ML20032E647

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Discusses Areas of Concern in Plant Seismic Analysis & Design Raised in ACRS Subcommittee 750218 Meeting.Sh Mendes Resume & Statement Before ACRS & News Clippings Encl
ML20032E647
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  
Issue date: 03/03/1975
From: Shao L
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To: Maccary R
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML20032E635 List:
References
NUDOCS 8111200774
Download: ML20032E647 (28)
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{{#Wiki_filter:~~ h UNITED STATES Mt-h.9 ~* NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMiss!ON g,.g f UASHINGTON. D. C. 20C55 Y $* s MO/A na u ws ~ M' '81 NOV -2 P2:43 R. R. Maccary, Assistant Director g for Engineering Division of Technical Review {0C F T G & SE b BRANCH AREAS OF C0fiCERft Itt SEISMIC At:ALYSIS Af;D DESIGil Ott DIASLO CAtiYO;t In a recent ACRS Subccmittee meeting (February 18,1975) on Diablo Canyon plant, the subject of conservatism in the seismic design of the plant came up again. It appears that the ACRS members attach a lot of importance to seismic analysis and design. At the meeting, Dr. D. Okrent and Dr. S. H. Bush of the ACRS Comittee were present. In addition they were acccmpanied by six seismic consultants - Dr. .ge, Dr. Koffman, Dr. Steinbrugge, Dr. Thcapson, Dr. Siegel and Dr. Trifunac. Considerable emphasis was placed by some of the ACRS members on the types of detailed analyses and audits performed by the staff to verify the adequacy of the seismic design. I pointed out to the members of the Committee that the staff reviews and evaluates procedures, methods of analysis, modelling and criteria, but ue do not perform a detailed checking I or audit of the applicant's analysis. I also mentioned that in order to perform a detailed audit, the Structuraf Engineering Branch would require a staff of over a hundred people. A large number of questions on seismic analysis and desi,gn were asked by the ACRS Subcc=ittee members and their consultants. All of these questions were answered by the staff to their satis-i faction. However, after a caucus of the ACRS Subccmmittee, they requested additional information on a few topics to be addressed by the applicant and the staff at the l'ay ACRS maeting on the Diablo Canycn plant. These tcpics are as follows. (1) The Ccmittee members would 1 ke to know what kind of errors l could arise in seismic analysis. They would like to know, for example, if the finite element method may have errors because of wrong input or the methodology itself may have l errors which fail to cancel but which may accumulate in one A direccion. They would also like to knew if we could estimate j all possible sources of errors. I i (2) The Ccmmittee members referred to Ap;:endix X (on Desicn Adequacy) of Reactor Safety Study, WASH 1400 and pointed out that, for i 1 LuTICS

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~ 2, R. R. Maccary !B.R 03 WS 19% of the items considered for seismic evaluation, design adequacy could not be ascertained because sufficient infor-mation was not available. They wanted to know whether the staff is performing similar type of audit and verification as was done in HASH 1400. They also wanted to know how the staff evaluates whether the seismic analysis and design is adequate and what type of audit the staff performs. (3) They also wanted to know whether differential movement between adjacent structures was considered for the two earthquakes for which the seismic design was checked. In addition they wanted to know why the two earthquakes are adequate to' define the srtismic risk at the site. Topic (1) will be addressed by the SEB, topic (2) should be addressed jointly by the MEB and SEB while topic (3) should be handled by the SES and SAS. As regards topic (2), a phone call to Franklin Institute revealed that the type of audit and verification documented in HASH 1400 Appendix X, required approximately 10 man-years in addition to the manpower spent by the Architect Engineers and Vendors. .i t/c L. C. Shao, Chief Structural Engineering Branch cc: E. Case Division of Technical Review A. Giambusso F. Schroeder H. Denton --e R. DeYoung

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STANLEY H. MENDES, INC. .TaucTunat sua'"*"" 00(.KETED 112.W eTATE ST. .UITE 7 U$NPC S ANTA BARSAR A, CALIF. 93101 11 NOV -2 P2:43 m o~E <.o., ..... 7a eML OFFICE OF SECRET /.0 STANLEY H. MENDES DCCKETiNG & SERvC BRANCH EDUCATION B.S. in Civil Engineering, California Institute of Technology, 1947 PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATIONS Civil Engineer, California No. 8223 (1951) Structural Engineer, California No. 709 (1954) Structural Engineer, Arizona No. 12116 (1978) Professional Engineer, Michigan No. 25812 (1978) Professional Engineer, Florida No. 30326 (1980) Nat:.onal Council of State Boards of Engineering Examiners,

ertificate of Qualification No. 3314 AFFILIATIONS PROFESSIONAL Structural Engineers Association of Southern Calif. - Member American Society of Civil Engineers - Fellow Santa Barbara Engineers Club - Past President Seismological Society of America Earthquake Engineering Research Institute National Society of Professional Engineers International Conference of Building Officials American Concrete Institute Prestressed Concrete Institute National Panel of Arbitrators of the American Arbitration Assn.

Lecturer, Calif. Poly State University, San Luis Obispo 1967-8 Engineer of the Year Award - Ventura/ Santa Barbara Counties 1981 COMMUNITY Santa Barbara City Water Commission - Former Member (14 years) Santa Barbara County Committee for School District Organization (17 years) Santa Barbara County Water Advisory Board 1970-73 Santa Barbara County Board of Building Appeals 1971-77 Citizens Planning Association (11 years) Rotary Club (25 years) Santa Barbara YMCA - Board of Directors (16 years)

