ML20032D150
| ML20032D150 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1981 |
| From: | Greger L, Peck C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20032D146 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0036-81-03, 70-36-81-3, NUDOCS 8111130438 | |
| Download: ML20032D150 (7) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT.
J REGION III i
. Report No. 70-036/81-03 Docket No.70-036 License No. SNM-33 Licensee: Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Nuclear Power Systems Windsor, CT 06095 Facility Name: Hematite
. Inspection At: Hematite, M0 Inspection Conducted: September 29 - October 1, 1981 hb
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Inspector:
C. C. Peck
' Date
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Approved By: L G
e Facilities Radiation.
' Date Protection Section Inspection Summary:
Inspection en September 29 - October 1, 1981 (Report No. 70-036/81-03)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced health and safety inspection, including: organization, training, audits, criticality safety, radiation protection, radioactive waste management, facility changes and modifica-Lions, emergency planning, and environmental monitoring. The inspection required 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: No violations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. A. Rode, Plant Manager
- H. E. Eskridge, Nuclear Licensing, Safety, and Accountability Supervisor
- L. J. Swallow, Quality Assurance Manager
- R. C. Miller, Production and Materials Control Supervisor
- A. J. Noack, Production Superintendent
- J.
Abernathy, Radiation Specialist
- L.
Deul, Engineer
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
General The inspection began at 7:45 a.m. on September 29, 1981, and was concluded on October 1, 1981.
During a plant tour on the first day of the inspection, the inspector observed that normal production activities were in progress. No unsafe conditions or practices were identified. The production of uranium oxide pellets has recently been resumed after several years during which only oxide powder was produced.
3.
Organization Since the previous health and safety inspection in January 1981 (Report No. 70-036/81-01), the resumption of pellet production has prompted the addition of several new employees to the work force.
A number of production operators, two laboratory technicians, and a health and safety technician have been added.
Mr. A. J. Noack was promoted to Production Superintendent, succeeding Mr. A. G. Swaringin, who retired.
Mr. J. G. Abernathy was promoted from health and safety technician to radiation specialist. A new technician was hired.
4.
Training An examination of training records disclosed that all new operators receive a five-hour indoctrination in industrial and radiation safety followed by a written quiz.
The new nuclear and industrial safety technician received detailed instruction from the Radiation Specialist in numerous radiation safety subjects over a period of two months.
The new laboratory technicians received indoctrination training in radiation and industrial safety.
The training of all new employees included the instructions required by 10 CFR 19.12..
~
5.
Audits Reports of weekly safety inspections by the Nuclear Licensing, Safety, and Accountability Supervisor, and monthly criticality inspections by the Quality Assurance Manager were examined. Findings made during these inspections require the attention and correction'by responsible supervision. Recent inspections noted several instances of storage of radioactive materials not in accordance with internal storage procedures. The licensee said these problems were being resolved.
None involved a violation of criticality safety rules.
Company representatives from Windsor conducted a semiannual audit June 11-12, 1981. The posting of new criticality signs limiting the stacking of pellets in the pellet plant and the use of larger signs in the item plant were recommended.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Facility Changes and Criticality Safety A license amendment request was submitted to the hTC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards in June 1981 to permit the storage of uranium oxide powder in containers on a new ccnveyor to be installed between the oxide plant and a storage aree in the item plant. The design was sent to Windsor for a KENO cr.ticality analysis before submittal of the amendment request.
Minor changes are reviewed by the Nuclear Licensing, Safety and Accountability Supervisor and the criticality specialist before implementation. The inspector examined the following recently approved changes:
059 - Installation of a blower on the UO dryer scrubber in the 4
wet recovery area 060 - Establishment of an exclusion area for a vessel to be used in washing plates from the acid insoluble filter press 061 - Addition of 42 safe storage spaces in item plant 062 - Definition of a safe floor storage area for pellets in trays 063 - Addition of 128 storage spaces in item plant 064 - Storage space for filter media designated for uranium recovery furnaces.
The inspector observed that new criticality signs, similar to the engraved plastic signs used in other operating areas had not been posted in the pellet plant where older, less legible paper signs were still in place. This matter was discussed at the exit interview.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Radiation Protection a.
External Exposure Control Film badges are changed monthly. Records for January through July 1981, indicated that only a few individuals have received measurable total body or skin dose.
TLD finger rings were temporarily assigned to employees working at the pellet presses. The maximum dose to any individual was 140 mrems in 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />.
b.
In Vivo Counting In vivo counting of production and maintenance workers is coa-ducted twice a year by a mobile counting service. Counts above 130 ug of uranium-235 are cause for work restriction.
In April 1981, all counts were less than 130 ug.
The average was 42 ug and the highest count was 118 ug, excluding one individual who is permanently restricted from work in areas with exposure potential. The uncertainties of the counts range from 30 to 50 ug at the 95 percent confidence level.
c.
Urinalyses Production and maintenance employees submit monthly samples for analysis by a contractor laboratory. Other plant employees submit semiannual samples. A fluorometric technique is used which has a detection limit of 5 ug/l of uranium. The action point is 50 ug/l at which the licensee would take a confirma-tory sample and conduct an investigation to determine the cause of the high concentration.
