ML20032E145
| ML20032E145 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1981 |
| From: | Baier S AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8111190713 | |
| Download: ML20032E145 (3) | |
Text
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STATEMENT TO NRC CONCERNING SUSQUEHANNA PLANT OCTOBER 19, 1981 FROM: STEPHEN W. BAIER, 1412 FAIRVIEW STREET, ALLENTOWN, PA.
Thank you for the opportunity to express my oppositier$ to the opening of the Sus,quehanna Nuclear Plant.
My opposition te nuclear power is grounded in one concern:
my concern for life; a life for myself, friends, relatives, r and all Americans, without a fear of radioactive contamination of our environment and our bodies.
As a biologist I understand the interconnectiveness of,;.: life and the earth's ecosystems, and I am aware of the long and short term effects of radioactive contamination on all living organisms.
If PP&L were to make a decision today to begin co: :truction of a nuclear generating plant, I strongly feel they would decide to remain a non-nuclear industry.
Nuclear power has proved to be a liability for the majority of nuclear utilities.
The economic realities and the effecto on future rates are grounds for denying PP&L an operating license for Susquehanna.
Several pages in the most recent PP&L profile provide an overview of the economic impact of Susquehanna Nuclear Generation.
One statement stands out: " changes in these assumptions could alter the results presented in the charts and text."
Operation of Suspuehanna will cause an immediate rate increase of 30-40%.
PP&L claims a net revenue savings is expected about 10 years after the two reactors begin service.
However, looking again at the assumptions, their claim is at the minimum optimistic; Based on present knowledge it seems quite unrealistic and misleading.
I will only mention a few problems associated with PP&L's economic evaluation:
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Assumption 1:
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S.W. BAIER pt' Assumption 2s A large financial advantage of the plant would result from selling all or a part of the power generated by. Susquehanna to the PJM grid.'
It is questionable that PP&L's expected sales will become a reality based on a decreasing demand for electricity in the grid.
It is interesting to note that PP&L's latest rate request mentioned less than expected sales to the grid as partial justification for the requested rate increase.
Assumption 3:
PP&L will'not face shutdowns of the reactors due to accidents, public pressures, or regulations as additional flaws in reactor design are uncovered.
TMI exemplifies the extreme costs of,.a_ major accidenti Another major accident is statistically likely to occur during the life-span of the Susquehanna reactors.
The public would likely demand closer scrutinity if not total shut-down of nuclear reactors.
Assumotion 4:
Radioactive waste storage will be established and largely funded by the federal government.
At this time, all wastes are being stored at the reactor sites.
Several utility companies are being forced to construct additional storage facilities.
Technical problems of storing high level wastes prevent disposal at this time.
Even if an acceptable disposal technology is developed, the political situation may prevent unfair taxpayers subsidies to provide storage for the nuclear utilities.
Additional costs, not calculated in the costs of Susquehanna, include insurance premiums and the cost of a major accident.
No less important are the less "antita.tive costs associated with L_
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nuclear power production.-
These include, but are by no means limited to, health effects on uranium miners, workers,in processing plants, and citizens living near the plant or along fuel and waste transport routes; the neg'ative impacts on the Susquehanna River ecosystem; higher rates of electri-city, thus discouraging industry from locating in the area; a loss of property values to local landowners; government subsidies to the nuclear industry; and a lack of motivation by PP&L to n&ro. ote alternative energy sources ( note.that if ceaf
,e electricalodecreases financial benefits of Sus.quehanna also decrease).'
A realistic and. detailed economic study of the financial impact of halting construction of Susquehanna has not been completed by PP&L.
The decision to continue construction and the request for an operating license is a result of momentum, not a c6ntinual careful evaluation of the economics.
PP&L should be denied an operating license, and must be forced to evaluate all costs and benefits of operating Susquehanna.
I support an independent economic study of the costs of continuing versus halting further construction of the Susquehanna plant'(
plant.
This option has been carefully studied and requested by the Susquehanna alliance.
In conclusion, nuclear power represents a technology out of tune with a rationalistic approach to the earth's resources and to human life itself.
PP&L unfortunately made a nearsighted decision to construct Susquehanna, and must be prevented from l
imposing undue financial hardships on their ratepayers as well as health risks to everyone affected by radioactive contamination
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because or their corporate errors.
The economic realities and health hazards of operating Susquehanna are more than adequate justification for the denial of an operating license.
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