ML20033B118
| ML20033B118 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1981 |
| From: | Sells D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19301A399 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111300401 | |
| Download: ML20033B118 (2) | |
Text
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1 hp7' NOV 5 1981 g
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-C po k ' ' s. $h MEMORANDUM FOR:
All NRR Division Directors All NRR Assistant Directors N
N Wh[
All Branch Chiefs HRU:
R. I T ed e ', t o. Aul s tant Di rec t or + 3r L icens ing, DL I
J. 'ii rag l i a, C h i e f, L itensing Branc n No. 3, DL FROM:
D. E. Sells, Project Manager, Licensing Branch No. 3, DL
SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT STATUS AND SCHEDULE On April 30, 1980, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued a show-cause order end notice of intent to impose a civil penalty to Houston Lighting and Power Company (HL&P).
This was the culmination of an investi-gation of activities at the South Texas Project (STP) which was initiated in 1979 as a result of a number of allegations.
HL&P accepted the civil penalty in May 1980 and responded to the show-cause order in July.
Subsequent to this action a nunber of act were initiated to improve the level of technical competence of the HL&P staff.
Early in 1981 HL&P contracted with Quadrex Corporation to perform a study of the engineering design work performed by Brown & Root (See summary of final reoort attached).
On Autust 21, 1981 HL&P informed the NRC that the earliest fuel load date for STr Unit I would not be before July 1984.
This was a 10 month slip from the previous fuel load date and was reportet) in the September 30, 1981 letter to Representative Tom Bevill.
F is 10 month slip should be applied to all previously set target dates.
On September 24, 1981 HL&P announced that Brown t.nd Root would be replaced
> wo by Bechtel as the architect engineer and construction manager at the STP.
R This reallocation of re ponsibilities will require a significant effort s
g and cause further delay in the fuel load date.
It is my personal opinion gg that asslip to December 1985 can be expected.
o s.
Af ter public release of the Quadrex Report on September 28, 1981, a great o
deal of interest has been generated concerning the status of the STP. This l
U includes a petition from intervenors on October 28, 1981, to the Connission g
to halt all work at the STP pending detailed review of the Quadrex Report.
no This petTtTon is now under review by the Commission and Staff (Petition EP enclosed). At the same time intervenors filed a motion (enclosed) with the ASLB to halt construction citing the Quadrex Report. The Staff has 15 days e to the ASLB on this motion.
g NOV 5 1981.
On October 16, 1981 copies of the Quadrex Report were sent to the Staff with a request that I be informed of any consnents or concerns raised by the Report.
Initially I did not ask that these comments be provided by a specific date. liowever, ir, view of the escalated interest, it is now requested that +N Staff provide comments to me as soon as possible, but no later than November 6, 1981.
In addition the ASLB issued an order on October 30, 1981 calling for a hearing on December'8, 1981 in Austin, Texas. Spc.ific questions raised by the Board (See enclosure) are to be addressed by all parties at that session.
I have also enclosed a note from Ed Reis to me which poses a number of questions concerning the Quadrex Report. Please consider these questions in your review. Also enclosed 11s a meeting suninary dealing with a presentation by liL&P on October 6,1981 concerning the realignment of responsibilities on the STP.
Additional copies of the Quadrex Report have been requested and should be available on November 7,1981.
Please contact me if you have any questions, X27100.
Doaald E. Sells, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File 50-498/499 i
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UNITE'O STATES
'n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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-E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 e
OCT 2 81981 i
MEMORANDUM FOR:
D. G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, NRR R. L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Ljc $n THRU:
. J. Miraglia, Chief, Licensing Branch-Nov-8,g, DL DL FROM:
. D. E.. Sells, Project-Manager, Licensing Branch No. 3,"DL~4
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF QUADREX REPORT - SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT The following tabulation is a very brief sumary of the Quadrex Report that deals with the engineering design status of the South Texas Project.
The study conducted by the Quadrex Corporation was not an in-depth analysis of The study TEoked at eight specific 6
Brown and Root's design effort to date.
areas:
1.
Civil / Structural 2.
Conputer Codes 3.
Electrical / Instrumentation and Control 4
HVAC 5.
Mechar,1 cal 6.
Nuclear / Mechanical Analysis 7.
Piping and Su:., ort 8.
Radiological Control Within each area Quadrex placed each concern that was identified into one of the following categories:
o most se.'fous - tnpacts licensing e serious - impacts reliability e noteworthy - contributes to project schedule and/or cost increases potential proble - may or may not be a problera, further investigation e
required.
9 other-minor or not amenable to corrective action.
The cttached table provides the number of concerns in each category for each area reviewed.
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> In addition the Quadrex Report identified four problem areas witn regard to Inservice-Inspection and cited 21 specific areas with regard to maintenance access engineering.
There were a total of 17 findings that were classified by Quadrex as generic.
Pending the results of the Bechtel in-depth analysis it would be pre-mature to place great weight on the following laundry list excerpted from Section 3 of
, Volume 1 of the Quadrex Report:
1.
No indicatinn of an effective systems integration and overview function 4 2.
Input data not consistently reviewed with calculations containing errors verified as correct. Vendor submitted reports not consis-tent.
3.
Thorough and consistent treatment of various plant operating modes l
and environmental conditions is not evident.
4.
Distinction between Safety-Related and Non-Safety Related equipment l
and calculations is questionable.
I 5.
No written guidelines exist for the conduct of failure mode and effects analysis.
6.
No documented evidence that FSAR commitments are being met.
7.
Little evidence of a well-thought-out and consistent basis for design.,
8.
Specific reliability requirements have not been established.
9.
Nuclear-related analysis questionable.
- 10. Use of preliminary data permitted up to the point of fuel loading.
- 11. Inadequate consideration of plant operation criteria.
- 12. Ineffective use of natural plant symmetry.
- 13. Incomplite specification of valve closure rates.
- 14. Inadequate analysis concerning access for maintenance and in-service-inspection.
- 15. Test provisions do not appear to have been systematically considered and implemented.
- 16. Local temperatures during maintenance may not have been considered adequately.
17. Use of abnormally low seismic valves for valve and pump end loads.
Volume 1 of the Report provides the results of the study and Volumes II and III provides the back-up information that was obtained in the brief time (3 months) that was devoted to gathering information by Quadrex.
i s?
/
Donald E. Sells. Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing cc: See next page.
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gg The Light Company Houston Lighting & Power P.O. Box 1700 Houston. Texas 77001 (713)228 9211 August 21, 1981 ST-HL-AE-723 SFil: V-0100
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Mr. Oarrell G. Eisenhut
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Director, Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission g, #g - {21
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Washington, D.C.
20555 (g;
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Cear Mr. Eisenhut:
South Texas Project Units 1&2 b
7 Do.ket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499
% v Revised Fuel Load Date The schedule for the South Texas Project is currently under evaluation and it is recogniied that ther's will bc sorte delay in the construction com-nietion date. While the exact amount of the delay cannot be established until the studies are cceplete, the initial fuel load date for Unit I will not be
, earlier than July 1, 1984 This information is provided to you to assist your staff in its re-source allocation.
