ML20033B223
| ML20033B223 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1981 |
| From: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20033B220 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-81-057, EA-81-57, NUDOCS 8112010063 | |
| Download: ML20033B223 (10) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
Docket No. 50-366
)
License No. NPF-5 Georgia Power Company
)
EA 81-57 270 Peachtree Street
)
Atlanta, GA 30303
)
ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY I
Georgia Power Company, 2/0 Peachtree Street, Atlanta, GA 30303 (the " licensee")
is the holder of License No. NPF-5 (the " license") issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the " Commission").
The license authorizes operation of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 in Appling County, Georgia, under certain specified conditions and is due to expire on December 27, 2012.
II An inspection of the licensee's activities under the license was conducted on March 23-27, 1981 at the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 in Appling County, Georgia.
As a result of this inspection, it appears that the licensee has not conducted its activities in full compliance with the conditions of its license and with the requirements of NRC regulations.
A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty was served upon the licensee by letter dated July 28, 1981.
The Notice stated the nature of the violations, the provisionc of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations and license conditions which the licensee had violated, and the amount of civil penalty i
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, proposed for each violation.
An answer dated August 26, 1981 to:the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty was received from the licensee.
III Upon consideration of the answers received and the statements of fact, explana-tion, and argument for rescission of the proposed civil penalty, as set forth in the Enclosure to this Order, the Di.ector of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement determined that the penalty proposed for the violations designated in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty should be imposed.
IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2282, PL 96-295), and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Forty Thousand Dollars
($40,000) within thirty cays of the date of this Order, by check, draft, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and nailed to the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
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^ f.m The licensee may, within thirty days of the datefof this Order, request a g."
hearing.
A request for a hearing shall-be addressed to the Director, Office f.
of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S.N.R.'C., Washington, DC 20555.sA copy"of-
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the hearing request shall also be sent to the. Executive Legal Director, U.S.N.R.C., Washington, DC 20555.
If a hearing is r'equested, the Commission x
will issue an Order designating the time and plac,e of hearing.
Upon-failure Q of the licensee to request a hearing within thi'ty days of the date.of this' i
r Order, the provisions of this Order shall be effective'without further proceedings and, if payment has not been made by that tim'e, the matter may.
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be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
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In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the is~ sues to.
be considered at such hearing shall be:
t (a) whether the licensee violated NRC regulations and license conditions I
as set forth in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of l
Civil Penalty; and c
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4-(b) whether, on the basis of such violation, this Order should be sustained.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-
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7 Victor Stell Jr., Mrector Office of I ection and Enforcement Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 19 day of October 1981
Attachment:
Evaluations and Conclusions 9
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i EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS For each violation and associated civil' penalty identified in the Notice of Violation (dated July 28, 1981) the original violation is restated and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement's edaluation and conclusion regarding the licensee's response (dated August 26, 1981) to each item is presented.
Item A STATEMENT OF NONCOMPLIANCE Technical Specification 3.3.3 requires that the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuation instrumentation shown in table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.3-2 and with Emergency Core Cooling System Response Time as shown in Table 3.3.3-3.
Contrary to'the above, the isolation valves for the high drywell pressure switches which provide input to actuate the ECCS were closed.
Specifically, pressure switches 2E11-N011A thru D could not sense a change in drywell pressure as the panel isolation valves associated with these switches were shut and therefore.the switches were not operable as required by Technical Specification 3.3.3.
Tnis condition existed between March 9, 1981 and March 23, 1981.
The reactor was in operating condition from March 14 to March 23, 1981 requiring compliance with the above Technical Specification.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).
(Civil Penalty - $20,000).
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION The licens6e's response stated, " Georgia Power Company admits that the valves were closed as stated above".
Further, in a paragraph entitled " Request for Rescission of Penalty", the licensee's response stated:
"... the actual severity of this particular violation does not rise to that' contemplated by Severity Level III.
Although the situation was cause for concern, the diversity of safety protection incorporated in the design of HNP-2 provided a sufficient degree of safety margin. The determination of adequate safety margin is based on'the basic design philosophy, as discussed in GE topical report NED0-10189, 'An Analysis of Functional Common-Mode Failures in GE BWR Protection and Control Instrumentation' which considered the possibility of le ; of protection system input i
variables due to maintenance errors as well as other types of common-mode failures.
Having functional and equipment diversity and using reasonable assumptions and prudent operator intervention, plant safety can be main-tained.
"The high drywell pressure instrumentation is one of several redundant sources of the reactor trip (scram) signal.
With the loss of high drywell
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. Attachment pressure instrumentation, automatic initiation of the Automatic Depressur-ization System (ADS) would not occur.