STANLEY H. MENDES, INC GTRUCTURALCMSINE D Resume--Stanley H. Mendes Page 2 ~ EXPERIENCE 1947-1955 Structural Engineer Donald F. Shugart, Consulting Structural Engineer Pasadena, California 1955-1959 Partner - Shugart and Mendes Consulting Structural Engineers Santa Barbara, California 1959-Present Consulting Structural Engineer Santa Barbara, California WORK INCLUDED Structural design, preparation of plans and specifications, and review of construction for schools, hospitals, churches, offices, commercial and industrial buildings. Structural l framing systems designed include practically all of the present day uses of steel, concrete and timber. Foundation i systems for the buildings were _unventional spread footings, steel and concrete piles, caissons, mats, etc. Replacement construction costs for completed projects are cpproximately $150,000,000, principally in Santa Barbara County. Many projects have been undertaken involving investigations and strengthening of existing buildings to resist the effects of damaging earthquakes. Supervised A. F. Janes Testing Laboratories, Inc., of Santa Barbara for three years. Work included sampling and testing construction materials, soil investigations, compaction tests, concrete mix designs, quality control, etc. EARTHQUAKE INVESTIGATIONS On-site investigations and inspections of earthquake damaged buildings and other facilities were made immediately after the following earthquakes: Tehachapi, California 1952 Alaska ( Anchorage Area) 1964 3anta Rosa, California 1969 San Fernando, California 1971 Oroville, California 1975 Santa Barbara, California 1978 El Centro, California 1979 A collection of over 2,000 colored slides has been accumula-ted which illustrate the effects of earthquakes on buildings, bridges, dams, underground utilities, etc. Numerous slide illustrated ta'ks have been given to local organizations.

'rANLEY H. MENDES, INC. CTMUCTUGAL EN11N21.M Resume--Stanley H. Mendes Page 3 SPECIAL EARTHQUAKE STUDIES Much of the available geotechnical, geological, seismologi-cal and engineering reports related to significant earth-4 quakes which have occurred during recent-times have been studied in order to become broadly knowledgeable about the causes and ef fects of earthquakes on man and his environment. The Magnitude 6.3 Santa Barbara earthquake of 1925 is of special interest, because many of the buildings which sa"fered damage still exist. Over the years, numerous buildings not specifically designed to resist earthquakes have been inspected as well as reviews made of available reports, photcgraphs, etc. These experiences have been of great help when attempting to predice performance of similar buildings during future earthquakes. Investigations of buildings which survived the Magnitude 7.5 Lompoc, California, earthquake of 1927 have also been made to determine the nature and extent of damage experienced. STUDIES OF EXISTING BUILDINGS Numerous investigations of existirg buildings have been made, primarily to determine building response to earth-quake forces. Reports which set forth recommended strength-ening for deficiencies found, including construction cost estimates, have been made for about thirty public schools and over one hundred public and commercial buildings. Beginning in 1972, studies have been made of the University of California at Santa Barbara facilities. All existing l buildings en campus were reviewed to identify potential earthquake hazards. The facilities reviewed included about fifty permanent buildings, ranging from one story wood frame construction to eight story reinforced concrete structures l as well as water and sewage pump stations, LPG tanks, etc. Recommended strengthening will cost about $20,000,000. Replacement costs for these buildings is in excess of i S250,000,000. Some strengthening projects have been under-taken, but the bulk of the work awaits state level policy determinations regarding strengthening programs for state owned buildings, establishment of priorities and funding. The August 13, 1978, Santa Barbara earthquake damaged a number of buildings on the U.C.S.B. campus. Repairs amounting to $3,500,000 were necessary to restore the dam-aged buildings to pre-earthquake condition.

~ Ow.in.. US.JR STANLEY H. MENDES, INC. .Tr.ucTu;4t. sem:ca 1228Y: CTATE ST. KutTE 7 si-NOV -2 P2:43 ,,,,,,, c,m,.,,,,, ~ tAA 0FF:CE 07 SECRETS ' OCCFliMG & SE. !.C. ~ T E R A!, ' - This statement is presented to a subcommittee of the Advisory Com.tission on-Reactor Safeguards meeting in Avila, California, on May 21', 1976. Gentlemen: Thank you for the invitation to make a presentation., I sincerely hope that my being here.will result in beneficial changes in the procedures presently followed by the NRC, formerly the AEC. I believe that undiscovered earthquake hazards very likely exist at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power facility and at other nuclear power facilities constructed in California and else-where. These earthquake ha::ards may represent a serious threat to the health, safety, and welfare of millions of people. My belief is basec~ upon thirty years of experience with the design and construction of buildings and related structures to resis t the ef fects of earthquake forces. My belief is based upon an intimate working knowledge of all f acets of design, planning, and construction procedures and practices. My belief is a result of numerous on-site investigations of

~ 3 STANLEY H. M ENDES STf*UCTURAL., ENGINEEH - May 21, 1976 earthq.uake damaged s tructures and reviews of hundreds of existing buildings for earthquake related hazards. My belief results from personal experiences wherein I have witnessed the AEC and staff in concert with Pacific Gas & Electric Company engage in " coverup" activities and " stonewalling" attempts to exclude adverse testimony as to.the earthquake safety of the Diablo Canyon facilities.' Following are the fundamental reasons why I believa undiscovered earthquake related hazards exist at the Diablo Canyo'n and other existing nuclear power facilities. 1. Present Nuclear Regulatory Commission reviews of the design and construction of nuclear facilities are inadequate, because only design efiteria and procedures are reviewed. No in-depth reviews are made of the design results, con-struction plans and actual construction. Public school buildings and hospitals receive greater in-depth, independent reviews of carthquako safety provisions by the State of California than do nuclear power facilities. 2. Investigations of recent damaging earthquakes.such as Alaska, 1964, and S'an Fernando, 1971, have c,cnclusively proven that important basic earthquake design criteria prev;ously used was based upon incorrect assumptions and inadequate knowledge about earthquake forces.

