ML20034C605
| ML20034C605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/08/1990 |
| From: | Curtiss J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Boxer B HOUSE OF REP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20034C606 | List: |
| References | |
| CCS, NUDOCS 9005040203 | |
| Download: ML20034C605 (2) | |
Text
I
/
- #I.oaes:gk UNITED STATES
+
- P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
o
(.
[
W ASHINGT oN, D. C. 20666
- b i
O 1
,0 9 e..,*
March 8, 1990 i
. CH AIRM AN I
l The Honorable Barbara Boxer United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Congresswoman Boxer:
I am responding to your letter of January 31, 1990, regarding the export of high enriched uranium (HEU) to Romania.
The particular shipment to which you refer was approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) two years ago, but for reasons-unconnected with the recent change of government in-Romania, never left the U.S.
In 1973, a U.S. TRIGA research reactor was licensed for export to Romania by the Atomic Energy Commission for teaching, basic research, and radioactive isotope production.
In 1978, 38 kilograms (kgs) of HEU fabricated into plates to fuel the research reactor were licensed for export pursuant to arrangements concluded under the U.S./ International Atomic Energy Agency Agreement for Cooperation.
At that time, Romania ordered an additional 16.5 kgs of HEU; however, this material was held in the U.S. until needed for the reactor's i
first reload.
In August 1988, the NRC licensed this material for export af ter being informed by Romania that the reactor i
required refueling.
Because of difficulties encountered-in completing financial and transportation arrangements, how-ever, the material was never shipped and has remained in the i
U.S.
l l
The HEU in this proposed export was the last HEU fuel pro-i duced by General Atomics for TRIGA research reactors and was l
intended to nermit sufficient operation of'the reactor to L
test prototype LEU fuel elements to allow full core conver-sion of the reactor to LEU fuel.
As you may be aware, the NRC for many years has participated in, and has supported-the U.S. Reduced Enrichment'Research and Test Reactor j
program.
In this regard, no other HEU fuel is available for shipment to any TRIGA reactor in the United States or else-where in the world.
Low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for this reactor model is still undergoing final testing before certification by the NRC for full core reactor use.
Any l
future export of uranium to fuel this reactor is expected to be LEU.
L
,ooso4o2o3 9oo30s FULL TEXT ASCll SCAN PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDC
l
~
2 With respect to your question concerning inspections, the NRC has no authority to conduct formal inspections of any foreign facilities.
However, a11' Romanian nuclear facilities are subject.to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards under the Government of Romania agreement with the IAEA pursuant'to Romania's adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
IAEArsafeguards inspectors visit the site regularly (a visit took place in December 1989, and another is planned for the first quarter of 1990).
In addition, under the terms of the NRC export license, the Romanian Government pledges that the material will'be used only'for non-military research.
The U.S.
Government has been assured through communications with the IAEA, which has been in direct contact with the provisional Romanian government, that U.S.-origin material in'Romania is maag properly secured and safeguarded.
In addition, on January 20, 1990, U.S. Embassy officials visited the reac;or site and observed the fuel in the reactor as well as a few stored spare fuel plates..The Embassy
't officials also noted the stringent security measures in place, which were consistent with those observed by a U.S.
team of physical protection experts who visited Romania in June 1989.
In light of the recent events in Romania, there'are no near-term plans for the release of the HEU fuel from the U.S., where it remains in the custody of the U.S. Department of Energy.
If the new government of Romania raises the issue with the U.S., there will be a careful reassessment of the situation to ensure that the material will be subject to strict nonproliferation commitments and adequately protected before its release is authorized.
Sincerely.
kn I
mes R. Curtiss Acting Chairman 1
I 8
].
t 1