ML20032E444

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Forwards Response to IE Bulletin 81-02,Suppl 1, Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure, Consisting of Third Interim Rept Re Significant Deficiency 80-06.Corrective Action Will Be Completed by 820601
ML20032E444
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 11/16/1981
From: Woolever E
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
REF-SSINS-6820 IEB-81-02, IEB-81-2, NUDOCS 8111200565
Download: ML20032E444 (5)


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NOV 161981 Duquesne Light

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P tub,,rgat. Pa 152f 9 United States Nuclear Regulatory C >cmiission Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 ATTENTION-Mr. Boyec 11. Grier, Director p

SUBJECT:

EEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - UNIT NO. 2 F H N

Docket No. 50-412

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O lE' Eulletin No. 31-02, Supplement 1 Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close 1

NOVI S 1984 % 1, h{/.' v.s. sama m N Against Dif ferential Pressure.

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l Centlemen :

The Duquesne Light Compymy response to IE Bulletin Nc. 81-02. is being addressed

' by the previously identified /F.ignificant Dc.ficiency 80-06.

Supplement 1 to this bulletin has been incorporated into this Significant Deficiency. The data requested

' by Sup;.jle:ent I was reported,in Interim Report No. 3 of Significant, Deficiency 80-06 tray.stnitted by Duquesne Light Letter 2DLC-4333.

As quested by this bulletin supplement, approximately forty (40) manhours were expended, in developing this response.

No est b te of man-days is presently available for implementing corrective action.

DUQUESNE'LIGilT COMPANY r

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~ Director of Inspect ron and Enforcement

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" Ms. Jane Grant t

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.v Interim Report No. 3 Significant Deficiency 80 -

Westinghouse MOV Cate Valves 1.0

SUMMARY

IE Bulletin No. 81-02, Supplement No.1, stated that closure problems could be -

. anticipated with' the entire line of W-EMD nunufactured motor-operated gate valves.

  • Several of these valves are scheduled for installation on Beaver Valley Unit No. 2.

Attachment No. I to this report lists the valves identified as -a result of this Bulletin Supplement that were not previously reported in earlier interim reports of Significant Deficiency 80-06.

2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN Nonconformance and disposition report 5029 has been prepared to identify and control all of the valves listed in Attachment No. I pending further investigation.

3.0 DESCRIPTION

OF DEFICIENCY A's a part of its ongoing analysis program, Westinghouse Electro-Mechanical Division (W-EMD) has applied the analytical methods developed for the 3" and 4" gate valves to the* remaining W-EMD motor operated gate valves. These analyses predict that the entire line of motor-operated gate valves has the potential for not closing against differential pressure.

4.0 ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS The safety icpiications are listed in the last column of Attachment No. I titled " Consequences of Failure to Close."

5.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION TO REMEDY THE DEFICIENCY Westinghouse is continuing the analysis of these valves to determine if each i

valve as currently built is capable of closing under its limiting normal and post i

accident se rvice condition (" Final Functional Recuirement" of Attachment 1).

For those valves which are incapable of Laeting these requirements, Westinghouse will identify correc tive action to be taken to insure that the valves clost when requi red. The corrective action is expected to be complete by June 1, -1982.

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G.0 ADDITIOFAL REPORTS A final report will be issued when valve modification details are complete.

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ATTACiltildNT I I"T" I

INTERIM ltEl'OR7 NO. 3 SIGNIFICANT DEF]CIENCY 80-06 i

Valve W-EMD Valve Location Eodci Maximum Dif ferential Pressure (PSI)

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Functio _n Numbe r Numbe r as Flow Approaches Zero Consequence of Failure to Close Equip.

Final Spec.

Functional Requirement VC1 Ouclet LCV-115C,E 4-CM72FB 200 100 Two valves in series; failure of either valve to close reduces redun-'

dancy of providing isolation. Alter-nate valve will provide isolation.

RWST to LCV-115B,D 8-GM72FB 200 200 One MOV in each of' two parallel Suction of paths f rom the RWST to suction of Cha rging the CCP's; failure reduces redundancg Pumps of providing isolation of RWST during the recirculation phase following a LOCA.