~. _ STANLEY H. MENDES ~ - STRUCTU2AL ENGINEE2 , May 21, 1976 3. The present state.of the art in the fields of geology, satls enginhering, seismology, and various engineering specialties is such that substantial human and technical errors are possible and not at all unusual. 6 4. The advocate type proceedings which' the NRC conducts in a semi-judicial atmosphere are not conducive to determin-ing scientific or technical truths. Open and candid discussion among informed persons is'the best way to determine scientific truth. Any such public discussion 'I would undoubtedly reveal the many unknown factors and-inadequacies which surround earthquake-resistant design-and construction. 4 ~ -5. Citizen participation in so-called public hearings is manipulated by the NRC and permitted.at such times as is convenient for the NRC and the utility company constructing the nuclear facilities. 6. Present technology is seriously limited by inadequate knowledge as to how structures really respond to earth-quake forces. Gentlemen, I would welecce a f rank and candid discussion of my beliefs. I am open to any proof you.may have that I am wrong! Respectfully submitted, M 6- %W Stanley H. Mendes, Structural Engineer

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. w. pe g .c t.. t y,; h.,211 C 0 r n I21 Ti e q ts tLL,t.11r 2 e=.... ,.A......., . ~ ~ rc ..,,,. m m...... ...... a.., .. u. ..,- 2.n. m e, e...rou o.c.c.c..,.u,...s,...... .<-s,,,,,, Se.NA _ COMMi :Tc. ON PUBLiC i ::. e. .. ~,.......... UTILITIES. TRANSIT AND ENERGY ALFRED E. ALOUIST CH AtRM AN AG ENDA HEARING ON TIIE NUCLEAR P0'.183 PLANTS.TMITIATIVE PdDI,IC TE.STIMONY March 23, 1976 Room 4203, Stato Capitol 1:30 o.m. WITNESSES: ROSERT *CRETTI, Commissioner 33. state Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission

  • MR.

RIC*-IARD EJ33ARD and **MR. GREGORY MINOR s .rcrmer Manager of Cuni:.ty Ansurance -*Former Manager of Advanced control and Instrumentation (Geaaral Electric Company) MR. :: VAN STJART, Manager of Licensinc and Safetv Nuclear Energy Diviston, General Eicctric company DR. AIR: D. PASTERSAv.. Commissioner Sta:e Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission CR. L20 'ARD :CJNIN, Economist Regionai Energy Analysis Program, Lawrence Scrkeley Labcratory, University of California !G.. :-CR.'CT SMITII. Co-Chairocrsen

!o e n 15 Cor.m.:.ctee
G. P A'.. : C2 :G S O N. Research Director California Labor Feceration (AFL-c;o)

!G. STANI.EY MENDES, Structura1 Encineer M2 A

  • E:'.viDIR ORE::cn't, aic ohvsicint Donner Lacoratory, Un; var: Icy of Ca1.ifornin, Derhelcy MR. EMORY CN2 TIS, Economic, Environmental a nd Trnnscort.r tica C :n.eultant (Cont'd.)

~

tR. ROGER MCORE, Chicf I
uclone Enginaer C.

F. Braun and Company PEO?LE FOR AN ENERGY POLICY Santa Clara County MR. DA.*T FitT'!EY, Nuclear Engineer California Society of Professional Engineerc [13. LOUIS R. POLI.ACK, Chemical Consultant MR.-CFARLIS FOLKERS Northern Californt.a Section of the American Ceramic Society MR. ALDEN JRYANT, Chairman Nortnern California Solar Energy Association-Laison Com.?. tree, I MR. NICNOD S BENTON U. S. Laucr Party i i 1

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.- ~. s v*. . i'..y > STAN LEY H. M EN O E5

  • c. :

sinucTunAs. sucmrca taaew STAT sr. surT 7 SANTA B ARBAMA. CAI.lF. 9 3101 enow :. ..s.vo March 23, 1976 The Hono'rable Alfred E. Alquist, Chairman and Members of Senate Cc=mittee on Public Utilities, Transit and Energy State Capitcl Building Sacramen:0, California 95814 Gentlemen: My purpose in appearing before this committee is, hcpefully, to make you concerned enough to investigate and determine, first hand, hcw the Nhclear Regulatory Commission (formerly the Atemic Energy Cc=ni.ssien) really functions to supposedly provide eff ective earthquake safety regulation of the construc-tion of nuclear pcwer f acilities. If you will really dig in and investigate, you will likely open up the biggest can of wor =s this state has seen in a 1cng time. I hope to convince this committee that the Nuclear Pcwe" D'= t Initiative, as written, has true = crit, that it is long overdue and much needed, and that you should willingly accept respcnsibility for determining that adequate safety previsions a e incorporated into the design and censtruction of nuclear pcwer facilicies in California. A proliferation of nuclear power facilities has been and is in process before preven earthquake safety provisions have been develcped. The San Fernando earthquake of 1971 clearly 1

C, TAN LEY H. M EN D ES g, STRUCTUZAI. ENGINEER j J March 23, 1976 demonstrated to all kncwledgeable persons that there is still much to be learned before we can construct totally earthquake-proof facilities. There is still plenty of room for human and technical errors in the various disciplines needed to construct nuclear power f acilities. I seriously doubt that the State of the Art is sufficiently advanced to produce the relatively risk-free f acilities to which the people of California are entitled. The people should know the truth and be able to influence their destinies with respect to the use of nuclear pcwer. The serious questions which can be raised about the adequacy of existing and proposed new plants should be discussed openly and candidly in public. As ' a licensed Civil and Structural Engineer in California, my entire professional career of nearly thirty years has been devoted to the design of buildings and related structures to withstand the effects of damaging earthctakes. I am quite f amiliar with earthquake resistant design and have personally inspected and studied numerous earthquako-damaged structures. I knew = cst of the strengths and weaknesses of my profession. Experiences during the past few years ha'is given me some insight as to hcw the :'uclear Regulatory Cc mission really functions. Frankly speaking, their system scares the hell cut of =e.

  • dere's hcw 3ig 3rother really operates!

