g\\
~
W,A 3 2 /,2 D 9 0 B Y I
\\
t
The Commissioners 2
Since the IIP became operational in 1985, 7 events have been investigated by an EDO established incident Investigation Team (IIT) and about 90 events have been inspected by a regional-level Augmented Inspection Team (AIT).
IITs (and AITs) have been highly effective in identifying both the technical and the regulatory lessons to be learned from significant operational events. Of the 139 NRC actions 1
assigned as a result of completed IITs, 65 have addressed plant-specific technical lessons, while 74 have addressed industry-generic technical lessons.
Additionally, 45 of the 74 actions have involved regulatory-process lessons.
l Although the objectivity of activities and specific technical findings and conclusions have not been questioned by the public, the media, or the Congress, perceptions persist regarding the credibility of the current ))P as an impartial and independent mechanism for NRC's self-evaluation of how the regulatory process may have contributed to serious events. These perceptions have resulted in continuing legislative proposals over the last decade in f avor of an independent Nuclear Safety Board, modelled after the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), to investigate serious events at NRC-licensed facilities.
As currently approved and implemented, the llP describes and provides the NRC investigation process for significant operational events, including in principle, those of extraordinary safety significance.
In practice, however, reactor events that have warranted an llT response to date have not involved significant reductions in nuclear safety I
margins in that they have not resulted in core damage or radiological consequences.
Were an event of extraordinary safety significance to occur at an NRC-licensed facility, the staff recognizes that responding with an 111, regardless of its technical merits and the soundness of its findings, may not persuade the public, the media, and Congress of the credibility, impartiality, and independence of the investigation.
In view of the potential for these perceptions, the staf f proposes a framework for incident investigation opt 1ons es additional elements of the incident investigation process.
Either option would be activated at the discretion of the Commission and would report directly to the Commission.
f A
h
i t
I The Commissioners 3
- s i
Discussion:
Ob.iectives and Considerations l
The principal staff objective is that-the options proposed result in a sound, objective, and timely investigation and include the technical and regulatory facts and implications t
of the event. A parallel objective is that any group assigned such responsibility be accorded a sufficient degree.
of independence in terms of its makeup and reporting accountability to' assure that its findings, including those i
relative to any contributions to the event from the NRC l
regulatory process, have high credibility.
The optional 4
process could be used for events at either production or
.j utilization facilities licensed by the NRC.
i Threshold for Activetion f
i The optional process would be activated by the Commission. at j
its discretion, for events which pose a significant hazard to the public health and safety, to property, or to the i
environment, and/or that involve high public, media, or Congressional interest.
Such events-would be expected to substantially exceed the threshold for events described in j
Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program." Management Directive 8.3 describes event l
characteristics for which either an IIT or AIT response should be considered.
1 i
for perspective, actual events for which the proposed optional investigation-framework might have been appropriate, or at least considered, were it in place at the time, include the Browns Ferry Fire in March 1975; the Three Mile Island Accident in March 1979; and the Davis-Besse loss of Main and l
Auxiliary Feedwater in June 1985. A criticality accident at a fuel fabrication facility involving significant overexposure or fatalities of licensee personnel would also be a potential candidate event for an optional investigation j
process response. The frequency of occurrence of events for which the proposed framework could be considered would be i
expected to average once every decade or less, while the
{
frequency of events involving an IIT response have averaged 4
about one per year.
Investication Process and Framework i
1 i
The core element of the proposed incident investigation framework would involve an Incident Investigation Group 4
(IIG). The llG would be established, approved by, and report I.
.l 5
?D Cc
~.
The Commissioners 4
t directly to the Commission.
By comparison, an IIT is established by the Executive Director for Operations (EDO)
}
and reports to the EDO, while an AIT is established by a Regional Administrator (RA) and reports to the RA. As with o
an IIT or AIT, the IIG would be composed of technical experts selected on the basis of their field of expertise, potential i
contributions to the investigation, and their freedom from j
significant involvement in the licensing and inspection of the facility, or from involvement with activities associated with issues that had a direct impact on the cause, the I
course, or the consequences of the event. As in the case of an IIT, the onsite activities of an IIG would begin (for a reactor incident) only after the emergency had been downgraded to the point where the reactor and containment building conditions had been stabilized.
The IIG would be led by an NRC senior manager (such as an Office Director, Deputy Office Director, or Regional Administrator), or alternatively, at the discretion of Commission, by someone outside of the NRC staff.
By comparison, an IIT is generally led by an NRC manager at the Division Director or Branch Chief level. As with an IIT, the core of the IIG would be composed of NRC senior technical i
experts selepted from the IIT roster.
The IIG core would be supplemented by selected industry (e.g., Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Electric Power Research Institute, utility) representatives and contractor (e.g., consultant.
university, national. laboratory) personnel with expert knowledge in areas to be investigated by the IlG.