Very truly yours, k.2"L L h
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C.G. Robertson (9
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Manager fs Nuclear Licensina CGR/inf
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91c12C073 910821 3 ;.t rCCC'A OtGGG W3 P C.1 4
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Houston Lighting 1 Power Company g
gg cc:
J. H. Goldberg ST-HL-AE-723 J. G. Dewease SFN: V-0100 D. G. Barker Page 2 C. G. Robertson Howard Pyle R. L." Waldrop H. R. Dean D. R. Beetn J. D. Parsons J. W. Williams J. W. Briskin J. E. Geiger STP RMS
.). S. Phillips (NRC)
J. O. Read (Read-Poland,Inc.)
M. D. Schwarz (Baker & Botts)
R. Gordon Gooch (Baker & Botts)
J. R. Newman (Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, & Axelrad)
Director, Office of Insoection & Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wasnington, D. C. 20555 R. L. Ranne/G. W. Muench Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Central Power & Light Company Chairman, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board P. O. Box 2121 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cemnission Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 Wasnington, O. C.
20555 R. L. Hancock/G. Pokorny Dr. James C. Lamb, III City of Austin 313 Woodhaven Road P. D. dox 1088 Chacel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Austin, Texas 78767
~~~
J. B. Poston/A. vonRosenbero Mr. Ernest E. Hill City Public Service Board Lawrence Livermore Laboratory P. O. Box 1771 University of California San Antonic, Texas 78296 P. O. Box 808, L-46 Livermore California 94550 Brian E. Serwick, Esquire William S. Jordan, III Assistant Attorney for the State of Texas Harnon & Weiss P. O. Box 12548 1725 I Street, N. W.
Caottol Station Suite 306 Austin, rexas 78711 Washington, D. C.
20006 Lanny Sinkin Citizens for Eouitable Utilities, Inc.
Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power c/o Ms. Peggy Suchorn 5106 Casa Oro I
Route 1, Box 1684 San Antonio, Texas 78233 Beszoria, Texas 77422
, Jay Gutierrez, Escuire Hearing Attorney Office of tne Executive Leqal Director
- 0. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wasatngten, D. C.
20555 Revision Date 7-28-81
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September 24, 1981 Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Chief Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Re.Julatory Commission Washington, D.
C..
20555 Dr. Jarses C.
Lamb, III Administrative Judge 313 Woodhaven Road Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Ernest E. Hill Administrative Judge Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Post Of fice Isox 808, L-123 Livermore, California StS50 RE:
Houston Lighting & Power Co. et al.
South Texas Project, Un'its 1 & 2, Docket :'os. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Gentlemen!
This is to inform you that Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) has decided to reallocate responsibilities for certain functions for the completion of the South Texas Project (STP).
/
Although contractual negotiations have not yet been completed, HL&P and the Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtei) have agreed in principle that (a) Bechtel will provide technical assistance consisting of the review of the exist-ing engineering, design and construction activities and vf J
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Low'z/nzrx, Nzwx A2c, Rzzs & Axzz. nan Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Dr. James C. Lamb Ernest E.
Hill September 24, 1981 Page Two their associated records in order to " benchmark" project status, to verify conformance with applicable requirements and practices and *.o prepare a project completion cost and J
schedule forecast; and (5) after an orderly transition period, Bechtel will assume responsibility for engineering, design and construction management services necessary to complete the project.
Brown & Root (B&R) has been asked by HL&P to continue to perform the construction work at STP.
The availability of Bechtel's personnel will enable design and engineering to progress more expeditiously in support of the constructibn effort.
In addition, Bechtel will bolster construction management by strengthening the scheduling and planning functions.
HL&P will be developing over the next several months specific infcrmation concerning the qualifications of Bechtel and its OA/QC program, as well as the details of the ultimate relationship among HL&P, Bechtel and B&R.
We have not yet had an oppcrtunity to discuss with the NRC Staff and the intervenors the effect of this development in the present proceeding.
We plan to undertake such consultations promptly after the hearings of the week of September 28 and are hopeful that joint recommendations can be submitted to the Board by mid-October.
In any event, this development does not affect the hearings scheduled for the week of* September 28 and should not affect the hearings scheduled for the week of October 19.
The new information has no bearing upon the testimony for HL&P of the operations panel and Mr. Williams, nor the testimony for CEU of Mr. Swayze, who is testifying concern-ing past events.
Similarly this development should not affect the testimony of other witnesses for CCANP and CEU (since they also are testifying as to past events), with the possible exception of Mr. Hubbard.
To the extent hearing time is available in October, it would also be feasible to hear the testi=o".y of the witnesses for the NRC Staff who, deal with past events.
Although it will be premature to discuss this new development in more detail at the hearings during the week
LowessTz:x, Nzwx Aw, Rzza & Axzt.nAD,
Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Dr. James C.
Lamb Ernest E.
Hill
~
September 24, 1981
~
Page Three of September 28, any questions concerning scheduling sug-gestions can be usefully explored at that time.
Respectfully submitted, i
b W
ack R. Newman,(
Of Counsel:
Lowenstein, Newman, Reis
& Axelrad 1025 Connecticut
- Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. -
20036 Baker & Botts 3000 One Shell Plaza Houston, Texas 77002 Attorneys for HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, Project Manager'of the South Texas Project, acting herein on behalf of itself and the other Applicants, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, TdGS, acting by and through the City Public Service Board of the City of San Antonio, CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY and CITY OF AUSTIN, TEXAS.
cc:
Certificate of Service
$ 4 I
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,<e UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER
)
Docket Nos. 50-498 OL COMPANY, E AL.
)
50-499 OL
)
(South Texas Project,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
i CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Applicants' letter to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board regarding reallocation of responsibilities in the South Texas Project have been served on the following individuals and entities by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, or as indicated by footnotes below, on this 24th day of September, 1981.
Charles Bechhoefer, Esq.*
Brian Berwick, Esq.
Chief Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing for the State of Texas Board Panel Environmental Protection U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division Washington, D.C.
20555 P.O.
Box 12548, Capitol Station
. Austin, TX 78711 Dr. James C.
Lamb, III s
Administrative Judge
' William S.
Jordan, III, Esq.
313 Woodhaven Road Hafmon & Weiss Chapel Hill, NC 27514 1725 I Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20006 Administrative Judge Xim Eastman, Co-coordinator Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Barbara A. Miller University of California Pat Coy P.O. Box 808, L-123 Citizens concerned About CA 94550
. Nuclear Power Livermore,'
5106 Casa Oro Mrs. Peggy Buchorn San Antonio, T:
78233 Executive Director Citizens for Equitable Lanny Sinkin**
Ui:,ilitie s, Inc.
2207-D Mucces Route 1, Box 1634, Austin, TX 78705 Brazoria, TX 77422 m..m
2 Jcy M. Gutierrez, Esq.*
Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Woc.hington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cormission Wochington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornission Wnshington, D.C.
20555
, Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornission W2shington, D.C.
20555 l
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Via Hand Delivery IVia Express Mail Via Federal Express h
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
)
HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER CO.
)
Docket Nos. 50-498 (South Texas Project, Units 1
)
and 2)
)
50-499
)
CITlZENS FOR EQUITABLE UTILITIES' PETITION TO SUSPEND CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT I.
INTRODUCTION
- 1. This petition to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( "NRC")
is brought by Citizens for Equitable Utilities ("CEU").