1 .... 7 STANLEY H. M ENCES mucm:4 mmm 1 l ' March 23, 1976 l 1. In the language of our times, I have personally witnessed ) the AEC engage in " coverup" activities and abuse their lavful powers in " stonewalling" attempts to exclude probable adverse testimony about the earthquake safety of nuclear plants. This was done in concert with Pacific Gas and Electric Company at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Facilities near San Luis Obispo. The AEC and Pacific Gas and Electric Company have continued. -to construct the Diablo Nuclear Power Plant facilities for the last five years with full knowledge that the basic desien criteria for the earthquake safety provisions of the facilities are incorrect. Why? 2.a) Public school buildings and hospitals receive greater in-depth, independent reviews of their earthquake safety provisions than do nuclear power p.' ants constructed in California. Why? b) No in-depth detailed reviews of earthquake safety pro-visions are made by NP.C of design calculations and' con-struction drawings to determine if errors have been made. ~#ny not? . c) No in-depth detailed reviews were made by qualified staff of PG&E of the basic earthquake design criteria for the Diablo Nuclear Pcwer Plant f acilities. Why not?

,}' STANLEY H. M ENCES mucrunn. wonan '. March 23, 1976 3. Citizen participation in so-called public hearings is permitted at such times ar is convenient for the NRC and the utility company constructing the nuclear f acilities. These hearings are charades which exclude meaningful citizen participation. 4. The NRC conducts advocate type proceedings ~, including " discovery" procedur'es, in a semi-judicial atmosphere which by its very nature is not really conducive to deter-mining scientific or technical truths. Open.and candid discussion conducted in public among informed persons is the best way to determine scientific truth. This method also permits lay persens to better understand the limita-tions of the Sca';e of the Art. 5.. The present State of the Art in the fields of geology,. soils engineering, seismology and various engineering specialties is such that substantial human and technical errors are possible and not at all unusual. NRC procedures of tentimes belatedly discover substantial errors. 6. Nuclear power plants constructed as little as fifteen years ago, in accordance with knowledge then available, very possibly will not provide tha necessary earthqu. safety features which are required today. What is being done to review and update existing facilities? In the interest of public health, safety, and welfare, I ask this cc=mittee to seek the truth, to centinue to investigate

-{' f3 TAN LEY H. M EN D E5 mucrvat m:mm .- March 23, 1976 and determine how the present system of safety regulation of nuclear power plants really works, to determine what inadequacies exist and to attempt to remedy the situation. The Nuclear Initiative is a giant step in the solution to a tremendous problem. 1 A i e e e

2 STANLEY H. M ENCEO m uc w us.suon ua . ' March 23, 1976 DISCUSSION 4 My discussion will be structured se as to give background information and reasons for my six (6) previcus statements. 1. Nearly five years ago, several attempts were made to recpen AIC hearings on the Diablo Canyon facilities based upon new information available immediately af ter the San Fernando earthquake of 1971. I was consultant to Scenic Shoreline Preservation, Inc., a recognized inter-vener in the hearings. The AEC legal staff and Pacific Gas tr Electric Ocmpany legal staff prepared briefs which said, in effect, "there's nothing new to be learned frcm the San Fernando earthquake" and "we used the best and latest techniques of analysis and design; therefore, there 's nothing to worry abcut. " This was all " attorney tal%" unsubstantiated by the licensed Civil Engineers respcnsible for the design of the Diablo Nuclear Pcwer facilities. On the basis of these represe itations, the Atemic Energy Ccamission refused to reopen che public hearings for new testimeny or to permit additional crcss examinatica of the designers of the facilicies. Why? E At that time, kncwledgeable geologists, seis=clegists -w-,. - ..w--m-- ,---,r ,.--,,ss .e-

STAN LEY H. M EN O CS STRUCTUZAL. ENGINEER g I. . March 23, 1976 and engineers knew full well that the San Fernando events clearly demonstrated the incorrectness of many of the basic criteria and assumptions ccmonly made in earthquake resistant design. It was a whole new ball game! An attempt was later made in 1972 to introduce my testimony. At t*.-

ime, public-hearings were held to determine whether

. cenr*.ruction should be allowed to continue pending prepara-tion of the Environmental Impact Report. By specific Order of the Atomic Energy Commission, I was precluded from testifying. Why? s After the draft Environmental Impact Report was prepared, public hearings, were held for cc=ents. Even though the EIR included specific sections en geology, seismology, and earthquake design, I was not permitted to testify. Again, this was by specific Order of the AEC. Why? I believe I was improperly and :.llegally excluded from giving testimony and participating in cross examination of the designers of the Diablo f acilities because PG&E and AEC knew that the basic earthquake design criteria for :ne facilities was incorrect and they feared public exposure of the f act. These tactics bcught them time to analyce and learn frcm the San Fernando experience and perhaps to determine en what basis the facilities as ,-,r- ,nn ,w ..,e- - - - - - - - - - -, - - -

STANLEY H. M ENCES i mucrurai. muse . March 23, 1976 cons.tructed might be accepted. An investigation on the part of this committee will deter-mine that even now, formal and inforac1 discussions are taking place between PG&E and the NRC regarding adequacy of the basic earthquake design criteria for the facilities. The design is questionable because a previously unrecognized major active earthquake fault was discovered about 1972 only three. miles offshore. In addition, the San Fernando earth-quake of 1971 proved conclusively that ground 'ro ck) accelerations more than three times that for which the plant was designed are possible. During the past five years, the construction of the Diablo facilities has gone full speed ahead. The tactics of PG&E and the AEC were quite obvious; get the facilities construcced so it will be much more difficult to deny an operating permit when one billion dollars have been invested. Big money talks! In an affidavit prepared in 1972, dated Jcauary 23, 1973, for the Diablo Canyon public hearings, I stated, based upon my investigations, "I doubt that sufficiently detailed physical explorations of the of f shore f ault systems have been made." This has since been croven true. Also, the basic earthquake design criteria included "--maximum rcck accelerations at the site are estimated to be:

.e ETANLEY H. M ENCES m ucrv=x. nunn m ~ . March.23, 1976 Earthquake D 0.20g." My comment was, "Again, ad extremely important element related to design involves a matter -cf assumption and judgment and does not reflect the accelerograph record of Pacoima Dam. That accelerograph record shows numercus pe.aks between 0.50g and 0.70g. This record indicates considerably hicher accelerations and for a much longer pericd of time than the above estimates. These hig{.er accelerations occurred over a period of time of 3 to 4 times longer than the Golden Gate Park, San Francisco, 1957 record which was utilized to design for Earth-quake D." Only in January of this year has the NRC asked for justification of design based upon ground accelerations of in excess of 0.50G. This ccmes rath"; late in the game, because the operating license hear _;.gs are scheduled for June of this year. It appears that for censtruction to have been allcwed to continue to completion, the PG&E and the !;2C must have already reached a mutually agreeable understanding. If by chance the Diablo Canycn f acil-ties are not given an operating permit by the NRC, what will happen c the one billion dollar investment of SG&E? It is my under-standing, based upon present Public Utilities commissi:n

.~ STANLEY H. M ENDES sinuctuut. cu stan . March 23, 1976 policy that the investment is risk capital and may not be charged to u.tility custemers by way of rate increases. It is my sincere hope that the present NRC proceedings questioning the earthquake safe'.y features of the Diablo Canyon facilities are honest and forthright so as to ultimately reveal the truth. Not being privileged to sit in on the " informal" discussions between PG&E and NPC, I just don't knew.

2. a,b, c) Detailed independent reviews are made by the State Office of-Architecture & Construction for all public school buildings and hospitals which are to be constructed in California.

These reviews include a check of criteria, methed, and precedures. They also make a detailed check of the results of the design, including verifying that plans correctly and cc=pletely agree with design assumptions and results. In addition, independent field inspections are made to assure cc=pliance with approved plans and specifications. Tne Office of Architecture and Ccns truction precedures contrast greatly wich the MRC precedures. The NRC dees not make a detailed check of analysis, design calculations and construction plans. They only "--check criceria, method and procedures. Cn February 13, 1975 at San

STANLEY H. MENDED muc-urn m:mua ' March 23, 1976 Luis Obispo, California, Mr. Larry Shao, of the Structural Engineering staff of NRC made the following statements when asked by a ec= mission member of the Advisory'Com-mission on Reactor Safeguards about the checking procedures of the Diabic Canyon nuclear power plant design: "We don't check detailed results. We only check criteria, method,,and procedures. Do you know how long 3 t would take to check a detailed analysis? It would take acout four or five years." -- - "In order to check detailed answers, I would need a staff of a thousand people to do that." From such a procedure, it is clear and apparent to expericnced engineers that human errors and mistakes will have to all be discovered by the designers of nuclear Let's have a close look at how PG&E designers facilities. of the Diablo Canyon facilities made an in house check. The seismological evaluation of the Diablo Canyon site is contcined in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and set forth in reports dated January 9,

1967, and May 29, 1968.

There are no significant differences in the Final SAR (FSAR) published only a couple of years ago. Under date of July 18, 1975, representatives of PG&E responded as follows, under penalty of perjury, to several significant questions contained in Interrogatories by San Luis chispo Mothers for Peace dated June 13, 1975.

STANLEY H. M ENCES STRUCTURAL ENGINEER ' March 23, 1976 "37. Name the person or persons responsible for the review of the " Seismic Evaluation o'f the Diablo Canyon Site" prepared by Hugo Benioff and transmitted to Mr. Gordon V. Richards under dates of January 9,

1967, and May 28, 1968.

Response

This document was submitted in connection with PGandE's, applications for construction permits for the two Diablo Units. It was reviewed by PGandE personnel, AEC Staff personnel, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards, and various consultants to PGandE is unable to name specific individuals each. responsible for this review." "38. State the nature and extent of the review which was made, including the number of man hours spent by each person or persons involved in the review referred to in question No. 37.

Response

PGandE does not have records of the time spent by its personnel in reviewing reports cf its consultants and obvicusly does not have that informa-tien for members of other organizations." "39. Name the person or persons responsible for the review of the " Recommended Earthquake Design Criteria f or Unit 2, Diablo Canycn the Nuclear ?cwer Plant Site" transmitted to Mr. Gordon Richards frcm Jchn -""T" 'T T-pr* y-c,,m ,m

g* . c . CTANLEY H. MENots STftUCTU 'AL ENTENE2J4 ' March 23, 1976 Blume and Associates, Engineers, under date of June 24, 1968. Said report is dated June 1968.

Response

See response to Interrogatory 37." The significance of the responses are tremendcus. PG&E can't name one single persen on their staff who reviewed the basic earthquake design criteria for the Diablo facilities. Certainly the criteria is important enough to have it reviewed by the best qualified persons on PG&E's staff! Yet no one knows who reviewed it nor how much time they spent reviewing it. I honestly question if it was reviewed at all. One main point I wish to make is chat if the basic earth-quake design criteria are incorrect,. then it 1cgically folicws that the earthquake safety provisions of the f acilities are likely to be inadequate. One can be reason-ably sure that the plant was not materially "overdesigned" not with PG&E's mcnay at stake. 3. As previously set fcrth in the discussion of item No. 1, I have on three separace occasions been excluded frem giving testimony at public hearings by specific crder of the AEC. Indications are that I probably will be permitted to testify at che June 1976 licensing hearings. This ccmes 4 e - y -- -wg, y c-e- --y- .-+ y r-.