As with an IIT, an IIG would not be expected.to include representatives from the licensee, the nuclear steam system supplier, the architect-engineer or from special interest groups.
Therefore, the composition and degree of prior involvement of IIG members would be about the same as for IITs.
The size of the IIG would vary depending on the complexity of the event and the severity of its consequences (e.g., the degree of J
core damage or radiological releases). An event of the complexity and severity of the TIM-2 accident would likely involve 25 to 30 technical professionals plus additional support personnel.
In comparison, recent IITs have ranged from six to eight technical members.
The IIG's charter would be approved by the Commission and would be very broad in scope to enable the IIG to conduct a thorough factual investigation from both a technical and i
'The addition of outside members to the IIG and the use of contractors would require taking into account issues relating to conflict of interests, advisory i
committees and NRC contracting policies.
l
?
The Commissioners 5
I regulatory process standpoint. As with an llT, the scope of the IIG's investigation would include a sequence of events; analysis of human factors and human performance (including i
accident management); an analysis of equipment performance i
and equipment failure (including core damage analysis if applicable); an assessment of any radiological releases and personnel exposures; an explanation of precursors to the i
event; and an analysis of the licensee emergency planning and emergency response. The IIG would also investigate NRC's prior regulatory process and oversight of the licensee; NRC's emergency planning and response to the incident; the NRC i
staff's assessment and dissemination of incident information; the susceptibility of similarly designed facilities; and, with Commission approval, the offsite emergency response, if l
the offsite response is assessed, appropriate experts from the Federal, State and/or local authorities involved would be included on the IIG.
During the onsite investigation, the llG would provide the NRC's responsible program and regional offices with the l
factual information to support short-term generic regulatory actions to preclude such events at other NRC-licensed facilities.
Information such as allegations and potential wrongdoing would be turned over to the appropriate office (s) for followup and disposition.
The Office of the Inspector General would be invited to provide a representative to participate as an IIG observer or member.
When the investigation was completed, the results would be documented in an IIG report containing the factual i
information collected, an analysis of the f acts, and findings, conclusions, and probable cause(s).
Since the llG would contain members from outside the Federal government, if it were chartered to provide recommendations, the llG would be required to function under the rules relating to advisory committees. The staff recommends that normally the IlG report not contain recommendations.
The report would be scheduled for completion 60 days after the IIG completed its onsite activities. An advance copy of the IIG report would be provided to headquarters and regional offices so that they could begin their assessment of the need for further short-term actions at licensed facilities, Icager-term generic actions, and actions needeo to address IIG findings associated with the regulatory process.
The Commissioners 6
s After the report is completed, the IIG would brief the Commission in an open meeting on the results of the investigation and place the report in the Public Document Room.
Following the Commission meeting, it would be expected that the Commission would issue the EDO a staff requirements memorandum requesting a proposed NRC Action Plan to address and resolve the IIG's findings and conclusions.
The EDO, with the support of the assigned headquarters and regional offices, and taking into account the views of the ACRS (or ACNW), would prepare the proposed action plan.
The Commission would be briefed on the proposed plan and would provide its requirements for the plan.
The Commission would approve the final NRC Action Plan. By comparison, AE00, with the support of the headquarters and regional offices, proposes NRC followup actions for an IIT, and the EDO issues the final NRC actions.
Optional incident Investiaation Board If the event severity is sufficient to cause high sustained public, media, or Congressional interest, the framework proposed would provide the Commission a further option of establishing an independent Incident Investigation Board (IIB) (See footnote 1 above, regarding the Chairman's authority to act in emergency situations).
The role of the 118 (i.e, "the Board") would be to provide direction over 1he IIG's activities and include making recommendations to the Commission that address investigation findings and conclusions.
The Board would be composed of three to five members, each selected by the Commission, including a Board Chairperson.
Board members could be composed of federal employees from outside the NRC or, alternatively, indivicuals outside of the federal service.
If the Board is chartered to make recommendations, and one or more nonfederal employees are selected as members, the Board would be chartered under rules relating to advisory committees. After the 116 report was completed, the llB would brief the Commission on the results of their investigation, including Board recommendations.
Establishing such a Board would be a Commission option for events where further enhancement of public, media, and Congressional confidence in the credibility, impartiality and independence of the investigation was required.
Coordination:
The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection.
4l&EW$YOb$$$40N$$$N$'$0E$$hh$$$$$fN$$$$Mk'h$&lkfM&Mcnesw :
The Commissioners 7
i Recommendation: Approve establishment of the proposed framework to be developed as an added element of the incident investigation process.
i 4
mes M. Ta5 or xecutive Director i
for Operations Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB Monday, January 4, 1993.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT Thursday, December 24, 1992, wi+h an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of sucn a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners OGC OCAA OIG OPA IP OCA OPP EDO ACRS ASLBP l
SECY
________