The petition seeks the immediate suspension of construction of the Souch Texas Project ("STP") on the basis of new information that reveals the design of the South Texas Project to be fundamentally flawed in areas bearing directly on reactor safety.
It is brought before the Commission rather than the staff for the reasons discussed below.~
- 2. The u.anaging partner of the South Texas Project is Houston Lighting and Power Company ("HL&P"), which entered into
]3 contracts on October 31, 1972, and June 11, 1974, with Brown and kb Root, Inc.
("B&R"), under which B&R was to perform all services j) \\ /
as architect / engineer and constructor of the South Texas Project,
/N3 A) including particularly the design of the project.
HL&P obtained d
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construction permits CPPR-128 and CPPR-129 for the project on December 25, 1975.
- 3. Construction proceeded at the South Texas Project until the issuance of an immediately effective Order to Show cause by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement on April 30,
O*
O 2
1980, which was based on the results of an intensive, three month special investigation of construction and quality assurance
~
at the project.
In response to the Order to Show Cause, HL&P effectively admitted the findings in the NRC's investigation and instituted reviews of several areas of plant construction, including safety-related concrete, safety-related welding, and structural backfill.
Based on these reviews and other HL&P actions, the NRC Staff has permitted construction to continue.
- 4. Largely as a result of the serious questions raised by the NRC's special investigation and Order to Show Cause, the Commission directed the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board considering l
HL&P's request for an Operating License to issue an expedited, partial initial decision on the questions raised by the NRC investi-gation, and particularly on the issue of the basic competence and character of HL&P.
Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), CLI-80-33 (1980).
The expedited hearings began on May 12, 1981.
CEU is an intervenor in the Operating License proceeding.
- 5. On September 24, 1981, HL&P informed tha Licensing Board and the parties that it had dismissed Brown and Root as
architect / engineer and construction manager of the South Texas Project, but said it expected B&R to continue as constructor.
In dismissing B&R, HL&P took the public position that its actions were not the result of inadequacies or flaws in the, design or design process, but of B&R's failure to produce enough of the design in time to allow construction to proceed smoothly.
- 6. In a letter to the Licensing Board on September 28, 1981, HL&P revealed the existence of an extensive report on'the o
e
~
Brown and Root design of the South Tcxas Project by tho Quadrcx Corporation.
CEU received the Quadrcx Report, " Design Review of Brown and Root Engineering Fork for the South Texas Project,"
several days lat~
- 7. The Quadrex Report is a devastating critique of the STP i
design.
It reveals a project floundering in chaos.
More importantly, more than five years after construction began, it reveals that Brown and Root does not understand, and the STP design does not adequately address, the most fundamental principles that govern nuclear reactor safety.
- 8. According to the Quadrex Report, the Brown and Root Design of the South Texas Project suffers from, among other things, inadequate consideration of safety-related~versus non-safety-related issues, and a poorly considered design basis'for tha plant that does not take into account the full range of' postulated accidents.
- 9. Although the Quadrex Report was apparently presented to HL&P in May 1981, it was not revealed to the public, the NRC Staff, or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board until five months later.
In the interim, HL&P bas continued construction at the project, and by letter of October 16, 1981, to Mr. Karl Seyfrit of NRC Region IV (Exhibit 1),
HL&P indicated that it would continue construction at the project, including safety-l related construction, where the work would be irreversible.
- 10. If the conclusions of the Quadrex Report are correct, all_ aspects of.the South Texas Project may be improperly designed.
Continued construction, particularly if it is irreversible, may render safe completion and operation impossible.
1 1
0 D.
4
- 11. Based on the Quadrex Report, CEU requests an iramediate halt to all construction at the South Texas Project pending a
~
thorough independent review of all aspects and details of the Brown and Root design.
i II.. DESCRIPTION OF PETITIONER
- 12. Citizens for Equitable Utilities is a state-wide organization of Texas citizens who are concerned with actions of public utilities in Texas and with the safety of nuclear projects in the state.
It has been admitted as an intervenor in the Operat-ting License proceeding concerning the South Texas Project and has actively participated in that proceeding.
III. JURISDICTION
- 13. This petition is brought before the Commission pursuant to the authority granted to it in 42 U.S.C.
SS2233(d), 2236 (a), and 2237, and 10 C.F.R.
SS2.204, 2. 206 (c) (1), and 50.54.
Furthermore, this petition invokes the inherent supervisory authority of the Commission to oversee all aspects of the regulatory and licensin'g process and its " overriding responsibility for assuring public health and safety in the operation of nuclear power facilities."
In the Matter of Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1, 2 and 3). CLI-75-8, NRCI 7518, 173, (1975).
- 14. This inherent authority of the Commissio: has been exercised on a number of occasions, despite the absence of express procedural authorization in the regulations for Commission oversight or review.
Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400 (1978); see also, U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project),
5 CLI-76-13, NRCI-76/8, 67, 75-76 (1976); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Uni 1 and 2), CLI-78-38, RAI-73-12, 1084 (1973).
This authority is necessar for the commission to carry out its-mission to see that "public safety is the first, last, and a permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction permit or license to operate a nuclear facility."
Power Reactor Development Corp. v.
International Union, 367 U.S. 396,402 (1961).
- 15. The commiss# 7n's inherent authority is explicitly recog-nized in 10 C.F.R. S2. 206 (c) (1).
10 C.F.R. $2.206(a) a6d 52.206(b) t provide a mechanism for petitions requesting show cause orders to be filed with the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or the Director of Inspection and Enforcement, as appropriate, and reviewed sua sponte by the Commission.
However, S2.206 (c) (1) states:
This review power does not limit in any way either the' Commission's supervisory power'over delegated staff actions or the Commission's power to consult with the staff on a formal or informal basis regarding institution of proceedings under this section.
- 16. In this case, it is necesssary for the Commission itself to take action.
The NRC Staff has had the opportunity and responsibility for well over five years to review the design of the South Texas Project and find the serious deficiencies reported by the Quadrex Corporation.
In that time, the Staff has conducted many investigations of the project, including a special investigation, and it has had a Resident Reactor Inspector on site since 1979.
It has even gone so far as to take the position that HL&P has the character and competence to receive an operating license, although HL&P's failure to uncover the
o
't.
flawsLin Brown and Root's design earlier has a clear bearing I
on that issue.
It would.be futile to refer this petition back to the Staff for action because, regrettably, the Staff's 4
failure to exercise its own duties is partially responsible i
for the factJthat construction at the South Texas Project has n
been allowed to proceed for so long with an inadequate design.
IV. BASES FOR IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION OF CONSTRUCTION
- 17. The Quadrex Report is the basis for this petition.1,/
As discussed below, it demonstrates that continued construction i
would adversly affect the safety of the South Texas Project.2/
I i
- 18. The construction that is now in progress at the South j
j
. Texas Project and that HL&P hopes to continue for the next four i
months is outlined in HL&P's letter of October 16, 1981, to P
Mr. Se'yfrit (ExhiDit l). In the safety-related area, it' includes j
particularly (1) continue concrete pours to complete
" Reactor Coolant Building Unit 1,"3/
(2) continue Unit 1 reactor 1/Due to the expense of copying this massive three volume report, we request that the Commission have the NRC Staff provide its own copies for use by the-Commission.