Isolation will be provided by check valve in series with the two paths.

RCP Scal 8100 3-CM72FBit 200 165 Two valves in series; failure of Water 8112 cither valve to close reduces Retu rn redundancy of providing isolation.

(Containment Alternate valve will provide isolatiG isolation)

Charging 8130A,B 8-GM72FB 200 200 Two valves in series; failure of Pump 8131A,B cither valve to close reduces c.iction redundancy of providing isolation licade r Alternate valve will provide isolatiq RilR Suction 8702A,B 1.2-GM88SEH 700 700 Two valves in series; failure of Isolation inner isolation valve to close (inner valves)

, reduces redundancy of providing isol(

" tion. Isolation is provided by

..,, closing the outer valve.

RiiR Suction 8701A,B 12-GM88SEH 700 700 Two valves in series; failu re of outer isolation valve to close Isolation (outer valves) reduces redundancy of providing isolc Isolationisprovidedbyclosif tion.

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ATTACll!!ENT 1 (CoffflNUED) l i

. Valve W-EMD 2 Valve Location Model Maximum Dif ferential Pressure (PSI)

[ Function Number Numbe r as Flow Approaches Zero

_ Consequence of Failure to ' Close Equip.

Final Spec.

Functional Requ i re ment s

iRilR Cold 8703A,B 10-CM88 Sell 700 700 Valve in series with two check Leg Discharge valves; no effect of valve failing to close.

Backflow into the Rl!RS from the RCS is prevented by the check valves.

!RWST to 8809A,B 14-CM72FB 200' 100 Valve is closed ror recirculation j SI Pump phase following a LOCA.

If valve i Suction faile to close, backflow into RWST is prevented by check va've in line.

SI Pump 8888A,B 10-CM78FN 2750 200 When valves are used for containment Cold Leg isolation:

Injection Containment isolation (ORC) valve.

Isolation of contaihment following failure of valve to close is provided by check valve (IRC).

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When valves are used for switchover f rom cold. leg to hot leg recirculatioG

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1 Valve is closed for switchover f rom CL to llL recirculation.

Failure of volve to close will degrade flow to llL's.

4 Accumu l a to r 8808A,B 12-CM88FNil 2750 0

Valve is. closed to prevent RCS Disc ha rge pressurization during colel shutdown o pe ra tions.

If the valve fails to

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close, the accenulator may be depres-;

.surized by venting the N2 to the containnent.

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ATTACllMENT I (CONF 1NUED)

Valve W-EMD Valve Location Eodel Maxinum Di f ferential Pressure (PSI)

Function Numbe r Numbe r as Flow Approaches Zero Consequence of Failure to Close j

Equip.

Final Functional Spec.

Requ i rement Low Ilead SI 8887A,B 10-GM72FB 200 300 Failure of valve to close reduces

' redundancy of providing low head Pump Dischargc Crossconnect train separation during CL recircu-lation phase following a LOCA.

Train separation can be achieved by closing other valve.

Low Ilead SI 8889 10-CM78FN 275'O 200 Valve is closed for switchover f rom Pump Discharge llL to CL recirculation following a to liot Leg LOCA.

If valve fails to close, iso--

lation is provided by closing the LilSI discharge c rossconnect' valves.

Rec ircul a t ion 8811A,B 10-CM72FB 200 200 Valve is opened for reci rculation Pump to Low phase following a LOCA and would be IIcad Safety closed for passive f ailu re in thc. ~.9)

Injection recirculation train. Following licade r failure of the valve to close, back-flow into the recirculation line is precluded by two check valves in the discharge line.

Low licad 8812A,B 8-GM72FB 200 200 Valve is opened for recirculation Recirculation phase following 'a LOCA and would be to Charging closed for an active or passive Pump Suction failure downstream of. the valve (in the CCP train). Failure of the valve to_close will not preclude isolation of CCP flow; flow will be stopped by shutting off the~CCP.