~ STAN LEY H. M EN C ES ~ saucrurai. taustan . March 23, 1976 a bit late! It will be a cold day in hell before I will dignify those hearings by participating. 4. The prdnary aim of advocate type proceedings is to sway a third party to a particular point of view. In the process, f acts detrimental to a point of view are almost never brought to light, exceot by the opposition. One does not harm one's own case! The name of.the game is win --- winning is everything. In contrast to advocate type proceedings are those normally followed by scientifically trained persons. ~Here, a premise is set forth and examined for merit. The pros and cons are discussed by all parties. Facts beccme f acts when they a. e mutually accepted. The entire purpose is to determine the truth -- not to win. How vastly different are the statements made by " experts" when they are part of a round table discussion among colleagues as compared to " expert testirony" during advocate type proceedings. 5. Practicing professionals in the fields of geology, soils engineering, seismology and varicus engineering specialties will inform you, if asked, of personal experiences wherein substantial errers have been made. Don't espect many or these persens to volunteer to come before you and furnish

STAN LEY T4. M EN O C5 sinuctum crmeen ' Mnrch 23, 1976 such informatien. Errors and omissions are usually reserved for discussion in private ec=mittees and con-ferences, but not before a Senate ccmmittee -- unless asked, that is. Ecw adequate are NRC procedures which allowed the Diablo Canyon facilities to.beceme over one-half constructed before discovery of an active offshore fault capable of generating a Magnitude 7.5 earthquake with ground accolor-ations on the order of 0.70G to 0.80G? What if the San Fernando earthquake of 1971 hadn't happened? We would be sitting here in ignorant bliss believing that maximum ground acceleratiens would never likely exceed 0.50G. The Pacoima Dan record produced peak accelerations of 1.25G! 6. I don' t believe any k..cwledgeable person would be so fcolish as to say that the professions haven't learned a great deal about earthquake resistant design during the past fif teen years. There has been an explosion of kncwledge which is still going on. Mos: earchquake design concepts are based upcn assumpciens, v.any of which have yet to be proven by performance during damaging earthquakes. Caly during damaging earthquakes do we gee a clearer picture of the adequacy of Our design precedures.

STANLEY H. MENCES STRUCTUOAl. ENTINEEM e. 2 . March 23, 1976 It is f air to say that the San Fernando earthquake of 1971 clearly showed there is one hell of a lot to be learned. While much attention since then has been focused on the well-known hazard of older unreinforced masonry buildings, .what has the NRC don'e to review cad update the earthquake safety provisions of older nuclear power facilities? This is a problem that I'm certain the NRC would not wish to have exposed publicly, but it is one which they should face up to as scan as possible. This committee should cencern itself with the adequacy of existing nuclear f acilities in California. 1 i 9 I I

m w-STANt.EY H. M ENDES 'J STRUCTUZAL. EN11NEER . March 23, 1976 RECOMMENDATIONS It is recc= mended: 1. This cc=mittee should iniestigate the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant proceedings and fully inform the Legislature of your findings regarding their propriety and the degree of confidence you have as to whether proper earthquake safety provisions have been made. 2. The Legislature should take action to assure that an independent review is made of the earthquake safety provisions of nuclear pcwer facilities which presently exist and those which are to be constructed in California in the fu ure. 3. The Legislature should conduct public conferences and public hearings to solicit open and candid discussion a=cng interested and informed persons to determine the folicwing: a) whether the State of the Art is sufficiently advanced in the fields of geology, soils engineering, seismcicgy, and earthquake engineering so as to permit the design and construccicn of nuclear pcwer facilities wichcut substantial risk to the health, safecy, and welfare of the pecple who live in California.

V: * * **. ' STANLEY H. M ENCES STRUCTUR AL. ENGlH EEM

  • March 23, 1976 b) the degree of risk which acccmpanies design and con-struction of nuclear power facilities which are subjected to the forces and effects of earthquakes.

l c). the consequences of a nuclear disaster which may accompany natural dise tsrs such as earthquakes. 4. The Legislature should inform the electorate of the findings frem the foregoing recommended conferences and hearings and allow them to participate in reaching a decision as to whether and/or undur what conditions nuclear pcwer facilities are to be constructed and operated in Calif-ornia. A decision should also be made as to whether and under what conditions existing nuclear power f acilities should be continued in use. Respectfully submitted, E J.c. M 'W -~mku Stanley H. Mendes e e W

Sant.a Itar bara, f'alif., Nrwn-Press 1.ma Aurle len Tirnen, fla r ch 14, l'879 tiarch 13, 1979 9:q A %w m. ' /h " rf 1 5 nudear p ants rive ensni#n ordered to do/"/W HUCLEAR POWER PLANT CLOSURES 8 NUCLEAR PLANTS se SHUT AS UNSAFE Centimurd from Mrst rage - 88ay nid of ses *e metd their saidy lle said a flaw its llee rompidee f.g. ( W A5f tINGTON (Url)- The rearvor, where the psoblem est e. vi, .s had bren a"ured rmda had ini en suipets tmly 1411 ag short supg.ly berare of prodextion Nuricar itegulatory Commig. fir,. discovered, w e,,, tim- , WASillNf71'ON-TI.e government Interruptions in tran The Nurien itegulainry Commis-ster *c as thote rc<rdred 1he de f.e t 18831Y (l**ed Felday. The other Tuesday ordered the shutiktwn of The Encegy Department, en plan. Fi"n said an imgwrq= r "mipuler for-was epit di-envered antit Ivt week . ton today ordered five atomic pnwer plante shut down imme. 6aree were grill la crere.>n thtre nuricar power plants and pro-niri to deal eith the rutrdt of Irarnan snula inwd to design the plants unwe terawe the Nur frar Sterut.atory when the oeiler one tiooed. N9ted two others from going barli cil, fad hoped to tramfer power frmn than seven years agu ha.1 led to he.Co.nums4wi dug ned glwe h tir emup.: (( distely tecause their conling eysteme may be unable to etih. The emergency shutdown into snvire because f.mity riesign has arcas with nurIcar trartms to tiare adcetuate support for ennling nyrtras ter formula. Dentma sauf threatened to force the UMted Irft vital enoting sysicms vulneraNe detiefuhng on oil fitr4 retre atnis f"P'5 II U* lupes fadnt 6t sM l*n of lienton sanl 11ree had tiren yr5 stand carthquak,, la en sciton with potentistly States to rely more. benvity on to pou Ne carthcluake damage. Iht Drnton said the reinnuvin, the three mam Inws of de fense safety relateil mmIcar pimed riod Israe implicatlone for U S. 813 fa' 08*er generation at a lhe five plants have a trdal etcetrk was not allowed in rewider the crn. agalmt maint scas tm areilents rmdd riowns in the last Iwi years but that time when oil supplice are generstmg capacity of 4.lW mcKa-nomk and sorial reperruuinns of ds only 7t} had bren ordsed by tfe rma. t.c hrearhe t-energy' supplies the commit. scarce tuecause of the lasnian watts. utvalent to the energy in safdy regulations and artym M hat we are talkpr aruntt is th* rnmime There were-ahmd "It) my lear slon said an improper computer formula used to des:gn the espost cutoff. In planning to ahmd 00. 2G barrnis of al a day. Detdrin said the shutdown mighg abihty of the pig 43.g r ytcm in a nu. power plants in operatput in tfie lind - deel utlh the tranlan situation, lianold Dentrm, the Nuricar flegu-last several months untd suppnrts for 'l**' reactor in wn.Marut earth c,I States as of tact sumnwr. P *"" ""' th"" e"en Icars ago led to inadequate suppott the Fnergy Department bad latory Comnnssuwis dircrW d mb the conting pipes cmd4 he :.ttrngth-criakes," f >nton n.ud "We are unt t I I ricar reactor regulation. said the ened. tafking alud turmal ogieratirm" -* power froen for conting nyttem plP-