2/The Quadrex Report also touches on areas that may not be relevant i
to the current status of construction.
CEU is at a disadvantage l
in this regard because we are not' fully aware of the status of all aspects of construction or of the extent to which continued construction 4
would adversely affect safety in some areas.
For example, we do not know whether construction of the project has reached the point j.
at which environmental qualification of equipment or pipe rupture.
-design. matters are relevant to the work.. We suspect that the former is probably not relevant yet, while the latter probably is.
The Quadrex Report severely criticized the Brown and Root Design in both areas, Vol.
I, pages 3-4, 3-12, 4-59, and 4-42.
- If construc-tion relevant to either issue has begun, it must be stopped so that the Quadrex criticisms can be addressed.
I 3/We assume HL&P meant " Reactor Containment Building Unit 1."
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7 coolant loop welding, (3), continue RCB Unit containment shell concrete placements, and (4) continue other safety-related concrete pours and welding.
A. The Basic Conclusions of the Quadrex Report Demonstrate a Pervasive Inadequacy of Design that Relates to Ongoing and Near Term Construction.
- 19. The Quadrex Report reaches several broad conclusions concerning design inadequacies that demonstrate the need for a complete design review before construction continues.
The most significant findings appear to be the following:
A. "There is no indication that'an effective systet integration and overview function exists within the B&R design process.
. A major concern is with the achievement of internal consistency among various design documents and the maintenance of that consistency over time with personnel turnover." (Section 3.l(a),
pages 3 3-2).
B. " Based solely on-the findings of this review,,a determination of cu.rrent adequacy [of the Civil /.
Structural design] cannot be made." (Section 4.1.2, page 4-4).
i l
C. "The technical adequacy of the Mechanical discipline is not presently adequate." (Section 4.5.5, page 4-49).
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D. "The nuclear analyses performed by B&R to date are either not complete or are not adequate.
The B&R Nuclear Analysis Group has not demonstrated either the ability to perform or to direct others in the performance of nuclear analyses, and has shown no concern for the timeliness of analysis relative to the needs of other interfacing disciplines.
Although STP is well advanced in the construction' stage, no evidence has been seen that the Brown and Root Nuclear Analysis Group has produced a significant contribution to the STP design."
(Section 4.6.2, page 4-57).
i E. "The B&R Radiological Control design program is not' currently-adequate." (Section 4.8.2, page 4-85).
20..The scope of the' failings indicated by'these conclusions brings the entire design into question. 'That is r
particularly true of the finding'that Brown and Root's design 4
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g pr0cces 1ccks an offcctive syctems integration and overview function, since both are crucial to achieving a safe and of-fective design for a project as complex as a nuclear power plant.
Without effective systems integration, it is quite possible, indeed likely, that various aspects of the design I
will be inconsistent and incompatible with each other.
In J
l terms of current construction at the project, we would expect that to be a part icular problem with respect to the proper location of penetrations in concrete pours since concrete pours are irreversible.
- 21. More specifically, the Quadrex conclusions con-cerning the inadequacies of'the Civil / Structural design and the Mechanical discipline require that all concrete, welding, and other work within those disciplines be halted immediately.
Since these are areas that HL&P has itself identified as.
Irreversible, independent design review is particularly-crucial beforo construction.can be allowed to proceed.
- 22. The Quadrex conclusions with respect to inadequate nuclear analyses and radiological control are extremely troubling, since they indicate that the design would fail in its most basic purpose-protecting the public health and safety from nuclear and radiological hazards.
There is no question that work cannot proceed in those areas before design review is completed.
However, we suspect that construction has not reached a
that point, so that this is more of a long-term concern.
B. The Design Basis for the South Texas Project is Poorly Thought Out and Inadequately Justified.
- 23. Nothing is more important to the ultimate safety 4
9 t
of a nuclear power plant than a correct and complete design basis.
The entire design'and construction hinges on the design basi s, and the ability of a nuclear reactor to withstand an accident of any sort depends upon the development of a sound 1
design basis that takes into account all relevant plant operating modes, accident conditions, and other events that may affect safety.
- 24. According to the Quadrex Report, the design basis of the South Texas Project does not come close to providing the requisite degree of precision or protection.
Quadrex reached two broad conclusions that bring into question any further construction activity at the site since they indicate that the I
entire design may be faulty:
A. There are no written design bases to guide the i
designer, and there is no evidence,that.the design takes into account the fact that e'quipment will' degrade over time or accident situations.
Many 4
design criteria appear to come from the 1973-1975 period and have not been updated.
In many instances
.the design is based on " normal plant conditions,"
not the severe accident conditions that must be taken into account.
(Section 3.1(c), page 3-4).
B. There is little evidence of a well thought out and consistent design basis, and much of the design is based on engineering judgment, without ade-quate justification.
In addition, a number of key fronc-end criteria documents are missing.
(Section 3.1(g), page 3-8 to 3-9).
These conclusions apply to the entire project,.and therefore 1
encompass the construction work now underway.
With respect to the Civil / Structural work in particular, Quadrex notes thab the, i
lack of verified data may have produced a very conservative design, but warns that verified data may later show the design to be-inadequate.
The lesson'of these conclusions is that Brown and Root tailored the design to the demands of the construction schedule rather than basing it on sound information.
If the d
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the Brown and Root design.
Quadrcx reached the following conclusions:
A. There is no multi-disciplinary interpretation of the single failure criterion in controlled documenta-tion. (Section 3.l(a), page 3-2).
B. No documented evidence exists that the single failure criterion has been complied with.
(Section 3. l(e), page 3-7).
C. The design disciplines do not know the postulated single failures on which the design is based.
(Section 3.1. (e), page 3-7).
D. The single failure criterion is not met for the D. The single failure criterion is not met for the common instrument air line. (Sections 4.3.2.1(a),
page 4-21, and 4.8.2.l(a), page 4-86).
- 29. To the extent that the South Texas Project does l
not comply with the single failure criterion, we can expect an accident comparable to Three Mi]e Island, and probably worse, to occur at the plant, with a significant threat to the public
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health and safety.
TMI) after all, was believed to meet the single failure criterion.
- 30. At this point, we cannot tell precisely how failure to meet the single failure criterion affects near-term construction.
However, a conservative approach requires assuming such an effect unless HL&P can show otherwise, since none of the design disciplines knew the postulated single failures on which the design was based, and apparently none even had the same interpretation of the single failure criterion.
In light of these conclusions, the burden is'en HL&P to demonstrate that construction will be consistent with a valid design.
Until that is accomplished, construction must be halted.
D.
The Brown and Root Design Violates ALARA Requirements.
- 31. 10 C.F.R. 50.34(a) requires that certain radioactive 6
11 Civil / Structural design is, in fact, conservative, it may be adequate.
Today, however, the point is that we do not knew whether it is adequate or not, and construction must be halted until an independent review is completed.
I
- 25. In addition to the above, Quadrex reached two further conclusions with respect to the STP design basis.
One goes directly to ongoing work at the site, while the other may not relate to near-term construction, but clearly indicates the deficiencies discovered by Quadrex.