However, no credit is taken for this scram signal in performing accident analysis. The ADS is designed for small break LOCA consideration.
For the standard licensing analysis of the small break LOCA, as discussed in GE topical report NED0-24708A,
' Additional Information Required for NRC Staff Generic Report on BWRs,'
several conservative assumptions are made in analyzing this event.
This analysis conservatively neglects scram signals generated by high drywell pressure and further assumes the reactor scrams and containment isolates on the low water level signal.
For all cases analyzed, calculations demonstrate BWR protection in depth against small break LOCAs."
These arguments were previously presented by the licensee, in an Enforcement Conference held on April 2, 1981, in support of a contention that the violation should not be slassified at Severity Level II.
The validity of the arguments was acknowledged and the violation was classified at a Severity Level III.
However, this classification was appropriate because the violation resulted in a system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being able to perform its intended function under certain conditions, i.e., without operator intervention.
The item as stated is a Severity Level III violation.
The information presented by the licensee does not provide a basis for remission or mitigation of the proposed penalty.
Item B STATEMENT OF NONCOMPLIANCE Technical Specification 6.'8.1.a requires that written procedures be established, implemented and mair,tained covering the activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
Appendix A.4 of the Regulatory Guide specifies procedures for control of safety relatea systems.
Hatch Nuclear Plant Procedure, HNP-2-1004, RPS/ECCS Instrument Valve Lineup, specifies that the panel isolation valves for the drywell pressure instruments be open prior to plant startup.
Contrary to the above, these valves were closed on March 9, 1981 during reactor shutdown and remained closed prior to plant startup and for ten days of plant operation from March 14 to 23, 1981.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).
(Civil Penalty - $20,000).
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION The licensee's response stated, "We do not agree, however, that we have failed to establish, implement, and maintain written procedures as required by Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.
The violation which occurred was, as stated below, a single instance of personnel error in following a procedure".
In the single instance of personnel error the licensee failed to implement an established
. Attachment written p*ocedure as required by the Technical Specification.
As a result of this failure, a serious safety event occurred.
It is the consequer.ce of the error, not its frequency of commission, that warrants imposition of a penalty in this case.
The item as stated is a violation.
The information presented by the licensee does not provide a basis for remission or mitigation of the proposed penalty.
REQUEST FOR RESCISSION OF PENALTY The licensee bases its request for rescission on three assertions:
(1)
... potential consequences of the loss of the high drywell pressure safety signals were of relatively lesser significance in relationship to the violations contemplated in the Severity Level III category...".
(2)
... prompt and effective actions were taken when the violation was identified to correct the violation...".
(3)
... imposition of a penalty is in the discretion of the NRC and that policy considerations prescribe exercise of discretion in this case."
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION The supporting text for the licensee's first assertion is presented above under Evaluation and Conclusion relative to Item A.
It was concluded that the violation was properly classified at Severity Level III and the licensee's presentation did not provide a basis for rescission or mitigation.
The licensee supported the second assertion as follows:
" Georgia Power Company identified and promptly corrected the violation, and immediately instituted actions which are intended to prevent the repetition of such errors.
It is undisputed that Georgia Power Company discovered and identified the violation on its own, and upon discovery it promptly corrected and reported the violation to the NRC.
"However, in Mr. Stello's cover letter (dated July 28, 1981) to the Notice of Violation, it is stated that Georgia Power Company ' possessed information that should have enabled' earlier identification and correction of the problem.
The implication is that Georgia Power Company should have acted differently than it did during the time period in question.
This position benefits from the experience of hindsight.
When the events beginning on March 14, 1981 took place, from the perspective of the total operation of the plant, the actions taken in response to the failure of the alarm to clear were normal and proper. While a symptom of the closed valves was identified on March 14, it should be noted that the cause of the symptom was not necessarily immediately obvious.
That is, the symptom could have been caused by many things.
In this case, the technician felt that it was
. Attachment a symptom of an instrument malfunction and that he had initially repaired the problem.
During the entire period, the control room operators took the proper actions and followed the routine review and correction process since the identified symptoms were not linked to a safety-related function.
"A thorough review of the record indicates that Georgia Power Company acted properly and in good faith up to and including the ectual discovery of the violations.
The judgment after the fact, by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, that proper actions, taken in good faith which ultimately led to the discovery and correction of a violation, were not taken do much to harm the incentives intended by this element of the interim enforcement policy (i.e., self identification and reporting).
In addition, independent of the timeliness of identification, there is no question that when identified, the violation was promptly corrected and reported, all prior to NRC discovery."
The information possessed by the licensee on March 14 was the same as possessed on March 23:
(1) The Primary Containment High/ Low Pressure alarm failed to actuate, and (2) the Primary Containment Low Pressure Annunciator was checked and found to be within tolerance.
