ML20033F946
| ML20033F946 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/02/1990 |
| From: | Hurt R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Bixby W ENERGY, DEPT. OF, IDAHO OPERATIONS OFFICE |
| References | |
| REF-PROJ-M-32 NUDOCS 9004040111 | |
| Download: ML20033F946 (5) | |
Text
3
- L
. L*,
APR 0 21990 Project M.32 l
W'1111s W. Bixby, Director West Valley Project Office V. S. Department of Energy Idaho Operations P. O. Box 191 West Valley, NY 14171
)
Dear Dr. Bixby:
The West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) submitted a preliminary seismic and tornado analysis of the WVDP Vitrification Facility (VF) to NRC on September 8, 1989. On November 7 we met with WVDP representatives to discuss the analysis and review our coments on it. This letter is to' summarize our interpretation of how the issues discussed in the November meeting were
. resolved.
L In the November meeting we agreed that you will augment the September submittal in'three main areas:
analysis of the effect of thermal stresses on the seismic l
competence of the VF structure, analysis of the effect of the col' lapse of a
I, adjacent structures (such as smoke stacks or nearby non. seismic buildings) j on the VF, and additional support for the damping values used in seismic 1
responst:, calculations.
Our detailed comments nn these topics are contained in
'he enclosure.
We encourage you to complete the VF seismic analysis as promptly as aossible, before VF construction proceeds much further. While our review of t1e information' submitted so far has not revealed any large problems, not all L
aspects of the analysis have been submitted. The topics in the September l
suamittal' included tornado missiles,. seismic competence of the VF structure, and seismic competence of the shield doors. The topics that have not been submitted to us include seismic competence of the llLP transfer piping, canister transport system, and interior VF fixtures such as the off-pas equipment.
j l
l Sincerely, OdginalSigneHf R. Davis Hurt West Valley Project Manager i
Advanced Fuel and Special i
FacilitiesSection I
9004040111 900402 Fuel Cycle Safety Branch PDR PROJ Division of Industrial and L
h-32 N
Medical Nuclear Safety
Enclosure:
NRC Comments on the WVDP Seismic i
L and Tornado Analysis for the i
l Vitrification Facility llj l
cc:
T. DeBoer, NYSERDA
[RDH/ PROJECT M32]
J. Price, SAIC Project M.32 PDR & LPDR NRC File Center HMSS R/F IMAF R/F L
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l DATE :03/M /90-
- 03/M/90
- 03/:f/90 j
}/90 OFFIClAL RECORD COPY k
EN(.L0st!RE i
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NRC COMMENTS ON THE WYDP SEISMIC AND TOP,NADO A!!ALYSIS FOR Ti!E VITRIFICATION FACILITY D
l
1 COMMENTS Oli THE 8/11/89 PF:0GRESS rep 0RT, CONTINEMtt'T BARRIER INTEGRITY REVIEW 0F SHIELD 000RS.
1.
Designs and design analysis should be provided to permit understanding and validation.
2.
(TableA) The formula used for calculation of
- Margin of Safety
- should be shown or described.
Is it:
a.
maximum allowable load based on allowable steel stress divided by the actual most severe maximum load combination, minus one; or, b,
the ratio of yield stress divided by maximum stress, minus one; or, c.
e or b above except without subtraction of one; or, d.
some other expression?
1
)
L I
2 COMMENTS ON THE 8/11/09 PROGRE$$ REPORT, PRIMARY CONr1NEMENT BARRIER INTEGRITY REVIEW, VITR1r! CATION FACILITY 1.
f tre. ?.?, p. ?-?,
T M dtsign review (and the ECASCO design analysis) should include exanination of >otential secondary (indirect) tornado and earthquake actions that mig 1t affect the VF confinement structure elements. These should include:
a.
impact of the mill type enclosing building elements with the confinement barrier, and clastic or inelastic response to tornado wind forces (with sheathing in place and with sheathing lost) and earthquake, b.
collapse of adjacent, non-seismic or non-tornado-resistant structures (including smoke stacks) on the VF, impact of heavy equipment housed within the mill t c.
collapse or rotation in an earthquake or tornado (ype building upon or analysis for survival of these elements).
2.
Para. 3.? 2, pps, 3.?, 3-3.
The dynamic analysis results are highly dependent on the estinated damping
- factor, it is generally conservative to use low damping factors.
The factors used in the EBASCO and the Dames and Moore analyses appear unconservative.
- Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power plants," should be used as a guide. Table 1 of this Regulatory Guide gives a maximum damping valut of 7 percent. The guide also states:
- Damping values higher than the ones delineated in Table 1 of this guide may be used in a dynamic seismic analysis if documented test deta are provided to sup> ort higher values.* The comment on p. 3 3 that Regulatory Guide 1.60 does not 3 ave a spectrum fer damping ratios greater than 10 percent is correct, but the rationale is considered to be that NRC does not expect higher damping factors to be used.
3.
Para. 4.1
- p. 4-1.
Thermal stresses are apparently the most critical load for design of the confinement barrier structure, but negligible data are prov'ided on which to base a validation of tFe design or of the D&M design review.
Specific data missing include:
a.
assumed thermal gradients through structural sections, b.
off normal conditions (e.g., cold sarinkler water from real or false alarm) that might produce greater tien normal temperature gradients, i
.'.1
. s 3
c.
thicknesses and other dimensions of sections, d.
steel percentages, each way, each face, e,
methods used for calculation of thermally induced stresses ("crach d section" assumption used, possibly?),
f.
structural restraint conditions assumed, if the structure was not modeled as a whole.
4.
Pa ra. 4.1, p. 4-1.
Melter shutdown as a pieventative for excess thermal gradient that might I
result from abnormal exposure of the external confinement boundary surfaces (tornado removal of the enclosing structure or sprinkler action) may not be effective due to thermal inertia, if credit for shutdown is taken in the analysis, a time history should be provided.
$