- 26. According to Quadrex, analysis of the essential cooling water (ECW) pond failed to consider all design bases, such that it appears that shut-down of one unit would result in operation of the other unit being in violation of technical specifications.
In addition, Brown and Root did no analysis of simultaneous, normal-shutdown of both units, al.though that has happened in the past. (Section 4.6.2.4(v), page 4-63).
The ECW aluminum bronze piping is one of the areas in which HL&P specifically intends to continue construction.
It should not be allowed to do so until the design is reviewed and corrected.
- 27. Finally, the design bases are not well defined for safety-related HVAC systems.
Plant operati$ng modes, including accident conditions, have not been adequately addressed.
(Section 4. 4.2. l(a), page 4-31).
From these examples, it appears that Brown and Root either did not understand or simply ignored the entire design basis principle.
C. Brown and Root's Design Does Not Meet the Single Failure Criterion.
- 28. One of the major principles of nuclear safety, the single failure criterion, is neither understood nor met by 6
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o emincions be limited to a laval "as low as ransoncbly cchievable" (ALARA).
According to Quadrex, the Brown and Root design does not mcet this requirement:
i A. Consideration of ALARA radiation exposurts related to access for maintenance and inspection has been inadequate. (Section 3.2 (n), page 3-16).
4 B. Brown and Root reviews of plant design from an ALARA viewpoint have not been adequate.
(Section 4. 8.2.2 (i), page 4-87).
- 32. The probable violation of ALARA requirements does not relate simply to particular pieces of equipment, or similar items that could be replaced or corrected, but to the basic design itself as it relates to access for maintenance and inspection.
Therefore, kny construction that irreversibly establishes the location and relationships of major components of the plant may well preclude correction of th'e ALARA deficien-cies.
In particular, this may be true of shell wall penetrations that determine the locations of piping and various conduits.
Construction of the shell wall of Reactor Containment Building Unit 2 would clearly influence the penetration and equipment location issue and may prevent compliance with ALARA requirements
. in some areas.
The same may well be true of other aspects of near term construction.
Accordingly, all construction muit be halted until a complete independent review of the ALARA issue has been carried out and has identified those aspects of the design that would in no way affect compliance with ALARA requirements.
E. Brown and Root's Distinctions Between Safety-Related and Non-Safety-Related Aspects of the Design May Not Be Valid.
- 33. Among the most disturbing findings of the Quadrex Report is that Brown and Root's distinctions between safety-
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13 related and non-safety-related aspects of the design may be invalid.
In particular, Quadrcx found:
'A.
In several instances, design activities that
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affected plant. safety were designated as non-safety-related. (Section3.l(d), page 3-6).
B. There is doubt about the rigor of the safety-related evaluation process. (Section 3.l(h),
page 4-86).
34.'At any plant, this would mean that there may be aspects of the design and construction crucial to reactor safsty that do not meet rigorous standards and have not been reviewed under a quality assurance program that meets the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B.
In short, it would mean that those aspects of the plant could not be relied upon to function properly and protect the public health and safety in event of an accident.
This deficiency is particularly acute at the South Texas Project, however, not only because the distinction itself was invalid in some cases, but also because Brown and Root seemed to follow a policy of minimal compliance for items designated as non-safety-related.
These items received'.
such cursory consideration that Brown and Root did not even ver1fy the design outputs for non-safety related -
aspects of the design. (Section 3.1(d), pages 3 3-6).
- 35. The lack of any certainty that Brown and Root's distinctions between safety-related and non-safety-related areas are valid requires the conclusion that all aspects of the design must be considered safety related until an independent review determines which aspects are not.
Accordingly, even those' areas of construction designated as non-safety-related in HL&P's letter of October 16, 1981, to Mr. Seyfrit, must be l
halted until such a review is completed.
F. The Quadrer. Report Indicates Serioun Deficiencies in All Aspects of Brown and Root's Design, Including Areas M t Specifically Studied by Guadrex.
- 36. The Quadrex Report clearly explains that the design review from which it is derived did not encompass all aspects of the Brown and Root design, but involved a careful sampling program that "would provide sufficient insight regarding the adequacy of the technical work performed by each discipline."
(Section 1.0, page 1-1).
As a result, Quadrex specifically concluded that its report could not be taken as having identified all of the deficiencies in the design.
- Rather, (2) there may still be other concerns in the STP design that were not detected by this design review program because of the nature of the sampling process used; (3) the identified concerns are regarded to be.
" indicative" of the technical problems present in the design.
." (Section 1.0, page 1-3).
- 37. Accordingly, the inescapable conclusion is that all aspects of the Brown and Root design must be considered to be deficient to the same degree as those aspects' reviewed by Quadrex until an independent review of the entire design is completed.
For the reasons discussed previously respecting specific design deficiencies, construction must be halte'd
until the inoependent review corrects the design such that safety will be assured.
V. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
- 38. The Quadrex Report raises serious questions about the adequacy of the most fundamental aspects of the design of the South Texas Project.
It clearly demonstrates that the facility could not be considered to be in compliance with NRC requirements e
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t' or to be safe'i~f-it,were completed according to the Brown and Root design.
Although it was not intended to and does not address the specific question of the safety impacts of continuing near term construction, it indicates that any irreversible 7
construction activities ma'y adversely affect safety both because the design. basis itself is deficient and because flaws exist in the design and design proce'ss for particular disciplines, including particularly Civil ' Structural and Mechanical.
In light of these findings, there can be no reasonable assurance that continued construction of any aspect of the facility will not be detrimental to the public health.
39.
Accordingly, CEU seeks the following relief:
Imbediatesuspensionofallaspectsofconstruction A.
at the South Texas Project.
B. Commencement of an immediate independent review of the Brown and Root design of the South Texas Project, with initial emphasis on a reanalysis
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of the safety-related versus non-safety-related distinction and identification,of all inadequate areas of the design for which construction has previously been begun or completed.
C. A prohibition on any'further construction at the South Texas Project until the safety-related versus non-safety related analysis has been completed, at which time non-safety related ponstruc-tion may proceed, subject to Paragraph 39(E),
below.
D. A prohibition on further safety-related construc-tion at the South Project until the independent review of the entire Brown and Root design has been completed, subject to Paragraph 39(E) below.
E. Establishment of an Atomic-Safety and Licensing Board to hold a full adjudicatory hearing with respect to (1)~ the adequacy of the safety-related versus non-safety-related analysis prior to permitting the renewal of non-safety-related construction, and (2) the adequacy of the independent design-review-and.the design itself prior to e'
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.o 16 permitting tthe renewal of safety-related construction.
40.
In addition, CEU believes that the Quadrex Report raises questions about the competence and character of HL&P to complete'and operate the South Texas Project that are at least t
as serious as those that prompted the Commission to institute the expedited phase of the operat?.ng license p*,oceeding with respect to those issues.
Given the gross deficiencies at the project thus far under HL&P's stewardship, CEU requests the following additional relief:
A prohibition on any further construction at the South Texas Project until the issue of HL&P's lack of corporate competence and character has been resolved and action has been taken to re-place the company as managing partner of the project.
41.
In requesting the trolief stated in the previous paragraphs, CEU recognizes that an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board is already in existence and is examinining the issues of the first phase of the operating license proceeding.