On March 14, the licensee checked the annunciator and took no further action.
On March 23 the licensee checked the annunciator and the instrument sensing lines were traced and the panel isolation valve was found to be closed.
In view of these facts NRC considered proposing imposition of a penalty for each day of violation between March 14 and 23, but did not propose these penalties because the violation was not willful and the licensee eventually did discover, as well as correct and report, the violation.
The facts presented by the licensee in support of the second assertion do not provide a basis for rescission or mitigation of the proposed penalty.
The licensee supported the third assertion as follows:
"The good faith actions already undertaken by Georgia Power Company indicate that imposition of a monetary penalty in this case was unnecessary to encourage such action.
The NRC Interim Enforcement Policy (45 Federal Register 66756 (sic)) provides that ' Orders may be issued in' lieu of... civil penalties' for various situations, including Severity III violations.
By reason of Georgia Power Company's actions alone, and certainly when the actual relative severity of the violation is con-sidered, the remission of any penalty and substitution by an Order confirming corrective action would be more appropriate.
"Indeed, the NRC recently declined to assess a civil penalty for a Severity III violation which was characterized by the NRC as having
' potential consequences... to the safety of the public (that) were significant.'
(Letter from Region III Director James G. Keppler, dated June 12, 1981, to a Region III licensee.) The NRC exercised such dis-cretion because 'the Order by itself provides for adequate remedial measures as evidenced by the corrective actions' taken by the licensee since the event and was ' adequate deterrent against future similar violations.'
The reasoning in that case is at least as applicable to the facts in this case.
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5-Attachment
" Finally, it is believed that policy considerations militate against application of civil penalties in cases, such as this, where the licensee identifies and corrects violations prior to NRC intervention. Civil penalties are inappropriate in such cases, in that they simply constitute a penalty without accomplishing any additional deterrent effect.
There is no incentive in such a policy for a licensee to be vigilant in discovering or correcting violations since the licensee will still face a significant civil penalty..Thus, such a policy is counterproductive to the goal of safety.
It is recommended that the NRC exercise its discretion in this case not to impose a civil penalty to establish a policy in practice, perhaps initiated in the above referenced case, which more appropriately carries out the objectives of the Atomic Energy Act."
Each enforcement action is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
The case involving an Order issued to another facility, referred to in Georgia Power Company's response, concerns circumstances of a different nature.
Civil penalty actions previously had been taken for that licensee's operation of the reactor for an extended period without containment integrity and.'or failure to follow operating procedures applicable to safety 4
related components.
The NRC Order issued in that case reflected a need for the licensee to implement substantial remedial measures due to recurring dif-ficulties in control over safety related systems.
With respect to the Hatch incident, we do not believe that the facts show at this time that a comprehensive order, such as that imposed in the case dis-cussed above, is necessary.
Imposition of a moderate civil penalty is appro-priate (i.e., at the base value for Severity Level III events) and should be sufficient at this time as a deterrent to future violations.
Georgia Power Company asserts that a civil penalty should not be levied where a licensee "... identifies and corrects violations prior to NRC intervention."
The NRC exercises its discretion in mitigating the application of a civil penalty where the licensee promptly identifies and reports the event, and immediate corrective action is taken.
Important to consideration for miti-gation are two factors:
the length of time the violation existed prior to discovery, and the opportunity available to discover the violation.
The hRC finds Georgia Power Company's corrective actions and reporting to be acceptable but, as stated previously, believes the violation should have been identified on March 14, 1981.
The facts presented by.the licensee in support of the third assertion do not provide a basis for rescission or mitigation of the proposed penalty.
Viewed in total the bases provided by the licensee do not support a request for recission or mitigation of the proposed civil penalty.
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Docket No. 50-366 License No. NPF-5 EA 81-57 Georgia Power Company ATTN: Mr. R. W. Scherer, President 270 Peachtree Street Atlanta, GA 30303 Gentlemen:
This refers to your letter of August 26, 1981, in response to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty sent to you with our letter of July 28, 1981.
Our July 28 letter concerned violations found during our inspection conducted on March 23-27, 1981 of activities at the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2.
After careful consideration of your response, we have concluded for the reasons given in the enclosed Order that the violations occurred as set out in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty. We have also given careful consideration to your request for rescission of the proposed penalty and have concluded for the reasons given in the the enclosed Order that the bases for rescission or mitigation were insufficient.
Accordingly, we hereby serve the enclosed Order on Georgia Power Company, imposing a civil penalty in the amount of Forty Thousand Dollars.
We have no further questions regarding the corrective actions described in your response.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice", Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
Sincerely, Ori; inal Si;:nce! Uy II. C. IL-Wung Victor Stello, Jr., Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED y/
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