Examination of 1981 urinalysis data through August disclosed no concentrations that approached the action point. Fifty-four percent of all concentrations were less than the detectable limit.
Of those above 5 ug/1, the highest noted was 16 ug/1.
The action point of 50 ug/l was discussed with licensee repre-sentatives during the inspection and at the exit interview.
If there were a confirmed urinalysis at 50 ug/1, and no cause could be identified, then it would be necessary to assume an accidental exposure to soluble uranium had occurred about 30 days before the elevated sample was submitted. A calculation of exposure using these conservative assumptions wculd excced 40 MPC-hours, the NRC limit for internal exposure to soluble uranium in a seven-day week. The licensee representatives pointed out that their air sampling program is the principal basis for determining individual exposures, that the urinalyses served as a check that air sampling is adequate, that no urin-alysis had approached the action point, and that the possibility. - - -
of an undetected accidental exposure to soluble uranium'was remote.
However, they agreed to investigate the basis for the 50 ug/l action point, which has been used for many years, and to consider
.using a lower action point or other' conservative change if appro-priate. This matter will be reviewed further during a future.
inspection.
d.
Air Sampling About 30 stationary air samplers are positioned at work locations in the oxide plant, pellet plant, and recyle-recovery _ areas. The air is sampled continuously, and samples are analyzed daily when operations are in progress. The samplers serve te detect equip-ment leaks and r' normal conditions.
The licensee relies principally on breathing zone'(lapel) samplers
.to determine individual exposures to airborne activity. Each employee assigned to one of the three operating areas wears a lapel sampler 40 percent of the time, for two shifts in a normal five-day work week. Daily exposures are calculated for each employee, and weekly and quarterly totals are maintained. The exposure of an employee.for a day in which he does not wear a sampler is considered to be the daily average for the previous ten workdays.
The licensee controls individual weekly exposures below 40 MPC-hours. The average weekly exposure per employee during the.first half of 1981 was 6.7 MPC-hours.
Individual weekly exposures exceeded 30 MPC-hours on three occasions in 1981-through September. The exposure calculations'are based on an MPC of IE-10 uCi/ml, the maximum permissible concentration for insoluble uranium. The airborne radioactivity to which employees are most likely to be exposed is uranium dioxide, generally considered insoluble.
No violations associated with radiation protection were identified.
8.
Radioactive Waste Management a.
Airborne Effluents The inspector examined radioactive effluent data generated since the inspection in January 1981 (Inspection Report 70-036/81-01).
All stacks are continuously sampled when operations associated with the stacks are in progress. The samples are counted weekly.
Volume discharge rates are determined annually by.the' pitot tube traverse method or a centerline velocity method. The sampling and volume data are combined to determine the total release of radioactivity from the plant.
Data indicate that the concentrations released from each of the individual stacks are less than the regulatory limits for release to an unrestricted area. The combined concentration - -
released from all stacks during the first sia months of 1981 was 1.4E-13 uCi/ml of low enriched uranium, a small fraction of MPC.
The licensee has experienced difficulty in sampling the dry.
scrubber stack for uranium. The sample line and rotameter frequently became plugged with limestone dust. Efforts to correct the condition have not resulted in any significant improvement. The effluent from this particular stack is a small fraction of the total uranium released from the stacks.
It was agreed that future sampling on a less than continuous basis would be acceptable.
b.
Liquid Effluents Uranium in waste water from the plant laundry it the only liquid radioactive waste intentionally released to tLe environment. The water is sampled from a collection tank, analyzed, then discharged through the plant storm sewer to the site pond. Uranium losses for 1981 have averaged about 12 grams per month through September 1981.
Concentrations are less than the MPC for release to an un-restricted area before the water enters the storm sewer, where concentrations are further reduced by dilution.
c.
Solid Wastes One shipment of low-level waste to a licensed waste burial site occurred in March 1981. The shipment consisted of 62 drums of filtrates and spent potassium hydroxide solution solidified in cement, plus noncombustible trash and scrap metal. There were about 9000 grams of low enriched uranium in the waste. An examination of shipping papers and survey records indicated that NRC and DOT transpor' ation requirements were met.
9.
Emergency Planning Drills are normally conducted twice a year. An unannounced evacuation drill was last conducted in January 1981, initiated by activation of the cr;iicality alarms. The record of the drill indicated that the evacuation was accomplished with no significant problems.
The licensee obtained approval from NRC's Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards for a change in the deadline for sub aittal of their Radiological Contingency Plan from August 1981 to January 31, 1981.
The licensee expects to submit the plan along with their application for renewal of license SNM-33.
10.
Environmental Monitoring The licensee's environmental monitoring program continues.
Air, water, and vegetation are routinely sampled for analysis at a number of locations in the vicinity of the plant. Examination of data for 1981 disclosed all samples to be well within applicable regulatory limits..
il Exit Interview 1The inspector met withLlicensee representatives identified in Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector described the scope of the -inspection and. informed the representatives: that no violations had been identified. ~The representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments concerning the following subjects:
The need for new criticality. limit signs in the pellet plant.
(Section 6).
- The action point of 50 ug/l for urinalysis results (Section 7).'
The difficulty in obtaining a continuous. uranium sample from the scrubber stack.(Section 8).
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