We recommend that the issues raised in this Petition be referred to that-Board for resolution, particularly because it is already familiar.-
with the project and is already addressing the issue of.HL&P's corporate competence and character.
Respectfully submitted, y.)
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William Sf' Jordan, III Harmon & Weiss 1725 I Street, N.W.
Suite 506 Washington, D.C. 20006 Counsel for Citizens for Equitable Utilities Dated:
October 28, 1981 i
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- m. n..mmi n....si.....rn, mm a ni m.m n October 16, 1981 ST-HL-AE-741 y
Mr. Karl Seyfrit Director, Region IV Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012
Dear Mr. Seyfrit:
South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 This letter supersedes our letter of 9/18/81 requesting concurrence to proceed on certain safety related construction activities.
As we discussed with you on 10/15/81, we have previously announced intention to change the engineering and construction management ;esponsibilities for STP and are in the process of developing a transition plan for accomplishing same.
Meanwhile, we have developed a list of safety related work that we plan to continue (Attachment A).
As we discussed with you and your staff, our objective for continuing this work is to:
(1) maintain critical crafts, (2) perform useful work and (3) attain a logical construction stopping point.
We have looked at this work against a risk criteria and have determined with Bechtel Power Corporation that it is reasonable to continue this work. The risk criteria is as follows: the work (1) will be allowed to continue if we have no conscious knowledge of a problem, and (2) is not considered irreversible.
There are a few exceptions to this criteria as Indicated on the Attachment A and the corresponding note. We estimate that this work will take place over approximately the next four months. During this period, Bechtel's QA staff will augment our staff in performing quality rurveillance over tSis work.
As a matter of information, Attachment B is included and describes' the work that we are continuing in non-safety related areas.
Accordingly, we respectfully request your concurrence with this plan for the safety related work.
Yours ypry truly,
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Execu sve Vice President I
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J. !!. Goldbarg October 16, 1981 J. C. Dewease ST-HL-AE-7t.1 D. G. Barker Page 2 C. G. Robertson Howard Pyle' R. L. Waldrop H. R. Dean R. A. Frazar j
D. R. Beeth J. D. Parsons i
J. W. Williams J. W. Briskin J. E. Geiger STP RMS H. S. Phillips (NRC)
J. O. Read (Read-Poland, Inc.)
M. D. Schwarz (Baker & Botts)
R. Gordon Gooch (Baker & Bcces)
J. R. Newman (Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, & Axelrad)
H. B. Friend (Bechtel)
D. W. Halligan (Bechtel)
Director, Office of Inspection & Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 R. L. Range /G. W. Muench Charles Bechhoef er, Esquire Central Power & Light Company Chairman, Atomic Safety.& Licensing Board P. O.. Box 2121 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 Vashington, D. C.
20555 R. L. Hancock/G. Pokorny Dr. James C. Lamb, III City of Austin 313 Woodhaven Road P. O. Box 1088 Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Austin, Texas 78767 J. B. Poston/A. vonRosenbeirg Mr. Ernest E. Hill City Public Service Board Lawrence Livermore Laboratory P. O. Box 1771 University of California San Antonio, Texas 78296 P. O. Box 808, L-46 Livermore, California 94550 Brian E. Berwick, Esquire William S. Jordan, III Assistant Attorney General Harmon & Weiss for the State of Texas 1725 I Street, N. W.
P. O. Box 12548 Suite 506 Capitol Station Washinton, D. C.
20006 Austin, Texas 78711 Lanny Sinkin Citizens for Equitable Utilities,.Ipe.
Cititens Concerned About Nuclear Power c/o Ms. Peggy Buchorn 5106 Casa Oro Route :
Box 1684 San Antonio, Texas 78233 Brazoria, Texas 77422 Jay Gutierrez, Esquire Hearing Attorney.
Office of the Executive Legal Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wa=hington, D. C.
20555 Revision Date 10-16-81
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ATTACHMENT l
t SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT t
SAFETY RELATED OR PARTIALLY S AFETY RELATED JOBSITE ACT.VITIES TO CONTINUE DUR{NG TRANSITION PHASE (about 4 mos.)
CENERAL 1.
Jobsite Maintenance (including)
A.
Maintenance of dewatering system B.
Maintenance of installed equipment 2.
Material Handling A.
Receiving / Warehousing B.
Preventive maintenance of stored equipment 3.
Concrete Production A.
Conc. rete batching for approved structures 4
Fabrication Shop A.
Rework of Q class items B.
~ Fabrication 'of conduit and cable tray supports.
A' plying of coatirigs in all areas 5.
p 6.
Maintain Records Vault and continue document control 7.
Maintain fire protection system REACTOR COOLANT BUILDING UNIT 1 1.
Continue containment dome concrete to com,.etion (1) 2.
Continue reactor coolant loop welding (1) 3.
Rework and repair ASME and AWS welds REACTOR COOLANT BUILDING UNIT 2 1.
Continue containment shell concrete placements (1)
F.H.B. UNIT 1 1.
Continue rework and repair of ASME/AWS welding 2.
Gontinue coerations for roof encrete placements (1)
D.C. B. I 1.
Continue concrete placements (1) e
D.C.B.1 (continued) 2.
. install Diesel Cencrator sole plates D. C. B. 11 1.
Start installation of basemat foundation (1)
B.O.P.
1.
Continue repair and installation of E.C.W. aluminum bronze piping including Area D plus hydro M.E. A.B. UNIT 1 1.
Rework and repair of ASME/AWS welding 2.
Continue installation of cable tray supports 3.
Continue installation of conduit and supports 4.
Continue installation of structural steel 5.
Continue inst'allation of permanent lighting NOTE 1 These activities are not reversible but owing to high technical confidence, we consider that this work should continue.
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ATTACHMENT B SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT NON SAFETY RELATED JOBSITE ACTIVITIES TO CONTINUE DURING TRANSITION PHASE (about 4 mos.)
CENERAL 1.
Jobsite Maintenance (including)
A.
General housekeeping and maintenance of roads and ditches B.
Maintenance of construction equipment 2.
Fabrication Shop A.
Fabrication of non quality class material T.G.B. UNIT 1 1.
Continue to install large bore piping including welding 2.
Continue installation of pipe hangers 4.
~ Continue installation, including welding, of ISO phase bus 3.
Continue installation of c~ondenser 5.
Continue inr.:allation of Turbine Generator 6.
Continue installation of power and control conduit 7.
Continue installation of cable try including supports 8.
Continue extraction steam piping internal to condenser including steam erosion guards 9.
nnstall condensate pumps 10.
Set and align steam chests 11.
Continue architectural items i.e., concrete masonry work
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12.
Continue plumbing installation T.G.B. UNIT ' 2 1.
Continue work on gantry crane-2.
Receive and install Moisture Separator 3.
Continue installation of condenser
e D.G.B. i 1.
Install crane rails and interior stairs B.O.P.
1.
Continue work on Unit #1 T.D.S. tanks t
2.
Continue work on deluge valve house #11 3.
Continue work on cathodic protection 4.
Continue work on acid caustic areas 5.
Continue installation of auxiliary boiler 6.
Continue work in oily waste treatment area 7.
Continue work in sanitary waste area 8.
Continue work in east west composite pipe run 9.
Continue installation of railroad to T.G.B. #1 10.
