ML20034A046

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 37 to License NPF-42
ML20034A046
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek 
Issue date: 03/28/1990
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20034A042 List:
References
NUDOCS 9004190224
Download: ML20034A046 (3)


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.Shf.E,T,Y,,E,V,A,L,U A,TJ,0p,,B,Y, TpE,,0ffj,C E, 0[ pu,C,L,E,AF, 3,E,A,CT03, p,E,GUpT 10 N RELATED TO AMENDMENT N0. 37 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-42 WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION WOLF,CR.E,E,K,,GEpE,RA,TJ NG,,S,T,A,TJ,0N DOCKET NO. 50-482 INTRODUCTION The Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) provides the control room with a conditioned atmosphere following various Design Basis Accidents (DBAs)suchasLossofCoolantAccident-(LOCA),fuelhandingaccident, rod ejection, main steamline break and steam generator tube rupture. This system ensures that the instrumentation and equipment located in the-control room.

will be maintained within their design temperatures and that the control room i-will remain habitable.

The Control Rocm Emergency Ventilation System consists of two separate and

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redundant trains which recirculate the control room air. - The system initietes filtered ventilation of the control room following receipt of-en-actuation signal. The CREVS design basis is established by the consequences of the limiting DBA which is a LOCA in MODE 1, 2, 3 and 4 and a fuel hardling i

accident in MODE 5 and 6.

The LOCA analysis assumes that only one_ train of the CREVS is functional due to a single-failure which disables the other train. The design basis is also established by the potential chlorine gas sources which would have the potential for incapacitating personnel. in-the control room if mitigating actions were not taken..

By letter dated February 7,1990,)the' licensee identified inconsistencies in theTechnicalSpecifications(TSs covering the CREVS and its associated j

actuation instrumentation. These TSs are 3.3.2, " Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation", 3.3.3.1, " Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations", 3.3.3.7, " Chlorine Detection System", and 3.7.6, " Control Room j

Emergency Ventilation System."

The licensee's letter requested an amendment to revise the action statements of TSs 3.3.2 and 3.7.6 concerning the CREVS and its associated actuation instrumentation such that an exception to TS 3.0.4 is allowed for those action l

statements which permit continued. unit operation for an unlimited period of time. The licensee stated that entry into one of the above action statements (i.e., when a liiniting condition for operation (LCO) is not met and designated actions are required under TS 3.3.2 and 3.7.6) es currently written would restrict operating mode changes due to TS 3.0.4.

This could result in a needless delay in a mode change since n'ost of the action' statements allow continued unit operation for-an unlimited time. The licensee, therefore, proposes the change on the basis that the action statement establishes an acceptable level of safety for continual unit operation, hence, node changes need not be restricted.

9004190224 900328 PDR ADOCK 05000482 P

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.=2 In addition, the licensee has truested amending the allowed outage time for an inoperable CREYS train or associated actuation instrumentation before the remaining train nust be placed in its emergency recirculation mode. The licensee has requested revising TSs 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.1 to establish a consistent allowed outage time of 7 days..

EVALUAT_I,0N The: action statements for each of the four TSs identified above permit unlimited plant operation provided that the~CREVS is placed in its emergency recirculation mode.

Inconsistencies identified by the licensee include the exception to TS.

3.0.4 regarding mode changes while in a.TS action statement.

Exceptions to TS 3.0.4 currently exist for TS 3.3.3.1 and 3'.3.3.7 but do not exist for 3.3.2 and 3.7.6.

In addition, the allowed outage time for a single CREVS train or i

associated actuation instruroentation is 7 days for TSs 3.3.3.7 and 3.7.6 but only-48 hours for TS 3.3.2 and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for TS 3.3.3.1.

The. proposed change regarding TS 3.0.4 would allow the licensee to make operation mode changes in modes 5 and 6 while operating in accordance with the existing action statement, which allows continued operation for an unlimited time period. This change is consistent with 87-09, which acknowledges that it is ov the guidance provided in Generic Letter erly conservative to restrict operational mode changes under conditions which provide an acceptable level of safety for unlimited continued operation. This proposed change will thereby eliminate a situation that could result in a delay in plant startup.

Based on the guidance provided in the generic letter, the staff finds these modifications as proposed ty the licensee acceptable.

A Establishing a uniform allowed outage time of 7 days for a CREVS train or for i

CREVS actuation instrumentation is desirable for consistency between the j

various TSs. However, the staff is currently in the process of modifying the Westinghouse standard technical specifications.

This process, known as the Technical Specification Inprovement Program (TSIP), is anticipated to remove many of the inconsistencies that currently exist in TS and provide uniform criteria for the industry. Therefore, in anticipation of the TSIP, the staff is currently deferring plant specific modifications ~that are scheduled to be included in the TSIP. The TSIP-is currently scheduled to be complete later this year.

1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendment involves a change in a requirement with respect to the instella.

d tion or use of a facility couponent located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes-in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no.significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures. The'Cornnission has previousF issued.a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public contrent on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set l

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.3 forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environinental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

CO,N,C,L,US 10N The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the will not-be endangered by operation in the pro)osed manner, and (2) public such activities will' be conducted in compliance witi the Connission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the connon defense and security or to the health and safety of-the public.-

Date:

March 28. 1990 Principal Contributors: Douglas V. Pickett Richard L. Emch Carl S. Schulten

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