    • e shutdnwns casld cause some pn*cr

. The'affected rearters are Itcarrr lie said the worst raec wnubl arrur , a if the pipes fsIled. it sald,two shnrts o ami pridiaNy wmild mean Valley at $hippmgpirt, l'a. Surty at an cattiviuske broke a pipe fccthng of the three main Ilnet of de' mar expensive electrlfily for Not I arvi 2 at cravel Neck. Va, emling = ster to the rea tor arut. at fenac nantent majar reactor ac. generstars cust< vs as the utihtics tavolved hmes Mttpattlr k at Scriba. N Y., and the same time, raired the reartor's Cdents routd tie becarbed. turn to other energy sources to gen

  • Maine-Yankee at Wieramet. Me.

emergenry rm e rieslug s ystem to fad. The reertnes ordered shut evale power

  • The Sutry No. 2 reattnr was al.

"Ihen ynn wouM have a dential doma were Penver vattey at lie said the ut!!! tics probably would Wy out of servere for reptarement plant me!!down " Denton ui. shipplasport. Fa ; Surry Nos. I have to burn innre al. ahcady ht of liteam peneratnes.1he IIcaver Val. Surh a drratter, whirh never has and 2 at Crevel Neck, Vs I rime Tera le rege A Cel. I ley reactor, where the Du prsne happened, rmthf release large Jame, yttrpatrick at Scriba. IJght Corp. first diwnvered the rrwd. ammmtsof rashn.u tivdy. N Y.: and Maine-Yonkee at en itig pipe proNem, was voluntardy Denton savt ali five t.lants were.lc. wieregeet, ktnine. 3 clo'ed Friday. The osher three still . signed by Srmic 4 Wolmerr a malear l-Tes*J.A* f ? I".r.cartors N were in operatinn when the order was engmcetuig and design fu m that ward ued. a computer mortcl to ralculate l I lY, bese the potentini for prostuctrig o n '. "7 Denton said the three operating stresses og tafcly retarcil pipen arvt 4 I mttlion watts of etertricity. W> g Harold Denton.dtrettor ef re-N t W. reactors had lo be shut dewn wdhm pipe suppnrls m the event of an 4A hours. All five were ordered as carthrpiake g[% actor regulaiton said all five M %b plante mutt be shut down within O 49 hours and slay oue er service w until their enfety has been so-sused. Ile enid the shutdown 00 might lagt several months. One of the reactors. Surry Ik 1. strendy was out of serv-Ice for replerement of stes'n generators. The Beaver Valley 4 i k

Indefinite Delay Blueprint Goof Perils Future Of Diablo Plant By Dewd Perimen saw.re uw.e Embarrassed offletals at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant disclosed yesterday their engineers used the wrong blueprints in designing and building a set of earthquake safety / ^- . supports for pipes in the nuclear reactor's auxiliary coesing systems. As a result of the error, a!! preparations for the compten fuel-leedtog operation mere halted in-SAN FPJJ4CISCO CHRONIC!.E dI""N "8 8 '" I"d'U"'** delay in schedvilog the first low-power operational test of the reae. Wed., September 30, 1991 tor riself. according to officials of Pacifk Gas and Electric Co. It also placed in Jeopardy the immediate tutt.re of the huge 82.3 billion twin reactor plant, and ramed the possibdity of a whole set of new legal challenges by anti-nuclear groups opbsing Diablo~s license. N) nuclear fuel was in the reactor when the errer was dtsecv-ered, according to both the velity and offxtals of the Nuclear Reriu:a-tory Commesson, and none will te removed from the underwster stor-age pool where it is held. De first evidence that some-thing was seriously wrong came durmg the engineering checks of seisme safety reinforcements 1.ast Friday, according to John B. lixh. PG&E's manager of nuclear projects At that time, lloch told The i Chron:cte in an interview, plant eng:neers realized that they were checking the wismic bractng in one l set of coohng system pipes agunst a i diagram that appeared to be a i Terror Image

  • of the way the braces were actually located.

Only on Sunday. Hoch said, did the eng:neers final y become aware that they were actuaJy using a diatram of the pipe support sy> tems that had teen prepared for Dtabio Canyon's second reactor. utuch a not yet completed and ubme bracing systems are stGI bemg modified to meet the strong. er eart3 quake design criteria cr-dered by the NRC in 1979. It u as then, after several phone ecnferences between the eng.neers at Dtabio and their c!.sefs :n San Franctsco, that they realized sert-ous questions cf fu ure safety might be involved at.d decided to halt all work for a more detailed review of the problem. Hoch said. He utJ1t) eng!neers it.en noti-fied the Nuclear Regalatory Com-mission s resider.t inspe'. tors, and en Monday sent formal notification of the problem to NRC headqJar-ters in Washirigton. On Friday, the plant engtceers Psge6 Col.I

