ML20033B335
| ML20033B335 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033B330 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112010266 | |
| Download: ML20033B335 (3) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g )* \\ '([
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE,0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS. 60 AND 42 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NOS. DPR-53 AND DPR-69 BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NOS.1 & 2 00CKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318 Introduction By application dated October 16, 1981, the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E) requested changes to the Technical Specifications for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2.
The application of October 16, 1981 included proposed Technical Specifications to allow an extended outage of a single hydrogen a.nalyzer, during a specified period, for the purpose of performing modificaticns in connection with Ti1I Action Plan Item II.F.1.6..By letter dated October 27, 1981, BG&E pro-vided additional information regarding'this matter.
In the course of reviewing the application of October 16, 1981, we have made' changes in tne proposed Technical Specifications in order to neet our require-ments.
These changes have been discussed with, and approved by, CG&E.
Discussion and Evaluation At the present time, Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 requires that both hydrogen analyzers be operable.
In the event that a single hydrogen analyzer becomes inoperable, the analyzer must be restored to operable status within 30 days or the reactor must be placed in hot standby within the r.cxt six hours.
By application dated October 16, 1931, as supplemented by letter dated October 27, 1981, BG&E informed the HRC of th'eir desire to extend the allowable outage time for a single hydrogen analyzer from 30 days to approxi-mately. 8 months, for a single occasion.
The stated purpose of the extended hydrogen analyzer outage is to perform modifications which are required to meet NRC requirements under TMI Action Plan Item II.F.1.6., entitled " Hydrogen Lev.el Monitoring".
The. licensee.has estimated that each hydrogen analyzer must be removed from service for a period of four months to perform the required modificaticns.
With regard to the design of the hydrogen analyzers, there are two hydrogen analyzer systers installed at Calvert Cliffs which together serve both Units.
The systems are cross-connected such that 'one system can draw samples from three pre-selected sample points in eacn containment, and the other systen can draw 8112010266 811106' PDR ADOCK 05000317 P
. samples f rom three different pre-selected sample points in each containment.
Both systems can also draw samples from the react,or coolant waste receiver and waste monitor tanks.
The cross-connect piping directs the sample' _ eosphere back into the appropriate containment or tank. When one analy a.
., tem is inoperable, the three sample points in each containment that are served by that analyzer are not used.
However, the second analyzer still samples both containments using its three assigned sample points in each containment.
The hydrogen analyzers are only necessary for containment sampling following a loss-of-coolant accident, when hydrogen generation may be expected.
In addi-tion, one analyzer system is used on a weekly basis to obtain a sample from the waste receiver and monitor tanks.
Both analyzer systems have a manual grab sample capability.
Grab samples are used routinely for monitoring the waste receiver and monitor tanks for hydrogen and the grab sample capability can also be used to monitor the containment atmosphere if the analyzer unit itself is inoperable.
The analyzer system pump must be operating to draw the sample.
During the period when one analyzer system is out of service, the second system will be available to perform all necessary sampling evolutions.
The replace-ment system will be fully installed and tested before the second analyzer system is replaced.
If while one anal the second analvzer is needed for operation (e.g., fol'yzer is beino reolacedlowing a loss-of-coolant-accident or to~ sa the radwaste tanks), replacement of key components in the second analyzer can be carried out in a reasonable period of time should the need arise.
If a hydrogen analyzer system experiences a single failure, the design function of the system can still be accomplished by using the grab sample feature if the analyzer itself fails or by substituting the pump from the inoperable analyzer system (which will remain ir its present installed location) if the pump is the component which fails.
Accordingly, there is reasonable assurance that a single hydrogen analyze ystem is adequate to perform the necessary post-accident sampling functic for either containment, during the extended outage of a hydrogen analyzer.
Based upon the information presented 3bove, we find that it is appropriate to change Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 Te haical Specification 3.6.5.1 to allow a single hydrogen analyzer to be made inopcrable, at any given time, for the
. purpose of performing nodifications relating to TMI Action Plan Item II.F.1.6.
This change is issued for a single occurrence, teminating August 1.1902.
During this. period of time, the provisions of Technical Specification 3.0.4, which would prevent Calvert Cliffs Units. I and 2 from changing operational modes with a hydrogen analyzer inoperable, is suspended as it applies to Tech-nic.1 Speci fication 3.6.5.1.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that the ' amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which ~is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFP 151.5(d)(4),
that an environmental impact statenent, or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the' issuance of these amendments.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a signi-ficant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significan't" hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comeission's regulations and the issuance of these anendments will not be ininical to the common defense, and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated:
November 6, 1981 O
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