ML20033B376
| ML20033B376 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1981 |
| From: | Davidson D CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112010335 | |
| Download: ML20033B376 (5) | |
Text
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMIN ATING COMPANY P o. Box 5000 e CLEVELAND. oHfo 44101 e TELEPHONE (216) 622-9800 m IL(UMINATING BLDG.
e 55 PUBitC SOUARE e ing e Best Lowton in the Nation Datwyn R. Davidson VICE PRESIDENT SYSTEM ENGiNEEHING AND CONSTRUCTION g{gQ[
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.g E h November 25, 1981 gD Mr. Robert L. Tedesco Assistant Director for Licensing
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Division of Licensing gp U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, D. C.
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Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Nos. 50-440; 50-441 Response to Request for Additional Information -
Siting Analysis
Dear Mr. Tedesco:
In our letter dated September 11, 1981, we committed to provide a response to Siting Analysis question 311.5 resardire oil and gas wells by mid November.
This letter e5d its attachment is submitted to provide draft response to the concerns identified in your letter dated September 15, 1981 in regara to Siting Analysis.
It is our intention to incorporate this response in a subsequent amendment to our Final Safety Analysis Report.
Very Truly Yours, li Dalwyn R. Davidson Vice President System Ergineeritig and Construction DRD: mlb Attachment cc:
G. Charnoff, Esq.
M. Dean Houston NRC Resident Inspector f
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g 8112010335 811125 PDR ADOCK 05000440 A
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311.5 Section 2.2.2.3 states tnat ten gas wells and five gas and oil 2.2.2.3 wells were completed in Lake County in 1978. It also states that gas and oil exploration may continue in the undeveloped areas of Lake Lounty. This presumably means that drilling may occur up to the exclusion area boundary.
l In view of this situation, please provide a detailed analysis which specifically discusses potential accidents at the closest point where mineral exploration may be permitted, including effects of fire, spillage and a gas well blow out. Your analysis should specifically discuss and consider the following:
(a)
The effer.ts of fire both with regard to heat flux upon the plan. as well as effects of dense suoke upon control room habitability.
(b)
The effects of any oil spillage, including consequences of oil runoff and features to mitigate or preclede this.
(c)
The effect of a gas well blow out which conservatively considers the release and delayed ignition of any non-buoyant components, such as ethane and propane, found in natural gas.
(d)
The effect of detonation of axplosives which may be used both in mineral extraction operations as well as extinguishing of fires. Please provide an indication of the maximum' quantity and type of explosives that might be used in connection with the activities identified above.
(e)
Indicate the overpressure, in psi, that the safety-related structures are designed to withstand.
(f)
Describe in detail the atmospheric dispersion models used, including assumptions.
I 1
311.5 (Page 2) Cont'd (g)
Discuss the possibility of subsidence and its effect on safety related plant structures as a result of-such exploration.
Picase state all other assumptions used.
Response
Potential accidents due to future mineral exploration activities adjacent to the plant site do not present a safety hazard to the plant. This is based or a detailed consideration of the effects of fire, spillage, and a gas well blowout.
In assessing these effects the conservative assumptions were made that a gas or oil well may be located as close as 2,600 feet to a safety related I
structure, that meteorology was class G stability with a 1 meter per second wind speed, and the largest expected flow rates from wells in this area would occur.
Considering Ohio law and the ownership of mineral rights ( )'( )
3,200 ft is the nearest distance a well could actually be placed.
a.
The effect of dense smoke from an oil fire on control room habitability
- is discussed in Section 2.2.3.1.3.1.
Also given are the heat flux effects resulting from fires involving the 500,000 gallon onsite fuel oil storage tank located.250 feet from the plant structure. Wells producing oil from the Newburg Limestone formation may deliver up to I
2,100 gallons per day (3)
There are, however, no oil fields within 30 i
miles of the plant (Section 2.5.1.1.8).
The topography of the site (Figure 2.1-3) precludes any offsite spillage approaching within 250 feet of a safety related structure.
For these reasons the onsite oil tank fire effects as presented in Section 2.2.3.1.3.1 will bound the possible 4
effects from offsite oil wells.
The maximum expected gas well blowout rate is ten million cubic feet per day ( ).
The heat flux at the plant from radiation of a flame of this
- size vill be less than five percent of the peak solar insolation rate.
The heated combustion plume will clear the top of the reactor con-tainment buildings by at least 150 feet, even in twenty mile per hour winds, the limit of G stability.
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311.5 (Pege 3) Cont'd
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b.
For the reasons of quantity, distance, and topography given in the response to part (a), the effects of offsite oil spillage and runoff are negligible. No special mitigation features are required.
c.
Unconfined natural gas clouds do not detonate. However, conservatively assuming neutral buoyancy and that all of the escaping natural gas cloud from a gas well blowout could ignite between its upper and lower flammability limits, results in a predicted p42k positive '.ncident overpressure of less than one psi on the nearest safety related structure, using the equivalency methods of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.91 Rev. 1.
A cloud concentration equal to the lowest flannability limit component gas (4..e.,
1.2 percent for hexancs) does not occur within 600
. feet of the nearest safety-related structure so that ignitable concentrations will not exist at plant air intakes.
d.
The maximum quantity and type of explosive used to control a runaway well has been determined to be 870 pounds of stick dynamite ( ).
This would not produce an overpressure greater than 1 psi at distances beyond 430 feet.
To produce a 1 psi overpressure at the assumed well plant separation of 2,600 feet would require-he use of 192,900 pounds of TNT.
Both pressures are calculated using the methods of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.91, Rev. -1.
e.
Reg. Guide 1.91, Revision 1, indicates that 1 psi is a conrervative peak positive incident overpressure below which no significant damage would b; expected. This is the limit used in the responses to (c) and (d) above.
f.
The atmospheric diffusion model for the gas well blowout model was the Gaussian plume model for centerline concentrations of ground level releases. The dispersion parameters were chosen for class "G" stability.
The Briggs' plume rise model as given in TID 25075 was used for the buoyancy calculations for the heated gas well fire plume.
g.
Section 2.5.1.1.8.3 discusses subsidence in the area due to gas extraction and concludas that this is unlikely.
Section 2.5.1.1.7.1.5 discusses subsidence monitoring for salt mining.
311.5 (Page 4) Cont'd e
References (1) FSAR Figure 2.1-5, " Status of Land and Mineral Rights" (2) State of Ohio 011 and Gas Law, Revised Code Chapter 1509, Sections 1509.24 and 1509.25, NRe-1-04 (3) Personal Communications, C. K. Tussel, Jr. (011 and Gas Consultant),
to P. J. Fulford (NUS Corp.), September 25, 1981 and October 20, 1981.
(4) NRC Docket 50-445/446, Commanche Peak 1/2 FSAR, Response to Question 311.03(d) 1
- p. 311.69 Amendment 18, April 21, 1981.
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