Continue installation of'16 KV transformer foundations and structures 11.
Install auxiliary fuel oil storage tanks 12.
Instali pipe culverts #2 & #3 13.
Continue installation of 3" potable water line west of units 14.
Continue removal of over burden to achieve final site grade (will improve s,ite drainage)
Contin' e installation of Admin. Bldg. parking lot 15.
u M.E. A.B. UNIT 1 1.
Continue installation of temporary fire protection system e
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UJITI:D STATES OF A::1;td CA 1
llBl' ORE Tile NUCI. EAR REGUI.ATOltY COMMI SSION
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In the Matter of
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)
HOUSTON LIGllTING AND POWER COMPANY
)
Docket Nos. 50-498 (South Texas Projects, Units 1
)
50-499
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and 2)
)
)
)
CITIZENS FOR EQUITABLE UTILITIES' MOTION TO SUSPEND CONSTRUCTION By letter of September 28, 1981, Houston Lighting and Power Company ( "HL&P") revealed to the Board and the Intervenors the existence of the Quadrex Report, " Design Review of B&R Engineering Work for the South Texas Project," which HL&P had apparently received in May of 1981, s,ome five months earlier.
The Quadrex Report itself, which Citizens for Equitable Utilities obtained soon af ter the llL&P letter, is an extraordinary indictment of both the Brown and Root design of the South Texas Project, and by necessary implication, of IIL&P 's f ailure to discover the serious design flaws sometime in the previous eight years of the project.
.The Quadrex Report raises a large number of very serious issues, many of which CEU expects to refine into contentions to be considered in the operating license proceeding.
More importantly, however, the Quadrex Report demonstrates that continued construction would be detrimental to the safety of the Sou 6h Texas Project and could preclude tr e development of a new design that complies with NRC requirements and assures the safety of the facility.
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l CEU has raised these matters with the Commission itself in the attached Petition to Suspend Constructions of the South Texas Project.
In that petition CEU asks the Commission to suspend construction pending the resolution of basic issues concerning the STP design.
In so doing, we have asked the Commission to refer all issues to this Board for consideration.
At the same time, we believe the Board has the jurisdiction to take immediate action on a request to suspend construction and is in the best position to do so since it is intimately familiar with developments at the project to date.
Accordingly, CDU moves that the Board order all construction at the South Texas Project halted immediately pending an independent review of the design and further adjudicatory hearings, as requested in Paragraph 39 of our Petition to the Commission.
The substantive arguments in support of this motion are contained in the Petition rather than included as a separate argument in this motion.
The Board's jurisdiction to consider this Motion stems directly from the Commission 's Order instituting this proceeding,
Houston Lightino and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 ),
CLI -8 0- 32, 12 NRC 281 (1980 ).
In that order the Commission directed the board to consider allegations related to the adequacy of the Quality Assurance / Quality Control program and other issues central to the safety of ongoing construction.
Recognizing that it.is important to resolve these issues well before construc-tion is completed, the Commission ordered that these matters be considered on an expedited basis.
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In so doing, the Commission stated, Either abdication of responsibility or abdication of knowledge, whether at the construction or operating phase, could form an' independent and sufficient basis for revoking a license or denying a license application on grounds of lack of competence (i.e.,
technical) or character qualification on the part of the licensee or license applicant.
Id., at 291.
Thus, the Commission reco.1ni zed that this Board might find it necessary not only to deny an operating license, but to revoke the construction permit if justified by the evidence.
Indeed, the very. requirement that this phase of the hearing be expedited demands the conclusion that this Board has.jurisdic-tion to take whatever actions may be necessary to assure the safety of the South Texas Project, including suspending construction.
If the result of a first phase were to favor HL&P, there would be no particular reason that it should not be part of a single operating license proceeding.
However, if a first phase might result in a holding against HL&P, suspension of construction would clearly be the result since HL&P would have been shown to be incapable of constructing a nuclear power plant.
Accordingly, whatsver the merits of the case, this Board clearly has the jurisdiction to consider this Motion to Suspend Construction.
We urge it to do so forthwith.
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Respectfully submitted, i
f William S. Jordan, III 1
HARMON & WEISS 1
1725 I Street, N.W.
Suite 506 Washing ton, D.C 20006 j.
Dated:
ct.oter 28, 1981 e
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3c De9i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0KilSSION ATO.MIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman Or. James C. Lamb Mr. Ernest E. Hill In the Matter of HOUSTON LIGHTING AND Docket Nos. STN 50-498 OL POWER COMPANY, ET AL.
STN 50-499 OL (South Texas Project
)
Units 1 and 2)
J October 30, 1981
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Scheduling Prehearing Conference and Evidentiary Hearing on Transition Period Construction Activ'ities)
By letter dated October 16, 1981, from the Executive Vice President of
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Houston Lighting and Power Co. to the. Diractor', Region IV, NRC. the Applicants requested NRC Staff concurrence in a plan for continuing safety-related work during the transition period in which certain of the project',s 0
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engineering and construction management responsibilities are to be shifted from Brown & Root, Inc. (B&R) to Bechtel Corp.1I The Board had been 1/ A copy of this letter was served on the Licensing Board and parties to this proceeding. As used in this Memorandum and Order, transitien, period refers to the period during which the work items spelle.d cut in "
the attachments to the Octc,ber 16 letter are to be carried out and is not intended to encompass the possibly different time period in ohich the entire transition from B&R to Bechtel is to occur.
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2-preliminarily advised of the proposed organizational changes by the Applicants' letter of September 24, 1981.
In a telephone conference call on October 7,1981, however, the Board also was apprised that the extent of the transition from B&R to Bechtel had not been determined. 'Specifically, we were informed that it was possible that construction as well as design engineering and construction management responsibilities would also be
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transferred from SLR to Bechtel.
See Memorandum and Order (Concerning Changes in Schedule for Hearings), dated October 8,1981, at p. 2.
According to the October 16, 1981 letter, the transition period during which the specified safet.y activities a' e to be undertaken will extend for about 4 r
months.
Depending upon the timing of NRC Staff review of the transition period activities, those activities could be completed as early as mid-February, 1982.
The' decision whether to approve the plan for transition period' construction activites, as requested in the Applicants' letter of.0ctober 16,, 1981, is initially within the province of the NRC Staff.
But because of the safety significance of the work to be'p'erformed, the adequacy of the plan for performing this work has a clear bearing on whether, or on what terms, the South Texas Project s'hould be licensed.
C_f,. 10 C.F.R.
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Q 2.717(b).
The adequacy of that plan also may have a significant impact on the resolution of some of the contentions and other issues which are now before this Board.
For example, transition work is to be performed in particular areas with respect to which testimon'y has already been presented in this proceeding, such as containment dome concrete, containment shell concrete, l
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3-and certain ASME_ and AWS welds.
These items, among others, were the subject of coments and criticism in the report prepared by Quadrex Corporation
'(" Design Review of Brown and Root Engineering ticrk for the South Texas
, Project," May,1981), transmitted to the Board on September 28, 1981.