pan 3ramim Et reMr Wed,SeptenM 30,198l t Diablo A-Plant's Future in Jeopardy melt the fuel to.h and that can raled caparity, and generating no Wom page.! allows any more week to proceed at der entsemcly high perssure, h ing on their location wdhin th, t housed in a containment structure containment structure's anmdus' neersnally he dime by the four firan ciertrirle y, were checking a group of steci. he reactor. hancpomn pumps that cirrulate D*" ' h "' ense u d. k 265 feet tall and 147 feet in Vhttars who have been per mh-water in the mam reartar ecolant straps deugned to add extra sup. r linth Stelin and Rlthard Vall' diameter. hat buildtng ts inade of restored remained a completely led lusMe the vast containment system. port agalnst earthquake shock for a mer, director of the NBC's engt laced with open qmn 124 nW, and H nat sct of large pipes in an auxillary ' neering divhlon, were asked how roncrete 3% feet thbrk'hlrher than hWe M Maws Drst team If thme pumps shoubt fall, likely to he ameered for a kmg reinforcing steel bars l unit have seen mMesplend enam. reactor cooling system. They dis. clowly the ngency's ow n inspectors then the natural earrulation r4 hat time ,,, g pies of sacel reinforrements, con.. envned they were following a are required to therk ip on the and erwler water with6a the rcartne diagram that did not show the litihty's finai safety lnspertions that InsMe the putcr contalament, trete buttresses, additlanal pipe straps in the proper places. must he made just before nuricar and separated from it by a space of hangers and strengthened support <*" berP 'h' " dant maving until tempesaturcs and water pressiere fuct is loaded into a reactor. about 17 feet, h another thkk structures drop low enough far a resMust It h also poss6hle that the shiciding wall of reinfortwl con Wrnnents of tl.e plant, howev-heat remaval system' to take over. enfincers Pave made similar errors ne NRC, they said, has nor-crete. And hetwecn those two to checking several other cooling mafly made a " detailed raamina his systein h designed to system pipes inside the reactor tion of the rnmpany's tomputation. pump outside canling wster building,llorh inld The Chronicle. al methn.Is " and the ks all system through the reartor, nung a pamp descriptions and computer An Official called it -d*'~~~~~ ' "'d d s h ' a" s i <a

  • ev <r that L"a",P','4W~r lm Ee:

sWe the containment imildlog 1he design calculatLm for every p6ere system h dc= 6gned to start up minup some of the pip? supports of equipment, and ret tainly doesn't L"?R'" ""L"m'"lc"s'a'?M,'b'"s y,';;,L" '"'"' ""v c'c' '" 'a fair 1y signa,fican1

"'";~;'g':, z' ;s;:.,3,tu:

i s herause of an anMent require, while ethers ate not sfront eng neer/ng gOOb@/ enmith. As Vollmer put it "We send an elerahie sysie,n to,,,. out an audit team whkh lonks at reov6ng scetual heit H reepured by The weak ones, iforh conced-the equipment and stic romp

  • loaded ten the thaMo reartnt, and every pipe."M.e only do an audit herause of the new nmfusinn over e R s sta dar b an thi w:lil require censiderable time af ter gevgew protectivt shields is a region raded er, have continued to Inskt that the strength of the suppgts in the the engineers sort them att out A '-

within the mare of pipes that idt Yesterday top officials of the "atvnutus," shere dorent of selsmic safety is stlti inade-turrent systeen, the NRP does not the tractor building. pC&l? promhed the NRC a full pip s penetrate the containment to quate - although the NRC ltself ran h w h**' % report by today, giving as much carry water for the various cooling has bmg since ruled that the IW9 g' rw lifica*ns to the pfant are, sam \\,letor Stcito, dircrtor of detail.as pimihte on the mluup. The systems in and nut of the bulldmg. adequate to withstand the mnst A spikesman for ps;&lt saH lospection and enforc= ment inr the ,gggy s top engineers have We AH these pipes are held in Intense conceivahte earthquake yesterday that the company a er gt-NRCin Washington,in a telephone been summoned to a meetlng next place by heavily strengthened suP shark. The opponents are now neers erre 4.usily testing the opera-Monday at NRC head guarters in ports, straps, hangers and other esp.rted in demand a new set of tion of fuct handimg evpdpenent ! 'This is phwlously a very unde. Itethesda, Md to review the pro 4 Incre M wpdpment In IN9 after safety hearmes ;nd to ca!I for a last week when the *rtsw rcpancy"

tem, streable pmitism for the company "y

N reaminent M plaWs fuelloa'l in the diagrams was first noted 1he to find itself in like"all nwicar pnuer plantt, quake f ault 2 5 miles ofIshore from le t Iermit. campany hd es ecrted la start Another NRC official called i: Diablo Canyon h equipped with a the plant,the NRC set new require loadmg snu b.ar f urt mem%es kdo sper s em that was large varacty of systems to cool its ments for the ahllity of the piang,

  • 4 fairly signtrarant engmeering reartor teth durmg normal opera equipment to withstand sevne s gned to remove what h cal I had hoput to start up the Ih st conf up."

gg*nn rearunn within at=nd two tion and in case of emcreencies. earthquake stresses.

  • resktual heat " This 65 heat gener-

- The NRr*s Stello agreed with These include mares of plutnbing A repwt 3wpared or e ate hy radloacHw f Wm products pG&E' silos h that many of the ptpe that can pump water into the utility by the engine:Ing firm of that remain in the enre of an I.no Tue.dw 6. NHc parM suppnsts and hanger straps will reactor aies or even spray water John A. Illume & Assnelates cA, operating reactor when the nwicar the rampany a tiren*.e to load fuct have to be redesigned twrause of down from almve. scrlhed the warytnit shnrk strengths reartion itself is shut down The amt conde t the first

  • low I*wer" the error, and Stello said the NRC will conduct a thornuth rev8 w of The rearfor Itucif, where.d that the pipes amt other equipment restitual heat must he removed tegg of the tem for - optatmrg it the equipment twfore the agency ing water normally circulates on-might have to withstand, depend-contirmamly lest it bulM up and at no mnre than 5 per rent of 61s 4

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