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Because of the safety significance of the transition work and the r
probability that it will have a bearing on the findings and conclusions we must reach in this operating li. cense proceeding, we wish to be apprised of the means by which the Applicants (including their contractors Bechtel and, if applicable, B&R) plan to maintain quality with respect to the construction of safety-related str'uctures and equipment during the transition period, and the means by which the NRC Staff plans to monitor the Applicants' commitments in this regard.
Specifically, we call upon the
. Applicants and/or Staff, as appiopriate, and other parties if they wish, to address the following subjects:
I 1.
the general responsibilities during the transition period of HL&P, Bechtel and B&R with respect to the safety-related work specified in the October 16 letter;
- 2. ' the problem of assuring that adequate and competent construction and QA/QC personnel remain on the job or are brought to the job (as applicable) during the transition period; 3.
the morale during the transition period of QA and QC personnel now employed by B&R, assuming' either, partial or full replacement of B&R; 4
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4.
the likelihood that problems related to safety and licenseability pointed out by the Quadrex report would (if they ex.ist and to the extent they might affect transition-period construction as specified in the October 16 letter) be c.ontinued or even exacerbated during the transition period; S.
the conformance of the items of safety-related transition period construction activites (Attachment A to October 16, 1981 letter) to the' criteria for performing transition period construction set forth in the body of the October 16 letter.
In particular, footnote 1 to Attachment A suggests that six work items do not conform to c6iterion 2.
In addition, b sed on issues raised in this proceeding and still not resolved, several work items appear
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not to conform with criterion 1; 6.
the possible safety significance of transition work designated as -
non-safety-related (Attachment B to October 16, 1981 letter). In that connection, see Quadrex report, Section 3.l(d), vol.1, pp. 3-5 and 3-6; 7.
the degree to which the quality of safety-related work to be performed during the transition period can later be verified; and 8.
the relative safety implications of (a) stopping all safety-related work and work which might affect safety-related strcctures or equipment; (b) continuation of only such transition work outlined in c.e letter dated October 16, 1981 as had already been coEnienced as of that date; or (c) continuation of wo'rk as proposed in the October 16, 1981 lattar.
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In posing these are'as of-inquiry for the short term, we wish to stress that we are concerned about the procedures to be followed by the Applicants and Staff to assure the quality of work on iteins described in the October 16
-l etter.
For such ady ce to be meaningful, it must be provided to us at an early date and, in any event, pridr to the expiration of the transition period.
We therefore are scheduling an evidentiary hearing.to ccmmence on Tuesday, December 8,1981, in Austin, Texas, to consider these questions. We expect the hearing to conclude no later than Thursday, December 10,1981, and earlier if possible.
To help meet this schedule, we invite (although we do not-require) the parties (particularly the Applicants and Staff) to provide prepared testimony, which must be in our hands no later than Wednesd.ay, November 25, 1981.
Discovery on the limited issues involving construction during the
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transition period (which do not encompass the entire Quadrex report) may begin ' mediately and shall conclude no.later'than November 18, 1981.
If interrogatories are used, they should be filed by November 6,1981 and
' served either by personal service or by express mail. Responses must also l
be served in this fashion.
We do not anticipate providing an opportunity in the short term for written proposed findings of fact and conclusicns of law on transition-period construction, but we will accept oral statements of the parties' positions at the conclusion of the evidentiary sessions on this
I subject.2I To the extent that the prehearing conference-referred to in our tiemorandi n and Order of October 8,1981 is needed, it will be held on December 8, imediately prior to this hearing.
The issues of what saf'ty-related work should be continued during the transition period and the controls (if any) which NRC may exercise over such work are being considered by the Licensing Board because of the important safety significance of the questions, their bearing on the adequacy of construction of the facility, and the possibility that the quality of at least some of the safety-related work may not be able to be adequately verified after construction has been completed.
Although these issues might
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be viewed as being raised by the Board sua sponte, their resolution is
' essential to provide an adequate record for us to rule on the broader,QA
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matters which are before us. We are raising these questions solely in the contex't of our operating license authority, as enhanced by the Commission's' broad instructions to us in CLI-80-32,12 faC 281 (1980), which pointed out hhat this operating license hearing could serve the goal of a " full airing of all relevant information regarding the safety of the nuclear plant".
Id.
at 290.
In the Board's view,' the adequacy of, and controls to be exercised over, safety-related. transition work falls well within that grant of authority.
In raising these issues, however, we recognize that the ha.it of some or all safety-related work during the transition period is a possible outcc.Te and i.nat there is some question of whether we possess stop-work I
2/ We will establish time limits for such statements after we ascertain the general positions to t3 taken by various parties during the evidentiary
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presentations.
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1;
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authority.
If we were to determine that a work stoppage in v. hole or in part were necessary, we would consider various means of effectuating that determination, including certification to the Co=aission.3_/
Because this Memorandum and Order raises issues which might be deemed to be raised sua,'sponte by the Board, we are transmitting copies to the Comission and to the General Counsel, in accordance with the Comission's instructions appearing in the Secretary's memorandum of June 30, 1981 "R' ising of Issues Sua Sponte in Adjudicatory (subject:
a Proceedings").SI For the foregoing reasons, it is, this 30th day of October,1981 ORDERED L
1,.
That an evidentiary hearing to consider the questions 'utlined
.herein will convene on December 8,1981, in Austin, Tdas, at Austin Public 3/ On October 29, 1981, we received copies of a CEU Petition to Suspend Construction (directed to the Comission) and a CEU Motion to Suspend Construction (directed to this Board).
As we informed the parties by telephone on October 29, this Memorandum and Order, which encompasses some of the matters raised by CEU, has been under preparation since October 19, when we received the Applicants' October 16 letter, and in no way has been influenced by or is intended to respond to either of CEU's filings.
' - = -
4/
In relevant part, that Memorandum provides:
"When a Licensing Board '
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- raises an issue sua sponte in an Operating License proceeding, it shall issue a separate order making the requisite findings, briefly state its reasons for raising the issue; and it shall forward a copy of that order to the Office of the General Counsel and to the Commission
[T]he Boards shall continue to make the initial determination of hether a Board question is an exercise of sua s;;cnte authority cr a question asked to ensure the completeness of t.ie record on an admitted -
4 contention.
Furthernore, the fact that an issue has been raised sua sponte, and that the Cc=aission will be adtised of that action by the Of fice of the General Counsel through its monitoring of adjudicatory proceedings, would not provide a basis for any party to fail to meet its obligation to respond expeditiously to the Board's questions."
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Library Auditorium, Fourth Floor, 800 Guadalupe, Austin, Texas 78701.
The hearing will comence at 9:30 a.m. or, if a prehearing conference is held, imediately following the preheari'ng conference., (On December 8 and 9, the hearing will comence at 9:15 a.m.)
I 2.
That discovery on these questions may comence imediately and shall conclude by November. 18, 1981, and that interrogatories (if used) are to be governed by the standards set forth in this opinion.
3.
That prepared testimony, if it' is to be filed, shall be delivered to the Board by November 25, 1981.
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4.
That a prehearing conference, to the extent.'necessary, will be held imediately prior to the evidentiary heering, at 9:30 a.m. on December 8, i,
'1981.
l THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD j
Ernes*. E. Hill ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
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r./ James C. Lamb MINISTRATIVE JUDGE dAss.~ Sdtw l
Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 1
Issued at Bethesda, Maryland.
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